Search results for 'Computational Theory of Mind' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Bartlomiej Swiatczak (2011). Conscious Representations: An Intractable Problem for the Computational Theory of Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 21 (1):19-32.score: 1636.0
    Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jon Cogburn & Jason Megill (2010). Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.score: 1636.0
    We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.score: 1349.0
    There is a thesis often aired by some philosophers of psychology that syntax is all we need and there is no need to advert to intentional/semantic properties of symbols for purposes of psychological explanation. Indeed, the worry has been present since the first explicit articulation of so-called Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Even Fodor, who has been the most ardent defender of the Language of Thought Hypoth- esis (LOTH) (which requires the CTM), has raised worries about its (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts' Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Synthese 141 (2):175-215.score: 1320.0
    Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and computation to understand neural, and thus mental, activity. McCulloch and Pitts's contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata (an important formalism in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jeffrey Hershfield (2005). Is There Life After the Death of the Computational Theory of Mind? Minds and Machines 15 (2):183-194.score: 1276.0
    In this paper, I explore the implications of Fodor’s attacks on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), which get their most recent airing in The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way. I argue that if Fodor is right that the CTM founders on the global nature of abductive inference, then several of the philosophical views about the mind that he has championed over the years founder as well. I focus on Fodor’s accounts of mental causation, psychological (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Steven Horst (1999). Symbols and Computation: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 9 (3):347-381.score: 1276.0
    Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Marcin Milkowski, Computational Theory of Mind. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 1244.0
    The Computational Theory of Mind The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) claims that the mind is a computer, so the theory is also known as computationalism. It is generally assumed that CTM is the main working hypothesis of cognitive science. CTM is often understood as a specific variant of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), […].
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider (2008). Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind. Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.score: 1236.0
    In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Steven Horst, The Computational Theory of Mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 1236.0
    Over the past thirty years, it is been common to hear the mind likened to a digital computer. This essay is concerned with a particular philosophical view that holds that the mind literally is a digital computer (in a specific sense of “computer” to be developed), and that thought literally is a kind of computation. This view—which will be called the “Computational Theory of Mind” (CTM)—is thus to be distinguished from other and broader attempts to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2006). Two Concepts of "Form" and the so-Called Computational Theory of Mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821.score: 1224.0
    According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism. John Benjamins & Co.score: 1224.0
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Iep Author, Computational Theory of Mind.score: 1224.0
    The Computational Theory of Mind The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) claims that the mind is a computer, so the theory is also known as computationalism. It is generally assumed that CTM is the main working hypothesis of cognitive science. CTM is often understood as a specific variant of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), […].
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Elske Vaart & Charlotte K. Hemelrijk (2012). 'Theory of Mind' in Animals: Ways to Make Progress. Synthese (3):1-20.score: 1188.0
    Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Elske van der Vaart & Charlotte K. Hemelrijk (2012). 'Theory of Mind' in Animals: Ways to Make Progress. Synthese 191 (3):1-20.score: 1188.0
    Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jason L. Megill (2004). Are We Paraconsistent? On the Lucas-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind. Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.score: 1116.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Craig DeLancey (1997). Emotion and the Computational Theory of Mind. In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.score: 1074.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Roger Fellows (1995). Welcome to Wales: Searle on the Computational Theory of Mind. In , Philosophy and Technology. New York: Cambridge University Press. 85-97.score: 1068.0
  18. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.) (1986). Meaning And Cognitive Structure: Issues In The Computational Theory Of Mind. Norwood: Ablex.score: 1044.0
  19. Steven Horst (1996). Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. University of California Press.score: 1032.0
    In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Brandon Zimmerman (2008). Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Review of Metaphysics 62 (1):141-142.score: 1032.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Hans D. Muller (1999). Steven W. Horst, Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 9 (3):424-430.score: 1024.0
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (2008). The Computational Theory of Mind and the Decomposition of Actions. Philosophical Topics 36 (2):63-86.score: 1020.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Paul Thagard (1987). Zenon W. Pylyshyn and William Demopoulos, Eds., Meaning and Cognitive Structure: Issues in the Computational Theory of Mind Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 7 (10):422-423.score: 1020.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Richard McDonough (2001). Why the Computational Theory of Mind Doesn't Compute. [REVIEW] Metascience 10 (3):442-447.score: 1020.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jane Duran (1989). Epistemics: Epistemic Justification Theory Naturalized and the Computational Model of Mind. University Press of America.score: 1017.0
    The third and fourth chapters of this work are devoted directly to that effort.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Akifumi Tokosumi (2001). A Computational Literary Theory: The Ultimate Products of the Brain/Mind Machine. In T. Kitamura (ed.), What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function? World Scientific. 3--43.score: 964.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.score: 870.0
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computational Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of Mind. In Francesco Ferretti, Massimo Marraffa & Mario De Caro (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface Between Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Springer. 343-353.score: 822.0
    According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), mental capacities are explained by inner computations, which in biological organisms are realized in the brain. Computational explanation is so popular and entrenched that it’s common for scientists and philosophers to assume CTM without argument.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jonathan Waskan (2011). A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia (a Gift to Computationalists). Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103 - 125.score: 795.0
    I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2011). Towards a Computational Theory of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.score: 786.0
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. P. Cariani (2012). Mind, a Machine? Review of “The Search for a Theory of Cognition: Early Mechanisms and New Ideas” Edited by Stefano Franchi and Francesco Bianchini. Constructivist Foundations 7 (3):222-227.score: 768.0
