Search results for 'Confirmability' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  45
    R. G. Swinburne (1974). Meaningfulness Without Confirmability: A Reply. Analysis 35 (1):22 - 27.
    IN THE COURSE OF "CONFIRMABILITY AND FACTUAL MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 33) I ARGUED THAT THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION STATEMENT OR CONFIRMABLE BY OBSERVATION STATEMENTS. MY ARGUMENT CONSISTED IN PRODUCING EXAMPLES OF FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS WHICH FAIL TO SATISFY THE PRINCIPLE. IN "CONFIRMABILITY AND MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 34) R I SIKORA ARGUED THAT MY EXAMPLES DO NOT SUPPORT MY CONCLUSION. HERE (...)
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  2.  63
    Richard I. Sikora (1974). Confirmability and Meaningfulness. Analysis 34 (4):142 - 144.
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  3.  68
    R. G. Swinburne (1973). Confirmability and Factual Meaningfulness. Analysis 33 (3):71 - 76.
    THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE, THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION-STATEMENT, OR THERE ARE OBSERVATION STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONFIRM OR DISCONFIRM IT. THIS PRINCIPLE IS THE FINAL WEAK CLAIM OF VERIFICATIONISM. EVEN IF TRUE, IT WOULD NOT BE OF GREAT USE IN SORTING OUT THE MEANINGFUL FROM THE MEANINGFULNESS, BUT IT IS SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY TO BE FALSE. A CLAIM THAT THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT MEN WILL EVER (...)
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  4.  42
    R. I. Sikora (1975). Swinburne on Confirmability. Analysis 35 (6):195 -.
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  5.  8
    T. D. P. (1976). Confirmation & Confirmability. Review of Metaphysics 29 (3):560-561.
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  6.  7
    James M. Brown (1976). Confirmation and Confirmability. Philosophical Studies 25:340-342.
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  7.  6
    S. Cannavo (1979). Confirmation and Confirmability. International Studies in Philosophy 11:186-188.
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  8.  9
    G. Schlesinger (1974). Confirmation and Confirmability. Clarendon Press.
  9.  6
    G. Schlesinger (1968). Confirmability and Determinism. Philosophical Quarterly 18 (70):29-39.
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  10. D. H. M. Brooks (1980). Confirmability and Meaningfulness. Philosophical Papers 9 (1):41-44.
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  11. Herbert Feigl (1951). Confirmability and Confirmation. Some Comments on the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning and Related Issues. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 5 (3/4=17/18):268.
     
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  12. R. A. Sharpe (1977). SCHLESINGER, G. "Confirmation and Confirmability". [REVIEW] Mind 86:147.
     
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  13. R. S. Woolhouse (1975). Confirmation and Confirmability. Philosophical Books 16 (2):27-29.
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  14.  19
    Sahotra Sarkar (2013). Carnap and the Compulsions of Interpretation: Reining in the Liberalization of Empiricism. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):353-372.
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  15.  36
    Moreland Perkins (1953). Intersubjectivity and Gestalt Psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (June):437-451.
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  16.  28
    Sebastian Lutz (forthcoming). Carnap on Empirical Significance. Synthese.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to the empirical significance (...)
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  17. Teed Rockwell, Commentary on a Hard Problem Thought Experiment.
    In the seventh paragraph of the post, you say "This question [which machine, if any or both, is conscious/] seems to be in principle unfalsifiable, and yet genuinely meaningful." (I'm assuming that you mean that any answer to it is unfalsifiable.) My neo-Carnapian intuitions diagnoses the problem right at this point. Forget about attributions of meaningless and all that stuff. Replace it in your statement with more pragmatically-oriented evaluative notions: theoretically fruitless, arbitray without even being helpful for any theoretical, experimental, (...)
     
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  18.  26
    Charles G. Conway (2008). The Normative Sciences at Work and Play. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 288-311.
    This essay posits that Peirce puts the Normative Sciences implicitly to work at three junctures of his Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (NARG): (1) in the distinguishing of musement from play; (2) in the generation of the Humble Argument via musement; and (3) in the portrayal of the Humble Argument as the first stage of an inquiry into its confirmability. Then, focus shifts to Peirce’s notions of the initiating “play” and the “plausibility” of the God-hypothesis, as a (...)
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  19.  6
    Frank M. Doan (1960). On the Construction of Whitehead's Metaphysical Language. Review of Metaphysics 13 (4):605 - 622.
    Examining whitehead's redesigned metaphysical language, the author first argues that its apparent lack of a formal syntactic structure throws its validity into question. then, reconstructing whitehead's method, he contends that his categories do not constitute the ground of a precise language. he further submits that whitehead's metaphysical language appears to be both descriptive and constitutive of reality. the author then examines whitehead's concept of creativity in the context of his distinction between appearance and reality. finally, he argues that whitehead's metaphysical (...)
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  20.  2
    Dennis Temple (1974). Grue‐Green and Some Mistakes in Confirmation Theory. Dialectica 28 (3‐4):197-210.
    SummaryIt is argued, contrary to Nelson Goodman, that confirmability is not a semantical property possessed by some hypotheses. Instead, hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of all relevant information, not just postivie or negative instances.
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  21.  1
    Fredricka Gilje & Anne-Grethe Talseth (2007). Mediating Consolation With Suicidal Patients. Nursing Ethics 14 (4):546-557.
    Psychiatric nurses frequently encounter suicidal patients. Caring for such patients often raises ethical questions and dilemmas. The research question for this study was: 'What understandings are revealed in texts about consolation and psychiatric nurses' responses to suicidal patients?' A Gadamerian approach guided re-interpretation of published texts. Through synthesizing four interpretive phases, a comprehensive interpretation emerged. This revealed being 'at home' with self, or an ethical way of being, as a hermeneutic understanding of a way to become ready to mediate consolation (...)
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  22.  5
    Axel Mueller (2001). Referenz Und Fallibilismus Zu Hilary Putnams Pragmatischem Kognitivismus.
    This is a two tiered investigation. On the one hand, the author presents a systematic account of the philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Being the first comprehensive account to be published in the German-speaking world, the author traces the development of Putnam's realism and philosophy of language and their connections from the early 1950's to 2000. Contrary to the popular view of the discontinuity of Putnam's philosophy, he demonstrates that Putnam maintains certain semantic, pragmatic and epistemological foundations for the rational (...), fallibility and self-corrigibility of theoretical knowledge in the empirical sciences as a constant around which many other philosophical assumptions are allowed to vary under critical examination. The resulting view of Putnam's philosophical "position" is decidedly "anti-metaphysical" (contrary to the common association of his philosophy of language with e.g. Kripke's understanding of realism), but not fully "deflationary" (contrary to the reclamation of his criticism of realist metaphysics as Quinean or Rortyan skepticism). On the other hand, the author generalizes, in the second and third parts of the book, Putnam's now famous theory of meaning and reference to develop a framework for the pragmatics of semantic continuity and discontinuity, as well as conceptual change within general terms in empirical settings, like natural kind terms, theoretical terms in natural sciences and commonsense classifications. The third part presents, develops and defends the basic normative premisses as a pragmatic alternative to both, metaphysical (Kripke, Devitt) and sceptical approaches (Quine, Kuhn). The main result here is that many (if not all) preconditions for the semantic bahvior of 'rigid' general terms are not, as usually assumed, ontological in nature, but can be usefully framed as part of the pragmatics of general terms in epistemic practices counting with rational revisability. (shrink)
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