Search results for 'Conceptualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Kevin Connolly (2014). Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)? Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337.
    A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate (...)
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  2. Thomas Land (2011). Kantian Conceptualism. In Guenther Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology. De Gruyter 1--197.
    In the recent debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about perceptual content, Kant’s notion of intuition has been invoked on both sides. Conceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their position, arguing that Kantian intuitions have the same kind of content as conceptual thought. On the other hand, nonconceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their own position, contending that Kantian intuitions have a distinctly nonconceptual kind of content. In this paper, I argue first, that both sides are wrong about Kant, (...)
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  3.  91
    Corijn van Mazijk (2014). Why Kant Is a Non-Conceptualist But Is Better Regarded a Conceptualist. Kant Studies Online:170-201.
    ABSTRACT This paper deals with the problem of characterizing the content of experience as either conceptual or non-conceptual in -/- Kant’s transcendenta -/- l philosophy, a topic widely debated in contemporary philosophy. I start out with -/- Kant’s pre -/- -critical discussions of space and time in which he develops a specific notion of non-conceptual content. Secondly, I show that this notion of non-conceptual intuitional content does not seem to match well with the Transcendental Deduction. This incongruity results in three (...)
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  4. Colin McLear (2014). The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate. Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
    One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy.
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  5. Santiago Echeverri (2011). McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could be (...)
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  6. Refeng Tang (2010). Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given. Synthese 175 (1):101-122.
    The motivation for McDowell’s conceptualism is an epistemological consideration. McDowell believes conceptualism would guarantee experience a justificatory role in our belief system and we can then avoid the Myth of the Given without falling into coherentism. Conceptualism thus claims an epistemological advantage over nonconceptualism. The epistemological advantage of conceptualism is not to be denied. But both Sellars and McDowell insist experience is not belief. This makes it impossible for experience to justify empirical knowledge, for the simple (...)
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  7.  19
    Nathan D. Shannon (2015). The Epistemology of Divine Conceptualism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):123-130.
    Divine conceptualism takes all abstract objects to be propositions in the mind of God. I focus here on necessary propositions and contemporary claims that the laws of logic, understood as necessarily true propositions, provide us with an epistemic bridge to theological predication—specifically, to the claim that God exists. I argue that when contemporary versions of DC say ‘G/god’ they merely rename the notion of necessary truth, and fail to refer to God. Given that God is incomprehensible, epistemic access to (...)
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  8.  41
    Charlie Pelling (2007). Conceptualism and the Problem of Illusory Experience. Acta Analytica 22 (3):169-182.
    According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has recently argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck’s argument, I explain why I think that Bill Brewer’s conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which I myself endorse. My argument turns (...)
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  9. Nathan Bauer (2012). A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception. Inquiry 55 (3):215-237.
    Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the (...)
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  10.  23
    Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Barry Smith (2004). Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge University Press 197--220.
    It is often claimed that the beginnings of Brentano’s ontology were Aristotelian in nature; but this claim is only partially true. Certainly the young Brentano adopted many elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and he was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian way of doing philosophy. But he always interpreted Aristotle’s ideas in his own fashion. He accepted them selectively, and he used them in the service of ends that would not have been welcomed by Aristotle himself. The present paper is an exposition (...)
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  11. Harjeet Singh Gill (2007). Conceptualism in Buddhist and French Traditions. Punjabi University.
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  12. John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
    Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and (...)
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  13.  26
    Hilla Jacobson & Hilary Putnam (2016). Against Perceptual Conceptualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):1-25.
    This paper is concerned with the question of whether mature human experience is thoroughly conceptual, or whether it involves non-conceptual elements or layers. It has two central goals. The first goal is methodological. It aims to establish that that question is, to a large extent, an empirical question. The question cannot be answered by appealing to purely a priori and transcendental considerations. The second goal is to argue, inter alia by relying on empirical findings, that the view known as ‘state- (...)’ is false. We will argue that our experiences do involve non-conceptual elements. That is, a subject may enjoy an experience with a particular phenomenal aspect, without possessing the concept needed for the specification of the content of that aspect, and moreover, without being able to acquire that concept upon having that experience. (shrink)
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  14.  21
    Marek Picha (2014). Apriorism, Psychologism, and Conceptualism About Thought Experiments. Dokos 2014 (1):27-47.
    Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear conception about (...)
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  15. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  16. Aaron M. Griffith (2012). Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):193-222.
    Abstract: Philosophers interested in Kant's relevance to contemporary debates over the nature of mental content—notably Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais—have argued that Kant ought to be credited with being the original proponent of the existence of ‘nonconceptual content’. However, I think the ‘nonconceptualist’ interpretations that Hanna and Allais give do not show that Kant allowed for nonconceptual content as they construe it. I argue, on the basis of an analysis of certain sections of the A and B editions of the (...)
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  17.  72
    Robert Hanna (2011). Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):399 - 415.