    Upshot: Written by recognized experts in their fields, the book is a set of essays that deals with the influences of early cybernetics, computational theory, artificial intelligence, and connectionist networks on the historical development of computational-representational theories of cognition. In this review, I question the relevance of computability arguments and Jonasian phenomenology, which has been extensively invoked in recent discussions of autopoiesis and Ashby’s homeostats. Although the book deals only indirectly with constructivist approaches to cognition, it is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Josh Weisberg, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.score: 744.0
    Over the last quarter century or so, no one has done more to shape debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science than Jerry Fodor. He is best known for championing the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the view that thinking consists of computations over syntactically structured mental representations (Fodor, 1975). He has also developed the idea that the mind is partially made up of isolated mechanisms called “modules” that employ innate databases informationally encapsulated (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Joseph A. Hedger & William V. Fabricius (2011). True Belief Belies False Belief: Recent Findings of Competence in Infants and Limitations in 5-Year-Olds, and Implications for Theory of Mind Development. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):429-447.score: 711.0
    False belief tasks have enjoyed a monopoly in the research on children’s development of a theory of mind. They have been granted this status because they promise to deliver an unambiguous assessment of children’s understanding of the representational nature of mental states. Their poor cousins, true belief tasks, have been relegated to occasional service as control tasks. That this is their only role has been due to the universal assumption that correct answers on true belief tasks are inherently (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). Embodied Cognition and Theory of Mind. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge.score: 711.0
    According to embodied cognition, the philosophical and empirical literature on theory of mind is misguided. Embodied cognition rejects the idea that social cognition requires theory of mind. It regards the intramural debate between the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory as irrelevant, and it dismisses the empirical studies on theory of mind as ill conceived and misleading. Embodied cognition provides a novel deflationary account of social cognition that does not depend on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Marcus P. Adams (2011). Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):763-773.score: 711.0
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008). In this paper, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone’s (2008) account. Second, I discuss various (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Monika Dullstein (2012). The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):231-248.score: 711.0
    It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Theodore Bach (2014). A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development. Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.score: 711.0
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Liesbeth Flobbe, Rineke Verbrugge, Petra Hendriks & Irene Krämer (2008). Children's Application of Theory of Mind in Reasoning and Language. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):417-442.score: 711.0
    Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed to involve the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Rineke Verbrugge & Lisette Mol (2008). Learning to Apply Theory of Mind. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):489-511.score: 711.0
    In everyday life it is often important to have a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people. Sometimes it is even useful to to have a correct model of their model of our own mental states: a second-order Theory of Mind. In order to investigate to what extent adults use and acquire complex skills and strategies in the domains of Theory of Mind and the related skill of natural language use, we (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Evelyn Gick & Wolfgang Gick (2001). F.A. Hayek's Theory of Mind and Theory of Cultural Evolution Revisited: Toward and Integrated Perspective. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 2 (1):149-162.score: 708.8
    F.A. Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution has often been regarded as incompatible with his earlier works. Since it lacks an elaborated theory of individual learning, we try to back his arguments by starting with his thoughts on individual perception described in hisTheory of Mind. With a focus on the current discussion concerning biological and cultural selection theories, we argue hisTheory of Mind leads to two different stages of societal evolution with well-defined learning processes, respectively. The first (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Marcus P. Adams (2013). Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):233-249.score: 702.0
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Bertram F. Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 225-255.score: 702.0
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Understanding Fictional Minds Without Theory of Mind! Style 45 (2):276-282.score: 702.0
    This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing with actual minds. Let us call this the ‘Same Resources Thesis’. I believe the ‘Same Resources Thesis’ is true. But this is because I defend the view that engaging in narrative practices is the normal developmental route through which children (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. C. M. Heyes (1998). Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):101-114.score: 702.0
    Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Mahin Chenari (2009). Hermeneutics and Theory of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):17-31.score: 702.0
    In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate around the concept of theory of mind. Theory of mind concerns our ability to understand another person. The two approaches that dominate the debate are “Theory Theory” (TT) and “Simulation Theory” (ST). This paper explores the connection between theory of mind and hermeneutics. Although both speak of the nature of understanding, and the way we gain and organize our knowledge of others, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. James R. O'Shea (2012). The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.score: 702.0
    Recent proponents of the ‘theory theory’ of mind often trace its roots back to Wilfrid Sellars’ famous ‘myth of Jones’ in his 1956 article, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’. Sellars developed an account of the intersubjective basis of our knowledge of the inner mental states of both self and others, an account which included the claim that such knowledge is in some sense theoretical knowledge. This paper examines the nature of this claim in Sellars’ original (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Marco Fenici (2012). Embodied Social Cognition and Embedded Theory of Mind. Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307.score: 702.0
    Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. James R. O'Shea (2012). 'The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.score: 702.0
    Recent proponents of the ‘theory theory’ of mind often trace its roots back to Wilfrid Sellars’ famous ‘myth of Jones’ in his 1956 article, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’. Sellars developed an account of the intersubjective basis of our knowledge of the inner mental states of both self and others, an account which included the claim that such knowledge is in some sense theoretical knowledge. This paper examines the nature of this claim in Sellars’ original (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Vivian Bohl & Wouter van den Bos (2012). Toward an Integrative Account of Social Cognition: Marrying Theory of Mind and Interactionism to Study the Interplay of Type 1 and Type 2 Processes. [REVIEW] Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 702.0
    Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of social interactions. We argue that instead of considering ToM and interactionism as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000