Search results for 'Closure' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. E. J. Lowe (2000). Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism. Philosophy 75 (294):571-586.score: 24.0
    Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it (...)
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  2. Noël Carroll (2007). Narrative Closure. Philosophical Studies 135 (1):1 - 15.score: 24.0
    In this article, “Narrative Closure,” a theory of the nature of narrative closure is developed. Narrative closure is identified as the phenomenological feeling of finality that is generated when all the questions saliently posed by the narrative are answered. The article also includes a discussion of the intelligibility of attributing questions to narratives as well as a discussion of the mechanisms that achieve this. The article concludes by addressing certain recent criticisms of the view of narrative expounded (...)
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  3. Joshua Schechter (2013). Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.score: 24.0
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less (...)
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  4. Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. Philström (eds.), Science - A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang.score: 24.0
    Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.
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  5. Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann (forthcoming). Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood. Philosophical Quarterly.score: 24.0
    Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that (...)
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  6. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Closing in on Causal Closure. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.score: 24.0
    I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version of (...)
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  7. Christoph Jäger (2004). Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske's Theory of Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.score: 24.0
    According to Fred Dretskes externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretskes epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known logical entailment. I argue that, given Dretskes construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. This has far-reaching consequences. (...)
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  8. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2011). Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure. Synthese 183 (2):127-142.score: 24.0
    Knowledge closure is, roughly, the following claim: For every agent S and propositions P and Q, if S knows P, knows that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is so implied, then S knows Q. Almost every epistemologist believes that closure is true. Indeed, they often believe that it so obviously true that any theory implying its denial is thereby refuted. Some prominent epistemologists have nevertheless denied it, most famously Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick. There are (...)
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  9. Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2013). Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It? Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.score: 24.0
    The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty (...)
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  10. Sven Bernecker (2012). Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure. Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.score: 24.0
    It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
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  11. Susan L. Feagin (2007). On Noël Carroll on Narrative Closure. Philosophical Studies 135 (1):17 - 25.score: 24.0
    This paper examines various claims by Noël Carroll about narrative closure and its relationship to narrative connections, which are, roughly, causal connections generously conceived to include necessary conditions for sufficient conditions for an effect. I propose supplementing the expanded notion of a cause with Michael Bratman’s notion of a psychological connection to account for the particular role that human agents play in narratives. A novel and a film are used as examples to illustrate how the concept of a psychological (...)
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  12. Michael Hughes (2013). Problems for Contrastive Closure: Resolved and Regained. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590.score: 24.0
    The standard contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox is intended to provide a way to retain epistemic closure while avoiding the excessive modesty of radical skepticism and the immodesty of Moorean dogmatism. However, contextualism’s opponents charge that its solution suffers from epistemic immodesty comparable to Moorean dogmatism. According to the standard contextualist solution, all contexts where an agent knows some ordinary proposition to be true are contexts where she also knows that the skeptical hypotheses are false. It has been (...)
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  13. Patrick Allo (2013). The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.score: 24.0
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
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  14. Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-62.score: 24.0
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact (...)
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  15. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Reply to Coffman on Closure and Skepticism. Synthese 162 (2):167–171.score: 24.0
    E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.
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  16. C. B. Cross (2012). The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected. Mind 121 (482):457-466.score: 24.0
    This essay corrects an error in the presentation of the Paradox of the Knowledge-Plus Knower, which is the variant of Kaplan and Montague’s Knower Paradox presented in C. Cross 2001: ‘The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure,’ MIND, 110, pp. 319–33. The correction adds a universally quantified transitivity principle for derivability as an additional assumption leading to paradox. This correction does not affect the status of the Knowledge-Plus paradox as a rebuttal to an argument against epistemic closure, (...)
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  17. Charles B. Cross (2001). The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure. Mind 110 (438):319-333.score: 24.0
    In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.
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  18. Yuval Avnur (2012). Closure Reconsidered. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (9).score: 24.0
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of (...)
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  19. Peter Murphy (2006). A Strategy for Assessing Closure. Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.score: 24.0
    This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive (...)
