Search results for 'Cognition Congresses' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eva Ejerhed & Sten Lindström (eds.) (1997). Logic, Action, and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer Academic.
  2.  24
    G. Greenberg & E. Tobach (eds.) (1987). Cognition, Language, and Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    "Each animal in its own psychological setting . . / 1 Gerard Piel Scientific American, New York TC Schneirla was more interested in questions than in ...
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  3. Steve Fuller (ed.) (1989). The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  4. Merry Bullock (ed.) (1991). The Development of Intentional Action: Cognitive, Motivational, and Interactive Processes. Karger.
  5.  78
    Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.) (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other species? The volume's four parts together offer a state of the art survey of the (...)
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  6. Alison Pease & Brendan Larvor (eds.) (2012). Proceedings of the Symposium on Mathematical Practice and Cognition Ii: A Symposium at the Aisb/Iacap World Congress 2012. Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour.
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  7. Lawrence A. Shapiro (2010). Embodied Cognition. Routledge.
    Introduction: toward an understanding of embodied cognition -- Standard cognitive science -- Challenging standard cognitive science -- Conceptions of embodiment -- Embodied cognition: the conceptualization hypothesis -- Embodied cognition: the replacement hypothesis -- Embodied cognition: the constitution hypothesis -- Concluding thoughts.
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  8. John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Paul G. Keil & Amanda J. Barnier (2010). The Psychology of Memory, Extended Cognition, and Socially Distributed Remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):521-560.
    This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive (...)
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  9.  41
    Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that (...)
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  10.  45
    Amanda Seed & Michael Tomasello (2010). Primate Cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):407-419.
    As the cognitive revolution was slow to come to the study of animal behavior, the vast majority of what we know about primate cognition has been discovered in the last 30 years. Building on the recognition that the physical and social worlds of humans and their living primate relatives pose many of the same evolutionary challenges, programs of research have established that the most basic cognitive skills and mental representations that humans use to navigate those worlds are already possessed (...)
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  11. Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.) (1994). Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    Consciousness seems to be an enigmatic phenomenon: it is difficult to imagine how our perceptions of the world and our inner thoughts, sensations and feelings could be related to the immensely complicated biological organ we call the brain. This volume presents the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers and cognitive scientists who have recently participated in the discussion of the status of consciousness in science. The focus of inquiry is the question: "Is it possible to incorporate consciousness into science?" (...)
     
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  12.  57
    Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll (2005). Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural (...) and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition. Key Words: collaboration; cooperation; cultural learning; culture; evolutionary psychology; intentions; shared intentionality; social cognition; social learning; theory of mind; joint attention. (shrink)
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  13.  14
    Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1980). Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
    The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach (the "proprietary vocabulary hypothesis") is that there (...)
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  14. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
  15. John Sutton (2006). Distributed Cognition: Domains and Dimensions. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):235-248.
    Synthesizing the domains of investigation highlighted in current research in distributed cognition and related fields, this paper offers an initial taxonomy of the overlapping types of resources which typically contribute to distributed or extended cognitive systems. It then outlines a number of key dimensions on which to analyse both the resulting integrated systems and the components which coalesce into more or less tightly coupled interaction over the course of their formation and renegotiation.
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  16.  44
    Robert A. Wilson (2004). Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition. Cambridge University Press.
    Where does the mind begin and end? Robert Wilson establishes the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. He blends traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. Wilson then develops novel accounts of mental representation and consciousness, discussing a range of other issues, such as nativism and the idea of group minds. Boundaries of the Mind re-evaluates the place of the individual in the cognitive, biological and (...)
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  17. Shannon Spaulding (2010). Embodied Cognition and Mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.
    Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied (...)
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  18. Shannon Spaulding (2014). Embodied Cognition and Theory of Mind. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge 197-206.
    According to embodied cognition, the philosophical and empirical literature on theory of mind is misguided. Embodied cognition rejects the idea that social cognition requires theory of mind. It regards the intramural debate between the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory as irrelevant, and it dismisses the empirical studies on theory of mind as ill conceived and misleading. Embodied cognition provides a novel deflationary account of social cognition that does not depend on theory of mind. In (...)
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  19.  68
    David Kirsh (2006). Distributed Cognition: A Methodological Note. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):249-262.
