An introduction to a vast but uncompleted survey of world history, this article argues that the study of the changing relationships among cities, states and trust networks can help us understand key elements of the emergence of our modern world. Beginning in ancient Uruk in modern-day Iraq, roughly five thousand years ago, the essay defines each of its central categories: city, state and trust network. It poses four questions to be pursued throughout the rest of the study. What determines (...) the degree of segregation or integration of cities and states? What determines the relative dominance of cities and states? What determines the extent of separation or integration between cities or states, on one side, and trust networks on the other? What difference do these variable configurations make to the quality of ordinary people’s lives? (shrink)
Mutual feedback between human-made environments and facets of thought throughout history has yielded two myths: the Garden and the Citadel. Both myths correspond to Jung’s feminine and masculine collective subconscious, as well as to Nietzsche’s premise of Apollonian and Dionysian impulses in art. Nietzsche’s premise suggests, furthermore, that the feminine myth of the Garden is time-bound whereas the masculine myth of the Citadel, or the Ideal City, constitutes a spatial deportment. Throughout history the two myths have continually molded (...) the built environment and thought, but the myth of the Ideal City – from Plato to Descartes to modernity – came to dominate city-form and ensuing aspects of contemplation. This relationship seems to have shifted during the twentieth century. Intellectual dispositions have begun to be largely nurtured by an incongruous city-form emerging from the gap between the incessant promise for an automated, well-functioning city, on the one hand, and looming alienation, coupled with the factual, malfunctioning city, on the other hand. Urban decay, a persisting and time-bound urban event that is a byproduct of this configuration, suggests the ascent of the Garden myth in post-modern city-form. (shrink)
This book has two main and connected themes - the conception and articulation of time in the Greek world and the creation of history, especially in the context of the Greek city. Both how time is expressed and how the past is presented have often been seen as reflections of society. By looking at the construction of the past through the medium of local historiography, where we can view these issues in the relatively restricted world of individual city-states, (...) we can gain a clearer insight into how different versions of the past and different constructions of time were offered to the community for approval. In this way, the citizens were able to negotiate time past and indeed their own history, and thereby to express their values and aspirations. (shrink)
This paper is a presentation and an interpretation of Murray Rothbard’s views on the relation between the fiscal necessities brought by war and interventionism in Money and Banking as read from his book A History of Money and Banking in the United States.
The goal of this essay is to discuss the comparison of the two most destructive totalitarian states in the twentieth century and no doubt in the modern world—Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia—and to explore the role that genocide played in the history of each. There have been other totalitarian states, such as Maoist China and Khmer Rouge Cambodia, that would fit the general categories I want to deal with here. But this essay will focus on the comparison between the (...) Nazis and Soviets, because those are the histories I know best. Also, the very concept of totalitarianism, as we use…. (shrink)
Political activity and political thinking began in the cities and other states of ancient Greece, and terms such as tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy and politics itself are Greek words for concepts first discussed in Greece. Rhodes presents in translation a selection of texts illustrating the formal mechanisms and informal workings of the Greek states in all their variety. From the states described by Homer out of which the classical Greeks believed their states had developed, through the archaic period which saw (...) the rise and fall of tyrants and the gradual broadening of citizen bodies, to the classical period of the fifth and fourth centuries, Rhodes also looks beyond that to the Hellenistic and Roman periods in which the Greeks tried to preserve their way of life in a world of great powers. For this second edition the book has been thoroughly revised and three new chapters added. (shrink)
In his last major work, Charles Tilly presents a schematic history of the development of cities, states, and trust networks over the past five millennia. I reconfigure his “look across history” from a more assertively spatial perspective, pushing back the starting point of the geohistory of cities another 5,000 years to what is presented as the first of three “urban revolutions.” From this geohistorical viewpoint, cities and states do not emerge together de novo in Sumeria but the state (...) is seen as being generated from earlier urbanization processes or what can be described as the stimulus of urban agglomeration. The generative power of cities or urban spatial causality, rarely addressed in the social science literature, is being re-discovered today as a primary source of societal development, technological innovation, and cultural creativity. In my schematic geohistory, the stimulus of urban agglomeration is traced over 10,000 years from its early role in the development of full-scale agriculture and the remarkable artistic creativity emanating from Çatalhöyük, the largest of the earliest urban settlements; through the formation of politically charged city-states and city-based empires; to the city-generated Industrial Revolution and the origins of urban industrial capitalism; ending in a look at the contemporary reconfiguration of cities and states and the shift from metropolitan to regional urbanization. (shrink)
