Search results for 'Compatibilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Humean Compatibilism (2002). 668 Philosophical Abstracts. Mind 111 (442).score: 30.0
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  2. Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.score: 24.0
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do (...)
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  3. Rik Peels (2013). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).score: 24.0
    William Alston has argued that the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be responsible (...)
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  4. Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.score: 24.0
    Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence (...)
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  5. Ned Markosian (1999). A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.score: 24.0
    The problem of freedom and determinism has vexed philosophers for several millennia, and continues to be a topic of lively debate today. One of the proposed solutions to the problem that has received a great deal of attention is the Theory of Agent Causation. While the theory has enjoyed its share of advocates, and perhaps more than its share of critics, the theory’s advocates and critics have always agreed on one thing: the Theory of Agent Causation is an incompatibilist theory. (...)
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  6. Galen Strawson (1986). On the Inevitability of Freedom (From the Compatibilist Point of View). American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):393-400.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
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  7. Jeremy Randel Koons (2002). Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.score: 24.0
    Most philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free will. Assuming the correctness of this concession, that leaves compatibilism and hard determinism as the only remaining choices in the free will debate. In this paper, I will argue that hard determinism turns out to be a form of compatibilism, and therefore, compatibilism is the only remaining position in the free will debate. I will attempt to establish this conclusion by arguing that hard determinists (...)
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  8. John Martin Fischer (2002). Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism. In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.score: 24.0
    In this essay I shall begin by sketching a "Frankfurt-type example." I shall then lay out a disturbing challenge to the claim I have made above that these examples help us to make significant progress in the debates about the relationship between moral responsibility and causal determinism. I then will provide a reply to this challenge, and the reply will point toward a more refined formulation of the important contribution I believe Frankfurt has made to defending a certain sort of (...)
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  9. Oisin Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (forthcoming). The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism. Philosophical Psychology:1-26.score: 24.0
    Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants’ being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the ‘natural’ compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk (...)
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  10. John Perry (2004). Compatibilist Options. In David Shier, Michael O'Rourke & Joseph Keim Campbell (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press/Bradford Book. 231.score: 24.0
    Compatibilism is the thesis that an act may be both free and determined by previous events and the laws of nature. I assume that in normal cases a condition of a person's performing an act freely is that the person is able to refrain from performing the act. Thus, I accept that if determinism entails that agents do not have this ability, we must give up compatibilism. In this paper I try to contribute to the rethinking of (...) by distinguishing between strong and weak accounts of laws and strong and weak accounts of ability. I argue that compatibilism is a tenable position when combined with either a weak account of laws, or a weak account of ability, or both. I shall concentrate on influential arguments for incompatibilism due to Peter van Inwagen, often called collectively the "consequence argument". (shrink)
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  11. Michael McKenna (2009). Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3 - 13.score: 24.0
    In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist's perspective a critical discussion of "Four Views on Free Will" by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer's semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors' objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be (...)
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  12. Joseph K. Campbell (2005). Compatibilist Alternatives. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.score: 24.0
    _If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in (...)
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  13. Ted Honderich, After Compatibilism and Incompatibilism.score: 24.0
    A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run (...)
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  14. Charles T. Wolfe (2010). Locke’s Compatibilism: Suspension of Desire or Suspension of Determinism? In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press.score: 24.0
    In Book II, chapter xxi of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, on ‘Power’, Locke presents a radical critique of free will. This is the longest chapter in the Essay, and it is a difficult one, not least since Locke revised it four times without always taking care to ensure that every part cohered with the rest. My interest is to work out a coherent statement of what would today be termed ‘compatibilism’ from this text – namely, a doctrine which (...)
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  15. A. A. Howsepian (2007). Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense. Sophia 46 (3):217-236.score: 24.0
    It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad (...)
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  16. Mark Siderits (2008). Paleo-Compatibilism and Buddhist Reductionism. Sophia 47 (1):29-42.score: 24.0
    Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately (...)
