Search results for 'Conditional probability' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Rani Lill Anjum, Johan Arnt Myrstad & Stephen Mumford, Conditional Probability From an Ontological Point of View.
    This paper argues that the technical notion of conditional probability, as given by the ratio analysis, is unsuitable for dealing with our pretheoretical and intuitive understanding of both conditionality and probability. This is an ontological account of conditionals that include an irreducible dispositional connection between the antecedent and consequent conditions and where the conditional has to be treated as an indivisible whole rather than compositional. The relevant type of conditionality is found in some well-defined group of (...)
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  2.  21
    David Makinson (2011). Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
    We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, (...)
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  3. Georg J. W. Dorn (1992/93). Popper’s Laws of the Excess of the Probability of the Conditional Over the Conditional Probability. Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26:3–61.
    Karl Popper discovered in 1938 that the unconditional probability of a conditional of the form ‘If A, then B’ normally exceeds the conditional probability of B given A, provided that ‘If A, then B’ is taken to mean the same as ‘Not (A and not B)’. So it was clear (but presumably only to him at that time) that the conditional probability of B given A cannot be reduced to the unconditional probability of (...)
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  4.  33
    Horacio Arló Costa & Rohit Parikh (2005). Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.
    We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of nonmonotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).'Expectation' is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form (...)
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  5.  51
    Donald Bamber (2000). Entailment with Near Surety of Scaled Assertions of High Conditional Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):1-74.
    An assertion of high conditional probability or, more briefly, an HCP assertion is a statement of the type: The conditional probability of B given A is close to one. The goal of this paper is to construct logics of HCP assertions whose conclusions are highly likely to be correct rather than certain to be correct. Such logics would allow useful conclusions to be drawn when the premises are not strong enough to allow conclusions to be reached (...)
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  6.  22
    Tommaso Flaminio (2007). NP-Containment for the Coherence Test of Assessments of Conditional Probability: A Fuzzy Logical Approach. [REVIEW] Archive for Mathematical Logic 46 (3-4):301-319.
    In this paper we investigate the problem of testing the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability following a purely logical setting. In particular we will prove that the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability χ can be characterized by means of the logical consistency of a suitable theory T χ defined on the modal-fuzzy logic FP k (RŁΔ) built up over the many-valued logic RŁΔ. Such modal-fuzzy logic was previously introduced in Flaminio (Lecture Notes (...)
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  7.  12
    Franco Montagna (2012). Partially Undetermined Many-Valued Events and Their Conditional Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):563-593.
    A logic for classical conditional events was investigated by Dubois and Prade. In their approach, the truth value of a conditional event may be undetermined. In this paper we extend the treatment to many-valued events. Then we support the thesis that probability over partially undetermined events is a conditional probability, and we interpret it in terms of bets in the style of de Finetti. Finally, we show that the whole investigation can be carried out in (...)
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  8.  35
    Isabel Guerra Bobo (2013). On Quantum Conditional Probability. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):115-137.
    We argue that quantum theory does not allow for a generalization of the notion of classical conditional probability by showing that the probability defined by the Lüders rule, standardly interpreted in the literature as the quantum-mechanical conditionalization rule, cannot be interpreted as such.Argumentamos que la teoría cuántica no admite una generalización de la noción clásica de probabilidad condicionada. Mostramos que la probabilidad definida por la regla de Lüders, interpretada generalmente como la regla de condicionalización mecánico-cuántica, no puede (...)
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  9.  31
    Rohit Parikh (2005). Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.
    We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of nonmonotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).'Expectation' is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form (...)
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  10.  99
    Allen Stairs & Jeffrey Bub (2006). Local Realism and Conditional Probability. Foundations of Physics 36 (4):585-601.
    Emilio Santos has argued (Santos, Studies in History and Philosophy of Physics http: //arxiv-org/abs/quant-ph/0410193) that to date, no experiment has provided a loophole-free refutation of Bell’s inequalities. He believes that this provides strong evidence for the principle of local realism, and argues that we should reject this principle only if we have extremely strong evidence. However, recent work by Malley and Fine (Non-commuting observables and local realism, http: //arxiv-org/abs/quant-ph/0505016) appears to suggest that experiments refuting Bell’s inequalities could at most confirm (...)
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  11.  22
    Tommaso Flaminio & Franco Montagna (2005). A Logical and Algebraic Treatment of Conditional Probability. Archive for Mathematical Logic 44 (2):245-262.
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  12.  4
    Norman H. Anderson (1960). Effect of First-Order Conditional Probability in a Two-Choice Learning Situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 59 (2):73.
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  13. Alan Hájek (2003). What Conditional Probability Could Not Be. Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
    Kolmogorov''s axiomatization of probability includes the familiarratio formula for conditional probability: 0).$$ " align="middle" border="0">.
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  14.  83
    Daniel Rothschild (2014). Capturing the Relationship Between Conditionals and Conditional Probability with a Trivalent Semantics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):144-152.
    (2014). Capturing the relationship between conditionals and conditional probability with a trivalent semantics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 24, Three-Valued Logics and their Applications, pp. 144-152. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2014.911535.
