38 found
Order:
  1. Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein (2016). Pain Signals Are Predominantly Imperative. Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.
    Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  43
    Colin Klein & Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Imperativism and Pain Intensity. In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Colin Klein (2009). Reduction Without Reductionism: A Defence of Nagel on Connectability. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):39 - 53.
    Unlike the overall framework of Ernest Nagel's work on reduction, his theory of intertheoretic connection still has life in it. It handles aptly cases where reduction requires complex representation of a target domain. Abandoning his formulation as too liberal was a mistake. Arguments that it is too liberal at best touch only Nagel's deductivist theory of explanation, not his condition of connectability. Taking this condition seriously gives a powerful view of reduction, but one which requires us to index explanatory power (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  4. Colin Klein (2010). Images Are Not the Evidence in Neuroimaging. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):265-278.
    fMRI promises to uncover the functional structure of the brain. I argue, however, that pictures of ‘brain activity' associated with fMRI experiments are poor evidence for functional claims. These neuroimages present the results of null hypothesis significance tests performed on fMRI data. Significance tests alone cannot provide evidence about the functional structure of causally dense systems, including the brain. Instead, neuroimages should be seen as indicating regions where further data analysis is warranted. This additional analysis rarely involves simple significance testing, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  5. Colin Klein (2007). An Imperative Theory of Pain. Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.
    forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  6.  25
    Colin Klein (2012). Cognitive Ontology and Region- Versus Network-Oriented Analyses. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):952-960.
    The interpretation of functional imaging experiments is complicated by the pluripotency of brain regions. As there is a many-to-one mapping between cognitive functions and their neural substrates, region-based analyses of imaging data provide only weak support for cognitive theories. Price and Friston argue that we need a ‘cognitive ontology’ that abstractly categorizes the function of regions. I argue that abstract characterizations are unlikely to be cognitively interesting. I argue instead that we should attribute functions to regions in a context-sensitive manner. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  7.  89
    Colin Klein (2011). The Dual Track Theory of Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence. Neuroethics 4 (2):143-162.
    The dual-track theory of moral reasoning has received considerable attention due to the neuroimaging work of Greene et al. Greene et al. claimed that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  8.  18
    Colin Klein & Jakob Hohwy, Variability, Convergence, and Dimensions of Consciousness.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  32
    Colin Klein (2012). Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
    Several authors have recently argued that the content of pains (and bodily sensations more generally) is imperative rather than descriptive. I show that such an account can help resolve competing intuitions about phantom limb pain. As imperatives, phantom pains are neither true nor false. However, phantom limb pains presuppose falsehoods, in the same way that any imperative which demands something impossible presupposes a falsehood. Phantom pains, like many chronic pains, are thus commands that cannot be satisfied. I conclude by showing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10. Colin Klein (2010). Philosophical Issues in Neuroimaging. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):186-198.
    Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  61
    Colin Klein (2008). Dispositional Implementation Solves the Superfluous Structure Problem. Synthese 165 (1):141 - 153.
    Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  12.  22
    Colin Klein (2014). The Penumbral Theory of Masochistic Pleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):41-55.
    Being whipped, getting a deep-tissue massage, eating hot chili peppers, running marathons, and getting tattooed are all painful. Sometimes they are also pleasant—or so many people claim. Masochistic pleasure consists in finding such experiences pleasant in addition to, and because of, the pain. Masochistic pleasure presents a philosophical puzzle. Pains hurt, they feel bad, and are aversive. Pleasures do the opposite. Thus many assume that the idea of a pleasant pain is downright unintelligible. I disagree. I claim that cases of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  43
    Colin Klein & Gabriel Love (2007). Kicking the Kohler Habit. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):609 – 619.
    Kohler's experiments with inverting goggles are often thought to support enactivism by showing that visual re-inversion occurs simultaneous with the return of sensorimotor skill. Closer examination reveals that Kohler's work does not show this. Recent work by Linden et al. shows that re-inversion, if it occurs at all, does not occur when the enactivist predicts. As such, the empirical evidence weighs against enactivism.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  14.  39
    Christopher Mole & Colin Klein (2010). Confirmation, Refutation, and the Evidence of fMRI. In Stephen Hanson & Martin Bunzl (eds.), Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping. MIT Press 99.
