Online research in philosophy

The UN Cartagena Protocol onBiosafety adopted in Montreal, 29 January, 2000and opened for signature in Nairobi, 15–26 May,2000 will exert a profound effect oninternational trade in genetically modifiedorganisms (GMOs) and their products. In thispaper, the potential effects of variousarticles of the Protocol on international tradein GMOs are analyzed. Based on the presentstatus of imports of GMOs and domestic researchand development of biotechnology in China,likely trends in imports of foreign GM food andrelated products after China accedes to WTO isexplored. Also, China's (...) potentialcountermeasures to control and regulate importsof GMOs in line with implementation of theProtocol are discussed. China, in recent times,has increased its food and agricultural importssubstantially from USA and Canada. Chinaimported soybean 10.42 mill. tons in 2000 andabout 15 mill tons in 2001, of which majorityare from USA where GM soybean accounts for60%. The plantation of US Monsanto'stransgenic Bt cotton was increased to more than1 million ha in China in 2001. Though China haspaid great attention to develop biotechnology,it appears to have little scope to export GMOsand GM products. So China may consider a rangeof administrative measures to implement theCartagena Protocol and to regulate its importof GMOs and GM agricultural products.Consequently, the Regulation on Safety ofAgri-GMOs was issued on June, 2001 and followedthree detailed rules issued in Jan. of 2002,with a priority to limit foreign GMOs importingby safety certification and labeling system.These were outlined taking into accountpolicies adopted in Western countries such asgreen barriers to international trade. (shrink)

Recent literature on the relationship between knowledge and justice has tended to focus exclusively on the social and ethical dimensions of this relationship (e.g. social injustices related to knowledge and power, etc.). For the purposes of this article, I am interested in examining the virtue of justice and its effects on the cognitive faculties of its possessor (and, correspondingly, the effects of the vice of injustice). Drawing upon Thomas Aquinas’s account of the virtue of justice, I argue that in certain (...) cases justice can be a criterion of epistemic evaluation and that it deserves more attention than it has been given among virtue epistemologists. More precisely, the virtue of justice may become a criterion of epistemic evaluation in cases when a belief is formed on the basis of testimony. It would seem that there are cases when A’s assent to proposition p is something that is owed to B on the basis of B’s testimony; or there may be instances when A is culpable for declining to let B’s testimony have any effect on A’s belief. I briefly sketch four distinct scenarios in which this bears out. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to rescue Plantinga’s (...) theory from certain objections. The most promising of such attempts fall under the broad category of “virtue epistemology” or a “virtue-theoretic” approach. The work being done in virtue epistemology is still in its early stages and a consensus on what actually constitutes virtue epistemology has yet to be reached. While some have attempted to structure an entire theory of knowledge based on the virtues possessed by the knower, others have focused more on the role of epistemic virtues as an attempt to supplement existing theories, including Plantinga’s. In this paper, I will offer an analysis of what such an attempt might look like and evaluate the potential success of broadening Plantinga’s original model. -/- My proposal is that certain features of a virtue-theoretic approach (also referred to as “agent-reliabilism”) could improve Plantinga’s model in significant ways. Not only would such a broadened approach be better equipped to handle common objections, but it would also be better suited to contribute an enhanced understanding of the task of epistemology, one that seeks to discover multiple epistemic goods other than what has been traditionally confined to the realm of knowledge. I conclude by applying this approach to Plantinga’s treatment of theistic belief in Warranted Christian Belief and by articulating a few of the ways in which epistemic virtues can increase the degree of warrant enjoyed by such belief. (shrink)

Recent technical improvements, such as 3D microscopy imaging, have shown the necessity of studying 3D biological tissue architecture during carcinogenesis. In the present paper a computer simulation model is developed allowing the visualization of the microscopic biological tissue architecture during the development of metaplastic and dysplastic lesions.The static part of the model allows the simulation of the normal, metaplastic and dysplastic architecture of an external epithelium. This model is associated to a knowledge base which contains only data on the nasal (...) epithelium. The latter has been well studied by numerous authors and its lesional states are well known. An inference engine allows the initialization of the static model parameters. A statistical comparison between simulated epithelia and real epithelia is achieved by adjusting the parameter values during the simulation. (shrink)

Genes are thought to have evolved from long-lived and multiply-interactive molecules in the early stages of the origins of life. However, at that stage there were no replicators, and the distinction between interactors and replicators did not yet apply. Nevertheless, the process of evolution that proceeded from initial autocatalytic hypercycles to full organisms was a Darwinian process of selection of favourable variants. We distinguish therefore between Neo-Darwinian evolution and the related Weismannian and Central Dogma divisions, on the one hand, and (...) the more generic category of Darwinian evolution on the other. We argue that Hull’s and Dawkins’ replicator/interactor distinction of entities is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for Darwinian evolution to take place. We conceive the origin of genes as a separation between different types of molecules in a thermodynamic state space, and employ a notion of reproducers. (shrink)