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  17. Gary Watson (1999). Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.score: 24.0
    In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane''s work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if (...)
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  18. Michael McKenna (2012). Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.score: 24.0
    Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does (...)
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  19. Manuel Vargas (2005). Compatibilism Evolves?: On Some Varieties of Dennett Worth Wanting. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):460-475.score: 24.0
    I examine the extent to which Dennett’s account in Freedom Evolves might be construed as revisionist about free will or should instead be understood as a more traditional kind of compatibilism. I also consider Dennett’s views about philosophical work on free agency and its relationship to scientific inquiry, and I argue that extant philosophical work is more relevant to scientific inquiry than Dennett’s remarks may suggest.
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  20. Peter A. Graham (2008). A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82.score: 24.0
    David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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  21. Saul Smilansky (2003). Compatibilism: The Argument From Shallowness. Philosophical Studies 115 (3):257-82.score: 24.0
    The compatibility question lies at the center of the free will problem. Compatibilists think that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and the concomitant notions, while incompatibilists think that it is not. The topic of this paper is a particular form of charge against compatibilism: that it is shallow. This is not the typical sort of argument against compatibilism: most of the debate has attempted to discredit compatibilism completely. The Argument From Shallowness maintains that the compatibilists do (...)
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  22. Helen Steward (2008). Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer's Semi-Compatibilism Vs. Anti-Fundamentalism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 12 (2):129 - 145.score: 24.0
    The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a (...)
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  23. S. Oakley (2006). Defending Lewis's Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349.score: 24.0
    Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC), allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee (...)
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  24. Stefaan E. Cuypers (2006). The Trouble with Externalist Compatibilist Autonomy. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve (...)
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  25. Tomis Kapitan (1991). Ability and Cognition: A Defense of Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.score: 24.0
    The use of predicate and sentential operators to express the practical modalities -- ability, control, openness, etc. -- has given new life to a fatalistic argument against determinist theories of responsible agency. A familiar version employs the following principle: the consequences of what is unavoidable (beyond one's control) are themselves unavoidable. Accordingly, if determinism is true, whatever happens is the consequence of events in the remote past, or, of such events together with the laws of nature. But laws and the (...)
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  26. Moti Gorin (2013). What Makes an Intuition a Compatibilist Intuition? A Response to Sripada. Philosophia 41 (4):1205-1215.score: 24.0
    So-called “manipulation arguments” have played a significant role in recent debates between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Incompatibilists take such arguments to show that agents who lack ultimate control over their characters or actions are not free. Most compatibilists agree that manipulated agents are not free but think this is because certain of the agent’s psychological capacities have been compromised. Chandra Sekhar Sripada has conducted an interesting study in which he applies an array of statistical tools to subjects’ intuitive responses to a (...)
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  27. Garrett Pendergraft (2010). The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.score: 24.0
    Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological (...)
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  28. Danilo Suster (2002). Post-Analytic Metaphilosophy and the Case of Compatibilism. In Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. 257-272.score: 24.0
    Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions.
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  29. Michael Robinson (2010). A Compatibilist-Friendly Rejection of Prepunishment. Philosophia 38 (3):589-594.score: 24.0
    In a series of recent papers, Saul Smilansky has argued that compatibilists have no principled way of resisting the view that prepunishment is at least sometimes appropriate, thus revealing compatibilism to be a radical position, out of keeping with our ordinary moral judgments. Recent attempts to resist this conclusion seem to have overlooked the biggest problem with Smilansky’s argument, which is this: Smilanksy argues that the most obvious objection to prepunishment—namely, that it is inappropriate because it involves punishing the (...)