Industrial welfare history presents important challenges to developmental state theories in “late” industrialization. This article expands the debate by examining how nation-states create statutory welfare by addressing institutional variety beyond markets. It is simplistic to argue linear growth of national welfare or of states autonomously regulating markets to achieve risk-mitigation. I contend that welfare institutions emerge from the state’s essential conflict and collaboration with various alternate institutions in cities and regions. Using histories of Europe, India, and Karnataka, I propose (...) a place-based, work-based, and work-place based welfare typology evolving at differential rates. Although economic imperatives exist to expand local risk-pools, it is precisely the alternate institutional diversity that makes late industrial nation-states unable or unwilling to do so. This results in institutionally “thin,” top-down industrial welfare. Ultimately, theories that overly depend on histories of small nations, homogenous nations, or city-states, provide weak tests of the economics of industrial welfare. (shrink)
We have considered the evolution of the relations between cities and states as the product of changing relative power positions. For the towns, these mainly consisted of their population figure, their economic and financial prosperity, their communication facilities, their prerogatives in administrative, economic, fiscal, and judicial matters, and their military force. For the monarchies, the continuity and skills of the rulers mattered, while the dimensions, the cohesion and communication facilities of the territory, the available resources and the pressure of neighboring (...) competitors weighed heavily on their destiny. In a pattern of changing relations, coalitions between the weaker partners in the polity against the mightier were normal.In most parts of Europe, the urban development took place either spontaneously - outside the feudal power structure - or with the active support of princes. As long as princes and towns found a common rival in the feudal nobility, they were allies to each other's advantage. The more a region was urbanized, the more resources the princes could get from them by bargaining or pressure. Cities thus paid in a way protection costs against the dangerous grip of the nobility. Where no monarch could elevate himself above the rest of the landed aristocracy, as in late medieval Germany, the towns had to secure their trade routes by leagues and treaties with feudal lords. In the case of Northern Italy, the growth and power of the cities were so overwhelming, in the absence of any real overlord, that the nobility merged with the urban elite to dominate the countryside. In other regions, the major trading cities reached a point in their development where their power balanced that of the monarch. In the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, this was the case of Aragonese towns, Baltic harbors and Flemish and Brabantine cities.The fifteenth century was crucial for the expansion of monarchical power. While most towns stagnated economically, the monarchies could build up larger and more efficient state structures, partly by elimination of weaker competitors. “Modern” states claimed functions that had traditionally belonged to the local and territorial prerogatives of the major cities. The list of these prerogatives is astonishingly convergent, from Barcelona to Danzig. “Modern” states expanded their functions in jurisdiction, coinage, economic regulation, fiscality, diplomacy, the violence monopoly. Evidently, they encroached on long-established urban practices, many of them once granted in privileges by former rulers. “Modern” sovereigns, however strove toward full and direct powers and did not hesitate to use their military supremacy to eliminate all intermediary powers, keeping them off the resources.Wolfgang Reinhard recently proposed a theoretical model of the increase in state power. Combining existing theories, he noticed that their arguments operate at different levels of abstraction without excluding each other. So he left some space for the voluntary action of individuals while situating it within the larger frameworks of political and social systems. Processes on the micro-level (personal ambitions, group egoisms reinforcing state institutions), the meso-level (class antagonisms, tensions between rulers and ruled, interstate competition) and the macro-level (states versus economic and geographical systems) converge to strengthen states. Buckle, Deutsche Untertanen, 114–126. The studies in the present volume fully confirm this mighty vision, albeit from the perspective of cities alone; the three levels of interaction are nevertheless displayed clearly from this viewpoint. Urban centers did not succeed, however, in creating coherent, and stable power structures alternative to those of the monarchical states, unlessurban potential was extremely high (Northern Italy, the Netherlands) and thus the communications easy and the distances short, orthe feudal power was extremely weak (Italy, Switzerland, Holland). Overwhelmingly mighty cities like Venice, Milan, and Florence created new systems of domination by the capital's elites over the smaller cities and the countryside. This tendency was blocked in the Southern Netherlands during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by a dramatic expansion and effort of monarchical power, but it came fully to the fore in the Dutch Republic. In Switzerland, both patterns of domination remained absent and a communal federation survived. Wolfgang Reinhard, “Croissance de la puissance de l'Etat: un modèle théorique,” in André Stegmann, editor, Pouvoir et Institutions en Europe au XVIème siècle (Paris: Vrin, 1987), 173–186.My central argument is that the requirements and pressures of monarchical states suffocated the metropoles of the European economy. The competition within the state system pushed all political unities toward increasing military expenditure and further reaching bureaucratic control. Both violate the conditions favorable to the early commercial capitalism. It is striking that the core cities of the European economy were always fairly independent from monarchical pressure: at most they bargained, like Barcelona, Prague, Augsburg, Nurnberg, and Antwerp, but never could they fulfill their metropolitan