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Profile: Christopher Hill (Brown University)
  1. Christopher S. Hill, Comments on Timothy Schroeder's Three Faces of Desire.
    Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02912.
     
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  2. Christopher S. Hill, The Paradox of Pain.
    It is generally possible to distinguish between the appearance of an empirical phenomenon and the corresponding reality. Moreover, generally speaking, the appearance of an empirical phenomenon is ontologically and nomologically independent of the corresponding reality: it is possible for the phenomenon to exist without its appearing to anyone that it exists, and it is possible for it to appear to exist without its actually existing. It is remarkable, therefore, that our thought and talk about bodily sensations presupposes that the appearance (...)
     
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  3. Christopher S. Hill, Visual Awareness and Visual Qualia.
    Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915.
     
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  4. Christopher S. Hill (forthcoming). Causal Necessitation, Moral Responsibility, and Frankfurt-Nozick Counterexamples. Behaviorism.
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  5. Christopher S. Hill (2014). Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. Oup Oxford.
    This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge.
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  6. Christopher S. Hill (2014). Tim Bayne on the Unity of Consciousness. Analysis 74 (3):499-509.
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  7. Christopher S. Hill (2013). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 122 (3):511-518.
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  8. Christopher S. Hill (2013). Revision. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oup Oxford. 134.
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  9. Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
    Th e type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, fi nding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics, and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. Th is volume (...)
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  10. Christopher S. Hill (2012). Précis of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):483-487.
    Précis of Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9813-3 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  11. Christopher S. Hill (2012). Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):503-511.
    Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  12. Christopher S. Hill (2011). Can Carey Answer Quine? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):132-133.
    In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument.
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  13. Christopher S. Hill (2011). Quine. Philosophical Review 120 (1):117-124.
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  14. Christopher S. Hill (2010). Intentionality Downsized. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):144-169.
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  15. Christopher S. Hill (2010). I Love Machery's Book, but Love Concepts More. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (3):411 - 421.
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  16. Christopher S. Hill (2009). Anti‐Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Philosophical Books 50 (2):112-123.
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  17. Christopher S. Hill (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    This book provides a comprehensive and novel theory of consciousness. In clear and non-technical language, Christopher Hill provides interrelated accounts of six main forms of consciousness - agent consciousness, propositional consciousness (consciousness that), introspective consciousness, relational consciousness (consciousness of), experiential consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness. He develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, showing in detail how it can be used to undercut dualistic accounts of mental states. In addition he offers original and stimulating discussions of a range of (...)
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  18. Christopher S. Hill (2008). Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
  19. Christopher S. Hill & David J. Bennett (2008). The Perception of Size and Shape. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):294-315.
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  20. Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter (2007). Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.
    In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that (...)
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  21. Christopher S. Hill (2006). Harman on Self Referential Thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):346-357.
    I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, (...)
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  22. Christopher S. Hill (2006). Perceptual Consciousness: How It Opens Directly Onto the World, Preferring the World to Itself. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 249--272.
     
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  23. Christopher S. Hill (2006). Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):174–181.
    Thought and World has three main concerns.1 First, it presents and defends a deflationary theory of propositional truth—that is, a deflationary theory of the concept of truth that figures in claims like the proposition that snow is white is true. I have long admired the deflationary theory of truth that Paul Horwich developed in the eighties, but I have also had substantial misgivings about that theory.2 In writing TW I was concerned to formulate an alternative view that enjoys the virtues (...)
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  24. Christopher S. Hill (2006). Replies to Marian David , Anil Gupta, and Keith Simmons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):205–222.
    I thank the commentators for their extremely rich and stimulating discussions of Thought and World.1 Their commentaries show that a number of TW’s claims are in need of clarification and defense, and that some of its arguments contain substantial lacunae. I am very pleased to have these flaws called to my attention, and to have an opportunity to try to correct them. Also, I am grateful for the commentators’ endorsements. As is perhaps inevitable in a symposium of this kind, the (...)
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  25. Christopher S. Hill (2005). Ow! The Paradox of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
     
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  26. Christopher S. Hill (2005). Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):147–147.
    Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
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  27. Christopher S. Hill (2004). Ouch! An Essay on Pain. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
     
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  28. Christopher S. Hill (2002). Review: Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (444):882-888.
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  29. Christopher S. Hill (2002). Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. Cambridge University Press.
    There is an important family of semantic notions that are applied to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts--as when one says that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Christopher Hill presents a theory of the content of such notions. That theory is largely deflationary in spirit. It represents a broad range of semantic notions free from substantive metaphysical and empirical presuppositions. He also explains the relationship of mirroring or semantic correspondence linking thoughts to reality.
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  30. Christopher S. Hill (2001). The Mysterious Flame. Philosophical Review 110 (2):300-303.
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  31. Christopher S. Hill (2001). The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Reconciling Deflationary Semantics with Correspondence Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):291 - 321.
    This paper has three main concerns. First, it proposes a deflationary theory of the concept of truth, arguing thatthe concept can be explicitly defined in terms of substitutionalquantification. Second, it attempts to describe and explainthe intuitions that have traditionally been thought tofavor correspondence theories of truth over deflationarytheories. And third, it argues that these intuitions areultimately compatible with deflationism, maintaining,among other things, that the relation of semantic correspondence can itself be characterized in terms ofsubstitutional quantification.
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  32. Christopher S. Hill (1999). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):273-276.
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  33. Christopher S. Hill (1999). Truth in the Realm of Thoughts. Philosophical Studies 96 (1):87-121.
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  34. Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. Mclaughlin (1999). There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
  35. Christopher S. Hill (1998). Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge. Analysis 58 (1):20-26.
  36. Christopher S. Hill (1998). Peacocke on Semantic Values. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):97 – 104.
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  37. Christopher S. Hill (1998). Supervenience and Materialism. Philosophical Review 107 (1):115-117.
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  38. Christopher S. Hill (1997). Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.
  39. Christopher S. Hill (1997). Lynne Rudder Baker, Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Noûs 31 (1):132–142.
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  40. Christopher S. Hill (1996). Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):567-581.
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  41. Christopher S. Hill (1996). Raw Feelings: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Philosophical Books 37 (2):127-130.
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  42. Christopher S. Hill (1994). Two Cheers for Process Reliabilism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):12-28.
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  43. Christopher S. Hill (1993). Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50.
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  44. Christopher S. Hill (1992). Van Inwagen on the Consequence Argument. Analysis 52 (2):49-55.
  45. Christopher S. Hill (1991). Introspection and the Skeptic. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
  46. Christopher S. Hill (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and (...)
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  47. Christopher S. Hill (1991). The Failings of Functionalism. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
  48. Christopher S. Hill (1991). Unity of Consciousness, Other Minds, and Phenomenal Space. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  49. Christopher S. Hill (ed.) (1989). Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press.
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  50. Christopher S. Hill (1988). Introspective Awareness of Sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
    My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs.
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