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  30. Eugene Mills (2006). The Sweet Mystery of Compatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4):50 - 61.score: 24.0
    Any satisfactory account of freedom must capture, or at least permit, the mysteriousness of freedom—a “sweet” mystery involving a certain kind of ignorance rather than a “sour” mystery of unintelligibility, incoherence, or unjustifiedness. I argue that compatibilism can capture the sweet mystery of freedom. I argue first that an action is free if and only if a certain “rationality constraint” is satisfied, and that nothing in standard libertarian accounts of freedom entails its satisfaction. Satisfaction of this constraint is consistent (...)
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  31. Barbara Hannan & Keith Lehrer (1989). Compatibilism, Determinism, and the Identity Theory. Inquiry 32 (March):49-54.score: 24.0
    Two issues are raised with regard to Ted Honderich's A Theory of Determinism. First, regarding the relation between a token identity theory of mental and physical events and Honderich's ?psychoneural union theory?, it is suggested that a token identity theory would serve Honderich's purposes while securing a simpler ontology. Second, it is argued that there is a substantive philosophical issue dividing compatibilists and incompatibilists on the question of whether persons possess free will, contrary to Honderich's contention that the compatibilist and (...)
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  32. Kenneth J. Perszyk (1999). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defence: A Reply to Bishop. Australasian Journal of Philosopy 77 (1):92-105.score: 24.0
    This paper 1) argues that libertarians are virtually as badly off as compatibilists in the face of the objection to the Free Will Defence that omnipotent God could have ensured that all free beings always but freely did right, and 2) explores the prospects for an "upgraded" Free Will Defense which takes freedom merely as a necessary condition for a further higher good which logically could not be achieved if God employed any of the available strategies--under both compatibilist and libertarian (...)
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  33. Anthony Robert Booth (2014). On Some Recent Moves in Defence of Doxastic Compatibilism. Synthese 191 (8):1-14.score: 24.0
    According to the doxastic compatibilist, compatibilist criteria with respect to the freedom of action rule-in our having free beliefs. In Booth (Philosophical Papers 38:1–12, 2009), I challenged the doxastic compatibilist to either come up with an account of how doxastic attitudes can be intentional in the face of it very much seeming to many of us that they cannot. Or else, in rejecting that doxastic attitudes need to be voluntary in order to be free, to come up with a principled (...)
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  34. Stefaan E. Cuypers (2013). Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188.score: 24.0
    In the debate on free will and moral responsibility, Saul Smilansky is a hard source-incompatibilist who objects to source-compatibilism for being morally shallow. After criticizing John Martin Fischer’s too optimistic response to this objection, this paper dissipates the charge that compatibilist accounts of ultimate origination are morally shallow by appealing to the seriousness of contingency in the framework of, what Paul Russell calls, compatibilist-fatalism. Responding to the objection from moral shallowness thus drives a wedge between optimists and fatalists within (...)
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  35. Göran Duus-Otterström (2010). Betting Against Compatibilism. Res Publica 16 (4):383-396.score: 24.0
    Some argue that libertarianism represents the riskier incompatibilist view when it comes to the free will problem. An ethically cautious incompatibilist should bet that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, these theorists claim, as doing so means that we no longer run the risk of holding the morally innocent responsible. In this paper, I show that the same reasoning also advises us to bet against compatibilism. Supposing that we are unsure about whether or not (...)
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  36. Matthew Talbert (2009). Compatibilism, Common Sense, and Prepunishment. Public Affairs Quarterly 23 (4):325-335.score: 24.0
    We “prepunish” a person if we punish her prior to the commission of her crime. This essay discusses our intuitions about the permissibility of prepunishment and the relationship between prepunishment and compatibilism about free will and determinism. It has recently been argued that compatibilism has particular trouble generating a principled objection to prepunishment. The failure to provide such an objection may be a problem for compatibilism if our moral intuitions strongly favor the prohibition of prepunishment. In defense (...)
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  37. Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist (2011). Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries. Neuroethics 4 (1):31-34.score: 24.0
    Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries Content Type Journal Article Pages 31-34 DOI 10.1007/s12152-010-9067-3 Authors Roy F. Baumeister, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA A. William Crescioni, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Jessica L. Alquist, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 1.
