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Profile: Claudine Verheggen (York University)
  1. Claudine Verheggen (2011). Semantic Normativity and Naturalism. Logique Et Analyse 216:553-567.
     
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  2. Claudine Verheggen (2007). The Community View Revisited. Metaphilosophy 38 (5):612-631.
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  3. Claudine Verheggen (2007). Triangulating with Davidson. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):96-103.
    According to Davidson, 'triangulation' is necessary both to fix the meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objectivity, both of which are necessary for thinking and talking at all. Against these claims, it has been objected that neither meaning-determination nor possession of the concept of objectivity requires triangulation; nor does the ability to think and talk require possession of the concept of objectivity. But this overlooks the important connection between the tasks that triangulation is meant (...)
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  4. Claudine Verheggen (2006). How Social Must Language Be? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):203-219.
  5. Claudine Verheggen (2005). Stroud on Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Community. Dialogue 44 (1):67-85.
    According to Barry Stroud, Wittgenstein thought that language is social only in this minimal way: we cannot make sense of the idea of someone having a language unless we can describe her as using signs in conformity with the linguistic practices of some community. Since a solitary person could meet this condition, Stroud concludes that, for Wittgenstein, solitary languages are possible. I argue that Wittgenstein infact thought that language is social in a much more robust way. Solitary languages are not (...)
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  6. Claudine Verheggen (2003). Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning. Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):285–310.
  7. Claudine Verheggen (2000). The Meaningfulness of Meaning Questions. Synthese 123 (2):195-216.
    Contra an expanding number of deflationary commentators onWittgenstein, I argue that philosophical questions about meaningare meaningful and that Wittgenstein gave us ample reason tobelieve so. Deflationists are right in claiming that Wittgensteinrejected the sceptical problem about meaning allegedly to befound in his later writings and also right in stressing Wittgenstein''s anti-reductionism. But they are wrong in taking these dismissals to entail the end of all constructive philosophizing about meaning. Rather, I argue, the rejection of the sceptical problem requires that we (...)
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  8. Claudine Verheggen (1997). Davidson's Second Person. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):361-369.
    According to Donald Davidson, language is social in that only a person who has interacted linguistically with another could have a language. This paper is a discussion of Davidson’s argument in defence of that claim. I argue that he has not succeeded in establishing it, but that he has provided many of the materials out of which a successful argument could be built. Chief among these are the claims that some version of externalism about meaning is true, that possession of (...)
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  9. Claudine Verheggen (1995). Wittgenstein and 'Solitary' Languages. Philosophical Investigations 18 (4):329-347.