    This paper is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant's Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories, in the B (1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the B Deduction. Correspondingly, the main thesis of the paper is this: (1) and (2) yield serious problems for (3), yet, in exploring these two serious problems for the B Deduction, we (...)
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  18. T. M. Crowther (2006). Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism. Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.
    Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. (...)
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  19.  14
    John Spackman (2014). Between Nihilism and Anti-Essentialism: A Conceptualist Interpretation of Nāgārjuna. Philosophy East and West 64 (1):151-173.
    This paper defends a “conceptualist” interpretation of Nāgārjuna which stands in-between two other prominent accounts, the nihilist view and what I call the anti-essentialist view. The nihilist reading, recently defended by Thomas Wood, holds that for Nāgārjuna nothing exists either at the ultimate or at the conventional level. On the anti-essentialist account, supported by Jay Garfield and David Kalupahana, though Nāgārjuna rejects the ultimate existence of things as svabhāva (independent), he affirms their conventional existence as interdependent. I argue that the (...)
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  20. Iris Einheuser (2011). Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding Problem. Noûs 45 (2):300-314.
    This paper defends a conceptualist answer to the question how objects come by their modal properties. It isolates the controversial metaphysical assumptions that are needed to get ontological conceptualism off the ground, outlines the conceptualist answer to the question and shows that conceptualism is not in as bad a shape as some critics have maintained.
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  21.  16
    Corijn Van Mazijk (2015). Do We Have To Choose Between Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):645-665.
    It is today acknowledged by many that the debate about non-conceptual content is a mess. Over the past decades a vast collection of arguments for non-conceptual content piled up in which a variety of conceptions of what determines a state’s content is being used. This resulted in a number of influential attempts to clarify what would make a content non-conceptual, most notably Bermúdez’s classic definition, Heck’s divide into ‘state’ and ‘content’ conceptualism and Speaks’s ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ non-conceptualism. However, (...)
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  22.  7
    Timothy M. Crowther (2006). Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism. Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.
    Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. (...)
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  23.  50
    Brady Bowman (2011). A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna's Kantian Non-Conceptualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):417 - 446.
    Hanna proposes a version of non-conceptualism he closely associates with Kant. This paper takes issue with his proposal on two fronts. First, there are reasons to dispute whether any version of non-conceptualism can be rightly attributed to Kant. In addition to pointing out passages that conflict with Hanna's interpretation, I also suggest ways in which the Kant of the Opus Postumum could integrate key insights of non-conceptualism into a basically conceptualist framework. In Part Two of the paper, (...)
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  24.  22
    E. Jonathan Lowe (2008). Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism. Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1):9-33.
    Metaphysical realism is the view that most of the objects that populate the world exist independently of our thought and have their natures independently of how, if at all, we conceive of them. It is committed, in my opinion, to a robust form of essentialism. Many modern forms of anti-realism have their roots in a form of conceptualism, according to which all truths about essence knowable by us are ultimately grounded in our concepts, rather than in things 'in themselves'. (...)
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  25.  72
    Charlie Pelling (2007). Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):211 - 234.
    In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim (...)
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  26.  31
    J. P. Moreland (2013). A Conceptualist Argument for a Spiritual Substantial Soul. Religious Studies 49 (1):35-43.
    I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept (...)
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  27.  28
    Amy Karofsky (2003). God, Modalities, and Conceptualism. Philosophy and Theology 15 (2):257-271.
    God’s relationship to modalities poses a serious problem for the theist. If God determines modalities, then it seems that he can do anything. If, on the other hand, modalities determine God’s actions, then it seems that he is not genuinely free. Conceptualism offers a solution to this problem by maintaining that modalities are determined by what is conceivable for the intellects of the universe that God has chosen to create. Prior to the creation of intellects, there are no modalities (...)
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  28.  44
    James Higginbotham (2003). Jackendoff's Conceptualism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):680-681.
    In this commentary, I concentrate upon Ray Jackendoff's view of the proper foundations for semantics within the context of generative grammar. Jackendoff (2002) favors a form of internalism that he calls “conceptualism.” I argue that a retreat from realism to conceptualism is not only unwarranted, but even self-defeating, in that the issues that prompt his view will inevitably reappear if the latter is adopted.
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  29.  24
    Terry F. Godlove (2011). Hanna, Kantian Non-Conceptualism, and Benacerraf's Dilemma. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):447 - 464.
    Abstract Robert Hanna has recently advanced a theory of non-conceptual content, the central claim of which is that "it is perfectly possible for there to be directly referential intuitions without concepts". Hanna bases this claim in Kant's account of intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason, and so extends his Kantian non-conceptualism beyond the epistemology of empirical knowledge into the realm of mathematics. Thus, Hanna has proposed a Kantian non-conceptualist solution to a well-known dilemma set out by Paul Benacerraf (...)