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  38. Nicole A. Vincent (forthcoming). A Compatibilist Theory of Legal Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-22.score: 24.0
    Philosophical compatibilism reconciles moral responsibility with determinism, and some neurolaw scholars think that it can also reconcile legal views about responsibility with scientific findings about the neurophysiological basis of human action. Although I too am a compatibilist, this paper argues that philosophical compatibilism cannot be transplanted “as-is” from philosophy into law. Rather, before compatibilism can be re-deployed, it must first be modified to take account of differences between legal and moral responsibility, and between a scientific and a (...)
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  39. Michael S. McKenna (1998). Moral Theory and Modified Compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):441-458.score: 24.0
    Recently there have been a number of attempts to show that free will is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. It is argued that moral responsibility can be shown to be compatible with determinism even if free will is not. I assess the two most prominent arguments for this position and conclude that neither is sound. There is, however, an argument which does make a prima facie case for this new form of compatibilism. This argument, however, is not (...)
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  40. Saul Smilansky (1991). The Contrariety of Compatibilist Positions. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:293-309.score: 24.0
    The compatibilist position on the free will problem tends to be perceived as clear, rather unitary and consistent even by those who oppose it. This notion is mistaken, and is harmful to the recognition of the weaknesses and strengths of compatibilism. By examining the three main compatibilist positions and their interrelationships, I attempt to see whether compatibilists can continue to hold together the different positions; and if they cannot, which position they should remain with. The conclusions reached are that (...)
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  41. Kevin Timpe (2009). Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):109-124.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind John Martin Fischer's semi-compatibilism. Particularly, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these motivations are in tension with each other: the more one is m..
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  42. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). On the Viability of Semi-Compatibilism. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):125-140.score: 24.0
    Semi-compatibilism regarding responsibility is the position according to which determinism is compatible with moral responsibility quite apart from whether determinism rules out the sort of freedom that involves access to alternative possibilities. I motivate the view that whether or not semi-compat..
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  43. Seth Shabo (2012). Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy: An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):158-186.score: 22.0
    In this paper, I explore a new approach to the problem of determinism and moral responsibility. This approach involves asking when someone has a compelling claim to exemption against other members of the moral community. I argue that it is sometimes fair to reject such claims, even when the agent doesn’t deserve, in the sense of basic desert, to be blamed for her conduct. In particular, when an agent’s conduct reveals that her commitment to comply with the standards of the (...)
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  44. Benjamin Vilhauer (2004). Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibilist About Determinism and Moral Responsibility? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):719 – 730.score: 22.0
    In this paper, I discuss Hud Hudson's compatibilistic interpretation of Kant's theory of free will, which is based on Davidson's anomalous monism. I sketch an alternative interpretation of my own, an incompatibilistic interpretation according to which agents qua noumena are responsible for the particular causal laws which determine the actions of agents qua phenomena. Hudson's interpretation should be attractive to philosophers who value Kant's epistemology and ethics, but insist on a deflationary reading of things in themselves. It is in an (...)
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  45. Benjamin Matheson (2014). Compatibilism and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.score: 22.0
    Compatibilists disagree over whether there are historical conditions on moral responsibility. Historicists claim there are, whilst structuralists deny this. Historicists motivate their position by claiming to avoid the counter-intuitive implications of structuralism. I do two things in this paper. First, I argue that historicism has just as counter-intuitive implications as structuralism when faced with thought experiments inspired by those found in the personal identity literature. Hence, historicism is not automatically preferable to structuralism. Second, I argue that structuralism is much more (...)
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  46. Helen Beebee (2003). Local Miracle Compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277.score: 21.0
  47. Jim Stone (1998). Free Will as a Gift From God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.score: 21.0
    I argue that God could give us the robust power to do other than we do in a deterministic universe.
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  48. John D. Bishop (1993). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.score: 21.0
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