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Profile: Chuck Stieg (University of Minnesota)
  1. Chuck Stieg (2009). Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? Cogprints 51 (4):152-61.
    Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of (...)
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  2. Chuck Stieg, Putting the Philosophy of Science Into Mind: Knowing Minds by Models.
    The philosophy of science can provide fruitful contributions to other areas of philosophy. In this paper, I argue that the application of work on the nature of theories helps to resolve a long-standing dispute on the philosophy of mind over mindreading. The Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory are two competing accounts of how it is that we explain and predict the actions and mental states of others. I discuss each view as well as some of their weaknesses. I suggest (...)
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  3. Chuck Stieg (2008). The Intentionality of Plover Cognitive States. Cogprints 8 (August):6.
    This paper attempts to clarify and justify the attribution of mental states to animals by focusing on two different conceptions of intentionality: instrumentalist and realist. I use each of these general views to interpret and discuss the behavior and cognitive states of piping plovers in order to provide a substantive way to frame the question of animal minds. I argue that attributing mental states to plovers is warranted for instrumentalists insofar as it is warranted for similar human behavior. For realists (...)
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  4. Chuck Stieg (2007). Bird Brains and Aggro Apes: Questioning the Use of Animals in the Affect Program Theory of Emotion. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):895-905.
    It is a common assumption amongst theorists that the phenomenon of animal emotion supports the affect program theory of emotion. I argue that this assumption is mistaken by exploring two cases of animal emotion from studies in ethology: aggression in chimpanzees and fear in piping plovers. While the affect program theory fails to account for the cognitive complexity involved in each case, I do not argue for a cognitive theory of emotion. Instead, I suggest that paying attention to animal emotions (...)
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  5. Chuck Stieg, Mental Representations: The New Sense-Data?
    The notion of representation has become ubiquitous throughout cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and the cognitive sciences generally. This paper addresses the status of mental representations as entities that have been posited to explain cognition. I do so by examining similarities between mental representations and sense-data in both their characteristics and key arguments offered for each. I hope to show that more caution in the adoption and use of representations in explaining cognition is warranted. Moreover, by paying attention to problematic notions (...)
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