Search results for 'Conditional analysis' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  82
    Helen Yetter-Chappell (2013). Circularity in the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):553-572.
    The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts purports to give physicalists a way of understanding phenomenal concepts that will allow them to (1) accept the zombie intuition, (2) accept that conceivability is generally a good guide to possibility, and yet (3) reject the conclusion that zombies are metaphysically possible. It does this by positing that whether phenomenal concepts refer to physical or nonphysical states depends on what the actual world is like. In this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  4
    Woojin Han (2014). Can the Conditional Analysis Strategy Help Physicalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):110-126.
    Braddon-Mitchell , Hawthorne , and Stalnaker provide a physicalistic argument that depends on the following two conditionals. If we experience dualistic pain, zombies are possible. On the other hand, if the actual world is physicalistic, zombies are impossible. Based on these conditionals, it is derived that zombies are conceivable but this does not entail their possibility. This line of argument for physicalism is referred to as the Conditional Analysis Strategy . I claim that the CAS does not help (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  39
    Jaeho Lee (2011). Genuine Counterexamples to the Simple Conditional Analysis of Disposition: A Reply to Choi. Philosophia 39 (2):327-334.
    Choi (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) argues that my counterexamples in Lee (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) to the simple conditional analysis of disposition ascription are bogus counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Choi’s arguments are not satisfactory and that my examples are genuine counterexamples.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  84
    Jaeho Lee (2010). Disposition, Explanation, and Causation—A Defense of the Reformed Conditional Analysis of Disposition. Philosophia 38 (3):569-577.
    D. Lewis proposed the reformed conditional analysis of disposition to handle Martin's influential counterexamples to the simple counterfactual analysis. Some philosophers, however, argue that the mere fact that the reformed conditional analysis of disposition can handle Martin's counterexamples should not be regarded as a reason to prefer the reformed conditional analysis to the simple analysis. In this paper, I argue that the reformed version should be preferred not because it can handle Martin's (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. Sungho Choi (2009). The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):568-590.
    The idea that dispositions are an intrinsic matter has been popular among contemporary philosophers of dispositions. In this paper I will first state this idea as exactly as possible. I will then examine whether it poses any threat to the two current versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions, namely, the simple and reformed conditional analysis of dispositions. The upshot is that the intrinsic nature of dispositions, when properly understood, doesn't spell trouble for either of the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6.  65
    Sungho Choi (2006). The Simple Vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. Synthese 148 (2):369 - 379.
    Lewis claims that Martin’s cases indeed refute the simple conditional analysis of dispositions and proposes the reformed conditional analysis that is purported to overcome them. In this paper I will first argue that Lewis’s defense of the reformed analysis can be understood to invoke the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. I will go on to argue that advocates of the simple analysis, just like Lewis, can also defend their analysis from alleged counterexamples (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  7.  46
    Ferenc Huoranszki (2011). Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis. Routledge.
    Free will and powers -- Powers and possibilities -- Agency and responsibility -- The conditional analysis of free will -- Abilities and control -- Free will and reasons -- Intelligibility -- Rationality -- Spontaneity -- The determination of the self -- Some concluding remarks on autonomy and free will.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. Jussi Haukioja (2008). A Defence of the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):145 - 151.
    A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism, thus blocking (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9.  69
    Torin Alter (2006). On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):777-778.
    Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10.  95
    Torin Alter (2007). On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):235 - 253.
    Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11.  5
    Davor Pećnjak (2013). Not the Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis. Prolegomena 12 (2):489-498.
    In his book "Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis", Ferenc Huoranszki tries to defend improved and amended version of the conditional analysis of free will. In my critical review, taking chapters 2 and 4 of his book as the most crucial for his theory, I try to show that incompatibilism is still more persuasive and that amended conditional analysis is not compatible with determinism. Despite my criticism, I consider this book as a significant (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Ferenc Huoranszki (2015). Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis. Routledge.
    _Freedom of the Will_ provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The original (...) can be amended so that the revised conditional account is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives. (shrink)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Ferenc Huoranszki (2010). Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis. Routledge.
    _Freedom of the Will_ provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The original (...) can be amended so that the revised conditional account is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives. (shrink)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  27
    Carl Ginet (1980). The Conditional Analysis of Freedom. In P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel 171-186.
  15. Sungho Choi (2003). The Simple Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. Unpublished Article.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  84
    Lars Gundersen (2010). Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis. Erkenntnis 72 (3):353 - 364.
