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Profile: Christopher Hill (Brown University)
  1. Christopher S. Hill (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories , and explores a number of important issues: (...)
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  2. Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. Mclaughlin (1999). There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
  3. Christopher S. Hill (1997). Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.
  4. Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter (2007). Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.
    In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that (...)
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  5.  17
    Nina Emery & Christopher S. Hill (forthcoming). Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory Reasoning. Analysis:anw068.
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  6.  12
    Christopher S. Hill (2014). Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge.
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  7.  11
    Christopher S. Hill (2002). Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. Cambridge University Press.
    There is an important family of semantic notions that are applied to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts--as when one says that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Christopher Hill presents a theory of the content of such notions. That theory is largely deflationary in spirit. It represents a broad range of semantic notions free from substantive metaphysical and empirical presuppositions. He also explains the relationship of mirroring or semantic correspondence linking thoughts to reality.
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  8. Christopher S. Hill (1996). Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):567-581.
  9.  54
    Christopher S. Hill (2014). Tim Bayne on the Unity of Consciousness. Analysis 74 (3):499-509.
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  10.  22
    Christopher S. Hill (2016). Deflationism: The Best Thing Since Pizza and Quite Possibly Better. Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3169-3180.
    I defend the deflationary theory of truth and reference I have proposed from the objections raised in Vann McGee’s “Thought, Thoughts, and Deflationism,” trying where possible to use arguments that other deflationists might find useful.
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  11. Christopher S. Hill (1998). Chalmers on the Apriority of Modal Knowledge. Analysis 58 (1):20-26.
  12. Christopher S. Hill (1977). Of Bats, Brains, and Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (September):100-106.
  13.  44
    Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
    The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics, and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading (...)
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  14.  72
    Christopher S. Hill & David J. Bennett (2008). The Perception of Size and Shape. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):294-315.
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  15.  84
    Christopher S. Hill (2010). Intentionality Downsized. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):144-169.
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  16. Christopher S. Hill (1992). Van Inwagen on the Consequence Argument. Analysis 52 (2):49-55.
  17.  15
    Christopher S. Hill (2016). Précis of Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):827-829.
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  18.  74
    Christopher S. Hill (1984). In Defense of Type Materialism. Synthese 59 (June):295-320.
  19. Christopher S. Hill (1988). Introspective Awareness of Sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
    My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs.
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  20.  38
    Lewis G. Creary & Christopher S. Hill (1975). Book Review:Counterfactuals David Lewis. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-.
  21.  80
    Christopher S. Hill (2002). Review: Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (444):882-888.
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  22.  78
    Christopher S. Hill (2012). Précis of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):483-487.
    Précis of Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9813-3 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  23.  72
    Christopher S. Hill (2012). Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):503-511.
    Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  24.  82
    Christopher S. Hill (1981). Why Cartesian Intuitions Are Compatible with the Identity Thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):254-65.
  25.  13
    Christopher S. Hill (1999). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):273-276.
  26.  8
    Christopher S. Hill (2016). Replies to Byrne, McGrath, and McLaughlin. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):861-872.
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  27. Christopher S. Hill (2005). Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
     
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  28.  38
    Christopher S. Hill (2013). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 122 (3):511-518.
  29.  85
    Christopher S. Hill (2006). Harman on Self Referential Thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):346-357.
    I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, (...)
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  30.  53
    Christopher S. Hill (1972). Gavagai. Analysis 32 (3):68 - 75.
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  31.  28
    Ian F. Carlstrom & Christopher S. Hill (1978). Book Review:The Logic of Conditionals Ernest W. Adams. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-.
  32.  27
    Christopher S. Hill (2001). The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Reconciling Deflationary Semantics with Correspondence Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):291 - 321.
    This paper has three main concerns. First, it proposes a deflationary theory of the concept of truth, arguing thatthe concept can be explicitly defined in terms of substitutionalquantification. Second, it attempts to describe and explainthe intuitions that have traditionally been thought tofavor correspondence theories of truth over deflationarytheories. And third, it argues that these intuitions areultimately compatible with deflationism, maintaining,among other things, that the relation of semantic correspondence can itself be characterized in terms ofsubstitutional quantification.
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  33.  12
    Christopher S. Hill (2005). Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):147–147.
    Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
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  34.  4
    Christopher S. Hill (1994). Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):155-167.
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  35. Christopher S. Hill (2005). Ow! The Paradox of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
     
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  36.  53
    Christopher S. Hill (2010). I Love Machery's Book, but Love Concepts More. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (3):411 - 421.
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  37.  23
    Christopher S. Hill (1999). Truth in the Realm of Thoughts. Philosophical Studies 96 (1):87-121.
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  38. Christopher S. Hill, Visual Awareness and Visual Qualia.
    Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915.
     
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  39.  5
    Christopher S. Hill (1993). Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50.
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  40.  33
    Christopher S. Hill (1984). Watsonian Freedom and the Freedom of the Will. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (September):294-98.
  41. Christopher S. Hill (2004). Ouch! An Essay on Pain. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins
     
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  42.  17
    Christopher S. Hill (2011). Quine. Philosophical Review 120 (1):117-124.
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  43.  35
    Christopher S. Hill (2008). Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
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  44. Christopher S. Hill (2005). Ow! The Paradox of Pain. In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
     
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  45.  35
    Christopher S. Hill (2006). Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):174–181.
    Thought and World has three main concerns.1 First, it presents and defends a deflationary theory of propositional truth—that is, a deflationary theory of the concept of truth that figures in claims like the proposition that snow is white is true. I have long admired the deflationary theory of truth that Paul Horwich developed in the eighties, but I have also had substantial misgivings about that theory.2 In writing TW I was concerned to formulate an alternative view that enjoys the virtues (...)
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  46.  8
    Christopher S. Hill (2015). The Peripheral Mind, by István Aranyosi. Mind 124 (493):312-317.
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  47.  19
    Christopher S. Hill (1985). On Getting to Know Others. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):257-266.
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  48.  13
    Christopher S. Hill (2011). Can Carey Answer Quine? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):132-133.
    In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument.
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  49.  11
    Christopher S. Hill (2013). Revision. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. OUP Oxford 134.
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  50.  19
    Christopher S. Hill (2001). The Mysterious Flame. Philosophical Review 110 (2):300-303.
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