17 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Conor McHugh (Institut Jean Nicod)
  1. Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
    This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention. Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, I argue, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions-reactivity and reasons-reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntary control. I develop and defend an (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Conor McHugh, Engel on Doxastic Correctness.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way, Broome on Reasoning.
    Among the many important contributions of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is an account of what reasoning is and what makes reasoning correct. In this paper we raise some problems for both of these accounts and recommend an alternative approach.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Conor McHugh (2013). Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Conor McHugh (2013). Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2).
    It is widely held that when you are deliberating about whether to believe some proposition p, only considerations relevant to the truth of p can be taken into account as reasons bearing on whether to believe p and motivate you accordingly. This thesis of exclusivity has significance for debates about the nature of belief, about control of belief, and about certain forms of evidentialism. In this paper I distinguish a strong and a weak version of exclusivity. I provide reason to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
    Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395–405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Conor McHugh (2012). Control of Belief and Intention. Thought 1 (4):337-346.
    This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of belief and that of intention. I do not defend this Symmetry View in detail, but rather try to adjudicate between different versions of it: what I call Evaluative, Normative and Teleological versions. I argue that the central motivation for the Symmetry View in fact supports only a specific Teleological version of the view.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Conor McHugh (2012). Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness. Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.
    We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008 ; Weatherson 2008 ). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Conor Mchugh (2012). The Truth Norm of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.
    I argue that, if belief is subject to a norm of truth, then that norm is evaluative rather than prescriptive in character. No prescriptive norm of truth is both plausible as a norm that we are subject to, and also capable of explaining what the truth norm of belief is supposed to explain. Candidate prescriptive norms also have implausible consequences for the normative status of withholding belief. An evaluative norm fares better in all of these respects. I propose an evaluative (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Conor McHugh (2012). What Assertion Doesn't Show. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.
    Abstract: Some recent arguments against the classical invariantist account of knowledge exploit the idea that there is a ‘knowledge norm’ for assertion. It is claimed that, given the existence of this norm, certain intuitions about assertability support contextualism, or contrastivism, over classical invariantism. In this paper I show that, even if we accept the existence of a knowledge norm, these assertability-based arguments fail. The classical invariantist can accommodate and explain the relevant intuitions about assertability, in a way that retains the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Conor McHugh (2011). Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
    Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Conor Mchugh (2011). What Do We Aim At When We Believe? Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
    It is often said that belief aims at truth. I argue that if belief has an aim then that aim is knowledge rather than merely truth. My main argument appeals to the impossibility of forming a belief on the basis of evidence that only weakly favours a proposition. This phenomenon, I argue, is a problem for the truth-aim hypothesis. By contrast, it can be given a simple and satisfying explanation on the knowledge-aim hypothesis. Furthermore, the knowledge-aim hypothesis suggests a very (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Conor McHugh (2010). Self-Knowing Agents, by Lucy O'Brien. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):153-158.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Conor McHugh (2010). Self-Knowledge and the Kk Principle. Synthese 173 (3):231 - 257.
    I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Conor McHugh, Self-Knowledge in Consciousness.
    When you enjoy a conscious mental state or episode, you can knowledgeably self-ascribe that state or episode, and your self-ascription will have a special security and authority (as well as several other distinctive features). This thesis argues for an epistemic but nonintrospectionist account of why such self-ascriptions count as knowledge, and why they have a special status. The first part of the thesis considers what general shape an account of self-knowledge must have. Against a deflationist challenge, I argue that your (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ezio Di Nucci & Conor McHugh (eds.) (2006). Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time - belong to the natural world, - represent the world, - give rise to our subjective experience, - and ground human knowledge? Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, Concepts and (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation