Search results for 'Conceivability' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (2002). Introduction: Conceivability and Possibility. In T. Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 1--70.score: 27.0
    To what extent and how is conceivability a guide to possibility? This essay explores general philosophical issues raised by this question, and critically surveys responses to it by Descartes, Hume, Kripke and "two-dimensionalists.".
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  2. David J. Chalmers (2002). Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 145--200.score: 25.0
    There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim (about what can be known or conceived), from there to a modal claim (about what is possible or necessary), and from there to a metaphysical claim (about the nature of things in the world).
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  3. Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.score: 24.0
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  4. Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them.
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  5. Brie Gertler (2002). Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments About the Mind. Noûs 36 (1):22-49.score: 24.0
    My aim here is threefold: (a) to show that conceptual facts play a more significant role in justifying explanatory reductions than most of the contributors to the current debate realize; (b) to furnish an account of that role, and (c) to trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind.
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  6. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Noûs 45 (1):22-49.score: 24.0
    The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.
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  7. M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility. Erkenntnis 67 (3):387 - 399.score: 24.0
    The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal (...)
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  8. Hamid Vahid (2006). Conceivability and Possibility: Chalmers on Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):243-260.score: 24.0
    We often decide whether a state of affairs is possible (impossible) by trying to mentally depict a scenario (using words, images, etc.) where the state in question obtains (or fails to obtain). These mental acts (broadly thought of as 'conceiving') seem to provide us with an epistemic route to the space of possibilities. The problem this raises is whether conceivability judgments provide justification-conferring grounds for the ensuing possibility-claims (call this the 'conceivability thesis'). Although the question has a long (...)
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  9. Daniel Stoljar (2001). The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.score: 24.0
    The conceivability argument (CA) against physicalism1 starts from the prem- ises that: (1) It is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, i.e., that there is someone who is physically identical to me and yet who lacks phenomenal con- sciousness; and (2) If it is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, then it is possible that I have a zombie-twin. These premises entail that physicalism is false, for physicalism is the claim—or can be assumed for our purposes to be the (...)
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  10. Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism. Diametros 7 (March):37-55.score: 24.0
    Chalmers argues that zombies are possible and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on physical facts, which shows the falsity of materialism. The crucial step in this argument – that zombies are possible – follows from their conceivability and hence depends on assuming that conceivability implies possibility. But while Chalmers’s defense of this assumption – call it the conceivability principle – is the key part of his argument, it has not been well understood. As I see it, (...)
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  11. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities. Synthese 151 (2):273-295.score: 24.0
    David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don't fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities. This means that some of Chalmers' (...)
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  12. Glen Hoffmann (2008). Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):287-299.score: 24.0
    The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic (...)
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  13. Heimir Geirsson (2005). Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):279-304.score: 24.0
    This paper advances the thesis that we can justifiably believe philosophically interesting possibility statements. The first part of the paper critically discusses van Inwagens skeptical arguments while at the same time laying some of the foundation for a positive view. The second part of the paper advances a view of conceivability in terms of imaginability, where imaginging can be propositional, pictorial, or a combination of the two, and argues that conceivability can, and often does, provide us with justified (...)
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  14. Moti Mizrahi & David R. Morrow (2014). Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility? Ratio 26 (4):n/a-n/a.score: 24.0
    In this paper, we argue that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’, which is the view that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary metaphysical possibility, is self-defeating. To this end, we outline two reductio arguments against ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’. The first reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that conceivability both is and is not conclusive evidence for possibility. The second reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that it (...)
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  15. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Conceivability, Rigidity and Counterpossibles. Synthese 171 (3):377 - 386.score: 24.0
    Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis’ objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright’s proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.
