Search results for 'Conscious' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Joshua Shepherd (2015). Conscious Control Over Action. Mind and Language 30 (3):320-344.
    The extensive involvement of nonconscious processes in human behaviour has led some to suggest that consciousness is much less important for the control of action than we might think. In this article I push against this trend, developing an understanding of conscious control that is sensitive to our best models of overt action control. Further, I assess the cogency of various zombie challenges—challenges that seek to demote the importance of conscious control for human agency. I argue (...)
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  2. Benjamin W. Libet (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  3. Daniel M. Wegner (2003). The Mind's Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.
    We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however – the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct (...)
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  4. Joshua Shepherd (2013). The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
    Recent work in cognitive science suggests that conscious thought plays a much less central role in the production of human behavior than most think. Partially on the basis of this work, Peter Carruthers has advanced the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. This claim is of independent interest for action theory, and its potential truth poses a problem for theories of free will and autonomy, which often take our capacity to consciously decide to be of central (...)
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  5. Markus E. Schlosser (2013). Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
    Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally (...)
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  6.  91
    Anders Nes (2016). The Sense of Natural Meaning in Conscious Inference. In T. Breyer & C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking. Routledge 97-115.
    The paper addresses the phenomenology of inference. It proposes that the conscious character of conscious inferences is partly constituted by a sense of meaning; specifically, a sense of what Grice called ‘natural meaning’. In consciously drawing the (outright, categorical) conclusion that Q from a presumed fact that P, one senses the presumed fact that P as meaning that Q, where ‘meaning that’ expresses natural meaning. This sense of natural meaning is phenomenologically analogous, I suggest, to our (...)
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  7.  59
    Daniel M. Wegner (2004). Précis of the Illusion of Conscious Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659.
    The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, (...)
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  8. Ole Koksvik (2013). Intuition and Conscious Reasoning. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):709-715.
    This paper argues that, contrary to common opinion, intuition can result from conscious reasoning. It also discusses why this matters.
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  9. Peter Carruthers (2007). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Synthese 96 (2):197 - 213.
    Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, (...)
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  10.  35
    Sven Walter (2014). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the (...)
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  11. Michael V. Antony (2008). Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2):239-263.
    Intuitively it has seemed to many that our concepts "conscious state" and "conscious creature" are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that "conscious state" and "conscious creature" are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline (...)
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  12.  52
    Michelle Montague (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming (...)
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  13.  74
    John N. Williams (2012). Moore-Paradoxical Belief, Conscious Belief and the Epistemic Ramsey Test. Synthese 188 (2):231-246.
    Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to (...)
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  14. Stevan Harnad (2003). Can a Machine Be Conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.
    A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can (...)
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  15.  3
    Virginia Bodolica & Martin Spraggon (2011). Behavioral Governance and Self-Conscious Emotions: Unveiling Governance Implications of Authentic and Hubristic Pride. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 100 (3):535 - 550.
    The main purpose of this article is to elucidate the bright connotation of the self-conscious emotion of pride, namely authentic pride, in the broader context of behavioral governance literature. Scholars in the field of psychology suggest that authentic and hubristic pride represent two facets of the same emotional construct. Yet, our review indicates that in the extant governance research pride has been treated as an exclusively dark leadership trait or self-attribution bias, thereby placing hubris among the main causes of (...)
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  16.  45
    Jukka Varelius (2009). Minimally Conscious State and Human Dignity. Neuroethics 2 (1):35-50.
    Recent progress in neurosciences has improved our understanding of chronic disorders of consciousness. One example of this advancement is the emergence of the new diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS). The central characteristic of MCS is impaired consciousness. Though the phenomenon now referred to as MCS pre-existed its inclusion in diagnostic classifications, the current medical ethical concepts mainly apply to patients with normal consciousness and to non-conscious patients. Accordingly, how we morally should stand with persons in minimally (...)
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  17.  15
    L. Syd M. Johnson (2011). The Right to Die in the Minimally Conscious State. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (37):175-178.
    The right to die has for decades been recognised for persons in a vegetative state, but there remains controversy about ending life-sustaining medical treatment for persons in the minimally conscious state (MCS). The controversy is rooted in assumptions about the moral significance of consciousness, and the value of life for patients who are conscious and not terminally ill. This paper evaluates these assumptions in light of evidence that generates concerns about quality of life in the MCS. It is (...)
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  18.  18
    Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). The Value of Spontaneous EEG Oscillations in Distinguishing Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. In Eror Basar & et all (eds.), Application of Brain Oscillations in Neuropsychiatric Diseases. Supplements to Clinical Neurophysiology. Elsevier 81-99.
    Objective: The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states was studied. Methods: We quantified dynamic repertoire of EEG oscillations in resting condition with closed eyes in patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS). The exact composition of EEG oscillations was assessed by the probability-classification analysis of short-term EEG spectral patterns. Results: The probability of delta, theta and slow-alpha oscillations occurrence was smaller for patients in MCS than for VS. (...)
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  19.  60
    Elisabeth Pacherie (2014). Can Conscious Agency Be Saved? Topoi 33 (1):33-45.
