In this work, Collingridge offers a general philosophy of criticism. Many philosophers influenced by the ideas of Karl Popper have hoped to see an expansion from his view of the operation of criticism within science to a more general account of criticism, and, until now, moves in this direction have had only limited success. This book extends Popper's account of the role of criticism in science to many other areas of inquiry.

In his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision Berkeley argues that it is only a happy accident that we are aware of space and objects in space by means of vision, and that the logically primary way in which we are aware of space is by touch. Berkeley 's argument is that all connections between the visual and the spatial properties of things are contingent. Thus we may judge an object's distance from us by noting the number and size (...) of intervening objects, by the sensations arising when we turn our eyes to it, from the confused appearance of the object, or from the straining of our eyes ; but in each case there is only a contingent connection between the method used and the distance of the object from the observer. Similar considerations apply to the judgements we make by sight of magnitude and situation. If this is so then clearly we must have some other way of making spatial judgements, for how else could we establish the various contingent links between what we see and space? This other method must, of course, be by touch, but then touch cannot be merely contingently related to space, for then we would need a third method and so on. Berkeley is therefore led to maintain that there are necessary connections between touch and space. For Berkeley, then, it is impossible for us to make spatial judgements, judgements of the distances between objects and of the magnitudes and positions of objects, by means of sight alone, whereas it is possible to make such judgements on the basis of information obtainable from touch alone. It is this joint claim that I wish to consider. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to take my earlier analysis of the relationship between facts and preferences further to cast light on how some types of preference claims might be assessed. I have argued that both Hume's Rule and the doctrine of the autonomy of values must be rejected on grounds of elementary logic. To take a well worn example: Re-arranging gives.

An incrementalist view of the R&Dprocess is developed, according to which R&D consists of informed trial and error. One way of avoiding expensive mistakes is to avoid choices within the R&D program that are highly sensitive to a particular scientific claim, because a great deal of time and money may have been spent to no avail should the claim turn out to befalse. The incremental view of R&D therefore entails that no choice within any R&D program is sensitive to any (...) scientific claim made at the time. Two tests are presented, antiseptic surgery and the first atomic pile, both of which confirm the incrementalist thesis. (shrink)