    Humans are closely coupled with their environments. They rely on being `embedded' to help coordinate the use of their internal cognitive resources with external tools and resources. Consequently, everyday cognition, even cognition in the absence of others, may be viewed as partially distributed. As cognitive scientists our job is to discover and explain the principles governing this distribution: principles of coordination, externalization, and interaction. As designers our job is to use these principles, especially if they can be converted (...)
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  20. Jiajie Zhang & Vimla L. Patel (2006). Distributed Cognition, Representation, and Affordance. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):333-341.
    This article describes a representation-based framework of distributed cognition. This framework considers distributed cognition as a cognitive system whose structures and processes are distributed between internal and external representations, across a group of individuals, and across space and time. The major issue for distributed research, under this framework, are the distribution, transformation, and propagation of information across the components of the distributed cognitive system and how they affect the performance of the system as a whole. To demonstrate the (...)
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  21. J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible (...)
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  22.  52
    Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Chicoisne (2006). A Framework for Thinking About Distributed Cognition. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):215-234.
    As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed (...). We argue that both relevant concepts, distribution and cognition, must be understood as continuous. As it is used in the context of distributed cognition, the concept of distribution is essentially fuzzy, and we will link it to the notion of emergence of system-level properties. The concept of cognition must also be seen as fuzzy, but for a different reason: due to its origin as an anthropocentric concept, no one has a clear handle on its meaning in a distributed setting. As the proposed framework forms a space, we then explore its geography and visit famous landmarks. (shrink)
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  23. Richard Menary (2006). Attacking the Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.
    Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call "cognitive integration," which is the view that internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think (...)
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  24. Stevan Harnad & Itiel Dror (2006). Distributed Cognition: Cognizing, Autonomy and the Turing Test. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):14.
    Some of the papers in this special issue distribute cognition between what is going on inside individual cognizers' heads and their outside worlds; others distribute cognition among different individual cognizers. Turing's criterion for cognition was individual, autonomous input/output capacity. It is not clear that distributed cognition could pass the Turing Test.
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  25. Murray Shanahan (2010). Embodiment and the Inner Life: Cognition and Consciousness in the Space of Possible Minds. Oxford University Press.
  26.  14
    L. SchiLbach, S. Eickhoff, A. RotArskajagiela, G. Fink & K. Vogeley (2008). Minds at Rest? Social Cognition as the Default Mode of Cognizing and its Putative Relationship to the "Default System" of the Brain. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):457--467.
    The “default system” of the brain has been described as a set of regions which are ‘activated’ during rest and ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks. To investigate the reliability of task-related deactivations, we performed a meta-analysis across 12 fMRI studies. Our results replicate previous findings by implicating medial frontal and parietal brain regions as part of the “default system”.However, the cognitive correlates of these deactivations remain unclear. In light of the importance of social cognitive abilities for human beings and their (...)
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  27.  21
    Georg Theiner (2014). Varieties of Group Cognition. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge 347-357.
    Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “the good [that] men do separately is small compared with what they may do collectively” (Isaacson 2004). The ability to join with others in groups to accomplish goals collectively that would hopelessly overwhelm the time, energy, and resources of individuals is indeed one of the greatest assets of our species. In the history of humankind, groups have been among the greatest workers, builders, producers, protectors, entertainers, explorers, discoverers, planners, problem-solvers, and decision-makers. During the late 19th (...)
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  28.  14
    Lawrence Lengbeyer (2007). Situated Cognition: The Perspect Model. In David Spurrett, Don Ross, Harold Kincaid & Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. MIT Press 227.
    The standard philosophical and folk-psychological accounts of cognition and action credit us with too much spontaneity in our activities and projects. We are taken to be fundamentally active rather than reactive, to project our needs and aims and deploy our full supporting arsenal of cognitive instruments upon an essentially passive environment. The corrected point of view presented here balances this image of active agency with an appreciation of how we are also continually responding to the world, that is, to (...)
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  29.  55
    David Kirsh (2005). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. In Peter Gardenfors, Petter Johansson & N. J. Mahwah (eds.), Cognition, education, and communication technology. Erlbaum Associates 147--180.
    Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition are (...)
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  30. Bertram F. Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 225-255.