    This paper is concerned with the role of conscious agency in human action. On a folk-psychological view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In the last decades, the development of new psychological and neuroscientific methods has made conscious agency an object of empirical investigation and yielded results that challenge the received wisdom. Most famously, the results of Libet’s studies on the ‘readiness potential’ have been interpreted by many (...)
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  20.  45
    Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in (...)
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  21.  28
    Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Are There Pure Conscious Events? In Chandana Chakrabarti & Gordon Haist (eds.), Revisiting Mysticism. Cambridge Scholars Press 100--120.
    There has been much discussion about the nature and even existence of so-called “pure conscious events” (PCEs). PCEs are often described as mental events which are non-conceptual and lacking all experiential content (Forman 1990). For a variety of reasons, a number of authors have questioned both the accuracy of such a characterization and even the very existence of PCEs (Katz 1978, Bagger 1999). In this chapter, I take a somewhat different, but also critical, approach to the nature and possibility (...)
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  22. Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
    Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person (...)
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  23.  47
    Michael V. Antony (2008). Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.
    are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I (...)
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  24.  22
    Murray Shanahan (2005). Global Access, Embodiment, and the Conscious Subject. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):46-66.
    The objectives of this article are twofold. First, by denying the dualism inherent in attempts to load metaphysical significance on the inner/outer distinction, it defends the view that scientific investigation can approach consciousness in itself, and is not somehow restricted in scope to the outward manifestations of a private and hidden realm. Second, it provisionally endorses the central tenets of global workspace theory, and recommends them as a possible basis for the sort of scientific understanding of consciousness thus legitimised. However, (...)
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  25. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing : Wegner on the Conscious Will. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? MIT Press
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of (...) Will (ICW) Wegner has developed.. (shrink)
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  26.  46
    Susan A. J. Stuart (2010). Conscious Machines: Memory, Melody and Muscular Imagination. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):37-51.
    A great deal of effort has been, and continues to be, devoted to developing consciousness artificially (A small selection of the many authors writing in this area includes: Cotterill (J Conscious Stud 2:290–311, 1995 , 1998 ), Haikonen ( 2003 ), Aleksander and Dunmall (J Conscious Stud 10:7–18, 2003 ), Sloman ( 2004 , 2005 ), Aleksander ( 2005 ), Holland and Knight ( 2006 ), and Chella and Manzotti ( 2007 )), and yet a similar amount of (...)
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  27.  28
    Byeong D. Lee (2004). Finkelstein on the Difference Between Conscious and Unconscious Belief. Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
    ABSTRACT: In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief On his proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone’s belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed (...)
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  28.  45
    Walter Glannon (2008). Neurostimulation and the Minimally Conscious State. Bioethics 22 (6):337–345.
    Neurostimulation to restore cognitive and physical functions is an innovative and promising technique for treating patients with severe brain injury that has resulted in a minimally conscious state (MCS). The technique may involve electrical stimulation of the central thalamus, which has extensive projections to the cerebral cortex. Yet it is unclear whether an improvement in neurological functions would result in a net benefit for these patients. Quality-of-life measurements would be necessary to determine whether any benefit of neurostimulation outweighed (...)
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  29.  13
    Daniel M. Wegner (2004). Precis of the Illusion of Conscious Will (and Commentaries and Reply). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659.
    The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity (...)
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  30.  16
    Birgitta Dresp & Jean Durup (2009). A Plastic Temporal Brain Code for Conscious State Generation. Neural Plasticity 2009:1-15.
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.’s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran’s remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin (...)
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  31.  43
    Daniel M. Wegner (2004). Frequently Asked Questions About Conscious Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):679-692.
    The commentators' responses to The Illusion of Conscious Will reveal a healthy range of opinions – pro, con, and occasionally stray. Common concerns and issues are summarized here in terms of 11 “frequently asked questions,” which often center on the theme of how the experience of conscious will supports the creation of the self as author of action.
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  32.  64
    Jukka Varelius (2011). Respect for Autonomy, Advance Directives, and Minimally Conscious State. Bioethics 25 (9):505-515.
    In this article, I consider whether the advance directive of a person in minimally conscious state ought to be adhered to when its prescriptions conflict with her current wishes. I argue that an advance directive can have moral significance after its issuer has succumbed to minimally conscious state. I also defend the view that the patient can still have a significant degree of autonomy. Consequently, I conclude that her advance directive ought not to be applied. Then I briefly (...)
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  33.  29
    Uwe Peters (2014). Interpretive Sensory-Access Theory and Conscious Intentions. Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):583–595.
    It is typically assumed that while we know other people’s mental states by observing and interpreting their behavior, we know our own mental states by introspection, i.e., without interpreting ourselves. In his latest book, The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge, Peter Carruthers (2011) argues against this assumption. He holds that findings from across the cognitive sciences strongly suggest that self-knowledge of conscious propositional attitudes such as intentions, judgments, and decisions involves a swift and unconscious process of (...)
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  34.  32
    Jukka Varelius (2011). Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor. Neuroethics (Browse Results) 6 (1):85-95.