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  30.  5
    J. P. Moreland (2013). A Conceptualist Argument for a Spiritual Substantial Soul. Religious Studies 49 (1):35-43.
    I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept (...)
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  31.  2
    Max A. Freund (2005). Conceptualismo realista y computabilidad (Realist Conceptualism and Computability). Critica 37 (111):3 - 38.
    El artículo formula una interpretación de la computabilidad desde la perspectiva del conceptualismo realista. En esta interpretación, la noción central es la de concepto computable, el cual se entiende como cierto tipo de capacidad cognitiva. Aquí se muestra cómo difiere esa interpretación conceptualista de la clásica, denominada teoría de la computabilidad efectiva, en la cual el concepto fundamental es el de algoritmo; también se discute la relación entre estas dos interpretaciones. La discusión explora las consecuencias de la idea de que (...)
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  32. André Abath (2008). The Constitution Argument Against Conceptualism. Sorites 20:49-66.
    According to philosophers such as McDowell and Brewer, the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. This view came to be known as Conceptualism. However, a number of critics have argued that they are wrong in thinking this, for they claim that there is an argument, the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which is valid and sound, and has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism. Although McDowell and Brewer seem to acknowledge that the Fineness of Grain Argument, if (...)
     
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  33. Max A. Freund (1989). Formal Investigations of Holistic Realist Ramified Conceptualism. Dissertation, Indiana University
    This dissertation constitutes an inquiry into the formal aspects of a particular form of conceptual intentional realism: Holistic Realist Ramified Conceptualism. Several axiomatic systems, which have this theory as their philosophical background are developed and/or studied from a syntactical and semantical point of view. ;Among systems studied are Cocchiarella's RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$. A set theoretical semantics for these systems is developed. Also, completeness theorems with respect to certain extensions of RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and certain notions of validity related to (...)
     
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  34. Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
    There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or (...)
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  35.  60
    Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
    The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of color is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when presented across (...)
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  36. Steven Porter (2006). Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Direct Realist and Conceptualist Theory of Foundationalism. Lexington Books.
    Against various detractors , this book develops a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. In contrast with Laurence BonJour and borrowing from John McDowell, the essential argument is that conceptualized perpetual experience provides a non-doxastic foundation for perceptual beliefs about physical objects.
     
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  37. Richard Brian Davis (2011). God and the Platonic Horde: A Defense of Limited Conceptualism. Philosophia Christi 13 (2):289-303.
     
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  38.  92
    Adina L. Roskies (2010). 'That' Response Doesn't Work: Against a Demonstrative Defense of Conceptualism. Noûs 44 (1):112-134.
  39. Walter Hopp (2009). Conceptualism and the Myth of the Given. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):363-385.
  40. Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha (2011). Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  41.  20
    Damiano Canale (2009). Consequences of Pragmatic Conceptualism: On the Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence. Ratio Juris 22 (2):171-186.
    Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to address some of the main issues of contemporary jurisprudential methodology by considering the contribution of Jules Coleman to this subject. After a description of Coleman's methodological approach and a clarification of its philosophical background, the paper focuses on some related problems, such as the relation between linguistic meaning and conceptual content, the nature of legal concepts, the different aspects of the normativity of content, and the revisability of conceptual truths.
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  42.  49
    Jerrold J. Katz & Paul M. Postal (1991). Realism Vs. Conceptualism in Linguistics. Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (5):515 - 554.
  43. Julius R. Weinberg (1941). Ockham's Conceptualism. Philosophical Review 50 (5):523-528.
  44.  19
    Nino Cocchiarella (2001). A Conceptualist Interpretation of Lesniewski's Ontology. History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):29-43.
    A first-order formulation of Le?niewski's ontology is formulated and shown to be interpretable within a free first-order logic of identity extended to include nominal quantification over proper and common-name concepts. The latter theory is then shown to be interpretable in monadic second-order predicate logic, which shows that the first-order part of Le?niewski's ontology is decidable.
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  45.  37
    Nino Cocchiarella (1989). Conceptualism, Realism, and Intensional Logic. Topoi 8 (1):15-34.
  46.  5
    Nadja El Kassar (2015). 2 Examining Non-Conceptualist Arguments Against Conceptualism. In Towards a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception: How We Relate to the World. De Gruyter 62-155.
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  47.  29
    Nino Cocchiarella (1986). Conceptualism, Ramified Logic, and Nominalized Predicates. Topoi 5 (1):75-87.
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  48.  4
    Nadja El Kassar (2015). 6 Why McDowell’s Revised Conceptualism Does Not Avoid Travis’s Anti-Representationalist Criticism. In Towards a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception: How We Relate to the World. De Gruyter 245-266.
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  49.  13
    Quentin Smith (1994). The Conceptualist Argument for God's Existence. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):38-49.
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  50.  45
    E. J. Lowe (2005). Is Conceptualist Realism a Stable Position? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):456–461.
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