    According to Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her belief that p is true and also satisfies the two tracking conditionals that had p been false, she would not have believed that p , and had p been true under slightly different circumstances, she would still have believed that p . In this paper I wish to highlight an interesting but generally ignored feature of this theory: namely that it is reminiscent of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  10
    Woojin Han (2008). The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:77-84.
    John Hawthorne (2002), David Braddon-Mitchell (2003), and Robert Stalnaker (2002), almost simultaneously but independently, developed a physicalistic argument which depends on such two conditional analyses: (1) If we experience dualistic pain, zombies are possible; (2) If our world is physicalistic, zombies are impossible. Hawthorne assumes that only an oracle will tell us which conditional is the case. From this setting, he concludes that zombies are conceivable butimpossible. I first show that Hawthorne actually fails in deriving neither the conceivability (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  41
    Wolfgang Malzkorn (2000). Realism, Functionalism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):452-469.
  19.  31
    Kevin D. Hoover (1990). The Logic of Causal Inference: Econometrics and the Conditional Analysis of Causation. Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):207.
    Discontented people might talk of corruption in the Commons, closeness in the Commons and the necessity of reforming the Commons, said Mr. Spenlow solemnly, in conclusion; but when the price of wheat per bushel had been the highest, the Commons had been the busiest; and a man might lay his hand upon his heart, and say this to the whole world, – ‘Touch the Commons, and down comes the country!’.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  20. Wolfgang Malzkorn (2001). On the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. In Uwe Meixner (ed.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age. Wien 140-148.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  21.  25
    Stephen Mumford (2001). Realism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions: Reply to Malzkorn. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):375-378.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22.  26
    Simon Kittle (2013). Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis, by Ferenc Huoranszki. Disputatio (37):368-374.
  23.  19
    Mark Heller (1985). Non-Backtracking Counterfactuals and the Conditional Analysis. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):75 - 85.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  7
    Zach Beckstead, Kenneth R. Cabell & Jaan Valsiner (2009). Generalizing Through Conditional Analysis: Systemic Causality in the World of Eternal Becoming. Humana.Mente 11:65-80.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  6
    Edwin W. McCann (1975). The Conditional Analysis of 'Can': Goldman's 'Reductio' of Lehrer. Philosophical Studies 28 (6):437 - 441.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  14
    Jan Thomas (1995). What We Can Say About What We Can Do: A Defense of the Conditional Analysis of 'Can'. Philosophical Papers 24 (3):167-182.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Sungho Choi (2006). The Simple Vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. Synthese 148 (2):369-379.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Lars Gundersen (2010). Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis. Erkenntnis 72 (3):353-364.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  7
    Nina Attridge & Matthew Inglis (2014). Intelligence and Negation Biases on the Conditional Inference Task: A Dual-Processes Analysis. Thinking and Reasoning 20 (4):454-471.
    We examined a large set of conditional inference data compiled from several previous studies and asked three questions: How is normative performance related to intelligence? Does negative conclusion bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Does implicit negation bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Our analysis demonstrated that rejecting denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent inferences was positively correlated with intelligence, while endorsing modus tollens inferences was not; that the occurrence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  24
    Henry Markovits (2000). A Mental Model Analysis of Young Children's Conditional Reasoning with Meaningful Premises. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):335 – 347.
    Mental model theory has been used to explain many differing phenomena in adult reasoning, including the extensively studied case of conditional reasoning. However, the current theory makes predictions about the development of conditional reasoning that are not consistent with data. In this article, young children's performance on conditional reasoning problems and the justifications given are analysed. A mental model account of conditional reasoning is proposed that assumes that (1) young children can reason with two models and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  6
    Miroslav Hanke (2013). Implied-Meaning Analysis of the Currian Conditional. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (4):367 - 380.
    Expanding on the recent research of Stephen Read and Catarina Dutilh Novaes concerning Thomas Bradwardine's theory of truth, the present paper makes an effort to analyse the Currian conditional in terms of the so-called ?Bradwardine principle?, i.e. the principle that meaning is closed under entailment. Based upon two possible applications of this approach, alternative solutions to the issues of semantic pathology and trivialisation of deductive systems are presented.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  83
    Robert C. Stalnaker & Richmond H. Thomason (1970). A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic. Theoria 36 (1):23-42.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   42 citations  
  33.  33
    Hilmi Demir (2008). Counterfactuals Vs. Conditional Probabilities: A Critical Analysis of the Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):45 – 60.
    Cohen and Meskin 2006 recently offered a counterfactual theory of information to replace the standard probabilistic theory of information. They claim that the counterfactual theory fares better than the standard account on three grounds: first, it provides a better framework for explaining information flow properties; second, it requires a less expensive ontology; and third, because it does not refer to doxastic states of the information-receiving organism, it provides an objective basis. In this paper, I show that none of these is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  34.  43
    D. J. O'Connor (1951). The Analysis of Conditional Sentences. Mind 60 (239):351-362.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. John T. Kearns (2004). “An Illocutionary Analysis of Conditional Assertions” Próximamente En. In Libor Behounek (ed.), Logica Yearbook 2003.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  25
    Ruth Manor (1974). A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Assertion. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2):37 - 52.
  37.  12
    Charles B. Daniels & James B. Freeman (1980). An Analysis of the Subjunctive Conditional. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):639-655.
  38.  1
    Angel Cabrera (1994). Functional and Conditional Equivalence: Conceptual Contributions From Behavior Analysis. In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum 16--130.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  4
    Howard C. Wasserman (1976). An Analysis of the Counterfactual Conditional. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (3):395-400.
  40. Charles A. Baylis (1951). Review: D. J. O'Connor, The Analysis of Conditional Sentences. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):301-302.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Helen Brodie (1940). Review: Roman Ingarden, Analysis of the Conditional Proposition. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):164-165.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Roman Ingarden (1940). Analysis of the Conditional Proposition. Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):164-165.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Serge Lapierre (1991). New Results in the Analysis of Some Conditional Quantifiers and Their Logics. Logique Et Analyse 133 (133-140):105-120.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  45
    Gabriele Contessa (forthcoming). Dispositions and Tricks. Erkenntnis:1-10.
    According to the Simple Conditional Analysis, disposition ascriptions are to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. The Simple Conditional Analysis is notoriously vulnerable to counterexamples. In this paper, I introduce a new sort of counterexample to the Simple Conditional Analysis, which I call ‘tricks’. I then explore a number of possible strategies to modify the Simple Conditional Analysis so as to avoid tricks and conclude that, in order to avoid tricks, the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Toby Handfield (2008). Unfinkable Dispositions. Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.
    This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  46.  95
    Jan Hauska (2009). Dispositions Unmasked. Theoria 75 (4):304-335.
    The problem of masking is widely regarded as a grave threat to the conditional analysis of dispositions. Unlike the difficulty arising in connection with finkish situations, the problem does not involve the (dis)appearance of a disposition upon the arrival of its activating conditions. Consequently, some promising responses to the finkish cases, in particular David Lewis's reformed analysis, are ill-equipped to deal with masks. I contend that the difficulty posed by masks can be surmounted by supplementing the counterfactual (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  75
    Sungho Choi (2010). Dispositions and Bogus Counterexamples: Reply to Lee. [REVIEW] Philosophia 38 (3):579-588.
    This paper discusses Lee’s argument that Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of dispositions is preferable to the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Lee’s argument is basically that there are some examples that can be adequately handled by Lewis’s analysis but cannot by the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. But I will reveal that, when carefully understood, they spell no trouble for the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, failing to serve a motivating role (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  38
    Jan Hauska (2008). Dispositions and Normal Conditions. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):219 - 232.
    It is agreed on all hands that the original version of the conditional analysis of dispositions is defeated by so-called finks and maskers. Some have responded to this predicament by contending that the counterfactual on the right-hand side of the analysis should be expected to hold only when the property it purports to describe is in normal conditions. The essay argues that at the end of the day this idea must presuppose that one is able to arrive (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49.  47
    Tobias Hansson (2006). Too Many Dispositional Properties. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):37-42.
    This paper identifies an overdetermination problem faced by the non-reductive dispositional property account of disposition ascriptions. Two possible responses to the problem are evaluated and both are shown to have serious drawbacks. Finally it is noted that the traditional conditional analysis of dispositional ascriptions escapes the original difficulty.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  51
    Matthias Unterhuber (2014). Do Ceteris Paribus Laws Exist? A Regularity-Based Best System Analysis. Erkenntnis 79 (10):1833-1847.
    This paper argues that ceteris paribus (cp) laws exist based on a Lewisian best system analysis of lawhood (BSA). Furthermore, it shows that a BSA faces a second trivialization problem besides the one identified by Lewis. The first point concerns an argument against cp laws by Earman and Roberts. The second point aims to help making some assumptions of the BSA explicit. To address the second trivialization problem, a restriction in terms of natural logical constants is proposed that allows (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000