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Collin Rice [11]Collin C. Rice [2]
  1.  96
    Robert W. Batterman & Collin C. Rice (2014). Minimal Model Explanations. Philosophy of Science 81 (3):349-376.
    This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, mechanical, difference-making, and so on, strategies prominent in the philosophical literature. We contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of these models is not that they have certain features in common with real systems. Rather, the models are explanatory because of a story about why a class of systems will all display the same large-scale behavior because the details that distinguish them are irrelevant. This story (...)
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  2.  60
    Collin Rice (2015). Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation. Noûs 49 (3):589-615.
    A prominent approach to scientific explanation and modeling claims that for a model to provide an explanation it must accurately represent at least some of the actual causes in the event's causal history. In this paper, I argue that many optimality explanations present a serious challenge to this causal approach. I contend that many optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium explanations that do not accurately represent the causes of their target system. Furthermore, in many contexts, it is in virtue of (...)
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  3.  35
    Collin Rice (2012). Optimality Explanations: A Plea for an Alternative Approach. Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):685-703.
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  4.  27
    Yasha Rohwer & Collin Rice (2013). Hypothetical Pattern Idealization and Explanatory Models. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):334-355.
  5.  24
    Yasha Rohwer & Collin Rice (forthcoming). How Are Models and Explanations Related? Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Within the modeling literature, there is often an implicit assumption about the relationship between a given model and a scientific explanation. The goal of this article is to provide a unified framework with which to analyze the myriad relationships between a model and an explanation. Our framework distinguishes two fundamental kinds of relationships. The first is metaphysical, where the model is identified as an explanation or as a partial explanation. The second is epistemological, where the model produces understanding that is (...)
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  6.  13
    Collin C. Rice (2016). Factive Scientific Understanding Without Accurate Representation. Biology and Philosophy 31 (1):81-102.
    This paper analyzes two ways idealized biological models produce factive scientific understanding. I then argue that models can provide factive scientific understanding of a phenomenon without providing an accurate representation of the features of their real-world target system. My analysis of these cases also suggests that the debate over scientific realism needs to investigate the factive scientific understanding produced by scientists’ use of idealized models rather than the accuracy of scientific models themselves.
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  7.  94
    Collin Rice (2013). Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
    Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. Therefore, concepts are vital to any theory of cognition. However, despite their widely accepted importance, there is little consensus about the nature and origin of concepts. Thanks to the work of Lawrence Barsalou, Jesse Prinz and others concept empiricism has been gaining momentum within the philosophy and psychology literature. Concept empiricism maintains that all concepts are copies, or combinations of copies, of perceptual representations—that is, all concepts are couched in the codes of perceptual representation (...)
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  8.  6
    Collin Rice (2014). Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.
    In contrast to earlier views that argued for a particular kind of concept, several recent accounts have proposed that there are multiple distinct kinds of concepts, or that there is a plurality of concepts for each category. In this paper, I argue for a novel account of concepts as pluralistic hybrids. According to this view, concepts are pluralistic because there are several concepts for the same category whose use is heavily determined by context. In addition, concepts are hybrids because they (...)
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  9.  26
    Collin Rice & Joshua Smart (2011). Interdisciplinary Modeling: A Case Study of Evolutionary Economics. Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):655-675.
    Biologists and economists use models to study complex systems. This similarity between these disciplines has led to an interesting development: the borrowing of various components of model-based theorizing between the two domains. A major recent example of this strategy is economists’ utilization of the resources of evolutionary biology in order to construct models of economic systems. This general strategy has come to be called evolutionary economics and has been a source of much debate among economists. Although philosophers have developed literatures (...)
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  10.  1
    Collin Rice (2016). Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):597-619.
    In contrast to earlier views that argued for a particular kind of concept, several recent accounts have proposed that there are multiple distinct kinds of concepts, or that there is a plurality of concepts for each category. In this paper, I argue for a novel account of concepts as pluralistic hybrids. According to this view, concepts are pluralistic because there are several concepts for the same category whose use is heavily determined by context. In addition, concepts are hybrids because they (...)
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  11.  31
    André Ariew, Collin Rice & Yasha Rohwer (2015). Autonomous-Statistical Explanations and Natural Selection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):635-658.
    Shapiro and Sober claim that Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen give a mistaken, a priori defense of natural selection and drift as epiphenomenal. Contrary to Shapiro and Sober’s claims, we first argue that WALM’s explanatory doctrine does not require a defense of epiphenomenalism. We then defend WALM’s explanatory doctrine by arguing that the explanations provided by the modern genetical theory of natural selection are ‘autonomous-statistical explanations’ analogous to Galton’s explanation of reversion to mediocrity and an explanation of the diffusion ofgases. (...)
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  12.  12
    Collin Rice (2011). Massive Modularity, Content Integration, and Language. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):800-812.
  13. Justin Garson, Yasha Rohwer, Collin Rice, Matteo Colombo, Peter Brössel, Davide Rizza, Simon M. Huttegger, Richard Healey, Alyssa Ney & Kathryn Phillips (2013). 10. Referees for Philosophy of Science Referees for Philosophy of Science (Pp. 479-482). Philosophy of Science 80 (3).
     
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