Search results for 'Circularity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Noah Lemos (2009). Sosa on Epistemic Circularity and Reflective Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):187-194.score: 24.0
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.
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  2. David J. Alexander (2011). In Defense of Epistemic Circularity. Acta Analytica 26 (3):223-241.score: 24.0
    In this paper I defend epistemic circularity by arguing that the “No Self-Support” principle (NSS) is false. This principle, ultimately due to Fumerton ( 1995 ), states that one cannot acquire a justified belief in the reliability of a source of belief by trusting that very source. I argue that NSS has the skeptical consequence that the trustworthiness of all of our sources ultimately depends upon the trustworthiness of certain fundamental sources – sources that we cannot justifiably believe to (...)
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  3. Andrew Rotondo (2013). Undermining, Circularity, and Disagreement. Synthese 190 (3):563-584.score: 24.0
    Sometimes we get what seem to be good reasons for believing that we’ve misevaluated our evidence for a proposition P. In those cases, can we use our evidence for P itself to show that we haven’t misevaluated our evidence for P? I show why doing so appears to employ viciously circular reasoning. However, I then argue that this appearance is illusory in certain cases and that we sometimes can legitimately reason in that way. This claim sheds new light on the (...)
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  4. Jesper Kallestrup (2012). Bootstrap and Rollback: Generalizing Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 189 (2):395-413.score: 24.0
    Reliabilists accept the possibility of basic knowledge—knowledge that p in virtue of the reliability of some belief-producing process r without antecedent knowledge that r is reliable. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002 , Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005 ) and Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000 , J Philos 105:518–539, 2008 ) have argued that one can bootstrap knowledge that r is reliable from basic knowledge. This paper provides a diagnosis of epistemic bootstrapping, and then shows that recent attempts at embracing (...)
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  5. David James Barnett (2014). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.score: 24.0
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version (...)
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  6. Tomasz Bigaj (2010). Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.score: 24.0
    Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that two distinct dispositional properties (...)
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  7. Dale Jacquette (2010). Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326.score: 24.0
    Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to particular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata themselves involve general truth functions, and in particular (...)
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  8. Eduardo Alejandro Barrio (2012). The Yablo Paradox and Circularity. Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):7-20.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I start by describing and examining the main results about the option of formalizing the Yablo Paradox in arithmetic. As it is known, although it is natural to assume that there is a right representation of that paradox in first order arithmetic, there are some technical results that give rise to doubts about this possibility. Then, I present some arguments that have challenged that Yablo’s construction is non-circular. Just like that, Priest (1997) has argued that such formalization (...)
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  9. L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). Parfit, Circularity, and the Unity of Consciousness. Mind 96 (October):525-29.score: 24.0
    In his recent book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit propounds a version of the psychological criterion of personal identity.1 According to the variant he adopts, the numerical identity through time of persons consists in non-branching psychological continuity no matter how it is caused. One traditional objection to a view of this sort is that it is circular, since psychological continuity presupposes personal identity. Although Parfit frequently denies the importance of personal identity, he considers his own psychological account of identity important (...)
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  10. Patrick Bondy (2014). Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure. Episteme 11 (3):335-348.score: 24.0
    Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in (...)
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  11. Pascale Hugon (2009). Breaking the Circle. Dharmakīrti's Response to the Charge of Circularity Against the Apoha Theory and its Tibetan Adaptation. Journal of Indian Philosophy 37 (6):533-557.score: 24.0
    This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” ( apoha ), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in (...)
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  12. Greg Bamford (1993). Popper's Explications of Ad Hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):335-355.score: 24.0
    Karl Popper defines an ad hoc hypothesis as one that is introduced to immunize a theory from some (or all) refutation but which cannot be tested independently. He has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of certain other allegedly undesirable properties of hypotheses or of the explanations they would provide, but his account is confused and mistaken. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which need not (...)
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  13. Heather Battaly (2012). Sosa's Reflective Knowledge: How Damaging is Epistemic Circularity? Synthese 188 (2):289-308.score: 24.0
    The problem of epistemic circularity maintains that we cannot know that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable without vicious circularity. Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge (2009) offers a solution to this problem. Sosa argues that epistemic circularity is virtuous rather than vicious: it is not damaging. Contra Sosa, I contend that epistemic circularity is damaging. Section 1 provides an overview of Sosa's solution. Section 2 focuses on Sosa's reply to the Crystal ballgazer Objection. Section 2 also (...)
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  14. Byeong D. Lee (2014). Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity. Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.score: 24.0
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I (...)
