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Cody Gilmore [16]Cody S. Gilmore [2]
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Profile: Cody Gilmore (University of California, Davis)
  1. Cody Gilmore (forthcoming). Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime. In Claudio Calosi & Pierluigi Graziani (eds.), Mereology and the Sciences. Springer.
    Endurantism, the view that material objects are wholly present at each moment of their careers, is under threat from supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to spacetime regions. I discuss three compromise positions. They are alike in that they all take material objects to be composed of spacetime points or regions without being identical to any such point or region. They differ in whether they permit multilocation and in whether they generate cases of mereologically coincident entities.
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  2. Cody Gilmore (forthcoming). Quasi-Supplementation, Plenitudinous Coincidentalism, and Gunk. In Robert Garcia (ed.), Substance: New Essays. Philosophia Verlag.
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  3. Cody Gilmore (2014). Parts of Propositions. In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. 156-208.
    Do Russellian propositions have their constituents as parts? One reason for thinking not is that if they did, they would generate apparent counterexamples to plausible mereological principles. As Frege noted, they would be in tension with the transitivity of parthood. A certain small rock is a part of Etna but not of the proposition that Etna is higher than Vesuvius. So, if Etna were a part of the given proposition, parthood would fail to be transitive. As William Bynoe has noted (...)
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  4. Cody Gilmore (2013). Location and Mereology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5. Cody Gilmore (2013). Slots in Universals. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:187-233.
    Slot theory is the view that (i) there exist such entities as argument places, or ‘slots’, in universals, and that (ii) a universal u is n-adic if and only if there are n slots in u. I argue that those who take properties and relations to be abundant, fine-grained, non-set-theoretical entities face pressure to be slot theorists. I note that slots permit a natural account of the notion of adicy. I then consider a series of ‘slot-free’ accounts of that notion (...)
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  6. Cody Gilmore (2013). When Do Things Die? In Ben Bradley, Jens Johansson & Fred Feldman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford University Press.
  7. Cody Gilmore (2012). Keep in Touch. Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):85-111.
    I introduce a puzzle about contact and de re temporal predication in relativistic spacetime. In particular, I describe an apparent counterexample to the following principle, roughly stated: if B is never in a position to say ‘I was touching A, I am touching A, and I will be touching A’, then (time travel aside) A is never in a position to say ‘I was touching B, I am touching B, and I will be touching B’. In the case I present, (...)
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  8. Cody Gilmore (2010). Coinciding Objects and Duration Properties: Reply to Eagle. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 5. Oxford University Press. 95-111.
  9. Cody Gilmore (2010). Sider, The Inheritance of Intrinsicality, and Theories of Composition. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):177-197.
    I defend coincidentalism (the view that some pluralities have more than one mereological fusion) and restricted composition (the view that some pluralities lack mereological fusions) against recent arguments due to Theodore Sider.
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  10. Cody Gilmore (2009). Why Parthood Might Be a Four-Place Relation, and How It Behaves If It Is. In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. de Gruyter. 83--133.
  11. Cody Gilmore (2008). Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1224-1254.
    How is the debate between endurantism and perdurantism affected by the transition from pre-relativistic spacetimes to relativistic ones? After suggesting that the endurance vs. perdurance distinction may run together a pair of cross-cutting distinctions (mereological endurance vs. mereological perdurance and locational endurance vs. locational perdurance), I discuss two recent attempts to show that the transition in question does serious damage to endurantism (at least of the locational variety).
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  12. Cody Gilmore (2007). Defining 'Dead' in Terms of 'Lives' and 'Dies'. Philosophia 35 (2):219-231.
    What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that (...)
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  13. Cody Gilmore (2007). Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Persistence. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3. Clarendon Press. 177-198.
    Existing puzzles about coinciding objects can be divided into two types, corresponding to the manner in which they bear upon the endurantism v. perdurantism debate. (Endurantism is the view that material objects lack temporal extent and persist through time by being wholly present at each moment of their careers. Perdurantism is the opposing view that material objects persist by being temporally extended and having different temporal parts located at different times.) Puzzles of the first type, which involve temporary (...)
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  14. Cody Gilmore (2006). Review of Hud Hudson, The Metaphysics of Hyperspace. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (10).
    This is a review of The Metaphysics of Hyperspace (OUP: 2005) by Hud Hudson.
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  15. Cody Gilmore (2006). Where in the Relativistic World Are We? Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.
    I formulate a theory of persistence in the endurantist family and pose a problem for the conjunction of this theory with orthodox versions of special or general relativity. The problem centers around the question: Where are things?
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  16. Cody Gilmore (2003). In Defence of Spatially Related Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):420-428.
    Immanent universals, being wholly present wherever they are instantiated, are capable of both multi-location and co-location. As a result, they can become involved in some bizarre situations, situations whose contradictory appearance cannot be dispelled by any of the relativizing maneuvers familiar to metaphysicials as solutions to the problem of change. Douglas Ehring takes this to be a fatal problem for immanent universals, but I do not. Although the old relativizing maneuvers don't solve the problem, I propose a new one that (...)
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  17. Cody S. Gilmore (2003). The Introspectibility Thesis. Psyche 9 (5).
    According to what Barry Dainton calls the 'Strong Introspectibility thesis', it is a necessary truth that mental states S and S* are co-conscious (experienced together) if and only if they are 'jointly introspectible', i.e., if and only if it is possible for there to be some single state of introspective awareness that represents both S and S*. Dainton offers two arguments for the conclusion that joint introspectibility is unnecessary for co-consciousness. In these comments I attempt to show, first, that Dainton's (...)
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  18. Cody S. Gilmore (2002). Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence, and Temporal Parts. Philosophical Studies 109 (3):241 - 263.
    Yuri Balashov has argued that endurantism is untenable in the context of Minkowski spacetime. Balashov's argument runs through two main theses concerning the relation of coexistence, or temporal co-location. (1) Coexistence must turn out to be an absolute or objective matter; and in Minkowski spacetime coexistence must be grounded in the relation of spacelike separation. (2) If endurantism is true, then (1) leads to absurd conclusions; but if perdurantism is true, then (1) is harmless. Iobject to both theses. Against (1), (...)
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