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  16. Gerald W. Barnes (2002). Conceivability, Explanation, and Defeat. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):327-338.score: 24.0
    Hill and Levine offer alternative explanations of these conceivabilities, concluding that these conceivabilities are thereby defeated as evidence. However, this strategy fails because their explanations generalize to all conceivability judgments concerning phenomenal states. Consequently, one could defend absolutely any theory of phenomenal states against conceivability arguments in just this way. This result conflicts with too many of our common sense beliefs about the evidential value of conceivability with respect to phenomenal states. The general moral is that the (...)
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  17. Raamy Majeed (2014). A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies. Philosophical Papers 43 (2):227-253.score: 24.0
    (2014). A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 227-253.
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  18. Phil Corkum (2012). Meta-Conceivability. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):12.score: 24.0
    In addition to conceiving of such imaginary scenarios as those involving philosophical zombies, we may conceive of such things being conceived. Call these higher order conceptions ‘meta-conceptions’. Sorensen (2006) holds that one can entertain a meta-conception without thereby conceiving of the embedded lower-order conception. So it seems that I can meta-conceive possibilities which I cannot conceive. If this is correct, then meta-conceptions provide a counter-example to the claim that possibility entails conceivability. Moreover, some of Sorensen’s discussion suggests the following (...)
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  19. Peter Murphy (2006). Reliability Connections Between Conceivability and Inconceivability. Dialectica 60 (2):195-205.score: 24.0
    Conceivability is an important source of our beliefs about what is possible; inconceivability is an important source of our beliefs about what is impossible. What are the connections between the reliability of these sources? If one is reliable, does it follow that the other is also reliable? The central contention of this paper is that suitably qualified the reliability of inconceivability implies the reliability of conceivability, but the reliability of conceivability fails to imply the reliability of inconceivability.
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  20. Gad Prudovsky (1995). Arguments From Conceivability. Ratio 8 (1):63-69.score: 24.0
    What can be inferred from the fact that something is, or is not, conceivable? In this paper I argue, contrary to some deflationary remarks in recent literature, that arguments which use such facts as their starting point may have significant philosophical import. I use Strawson's results from the first chapter of "Individuals" in order to show that Galileo's arguments in favor of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which are based on premises concerning conceivability, should not be dismissed: (...)
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  21. Peter Kail (2003). Conceivability and Modality in Hume: A Lemma in an Argument in Defense of Skeptical Realism. Hume Studies 29 (1):43--61.score: 24.0
    This paper examines the ramifications of Hume's view of the relation of conceivability to metaphysical possibility. It argues that the limitations Hume places of the representations involved in moves to conceivability to metaphysical possibility preclude any straightforward argument against full-blooded causal realism in Hume from conceivability. Furthermore, our finding certain states of affairs conceivable when they are not metaphysically possible is perfectly compatible with the thrust of the causal realist position.
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  22. Stephen Boulter (2011). The Medieval Origins of Conceivability Arguments. Metaphilosophy 42 (5):617-641.score: 24.0
    The central recommendation of this article is that philosophers trained in the analytic tradition ought to add the sensibilities and skills of the historian to their methodological toolkit. The value of an historical approach to strictly philosophical matters is illustrated by a case study focussing on the medieval origin of conceivability arguments and contemporary views of modality. It is shown that common metaphilosophical views about the nature of the philosophical enterprise as well as certain inference patterns found in thinkers (...)
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  23. Lewis Powell (2013). How To Avoid Mis-Reiding Hume's Maxim Of Conceivability. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):105-119.score: 24.0
    In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Thomas Reid offers a barrage of objections to the view, held by David Hume, that conceivability implies possibility. In this paper, I present Reid's first two objections to the ‘maxim of conceivability’ and defend Hume from them. The first objection concerns our ability to understand impossible claims, while the second concerns thoughts about impossible claims (such as, for instance, the thought that they are impossible). Reid's objections have special force (...)
