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Connie S. Rosati [25]Connie Rosati [2]Connie Sue Rosati [1]
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Profile: Connie Rosati (University of Arizona)
  1. Connie S. Rosati (1995). Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good. Ethics 105 (2):296-325.
  2. Connie S. Rosati (2006). Personal Good. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press 107.
     
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  3.  71
    Connie S. Rosati (2009). Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):205-234.
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  4. Connie S. Rosati (2003). Agency and the Open Question Argument. Ethics 113 (3):490-527.
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  5.  67
    Connie S. Rosati (2008). Objectivism and Relational Good. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):314-349.
    In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alternatives so (...)
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  6.  81
    Connie S. Rosati (1996). Internalism and the Good for a Person. Ethics 106 (2):297-326.
    Proponents of numerous recent theories of a person's good hold that a plausible account of the good for a person must satisfy existence internalism. Yet little direct defense has been given for this position. I argue that the principal intuition behind internalism supports a stronger version of the thesis than it might appear--one that effects a "double link" to motivation. I then identify and develop the main arguments that have been or might be given in support of internalism about a (...)
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  7.  97
    Connie S. Rosati (2006). Moral Motivation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In our everyday lives, we confront a host of moral issues. Once we have deliberated and formed judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to have a marked hold on us. Although in the end, we do not always behave as we think we ought, our moral judgments typically motivate us, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with them. When philosophers talk about moral motivation, this is the basic phenomenon they seek (...)
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  8. Connie S. Rosati (1995). Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument. Noûs 29 (1):46-70.
  9.  26
    Connie Rosati (2006). Preference-Formation and Personal Good. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59 (59):33-64.
  10.  29
    Connie S. Rosati (2006). Review: Darwall on Welfare and Rational Care. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 130 (3):619 - 635.
  11.  11
    Connie S. Rosati & Colin McGinn (1999). Ethics, Evil, and Fiction. Philosophical Review 108 (3):439.
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  12.  26
    Connie S. Rosati (2009). Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):311 - 325.
    Stephen Darwall has recently suggested (following work by Mark Overvold) that theories which identify a person’s good with her own ranking of concerns do not properly delimit the ‘scope’ of welfare, making self-sacrifice conceptually impossible. But whether a theory of welfare makes self-sacrifice impossible depends on what self-sacrifice is. I offer an alternative analysis to Overvold’s, explaining why self-interest and self-sacrifice need not be opposed, and so why the problems of delimiting the scope of welfare and of allowing for self-sacrifice (...)
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  13.  4
    Connie S. Rosati (2016). Normativity and the Planning Theory of Law. Jurisprudence 7 (2):307-324.
    In this essay, I focus on what appear to be Shapiro’s views about the normativity of law, as well as with his surprising claim that law necessarily has a moral aim. I argue that even if Shapiro offers a more compelling reply to the problem of the normativity of law than Hart offers in The Concept of Law, the moves that he makes appear to be equally available to a defender of Hart’s theory, and so in this respect, the planning (...)
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  14.  65
    Connie S. Rosati (2004). Some Puzzles About the Objectivity of Law. Law and Philosophy 23 (3):273 - 323.
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  15.  3
    Connie S. Rosati (2009). XV-Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):311-325.
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  16.  38
    Connie S. Rosati (2007). Mortality, Agency, and Regret. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):231-259.
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  17.  7
    Connie S. Rosati (2000). Brandt's Notion of Therapeutic Agency. Ethics 110 (4):780-811.
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  18.  27
    Connie S. Rosati (2013). The Story of a Life. Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):21-50.
    This essay explores the nature of narrative representations of individual lives and the connection between these narratives and personal good. It poses the challenge of determining how thinking of our lives in story form contributes distinctively to our good in a way not reducible to other value-conferring features of our lives. Because we can meaningfully talk about our lives going well for us at particular moments even if they fail to go well overall or over time, the essay maintains that (...)
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  19. Connie S. Rosati (2006). Darwall on Welfare and Rational Care. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):619-635.
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  20.  2
    Connie S. Rosati, R. G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris (1995). Value, Welfare, and Morality. Philosophical Review 104 (4):603.
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  21.  5
    Connie S. Rosati (1995). Book Review:Moral Differences: Truth, Justice, and Conscience in a World of Conflict. Richard W. Miller. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (3):649-.
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  22.  1
    Connie S. Rosati & Paul Grice (1993). The Conception of Value. Philosophical Review 102 (2):267.
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  23.  9
    Connie S. Rosati (2003). Comments: Ethics, Philosophy, and Moore's Legacy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement):21-29.
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  24.  2
    Connie S. Rosati (2014). The Story of a Life. Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):21-50.
    This essay explores the nature of narrative representations of individual lives and the connection between these narratives and personal good. It poses the challenge of determining how thinking of our lives in story form contributes distinctively to our good in a way not reducible to other value-conferring features of our lives. Because we can meaningfully talk about our lives going well for us at particular moments even if they fail to go well overall or over time, the essay maintains that (...)
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  25.  20
    Connie S. Rosati (2003). Ethics, Philosophy, and Moore's Legacy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):21-29.
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  26.  13
    Connie S. Rosati (1995). Value, Welfare, and Morality. Philosophical Review 104 (4):603-605.
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  27. Luca Ferrero Faulkner, Amy Gutmann, Paul Harris, Pamela Hieronymi, Karen Jones, Adam Leite, Wolfgang Mann, Peter de Marneffc, David Owens Minar & Connie Rosati (2006). Getting Told and Being Believed. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press
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