  15.  53
    Colin Klein (2015). What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows. Mind 124 (494):493-516.
    Pain asymbolics feel pain, but act as if they are indifferent to it. Nikola Grahek argues that such patients present a clear counterexample to motivationalism about pain. I argue that Grahek has mischaracterized pain asymbolia. Properly understood, asymbolics have lost a general capacity to care about their bodily integrity. Asymbolics’ indifference to pain thus does not show something about the intrinsic nature of pain ; it shows something about the relationship between pains and subjects, and how that relationship might break (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Colin Klein, Critical Notice: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind by Robert Rupert.
    Robert Rupert is well-known as an vigorous opponent of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). His Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind is a first-rate development of his “systems-based” approach to demarcating the mind. The results are impressive. Rupert’s account brings much-needed clarity to the often-frustrating debate over HEC: much more than just an attack on HEC, he gives a compelling picture of why the debate matters.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Colin Klein (2013). Multiple Realizability and the Semantic View of Theories. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):683-695.
    Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  61
    Colin Klein (2008). An Ideal Solution to Disputes About Multiply Realized Kinds. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):161 - 177.
    Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Anthony Chemero, Colin Klein & William Cordeiro, Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances.
    In a target article that appeared in this journal, Thomas Stoffregen 2000 questions the possibility of ecological event perception research. This paper describes an experiments performed to examine the perception of the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances, a variety of event as defined by Chemero 2000. We found that subjects reliably perceive both gap-crossing affordances and the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances. Our findings provide empirical evidence in favor of understanding events as changes in the layout of affordances, shoring up event perception (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  42
    Colin Klein (2010). Response to Tumulty on Pain and Imperatives. Journal of Philosophy 107 (10):554-557.
    Maura Tumulty has raised two objections to my imperative account of pain.1 First, she argues that there is a disanalogy between pains and other imperative sensations like itch, hunger, and thirst. Suppose (with Hall) one thinks that an itch says “Scratch here!”2 Scratch the itch, and it dutifully disappears. Not so with pain. The pain of a broken ankle has the content ‘Do not put weight on that ankle!’ Yet the coddled ankle still throbs: obeying the imperative does not extinguish (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Colin Klein, Maudlin on Computation.
    I argue that computationalism is compatible with a plausible supervenience thesis about conscious states. The most plausible way of making it compatible, however, involves abandoning counterfactual conditions on implementation.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22. Colin Klein, Significance, Evidence, and the Uncomfortable Science of fMRI.
    Functional magnetic resonance imaging (or fMRI)1 is widely used to support hypotheses about brain function. Many find the images produced from fMRI data to be especially compelling evidence for scientific hypotheses [McCabe and Castel, 2008]. There are many problems with all of this; I want to start with two of them, and argue that they get us closer to an under-appreciated worry about many imaging experiments.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Colin Klein, Phantom Limbs and the Imperative Account of Pain.
    Amputation of a limb can result in the persistent hallucination that the limb is still present [Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998]. Distressingly, these socalled ‘phantom limbs’ are often quite painful. Of a friend whose arm had been amputated due to gas gangrene, W.K. Livingston writes: I once asked him why the sense of tenseness in the hand was so frequently emphasized among his complaints. He asked me to clench my fingers over my thumb, flex my wrist, and raise the arm into (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  1
    Colin Klein (2009). Reduction Without Reductionism: A Defence of Nagel on Connectability. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):39-53.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  9
    Colin Klein (2014). The Brain at Rest: What It Is Doing and Why That Matters. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):974-985.
    Neuroimaging studies of the resting state continue to gather philosophical and scientific attention. Most discussions assume an identification between resting-state activity and activity in the so-called default mode network. I argue we should resist this identification, structuring my discussion around a dilemma first posed by Morcom and Fletcher. I offer an alternative view of rest as a state dominated by long-term processes and show how interaction effects might thereby let rest shed light on short-term changes in activation.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  3
    Colin Klein (2015). Olympia and Other O-Machines. Philosophia 43 (4):925-931.