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  15.  10
    Alexandre Street (2010). On the Conditional Value-at-Risk Probability-Dependent Utility Function. Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):49-68.
    The Expected Shortfall or Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) has been playing the role of main risk measure in the recent years and paving the way for an enormous number of applications in risk management due to its very intuitive form and important coherence properties. This work aims to explore this measure as a probability-dependent utility functional, introducing an alternative view point for its Choquet Expected Utility representation. Within this point of view, its main preference properties will be characterized and (...)
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  16.  43
    Teddy Seidenfeld (2001). Remarks on the Theory of Conditional Probability: Some Issues of Finite Versus Countable Additivity. In Vincent F. Hendricks, Stig Andur Pederson & Klaus Frovin Jørgensen (eds.), Probability Theory: Philosophy, Recent History and Relations to Science. Synthese Library, Kluwer
    This paper discusses some differences between the received theory of regular conditional distributions, which is the countably additive theory of conditional probability, and a rival theory of conditional probability using the theory of finitely additive probability. The focus of the paper is maximally "improper" conditional probability distributions, where the received theory requires, in effect, that P{a: P = 0} = 1. This work builds upon the results of Blackwell and Dubins.
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  17.  43
    Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2006). Inference in Conditional Probability Logic. Kybernetika 42 (2):391--404.
    An important field of probability logic is the investigation of inference rules that propagate point probabilities or, more generally, interval probabilities from premises to conclusions. Conditional probability logic (CPL) interprets the common sense expressions of the form “if . . . , then . . . ” by conditional probabilities and not by the probability of the material implication. An inference rule is probabilistically informative if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is not (...)
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  18.  45
    Erik J. Olsson (2009). In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114.
    Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Many authors contend, however, that reliabilism is incompatible with this item of common sense. If a belief is true, adding that it was reliably produced doesn't seem to make it more valuable. The value of reliability is swamped by the value of truth. In Goldman and Olsson (2009), two independent solutions to the problem were suggested. According to the conditional probability solution, reliabilist knowledge is more valuable in virtue of being (...)
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  19. Joachim Horvath (2009). Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):115-120.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the standard objections to reliabilism. If one assumes, as reliabilism does, that truth is the only non-instrumental epistemic value, then the worry is that the additional value of knowledge over true belief cannot be adequately explained, for reliability only has instrumental value relative to the non-instrumental value of truth. Goldman and Olsson reply to this objection that reliabilist knowledge raises the objective probability of future true beliefs and is thus more valuable than mere (...)
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  20. Frank Döring (2000). Conditional Probability and Dutch Books. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):391-409.
    There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.
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  21. A. Millar & A. Haddock, Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the standard objections to reliabilism. If one assumes, as reliabilism does, that truth is the only non instrumental epistemic value, then the worry is that the additional value of knowledge over true belief cannot be adequately explained, for reliability only has instrumental value relative to the non instrumental value of truth. Goldman and Olsson reply to this objection that reliabilist knowledge raises the objective probability of future true beliefs and is thus more valuable (...)
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  22. Kenny Easwaran (2011). Varieties of Conditional Probability. In Prasanta Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook for Philosophy of Statistics. North Holland
    I consider the notions of logical probability, degree of belief, and objective chance, and argue that a different formalism for conditional probability is appropriate for each.
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  23.  47
    C. Martin Edwards & Gottfried T. Rüttimann (1990). On Conditional Probability in GL Spaces. Foundations of Physics 20 (7):859-872.
    We investigate the notion of conditional probability and the quantum mechanical concept of state reduction in the context of GL spaces satisfying the Alfsen-Shultz condition.
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  24.  42
    Eyvind Ohm & Valerie A. Thompson (2006). Conditional Probability and Pragmatic Conditionals: Dissociating Truth and Effectiveness. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):257 – 280.
    Recent research (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004) has provided support for the hypothesis that people evaluate the probability of conditional statements of the form if p then q as the conditional probability of q given p , P( q / p ). The present paper extends this approach to pragmatic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). In so doing, we demonstrate a distinction between the truth status (...)
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  25.  48
    Charles G. Morgan (1999). Conditionals, Comparative Probability, and Triviality: The Conditional of Conditional Probability Cannot Be Represented in the Object Language. Topoi 18 (2):97-116.
    In this paper we examine the thesis that the probability of the conditional is the conditional probability. Previous work by a number of authors has shown that in standard numerical probability theories, the addition of the thesis leads to triviality. We introduce very weak, comparative conditional probability structures and discuss some extremely simple constraints. We show that even in such a minimal context, if one adds the thesis that the probability of a (...)
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  26.  14
    Laura Macchi & Maria Bagassi (2007). The Underinformative Formulation of Conditional Probability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):274-275.
    The formulation of the conditional probability in classical tasks does not guarantee the effective transmission of the independence of the hit rate from the base rate. In these kinds of tasks, data are all available, but subjects are able to understand them in the specific meanings proper to a specialized language only if these are adequately transmitted. From this perspective, the partitive formulation should not be considered a facilitation, but rather, a way of effectively transmitting the conditional (...)