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  20. John Bacon (1990). Van Cleve Versus Closure. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):239-242.score: 24.0
    In "Supervenience, Necessary Coextension, and Reducibility" (Philosophical Studies 49, 1986, 163-176), among other results, I showed that weak or ordinary supervenience is equivalent to Jaegwon Kim's strong supervenience, given certain assumptions: S4 modality, the usual modal conception of properties as class-concepts, and diagonal closure or resplicing of the set of base properties. This last means that any mapping of possible worlds into extensions of base properties counts itself as a base property. James Van Cleve attacks the modal conception of (...)
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  21. Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 24.0
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in (...)
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  22. Claudio Almeida (2012). Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility. Synthese 188 (2):197-215.score: 24.0
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But (...)
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  23. Cameron Boult (2013). Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination. Philosophia 41 (4):1125-1133.score: 24.0
    Anthony Brueckner has argued that claims about underdetermination of evidence are suppressed in closure-based scepticism (“The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 1994). He also argues that these claims about underdetermination themselves lead to a paradoxical sceptical argument—the underdetermination argument—which is more fundamental than the closure argument. If Brueckner is right, the status quo focus of some predominant anti-sceptical strategies may be misguided. In this paper I focus specifically on the relationship between these two (...)
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  24. Charles B. Cross (2004). More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure. Mind 113 (449):109-114.score: 24.0
    In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure”, MIND 110:319-33, 2001, I develop a version of the Knower Paradox which does not assume epistemic closure, and I use it to argue that the original Knower Paradox does not support an argument against epistemic closure. In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure?”, MIND 113:95-107, 2004, Gabriel Uzquiano, using his own result, argues that my rebuttal to the anti-closure argument is not successful. I respond (...)
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  25. Matthew Lockard (2014). Closure Provides No Relief From the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Erkenntnis 79 (2):461-469.score: 24.0
    Closure principles loom large in recent internalist critiques of epistemic externalism. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002, Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005), Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000), and Fumerton (Meta-Epistemology and skepticism. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1995) argue that, given closure, epistemic externalism is committed to the possibility of implausibly easy knowledge. By contrast, Zalabardo (Philos Rev 114:33–61, 2005) proposes that epistemic closure actually precludes the possibility of easy knowledge, and appeals to closure principles to solve (...)
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  26. Luciano Floridi (2014). Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection. Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050.score: 24.0
    In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look (...)
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  27. Dennis R. Cooley (2012). Epistemic Closure's Clash with Technology in New Markets. Journal of Business Ethics 108 (2):181-199.score: 24.0
    Many people, such as Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, Irving Fisher, and William Sharpe, assume that free markets full of rational people automatically lead to ethical actions and outcomes. After all, at its equilibrium point, a perfectly competitive free market maximizes utility, respects autonomy, and fulfills justice’s dictates. Unfortunately, in some technology markets, there are a significant number of people who have undergone epistemic closure. Epistemic closure entails that all reliable evidence that would challenge deeply held beliefs is dismissed (...)
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  28. Patrick John Leman & Marco Cinnirella (2013). Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories and the Need for Cognitive Closure. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 24.0
    An important component of conspiracy theories is how they influence, and are influenced by, the evaluation of potential evidence. Some individuals may be more open minded regarding certain explanations for events whereas others may seek closure and thus cut off a conspiracy explanation. Two studies examined the relationship between the need for cognitive closure (NFCC), levels of belief in real world conspiracy theories, and the attribution of conspiracy theories to explain events. A first, small (N=30) and preliminary study (...)
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  29. Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson (2013). Epistemic Closure and Commutative, Nonassociative Residuated Structures. Synthese 190 (1):113-128.score: 24.0
    K-axiom-based epistemic closure for explicit knowledge is rejected for even the most trivial cases of deductive inferential reasoning on account of the fact that the closure axiom does not extend beyond a raw consequence relation. The recognition that deductive inference concerns interaction as much as it concerns consequence allows for perspectives from logics of multi-agent information flow to be refocused onto mono-agent deductive reasoning. Instead of modeling the information flow between different agents in a communicative or announcement setting, (...)