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular (...)
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  31. Richard Menary (2007). Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded. Palgrave Macmillan.
    In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. (...)
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  32.  15
    Georg Theiner, Colin Allen & Robert L. Goldstone (2010). Recognizing Group Cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):378-395.
    In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group (...)
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  33.  65
    Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar (2013). Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition. Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
    We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous (...)
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  34.  72
    Krist Vaesen (2011). Knowledge Without Credit, Exhibit 4: Extended Cognition. [REVIEW] Synthese 181 (515):529.
    The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p . Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as (...)
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  35. Mark Reybrouck (2005). A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy. [REVIEW] Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems. 15 (2):229-266.
    This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims that music knowledge must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world and calls forth a shift from a structural description of music as an artifact to a process-like approach to dealing with music. As listeners, we are observers who construct and organize our knowledge and bring with us our observational tools. What matters is not merely the sonic world (...)
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  36. Fred Adams (2010). Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.
    Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and (...)
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  37.  55
    Michael L. Anderson, Michael J. Richardson & Anthony Chemero (2012). Eroding the Boundaries of Cognition: Implications of Embodiment1. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (4):717-730.
    To accept that cognition is embodied is to question many of the beliefs traditionally held by cognitive scientists. One key question regards the localization of cognitive faculties. Here we argue that for cognition to be embodied and sometimes embedded, means that the cognitive faculty cannot be localized in a brain area alone. We review recent research on neural reuse, the 1/f structure of human activity, tool use, group cognition, and social coordination dynamics that we believe demonstrates how (...)
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  38.  51
    Michael David Kirchhoff (2012). Extended Cognition and Fixed Properties: Steps to a Third-Wave Version of Extended Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):287-308.
    This paper explores several paths a distinctive third wave of extended cognition might take. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings of first- and second-wave extended cognition associated with a tendency to conceive of the properties of internal and external processes as fixed and non-interchangeable. First, in the domain of cognitive transformation, I argue that a problematic tendency of the complementarity model is that it presupposes that socio-cultural resources augment but do not significantly transform the brain’s (...)
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  39.  61
    John Sutton (2013). Skill and Collaboration in the Evolution of Human Cognition. Biological Theory 8 (1):28-36.
    I start with a brief assessment of the implications of Sterelny’s anti-individualist, anti-internalist apprentice learning model for a more historical and interdisciplinary cognitive science. In a selective response I then focus on two core features of his constructive account: collaboration and skill. While affirming the centrality of joint action and decision making, I raise some concerns about the fragility of the conditions under which collaborative cognition brings benefits. I then assess Sterelny’s view of skill acquisition and performance, which runs (...)
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  40. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis. Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.
    This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current (...)
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  41. David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
    A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think (...)
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  42. Leon De Bruin & Sanneke De Haan (2012). Enactivism and Social Cognition: In Search for the Whole Story. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics (1):225-250.
    Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is (...)
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  43. Robert D. Rupert (2004). Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
  44. Shannon Spaulding (2013). Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition. Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.
    Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue (...)
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  45. Dave Ward & Mog Stapleton (2012). Es Are Good. Cognition as Enacted, Embodied, Embedded, Affective and Extended. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness.
    We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from (...)
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    V. A. Okladnoy (2008). The Creative and Constructive Nature of Cognition. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:359-365.
    Rational reconstructions of cognition, outgoing from the results of cognitive activity, often introduce incorrect or imaginary cognitive procedures. Cognition needs to be examined as the open creative process directed to the unknown future. In the process of cognition a theoretical language, perceptive structures, methods of empiric researches and ontological phenomena are mutually constructed. The contents of the results of cognition are encoded in the language of theory and becomes objective in its ontology. It is the same (...)
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    V. I. Selivanova (2008). On the Universal Principle of Scientific and Philosophical Cognition. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:235-239.
    The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the fact (...)
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    V. I. Selivanova (2008). On the Universal Principle of Scientific and Philosophical Cognition. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:235-239.
    The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the fact (...)
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  49.  79
    Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  50.  66
    Mitchell Herschbach (2012). On the Role of Social Interaction in Social Cognition: A Mechanistic Alternative to Enactivism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):467-486.
    Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism’s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition in general and social cognition in (...)
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