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  24. C. J. G. Wright (2002). The Conceivability of Naturalism. In Tamar S. Gendler (ed.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 401--439.score: 24.0
  25. Tibor R. Machan (1969). Note on Conceivability and Logical Possibility. Kinesis 2:39--42.score: 24.0
    A. Collins once argued that time travel is only imaginable if we relate the "event" out of context. John Hospers argues that it is logically possible for an iron bar to float in water even if it is actually (empirically) impossible. My point in this piece is that Hospers relies on viewing the floating out of context, in Walt Disney fashion; but that is no way to establish any kind of possibility. I also discuss "conceivability", a term frequently used (...)
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  26. Peter Menzies (1998). Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections. In Roberto Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 255--277.score: 24.0
    In the history of modern philosophy systematic connections were assumed to hold between the modal concepts of logical possibility and necessity and the concept of conceivability. However, in the eyes of many contemporary philosophers, insuperable objections face any attempt to analyze the modal concepts in terms of conceivability. It is important to keep in mind that a philosophical explanation of modality does not have to take the form of a reductive analysis. In this paper I attempt to provide (...)
     
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  27. Albert Casullo (1979). Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability. Analysis 39 (4):212--219.score: 22.0
    Hume's maxim consists of two principles which are logically independent of each other: (1) whatever is conceivable is possible; and (2) whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Thomas Reid offered several arguments against the former principle, while John Stuart mill argued against the latter. The primary concern of this paper is to examine whether Reid and mill were successful in calling Hume's maxim into question.
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  28. Albert Casullo (1975). Conceivability and Possibility. Ratio 17:118-121.score: 22.0
    The purpose of this article is to defend Hume's claim that whatever is conceivable is possible from a criticism by William Kneale. Kneale argues that although a mathematician can conceive of the falsehood of the Goldbach conjecture, he does not conclude that it is not necessarily true. The author suggests that by taking into account Hume's distinction between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, a revised version of his claim can be offered which is not open to Kneale's criticism.
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  29. Stephen Yablo (1993). Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.score: 21.0
  30. Christopher S. Hill (1997). Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.score: 21.0
  31. Joseph Levine (1998). Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind. Noûs 32 (4):449-480.score: 21.0
  32. Sara Worley (2003). Conceivability, Possibility and Physicalism. Analysis 63 (1):15-23.score: 21.0
  33. John Collins (2009). The Limits of Conceivability: Logical Cognitivism and the Language Faculty. Synthese 171 (1):175 - 194.score: 21.0
    Robert Hanna (Rationality and logic. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006) articulates and defends the thesis of logical cognitivism, the claim that human logical competence is grounded in a cognitive faculty (in Chomsky’s sense) that is not naturalistically explicable. This position is intended to steer us between the Scylla of logical Platonism and the Charybdis of logical naturalism (/psychologism). The paper argues that Hanna’s interpretation of Chomsky is mistaken. Read aright, Chomsky’s position offers a defensible version of naturalism, one Hanna may accept (...)
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  34. Jamie L. Phillips (1998). A Problem with Marton's Zombies Vs. Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):175-178.score: 21.0
  35. Rene Woudenberg (2006). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):210-221.score: 21.0
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  36. James van Cleve (1983). Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):35-45.score: 21.0
  37. Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.score: 18.0
    In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism, is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.
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  38. Andrew R. Bailey, The Unsoundness of Arguments From Conceivability.score: 18.0
    It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all (...)
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  39. Daniel Stoljar (2007). Two Conceivability Arguments Compared. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.score: 18.0
    The conclusion of this argument (hereafter ZA) entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though (...)
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  40. Manolo Martínez (2013). Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem. Erkenntnis 78 (5):979-990.score: 18.0
    Our limited a priori-reasoning skills open a gap between our finding a proposition conceivable and its metaphysical possibility. A prominent strategy for closing this gap is the postulation of ideal conceivers, who suffer from no such limitations. In this paper I argue that, under many, maybe all, plausible unpackings of the notion of ideal conceiver, it is false that ideal negative conceivability entails possibility.
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  41. M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364-380.score: 18.0
    The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness (...)