function under the rigorous control of a centralized bureaucracy. Seville, where this seemed a real danger in the seventeenth century, managed to circumvent state regulation by massive fraud. The articles in this volume illustrate the reasons for this incompatibility.Metropoles and monarchs only could collaborate as long as the latter were not yet unchallenged rulers. As soon as they could think about centralized, bureaucratic, “national,” “modern” states, they had to eliminate the intermediary power structures within their territory. Major cities that had lived on export industries and long-distance trade had necessarily built up such structures in their regions and even beyond. Disturbing these, the monarchs touched the base of the urban prosperity, which they further suffocated by the fiscal overload warfare imposed.However, even the submission of a high urban potential area by a monarchical state, by conquest, internal war, or heritage, could not lead to the status of dependent towns as we observed in Central Europe after 1450. Accumulated capital, existing social and political structures, and the advance in intensity could not be annihilated by sheer physical violence. We can observe a close correlation between the development of autonomously active representative organizations and urban potential. On the local scale, the mobility in the town councils correlated strongly with the size and the socioeconomic differentiation of a city. In the major ones, artisans had a say in the large councils but the merchants and rentiers kept firm control and fiercely opposed popular revolts in other cities. On the supralocal scale, commercial centers necessarily developed loosely structured consultative organizations in order to regulate the material, judicial and diplomatical aspects of the trade. These intensive negotiations crossed state borders and included all kinds of partners ranging from their own or foreign monarchs to local producers. Dollinger, La Hanse, 166–168, 352–358; Schildhauer, Soziale, politische, 26–40; W. P. Blockmans, “A typology of representative institutions in late medieval Europe,” Journal of Medieval History, 4 (1978) 189–215; “Mobiliteit in stadsbesturen, 1400–1550,” in D. E. H. De Boer and J. W. Marsilje, editor, De Nederlanden in de late middeleeuwen (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1987), 236–260.The submission of formerly fairly autonomous cities could only be accomplished by granting substantial parts of the profits to local elites who thus were turned to rentiers. The rhythm of negotiations slowed down and they became more formalistic, but they did not disappear. During the fifteenth century, a tendency toward a higher exclusiveness can be noticed. More conservative elites obviously were prepared to give up the political autonomy of the city for a consolidation of their personal positions.Urbanization thus fundamentally influenced the shape of “national” states: by facilitating their emergence first, and by obstructing centralization in further stages. On the other hand, monarchies furthered the development of commercial capitalism as long as they were not able to impose their dynastical or imperial chimeras that - unlimited as they are - necessarily exhaust even the most flourishing economy. (shrink)
Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic marks the initial appearance of the multi-volume Handbook of the History of Logic. Additional volumes will be published when ready, rather than in strict chronological order. Soon to appear are The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege. Also in preparation are Logic From Russell to Gödel, The Emergence of Classical Logic, Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century, and The Many-Valued and Non-Monotonic Turn in Logic. Further volumes will follow, including Mediaeval (...) and Renaissance Logic and Logic: A History of its Central. In designing the Handbook of the History of Logic, the Editors have taken the view that the history of logic holds more than an antiquarian interest, and that a knowledge of logic's rich and sophisticated development is, in various respects, relevant to the research programmes of the present day. Ancient logic is no exception. The present volume attests to the distant origins of some of modern logic's most important features, such as can be found in the claim by the authors of the chapter on Aristotle's early logic that, from its infancy, the theory of the syllogism is an example of an intuitionistic, non-monotonic, relevantly paraconsistent logic. Similarly, in addition to its comparative earliness, what is striking about the best of the Megarian and Stoic traditions is their sophistication and originality. Logic is an indispensably important pivot of the Western intellectual tradition. But, as the chapters on Indian and Arabic logic make clear, logic's parentage extends more widely than any direct line from the Greek city states. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that for centuries logic has been an unfetteredly international enterprise, whose research programmes reach to every corner of the learned world. Like its companion volumes, Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic is the result of a design that gives to its distinguished authors as much space as would be needed to produce highly authoritative chapters, rich in detail and interpretative reach. The aim of the Editors is to have placed before the relevant intellectual communities a research tool of indispensable value. Together with the other volumes, Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, will be essential reading for everyone with a curiosity about logic's long development, especially researchers, graduate and senior undergraduate students in logic in all its forms, argumentation theory, AI and computer science, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, linguistics, forensics, philosophy and the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas. (shrink)
This paper forms part of a research project investigating conceptions of the relationship between micro-level selfseeking agent behaviour and the desirability or otherwise of the resulting macro-level social outcomes in the history of economics.