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  15. Aidan Gray (2014). Name-Bearing, Reference, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):207-231.score: 24.0
    Proponents of the predicate view of names explain the reference of an occurrence of a name N by invoking the property of bearing N. They avoid the charge that this view involves a vicious circularity by claiming that bearing N is not itself to be understood in terms of the reference of actual or possible occurrences of N. I argue that this approach is fundamentally mistaken. The phenomenon of ‘reference transfer’ shows that an individual can come to bear a (...)
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  16. Baron Reed (2012). Knowledge, Doubt, and Circularity. Synthese 188 (2):273-287.score: 24.0
    Ernest Sosa's virtue perspectivism can be thought of as an attempt to capture as much as possible of the Cartesian project in epistemology while remaining within the framework of externalist fallibilism. I argue (a) that Descartes's project was motivated by a desire for intellectual stability and (b) that his project does not suffer from epistemic circularity. By contrast, Sosa's epistemology does entail epistemic circularity and, for this reason, proves unable to secure the sort of intellectual stability Descartes wanted. (...)
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  17. Victor Gijsbers & Leon de Bruin (2013). How Agency Can Solve Interventionism's Problem of Circularity. Synthese:1-17.score: 24.0
    Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is beset by a problem of circularity: the analysis of causes is in terms of interventions, and the analysis of interventions is in terms of causes. This is not in itself an argument against the correctness of the analysis. But by requiring us to have causal knowledge prior to making any judgements about causation, Woodward’s theory does make it mysterious how we can ever start acquiring causal knowledge. We present a solution to this problem (...)
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  18. Víctor M. Verdejo (2013). The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):7-25.score: 24.0
    The central Fodorian objections to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine those two challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which the challenges are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist version of IRS and argue that this version meets the Fodorian challenges head on. If sound, this line (...)
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  19. Jochen Briesen (2013). Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.score: 22.0
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problem or the easy-knowledge-problem). For some (...)
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  20. Marc Slors (2001). Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory. Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):186-214.score: 21.0
  21. Scott Campbell (2001). Neo-Lockeanism and Circularity. Philosophia 28 (1-4):477-489.score: 21.0
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  22. Bob Beddor (forthcoming). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 21.0
    This paper explores what happens if we construe evidentialism as a thesis about the metaphysical grounds of justification. According to grounding evidentialism, facts about what a subject is justified in believing are grounded in facts about that subject’s evidence. At first blush, grounding evidentialism appears to enjoy advantages over a more traditional construal of evidentialism as a piece of conceptual analysis. However, appearances are deceiving. I argue that grounding evidentialists are unable to provide a satisfactory story about what grounds the (...)
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  23. John Greco (2011). Epistemic Circularity: Vicious, Virtuous and Benign. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):105-112.score: 21.0
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  24. Katarzyna Budzynska (2013). Circularity in Ethotic Structures. Synthese 190 (15):3185-3207.score: 20.0
    The aim of this paper is to provide a model that allows the representation and analysis of circularity in ethotic structures, i.e. in communication structures related to the speaker’s character and in particular, his credibility. The paper studies three types of cycles: in self-referential sentences, embedded testimony and ethotic begging the question. It is shown that standard models allow the reconstruction of the circularities only if those circular utterances are interpreted as ethotic arguments. Their alternative, assertive interpretation requires enriching (...)
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  25. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.score: 18.0
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
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  26. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Counterfactuals, Causal Independence and Conceptual Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):299–308.score: 18.0
    David Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals remains the standard view. Yet counter-examples have emerged, which suggest a need to invoke causal independence, and thus threaten conceptual circularity. I will review some of these counter-examples (§§1–2), illustrate how causal independence proves useful (§3), and suggest that any resulting circularity is unproblematic (§4).
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  27. Claire Horisk (2008). Truth, Meaning, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269 - 300.score: 18.0
    It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of (...)
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  28. Jan Willem Wieland (2011). The Sceptic's Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):359-369.score: 18.0
    Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, Hume and Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers' practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.
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  29. Anthony Brueckner (2013). Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.score: 18.0
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  30. Helen Yetter-Chappell (2013). Circularity in the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):553-572.score: 18.0
    The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts purports to give physicalists a way of understanding phenomenal concepts that will allow them to (1) accept the zombie intuition, (2) accept that conceivability is generally a good guide to possibility, and yet (3) reject the conclusion that zombies are metaphysically possible. It does this by positing that whether phenomenal concepts refer to physical or nonphysical states depends on what the actual world is like. In this paper, I offer support for the Chalmers/Alter objection (...)