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  27.  31
    Teddy Seidenfeld, Remarks on the Theory of Conditional Probability: Some Issues of Finite Versus Countable Additivity.
    This paper (based on joint work with M.J.Schervish and J.B.Kadane) discusses some differences between the received theory of regular conditional distributions, which is the countably additive theory of conditional probability, and a rival theory of conditional probability using the theory of finitely additive probability. The focus of the paper is maximally "improper" conditional probability distributions, where the received theory requires, in effect, that P{a: P(a|a) = 0} = 1. This work builds upon (...)
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  28.  17
    Vincent Corbin & Neil J. Cornish (2009). Semi-Classical Limit and Minimum Decoherence in the Conditional Probability Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Physics 39 (5):474-485.
    The Conditional Probability Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics replaces the abstract notion of time used in standard Quantum Mechanics by the time that can be read off from a physical clock. The use of physical clocks leads to apparent non-unitary and decoherence. Here we show that a close approximation to standard Quantum Mechanics can be recovered from conditional Quantum Mechanics for semi-classical clocks, and we use these clocks to compute the minimum decoherence predicted by the Conditional (...) Interpretation. (shrink)
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  29.  2
    Nick Chater Mike Oaksford (2003). Conditional Probability and the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning. Mind and Language 18 (4):359-379.
    : This paper addresses the apparent mismatch between the normative and descriptive literatures in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Descriptive psychological theories still regard material implication as the normative theory of the conditional. However, over the last 20 years in the philosophy of language and logic the idea that material implication can account for everyday indicative conditionals has been subject to severe criticism. The majority view is now apparently in favour of a subjective conditional probability (...)
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  30.  8
    Frank Doring (2000). Conditional Probability and Dutch Books. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):391 - 409.
    There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.
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  31.  13
    Giulianella Coletti, Angelo Gilio & Romano Scozzafava (1993). Comparative Probability for Conditional Events: A New Look Through Coherence. Theory and Decision 35 (3):237-258.
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  32.  5
    Robert S. Witte (1961). Conditional Response Probability in a T Maze. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (5):439.
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  33.  5
    James R. Erickson & Karen K. Block (1970). Conditional Response Distributions in a Multiple-Choice Probability-Learning Situtation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 86 (2):328.
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  34. Alan Hájek (2003). Conditional Probability Is the Very Guide of Life. In Kyburg Jr, E. Henry & Mariam Thalos (eds.), Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance. Open Court 183--203.
    in Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance, eds. Henry Kyburg, Jr. and Mariam Thalos, Open Court. Abridged version in Proceedings of the International Society for Bayesian Analysis 2002.
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  35.  44
    Johan van Benthem (2003). Conditional Probability Meets Update Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (4):409-421.
    Dynamic update of information states is a new paradigm in logicalsemantics. But such updates are also a traditional hallmark ofprobabilistic reasoning. This note brings the two perspectives togetherin an update mechanism for probabilities which modifies state spaces.
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  36.  29
    Alan Hájek & N. Hall (1994). The Hypothesis of the Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability. In Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press 75.
  37.  76
    Horacio Arlo-Costa & Rohit Parikh, Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, 97-119, 2005.
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  38.  24
    Jiaying Zhao, Anuj Shah & Daniel Osherson (2009). On the Provenance of Judgments of Conditional Probability. Cognition 113 (1):26-36.
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  39.  31
    Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2003). Conditional Probability and the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning. Mind and Language 18 (4):359–379.
  40.  99
    Dorothy Edgington (1996). Lowe on Conditional Probability. Mind 105 (420):617-630.
  41.  6
    Brian Skyrms (1981). Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351.
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  42.  78
    E. J. Lowe (1996). Conditional Probability and Conditional Beliefs. Mind 105 (420):603-615.
  43.  70
    Michael Clark (1989). A Paradox of Conditional Probability. Analysis 49 (1):16 - 21.
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  44.  7
    Isaac Levi (1978). Coherence, Regularity and Conditional Probability. Theory and Decision 9 (1):1-15.
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  45.  9
    Michael Friedman & Hilary Putnam (1978). Quantum Logic, Conditional Probability, and Interference. Dialectica 32 (3‐4):305-315.
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  46.  78
    E. J. Lowe (2008). What is 'Conditional Probability'? Analysis 68 (299):218–223.
  47.  5
    E. J. Lowe (2008). What is ‘Conditional Probability’? Analysis 68 (299):218-223.
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  48. Klaus Fiedler, Babette Brinkmann, Tilmann Betsch & Beate Wild (2000). A Sampling Approach to Biases in Conditional Probability Judgments: Beyond Base Rate Neglect and Statistical Format. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 129 (3):399-418.
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  49. Craig R. Fox & Jonathan Levav (2004). Partition-Edit-Count: Naive Extensional Reasoning in Judgment of Conditional Probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 133 (4):626-642.
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  50.  3
    Trenton Merricks (2002). Conditional Probability and Defeat. In James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press 165-175.
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