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  42. H. Jacoby (1990). Empirical Functionalism and Conceivability Arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.score: 18.0
    Functionalism, the philosophical theory that defines mental states in terms of their causal relations to stimuli, overt behaviour, and other inner mental states, has often been accused of being unable to account for the qualitative character of our experimential states. Many times such objections to functionalism take the form of conceivability arguments. One is asked to imagine situations where organisms who are in a functional state that is claimed to be a particular experience either have the qualitative character of (...)
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  43. Jussi Jylkkä (2013). Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument. Erkenntnis 78 (3):647-663.score: 18.0
    The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers’ variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist (...)
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  44. Mircea Dumitru (2008). Conceivability and Possibility. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:53-60.score: 18.0
    Explaining phenomenal consciousness may be the scientific and philosophical problem of our time, the last frontier of knowledge. This is not at all an easy task. For any serious attempt at finding a place for consciousness within the natural world was not successful so far. There is a conceptual tension here which makes this business of coming up with a unified (monist) explanation of mind and physical world one of the most intriguing mystery. The most predominant image of the natural (...)
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  45. Heimir Geirsson (2014). Conceivability and Coherence: A Skeptical View of Zombies. Erkenntnis 79 (1):211-225.score: 18.0
    One reason for the recent attention to conceivability claims is to be found in the extended use of conceivability in philosophy of mind, and then especially in connection with zombie thought experiments. The idea is that zombies are conceivable; beings that look like us and behave like us in all ways, but for which “all is dark inside;” that is, for a zombie, there is no “what it is like.” There is no “what it is like” to be (...)
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  46. Mark Silcox (2007). On the Conceivability of an Omniscient Interpreter. Dialogue 46 (4):627-636.score: 18.0
    l examine the “omniscient interpreter” (OI) argument against scepticism that Donald Davidson published in 1977 only to retract it twenty-two years later. I argue that the argument’s persuasiveness has been underestimated. I defend it against the charges that Davidson assumes the actual existence of an OI and that Davidson’s other philosophical commitments are incompatible with the very conceivability of an OI. The argument’s surface implausibility derivesfrom Davidson’s suggestion that an OI would attribute beliefs using the same methods as afallible (...)
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  47. Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (forthcoming). On Zalta's Notion of Encoding in Conceivability Contexts. Metaphysica.score: 18.0
    Zalta's notion of encoding which lies at the core of his theory of abstract objects is refined so that it can capture cognitive dynamic phenomena such as multiple object-tracking in particular intentional contexts; namely hypothetical stipulation concerning abstract objects and counter-essential conceivability about ordinary ones. Zalta's Modal Axiom of Encoding is weakened and the notion of 'quasi-encoding' is spelt out.
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  48. Entail Possibility (2002). Does Conceivability. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 145.score: 18.0
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  49. Lilli Alanen (1988). The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and His Predecessors. In Simo Knuuttila (ed.), Modern Modalities: Studies of the History of Modal Theories From Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism. Kluwer. 1-69.score: 18.0
    Descartes's view of modality is analyzed by contrast to two earlier models: the ancient realist one, defended by Boethius, where possibility and necessity are connected to natural potency, and the modern intensionalist one, which dissociates necessary and possible truths from any ontological foundation, treating them as conceptual, a priori given preconditions for any intellect. The emergence of this view is traced from Gilbert of Poitiers to duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez. The Cartesian theory of the creation of eternal truths, it (...)
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  50. Gordon Barnes (2002). Conceivability, Explanation, and Defeat. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):327 - 338.score: 18.0
    Christopher Hill and Joseph Levine have argued that the conceivabilities involved in anti-materialist arguments are defeated as evidence of possibility. Their strategy assumes the following principle: the conceivability of a state of affairs S constitutes evidence for the possibility of S only if the possibility of S is the best explanation of the conceivability of S. So if there is a better explanation of the conceivability of S than its possibility, then the conceivability of S is (...)
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