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  31. Jessica Brown (2004). Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):339–348.score: 18.0
    Bergmann argues that we should accept epistemically circular reasoning since, he claims, it is a consequence of the plausible assumption that some justification is noninferential (Bergmann, M. "Epistemic Circularity, Malignant and Benign", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming). I show that epistemically circular reasoning does not follow merely from the assumption that some justification is noninferential, but only from that view combined with the assumption of basic justification or knowledge. Thus, we have reason to endorse epistemically circular reasoning only to (...)
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  32. Ross P. Cameron (2007). Lewisian Realism: Methodology, Epistemology, and Circularity. Synthese 156 (1):143 - 159.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this (...) is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis. (shrink)
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  33. C. S. I. Jenkins (2011). Reflective Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):305-325.score: 18.0
    Abstract This paper examines the kind of epistemic circularity which, according to Ernest Sosa, is unavoidably entailed whenever one has what he calls ?reflective? knowledge (that is, knowledge that p such that the knower reflectively endorses the reliability of the epistemic sources by which she came to her belief that p). I begin by describing the relevant kind of circularity and its role in Sosa's epistemology, en route presenting and resisting Sosa's arguments that this kind of circularity (...)
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  34. Michiru Nagatsu (2010). Beyond Circularity and Normativity: Measurement and Progress in Behavioral Economics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):265-290.score: 18.0
    This article assesses two major conceptual arguments against theories of choice.The first argument concerns the circularity of belief-desire psychology, on which decision theory is based. The second argument concerns the normativity arising from the concept of rationality. Each argument is evaluated against experimental practice in economics and psychology, and it is concluded that both arguments fail to establish their skeptical conclusion that there can be no science of intentional human actions.
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  35. Maria Lasonen & Tomas Marvan (2004). Davidson's Triangulation: Content‐Endowing Causes and Circularity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (2):177 - 195.score: 18.0
    In this article we aim to reconstruct some aspects of Davidson's idea of triangulation, and against this reconstruction, ask whether the idea is viciously circular. We begin by looking at the claim that without a triangularn setting, there is no saying what the cause of a being's responses is. In the first section we discuss the notion of relevant similarity, and what difference the presence of a second non?linguistic being could make for the individuation of a common focus of attention. (...)
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  36. Tyler Cowen & Gregory Kavka (2003). The Public Goods Rationale for Government and the Circularity Problem. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (2):265-277.score: 18.0
    George Mason University, USA It has been suggested that the production of public goods through a government involves a circularity problem. Since government itself is a public good, how can we use government to produce other public goods? Several solutions to this supposed circularity are offered. Government is a unique kind of public good with some potentially self-generating and self-supporting features. The public goods theory of government remains intact, and this enterprise helps shed some light on the special (...)
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  37. I. L. Humberstone (1997). Two Types of Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):249-280.score: 18.0
    For the claim that the satisfaction of certain conditions is sufficient for the application of some concept to serve as part of the (`reductive') analysis of that concept, we require the conditions to be specified without employing that very concept. An account of the application conditions of a concept not meeting this requirement, we call analytically circular. For such a claim to be usable in determining the extension of the concept, however, such circularity may not matter, since if the (...)
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  38. Matthias Adam (2004). Why Worry About Theory-Dependence? Circularity, Minimal Empiricality and Reliability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):117 – 132.score: 18.0
    It is a widely shared view among philosophers of science that the theory-dependence (or theory-ladenness) of observations is worrying, because it can bias empirical tests in favour of the tested theories. These doubts are taken to be dispelled if an observation is influenced by a theory independent of the tested theory and thus circularity is avoided, while (partially) circular tests are taken to require special attention. Contrary to this consensus, it is argued that the epistemic value of theory-dependent tests (...)
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  39. Baron Reed (2006). Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism About Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186–197.score: 18.0
    Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, (...)
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  40. Dan López de Sa (2003). The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke Vs. Peacocke. Teorema 22:85-93.score: 18.0
    According to the view that Peacocke elaborates in A Study of Concepts (1992), a concept can be individuated by providing the conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to possess that concept. Hence possessions conditions for concepts should be specifiable in a way that respects a non-circularity constraint. In a more recent paper “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality” (1998a) Peacocke argues against his former view, in the light of the phenomenon of rationally accepting principles which do not follow from (...)
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  41. Paul Franceschi, On the Circularity in the Sorites Paradox.score: 18.0
    I begin by highlighting the importance of the step size in the induction step of the sorites paradox. A careful analysis reveals that the step size can be characterised as a proper instance of the concept very small . After having accurately described the structure of sorites-susceptible predicates, I argue that the structure of the induction step in the Sorites Paradox is inherently circular. This circularity emerges in the structure of Wang's paradox and also of the classical variations of (...)