    Against Maudlin, I argue that machines which merely reproduce a pre-programmed series of changes ought to be classed with Turing’s O-Machines even if they would counterfactually show Turing Machine-like activity. This can be seen on an interventionist picture of computational architectures, on which basic operations are the primitive loci for interventions. While constructions like Maudlin’s Olympia still compute, then, claims about them do not threaten philosophical arguments that depend on Turing Machine architectures and their computational equivalents.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  12
    Colin Klein (2013). Reliability in Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meta-Meta Analysis. Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):606-609.
    Reliability in Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meta-Meta Analysis. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838818.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Colin Klein, Error, Reference, and the First Horn of Hempel's Dilemma.
    It would be nice if our definition of ‘physical’ incorporated the distinctive content of physics. Attempts at such a definition quickly run into what’s known as Hempel’s dilemma. Briefly: when we talk about ‘physics’, we refer either to current physics or to some idealized version of physics. Current physics is likely wrong and so an unsuitable basis for a definition. ‘Ideal physics’ can’t itself be cashed out except as the science which has completed an accurate survey of the physical; appeals (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  11
    Esther Klein & Colin Klein (2012). Did the Chinese Have a Change of Heart? Cognitive Science 36 (2):179-182.
    In their “The Prevalence of Mind-Body Dualism in Early China,” Slingerland and Chudek use a statistical analysis of the early Chinese corpus to argue for Weak Folk Dualism (WFD). We raise three methodological objections to their analysis. First, the change over time that they find is largely driven by genre. Second, the operationalization of WFD is potentially misleading. And, third, dating the texts they use is extremely controversial. We conclude with some positive remarks.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  4
    Colin Klein (2010). Redeployed Functions Versus Spreading Activation: A Potential Confound. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):280-281.
    Anderson's meta-analysis of fMRI data is subject to a potential confound. Areas identified as active may make no functional contribution to the task being studied, or may indicate regions involved in the coordination of functional networks rather than information processing per se. I suggest a way in which fMRI adaptation studies might provide a useful test between these alternatives.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Colin Klein, Idealization is Simplification, Not Representation.
    The problem with idealization is not just that, when idealizing, scientists ask us to suppose false things. Many people do that. No, the puzzling thing about idealizers—unlike astrologers, spodomancers, and homeopaths—is that it is worth listening to them. Supposing that populations of rabbits are in- finite is useful for a variety of ecological explanations. Yet we are not up to our necks in rabbits; the puzzle is why it should be useful to suppose that we are.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Colin Klein, Spheres Are Not Multiply Realizable.
    Are spheres multiply realizable? A venerable tradition implies that they are. Putnam’s discussion of the peg and holes (in [Putnam, 1975]) is often taken to show that all volumetric shape properties are multiply realizable . The argument runs: (a) physics is the science of the “ultimate constituents” (Putnam’s phrase) of matter, and so (b) physics can only track the behavior of each of the simple constituents of a particular system, but (c) tediously tracking individual particles doesn’t make for a very (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Colin Klein, Experimental Philosophy and Individual Differences: Some Pitfalls.
    Reasonable individuals can disagree about philosophical questions. This disagreement sometimes takes the form of conflicting intuitions; the seminar room provides many examples. Experimental philosophers, who have devoted themselves to the systematic study of intuitions, have found empirical support for what anecdotes suggest. Their data often reveals that a significant minority of subjects have intuitions counter to those of the majority.1 A recent replication of [Knobe, 2003a] discovered three distinct subgroups of subjects with three distinct patterns of response. Only about one-third (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Colin Klein (2014). Alcino J. Silva, Anthony Landreth, and John Bickle,Engineering the Next Revolution in Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press , 204 Pp., $39.95. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 81 (3):486-489.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Colin Klein, Aristotle on Functionalism.
  36. Colin Klein (2010). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (3-4).
    Robert Rupert is well-known as a vigorous opponent of the hypothesis of extended cognition . His Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind is a first-rate development of his "systems-based" approach to demarcating the mind. The results are impressive. Rupert's account brings much-needed clarity to the often-frustrating debate over HEC: much more than just an attack on HEC, he gives a compelling picture of why the debate matters.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Colin Klein, Idealization in Cognitive Psychology: A Case Study.
    develops themes from the dissertation. I argue that two models of prosopagnosia are best understood as idealizing models, and as such are subject to importantly different methodological constraints from non-idealized theories of face recognition.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Colin Klein, Toward an Accurate Phenomenology of Pain.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography