Works by Christopher Stephens ( view other items matching `Christopher Stephens`, view all matches )

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Profile: Christopher Stephens (University of British Columbia)
  1. Christopher Stephens (2010). Forces and Causes in Evolutionary Theory. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):716-727.
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  2. Mohan Matthen & Christopher Stephens (eds.) (2007). Philosophy of Biology. Elsevier.
    This collection of 25 essays by leading researchers provides an overview of the state of the field.
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  3. Christopher Stephens (2005). What Can Evolutionary Theory Teach Us About Human Nature? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (1):221-232.
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  4. Christopher Stephens (2004). Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):550-570.
    Recently, several philosophers have challenged the view that evolutionary theory is usefully understood by way of an analogy with Newtonian mechanics. Instead, they argue that evolutionary theory is merely a statistical theory. According to this alternate approach, natural selection and random genetic drift are not even causes, much less forces. I argue that, properly understood, the Newtonian analogy is unproblematic and illuminating. I defend the view that selection and drift are causes in part by attending to a pair of important (...)
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  5. Christopher Stephens & Mohan Matthen (eds.) (2004). Elsevier Handbook in Philosophy of Biology. Elsevier.
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  6. Christopher L. Stephens (2001). When is It Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe Than Sorry Argument. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.
    Several philosophers have argued that natural selection will favor reliable belief formation; others have been more skeptical. These traditional approaches to the evolution of rationality have been either too sketchy or else have assumed that phenotypic plasticity can be equated with having a mind. Here I develop a new model to explore the functional utility of belief and desire formation mechanisms, and defend the claim that natural selection favors reliable inference methods in a broad, but not universal, range of circumstances.
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  7. Branden Fitelson, Christopher Stephens & Elliott Sober (1999). How Not to Detect Design:The Design Inference William A. Dembski. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472-.
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  8. Branden Fitelson, Christopher Stephens & Elliott Sober (1999). Review: How Not to Detect Design. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472 - 488.
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  9. Christopher Stephens (1996). Modelling Reciprocal Altruism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):533-551.
    Biologists rely extensively on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game to model reciprocal altruism. After examining the informal conditions necessary for reciprocal altruism, I argue that formal games besides the standard iterated Prisoner's Dilemma meet these conditions. One alternate representation, the modified Prisoner's Dilemma game, removes a standard but unnecessary condition; the other game is what I call a Cook's Dilemma. We should explore these new models of reciprocal altruism because they predict different stability characteristics for various strategies; for instance, I (...)
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