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  30. Ju Wang (forthcoming). Closure and Underdetermination Again. Philosophia:1-12.score: 24.0
    In contemporary epistemology, sceptical arguments are motivated either by the closure principle or the underdetermination principle. Therefore, it is very important to figure out the structure of the sceptical argument before coming up with an anti-sceptic strategy. With a review of the debate on the relationship between the two principles from Anthony Brueckner to Kevin McCain, it is argued that while maintaining the weak closed justification (WCJ*), closure and underdetermination are not logically equivalent. As a result, two independent (...)
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  31. Patrick Van Kenhove, Iris Vermeir & Steven Verniers (2001). An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Ethical Beliefs, Ethical Ideology, Political Preference and Need for Closure. Journal of Business Ethics 32 (4):347-361.score: 24.0
    An analysis is presented of the relationships between consumers ethical beliefs, ethical ideology, Machiavellianism, political preference and the individual difference variable "need for closure". It is based on a representative survey of 286 Belgian respondents. Standard measurement tools of proven reliability and robustness are used to measure ethical beliefs (consumer ethics scale), ethical ideology (ethical positioning), Machiavellianism (Mach IV scale) and need for closure. The analysis finds the following. First, individuals with a high need for closure tend (...)
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  32. Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli (2012). Towards Closure on Closure. Synthese 188 (2):179-196.score: 24.0
    Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial (...)
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  33. Marcello Di Bello (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure, Assumptions and Topics of Inquiry. Synthese:1-26.score: 24.0
    According to the principle of epistemic closure, knowledge is closed under known implication. The principle is intuitive but it is problematic in some cases. Suppose you know you have hands and you know that ‘I have hands’ implies ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’. Does it follow that you know you are not a brain-in-a-vat? It seems not; it should not be so easy to refute skepticism. In this and similar cases, we are confronted with a puzzle: epistemic closure (...)
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  34. Joeri Engelfriet & Jan Treur (2002). Linear, Branching Time and Joint Closure Semantics for Temporal Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (4):389-425.score: 24.0
    Temporal logic can be used to describe processes: their behaviour ischaracterized by a set of temporal models axiomatized by a temporaltheory. Two types of models are most often used for this purpose: linearand branching time models. In this paper a third approach, based onsocalled joint closure models, is studied using models which incorporateall possible behaviour in one model. Relations between this approach andthe other two are studied. In order to define constructions needed torelate branching time models, appropriate algebraic notions (...)
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  35. Tim Kraft (2014). Transmission Arguments Against Knowledge Closure Are Still Fallacious. Synthese 191 (12):2617-2632.score: 24.0
    Transmission arguments against closure of knowledge base the case against closure on the premise that a necessary condition for knowledge is not closed. Warfield argues that this kind of argument is fallacious whereas Brueckner, Murphy and Yan try to rescue it. According to them, the transmission argument is no longer fallacious once an implicit assumption is made explicit. I defend Warfield’s objection by arguing that the various proposals for the unstated assumption either do not avoid the fallacy or (...)
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  36. Leigh C. Vicens (2014). Physical Causal Closure and Non-Coincidental Mental Causation. Philosophia 42 (1):201-207.score: 24.0
    In his book Personal Agency, E. J. Lowe has argued that a dualist theory of mental causation is consistent with “a fairly strong principle of physical causal closure” and, moreover, that it “has the potential to strengthen our causal explanations of certain physical events.” If Lowe’s reasoning were sound, it would undermine the most common arguments for reductive physicalism or epiphenomenalism of the mental. For it would show not only that a dualist theory of mental causation is consistent with (...)
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  37. Timothy H. McNicholl (2001). On the Convergence of Query-Bounded Computations and Logical Closure Properties of C.E. Sets. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1543-1560.score: 24.0
    Call a set A n-correctable if every set Turing reducible to A via a Turing machine that on any input makes at most n queries is Turing reducible to A via a Turing machine that on any input makes at most n-queries and on any input halts no matter what answers are given to its queries. We show that if a c.e. set A is n-correctable for some n ≥ 2, then it is n-correctable for all n. We show that (...)