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  42. Rosanna Keefe (2002). When Does Circularity Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):253–270.score: 18.0
    This paper asks whether a good philosophical account of something can ever be circular. It explores the kind of circumstances in which an account of F might involve F itself while still serving the functions of and meeting the requirements on a philosophical account. The paper discusses two criteria for acceptable circularity, based on ideas from Humberstone 1997. And it illustrates the surprisingly wide variety of kinds of accounts in which circularity need not be bad.
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  43. Avery Goldman (2010). Kant, Heidegger, and the Circularity of Transcendental Inquiry. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (1):107-120.score: 18.0
    While in Being and Time Heidegger criticizes Kant for presupposing the very objects that he then goes on to examine, in his 1935–1936 lecture course What Is a Thing? he argues that the differentiation of subject and object with which Kant begins enables him to point to the temporal nature of thought. In following Kant’s own description of his project, Heidegger deems the presupposition of the objects of experience not detrimental to the inquiry, but determinative of its circular method. In (...)
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  44. Anne Meylan (2011). Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of Cheap Credit. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):327-340.score: 18.0
    Abstract This article raises a worry concerning Ernest Sosa's way of solving the problem of epistemic circularity. Sosa's solution to the problem of epistemic circularity relies on the following claim of sufficiency: for S to deserve to be credited for his true belief, it is sufficient that his belief is, in a sense to be made clear, ?apt?. I argue that this solution undersells the notion of credit. I present three kinds of cases in which the attribution of (...)
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  45. Matthias Steup (2013). Is Epistemic Circularity Bad? Res Philosophica 90 (2):215-235.score: 18.0
    Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability ofone’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic (...) is vicious, it is impossible to produce a cogent argument for the reliability of anything. For example, if epistemic circularity were vicious, a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s car would not be possible. The seeming viciousness of epistemic circularity even threatens, I propose, the possibility of justification and knowledge. Much, therefore, hangs one the question of whether epistemic circularity is indeed bad. I argue that epistemic circularity, or bootstrapping, need not be bad. When we use a crystal ball—a source perspicuously guilty of unreliability—to confirm its own reliability, bootstrapping is foolish. When we attribute reliability to a witness solely because the witness says he is reliable, bootstrapping is dogmatic. Foolish and dogmatic bootstrapping are bad. However, when a witness provides a rich body of testimony, using that testimony to gauge the witness’s reliability need not be a vicious form of circularity. When done critically, I argue, such reasoning exemplifies a form of bootstrapping that is benign. (shrink)
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  46. David Shatz (1986). Circularity and Epistemic Principles: A Reply to James Keller. Synthese 68 (2):369 - 382.score: 18.0
    This paper is a reply to James Keller's criticisms of my Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Levels Gambit (Synthese 55, April 1983).Foundationalists have often claimed that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles in a mediate, empirical fashion, while escaping the charge of vicious circularity that is usually thought to afflict such methods of justification. In my original paper I attacked this foundationalist strategy; I argued that once mediate, empirical justification of epistemic principles is allowed, (...)
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  47. T. Shogenji (2000). Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):287-298.score: 18.0
    This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justification are not truly circular but are instances of ordinary Bayesian confirmation, and hence they can (...)
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  48. Marc Artiga (forthcoming). Teleosemantics, Info-Telsemantics and Circularity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-21.score: 18.0
    Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls ‘Infotel-semantics’), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off (...)
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  49. Juho Ritola (2008). Harmless Epistemic Circularity? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:227-233.score: 18.0
    Epistemic circularity is a problem of arguments purporting to establish the reliability of our different sources of belief‐acquisition. For example:(TRA)At t1, S formed the perceptual belief that p, and p.At t2, S formed the perceptual belief that q, and q.At t3, …Therefore, sense perception is reliable source of beliefs.The problem is that any arguer putting forth this argument is ompelled to rely on the thing to be proven in establishing the second conjuncts of each premise. But relying on the (...)
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  50. Dilip K. Basu (1994). Begging the Question, Circularity and Epistemic Propriety. Argumentation 8 (3):217-226.score: 18.0
    In this paper we shall try to understand what it is to beg the question, and since begging the question is generally believed to be linked with circularity, we shall also explore this relationship. Finally, we shall consider whether certain forms of valid argument can go through smoothly in anepistemio context without begging the question. We shall consider, especially, the claims of the disjunctive syllogism in this regard.
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