Most American historians of medicine today would be very hesitant about any claim that medical history humanises doctors, medical students or the larger health care enterprise. Yet, the idea that history can and ought to serve modern medicine as a humanising force has been a persistent refrain in American medicine. This essay explores the emergence of this idea from the end of the 19th century, precisely the moment when modern biomedicine became ascendant. At the same institutions where the (...) new version of scientific medicine was most energetically embraced, some professional leaders warned that the allegiance to science driving the profession's technical and cultural success was endangering humanistic values fundamental to professionalism and the art of medicine. They saw in history a means for rehumanising modern medicine and countering the risk of cultural crisis. While some iteration of this vision of history was remarkably durable, the meanings attached to ‘humanism’ were both multiple and changing, and the role envisioned for history in a humanistic intervention was transformed. Starting in the 1960s as part of a larger cultural critique of the putative ‘dehumanisation’ of the medical establishment, some advocates promoted medical history as a tool to help fashion a new kind of humanist physician and to confront social inequities in the health care system. What has persisted across time is the way that the idea of history as a humanising force has almost always functioned as a discourse of deficiency—a response to perceived shortcomings of biomedicine, medical institutions and medical professionalism. (shrink)
Many explanations have been offered for why the dominant city-states of Italy declined, giving way to the larger, national states of Western Europe. Some, like World Systems theorists, have seen the decline of the Italian city-states as the result of the shift of trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, while others, like Richard Lachmann, have focused on institutional arrangements that rendered these systems less resilient when faced by external threats. This article focuses on the relations of local (...) institutions with the interests of capital, and on the role of contentious politics within the city-state that developed as a result of this interaction. Taking as my starting point the comparative historical analysis of statebuilding in the work of Charles Tilly, in Coercion, Capital and European States, the article places contentious politics as a bridge between the Tillian categories of capital-domination and statebuilding, using the case of Florence in the late 14th and early 15th centuries to etch the skeleton of that bridge. With Tilly, I argue that the class interests of the urban elites that were built directly into the mechanisms of city-state politics worked at cross-purposes to the collective requirements of statebuilding. Next, I argue that Tilly pays too little attention to the specificities of the Italian case and gives short shrift to its internal political processes. Finally, I argue that class domination working through institutional conflicts led to periodic outbursts of conflict and built a lack of trust into the structure of governance. I conclude by suggesting why the Italian city-states, at least, were inhibited from taking the nation-state route to the modern world until quite late in their histories. (shrink)
In this essay, I utilize the concept of the echo, as formulated in the historical and methodological work of Michel Foucault and Joan W. Scott, to help theorize the historical relationship between health feminism and AIDS activism. I trace the echoes between health feminism and AIDS activism in order to present a more complex history of both movements, and to try to think through the ways that the coming together of these two struggles in a particular place and time—New (...) York City in the 1980s—created particular practices that might be effective in other times and places. The practice that I focus on here is one that I call 'doing queer love'. As I hope to show, 'doing queer love' both describes a particular history of health activism and opens up the possibility of bringing into being a different future than the one a conventional history of AIDS seems to predict. It is an historical echo that I believe we must try to hear now, not just in order to challenge a particular history of AIDS activism in the United States, but also in order to provide a model that can be useful for addressing the continuing problem of AIDS across the globe. (shrink)