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  38. Nico van Straalen (2011). The Issue of “Closure” in Jagers Op Akkerhuis's Operator Theory. Foundations of Science 16 (4):319-321.score: 24.0
    Attempts to define life should focus on the transition from molecules to cells and the “closure” aspects of this event. Rather than classifying existing objects into living and non-living entities I believe the challenge is to understand how the transition from non-life to life can take place, that is, the how the closure in Jagers op Akkerhuis’s hierarchical classification of operators, comes about.
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  39. Gregory L. McColm (1995). The Dimension of the Negation of Transitive Closure. Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (2):392-414.score: 24.0
    We prove that any positive elementary (least fixed point) induction expressing the negation of transitive closure on finite nondirected graphs requires at least two recursion variables.
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  40. Athel Cornish-Bowden, Gabriel Piedrafita, Federico Morán, María Luz Cárdenas & Francisco Montero (2013). Simulating a Model of Metabolic Closure. Biological Theory 8 (4):383-390.score: 24.0
    The goal of synthetic biology is to create artificial organisms. To achieve this it is essential to understand what life is. Metabolism-replacement systems, or (M, R)-systems, constitute a theory of life developed by Robert Rosen, characterized in the statement that organisms are closed to efficient causation, which means that they must themselves produce all the catalysts they need. This theory overlaps in part with other current theories, including autopoiesis, the chemoton, and autocatalytic sets, all of them invoking some idea of (...)
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  41. José Gil-Férez (2011). Representations of Structural Closure Operators. Archive for Mathematical Logic 50 (1-2):45-73.score: 24.0
    We continue the work of Blok and Jónsson by developing the theory of structural closure operators and introducing the notion of a representation between them. Similarities and equivalences of Blok-Jónsson turn out to be bijective representations and bijective structural representations, respectively. We obtain a characterization for representations induced by a transformer. In order to obtain a similar characterization for structural representations we introduce the notions of a graduation and a graded variable of an M-set. We show that several deductive (...)
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  42. Claudio de Almeida (2007). Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons. Acta Analytica 22 (4):301 - 319.score: 21.0
    It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.
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  43. Brad Weslake (forthcoming). Difference-Making, Closure and Exclusion. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Huw Price (eds.), Making a Difference. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    Consider the following causal exclusion principle: For all distinct properties F and F* such that F* supervenes on F, F and F* do not both cause a property G. Peter Menzies and Christian List have proven that it follows from a natural conception of causation as difference-making that this exclusion principle is not generally true. Rather, it turns out that whether the principle is true is a contingent matter. In addition, they have shown that in a wide range of empirically (...)
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  44. Graham Priest (1999). Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Non-Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):549--558.score: 21.0
    It is known that a semantically closed theory with description may well be trivial if the principles concerning denotation and descriptions are formulated in certain ways, even if the underlying logic is paraconsistent. This paper establishes the nontriviality of a semantically closed theory with a natural, but non-extensional, description operator.
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  45. Claudio Almeida (2007). Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons. Acta Analytica 22 (4):301-319.score: 21.0
    It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or epistemic rationality ) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.
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  46. José Naranjo (2011). Bridging the Gap: Does Closure to Efficient Causation Entail Quantum-Like Attributes? Axiomathes 21 (2):315-330.score: 21.0
    This paper explores the similarities between the conceptual structure of quantum theory and relational biology as developed within the Rashevsky-Rosen-Louie school of theoretical biology. With this aim, generalized quantum theory and the abstract formalism of (M,R)-systems are briefly presented. In particular, the notion of organizational invariance and relational identity are formalized mathematically and a particular example is given. Several quantum-like attributes of Rosen’s complex systems such as complementarity and nonseparability are discussed. Taken together, this work emphasizes the possible role of (...)
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  47. Barbara Montero (2003). Varieties of Causal Closure. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 173-187.score: 21.0
  48. Mohammad Ardeshir & Rasoul Ramezanian (2012). On the Constructive Notion of Closure Maps. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 58 (4‐5):348-355.score: 21.0
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  49. Lankun Guo, Guo-Qiang Zhang & Qingguo Li (2011). Fuzzy Closure Systems on L-Ordered Sets. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 57 (3):281-291.score: 21.0
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  50. James van Cleve (1990). Supervenience and Closure. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):225-38.score: 21.0
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