    Abstract In a recent issue of Neuroethics , I considered whether the notion of human dignity could help us in solving the moral problems the advent of the diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS) has brought forth. I argued that there is no adequate account of what justifies bestowing all MCS patients with the special worth referred to as human dignity. Therefore, I concluded, unless that difficulty can be solved we should resort to other values than human dignity (...)
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  35.  2
    Stephen Napier (2015). Perception of Value and the Minimally Conscious State. HEC Forum 27 (3):265-286.
    The “disability paradox” is the idea that for those who become severely disabled, their own quality of life assessment remains at or slightly below the QoL assessments of normal controls. This is a source of skepticism regarding third-person QoL judgments of the disabled. I argue here that this skepticism applies as well to those who are in the minimally conscious state. For rather simple means of sustaining an MCS patient’s life, the cost of being wrong that the patient would (...)
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  36.  33
    Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Freudian Conscious. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):1-28.
    To reduce the likelihood that psychology will develop in a deeply flawed manner, the present article seeks to provide an introduction to Freud?s conception of consciousness because, for among other reasons, his general theory is highly influential in our science and culture and among the best understood by clinicians and experimentalists. The theory is complex and all of its major parts have a bearing on one another; indeed, consciousness has a central place in the total conceptual structure ? as is (...)
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  37.  18
    Jure Zovko (2008). Metaphysics as Interpretation of Conscious Life: Some Remarks on D. Henrich's and D. Kolak's Thinking. Synthese 162 (3):425 - 438.
    In this article, I discuss the manner in which Dieter Henrich’s theory of subjectivity has emerged from the fundamental questions of German Idealism, and in what manner and to what extent this theory effects a reinstatement of metaphysics. In so doing, I shall argue that Henrich’s position represents a viable refutation of the attempt of the physicalist explanation of the world to prove the concept of the subject to be superfluous. Henrich’s metaphysics of subjectivity is primarily focused on the ‘ultimate (...)
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  38.  6
    Thorsten Botz-Bornstein (2012). The Conscious and the Unconscious in History:Lévi-Strauss, Collingwood, Bally, Barthes. Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2):151-172.
    Claude Lévi-Strauss holds that history and anthropology differ in their choice of complementary perspectives: history organizes its data in relation to conscious expressions of social life, while anthropology proceeds by examining its unconscious foundations. For R. G. Collingwood historical science discovers not only pure facts but considers a whole series of thoughts constituting historical life. Also Lévi-Strauss sees this: “To understand history it is necessary to know not only how things are, but how they have come to be.” However, (...)
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  39.  12
    Yung-Chi Sung & Da-Lun Tang (2007). Unconscious Processing Embedded in Conscious Processing: Evidence From Gaze Time on Chinese Sentence Reading. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):339-348.
    The current study aims to separate conscious and unconscious behaviors by employing both online and offline measures while the participants were consciously performing a task. Using an eye-movement tracking paradigm, we observed participants’ response patterns for distinguishing within-word-boundary and across-word-boundary reverse errors while reading Chinese sentences . The results showed that when the participants consciously detected errors, their gaze time for target words associated with across-word-boundary reverse errors was significantly longer than that for targets words associated with within-word-boundary reverse (...)
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  40.  9
    E. Subitzky (2003). I Am a Conscious Essay. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):64-66.
    Though merely an essay, I challenge you, gentle reader, by attempting to demonstrate that my own words are not fundamentally different from the conscious thoughts in your own mind: I thus claim to have consciousness and qualia.
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  41. Patrick Haggard (2005). Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
  42.  10
    Jesse Prinz (2012). The Conscious Brain. OUP Usa.
    The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.
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  43.  40
    Wilfried Kunde, Andrea Kiesel & Joachim Hoffman (2003). Conscious Control Over the Content of Unconscious Cognition. Cognition 88 (2):223-242.
  44.  19
    Daniel Holender (1986). Semantic Activation Without Conscious Identification in Dichotic Listening, Parafoveal Vision, and Visual Masking: A Survey and Appraisal. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):1-23.
    When the stored representation of the meaning of a stimulus is accessed through the processing of a sensory input it is maintained in an activated state for a certain amount of time that allows for further processing. This semantic activation is generally accompanied by conscious identification, which can be demonstrated by the ability of a person to perform discriminations on the basis of the meaning of the stimulus. The idea that a sensory input can give rise to semantic activation (...)
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  45.  44
    G. Knoblich & T. T. J. Kircher (2004). Deceiving Oneself About Being in Control: Conscious Detection of Changes in Visuomotor Coupling. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 30 (4):657-66.
  46.  94
    Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but (...)
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  47. Paul Raymont, Conscious Unity.
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  48.  37
    Mario Beauregard, Johanne Lévesque & Pierre Bourgouin (2001). Neural Correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of Emotion. Journal of Neuroscience 21 (18):6993-7000.
  49. Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser (2006). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment. Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
    ��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking (...)
     
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  50.  5
    Kathryn Pavlovich & Patricia Doyle Corner (2014). Conscious Enterprise Emergence: Shared Value Creation Through Expanded Conscious Awareness. Journal of Business Ethics 121 (3):341-351.
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