Search results for 'Conscious (Personality Factor)*' (try it on Scholar)

83 found
  1. Daniel M. Wegner (2003). The Mind's Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.
    We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however – the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct perceptions (...)
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  2.  95
    Patrick Haggard (2005). Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
  3.  38
    Wilfried Kunde, Andrea Kiesel & Joachim Hoffman (2003). Conscious Control Over the Content of Unconscious Cognition. Cognition 88 (2):223-242.
  4. Stevan Harnad (2003). Can a Machine Be Conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.
    A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can (...)
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  5. Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
    Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person (...)
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  6.  19
    Murray Shanahan (2005). Global Access, Embodiment, and the Conscious Subject. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):46-66.
    The objectives of this article are twofold. First, by denying the dualism inherent in attempts to load metaphysical significance on the inner/outer distinction, it defends the view that scientific investigation can approach consciousness in itself, and is not somehow restricted in scope to the outward manifestations of a private and hidden realm. Second, it provisionally endorses the central tenets of global workspace theory, and recommends them as a possible basis for the sort of scientific understanding of consciousness thus legitimised. However, (...)
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  7. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing : Wegner on the Conscious Will. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? MIT Press
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of (...) Will (ICW) Wegner has developed.. (shrink)
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  8.  43
    Daniel M. Wegner (2004). Frequently Asked Questions About Conscious Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):679-692.
    The commentators' responses to The Illusion of Conscious Will reveal a healthy range of opinions – pro, con, and occasionally stray. Common concerns and issues are summarized here in terms of 11 “frequently asked questions,” which often center on the theme of how the experience of conscious will supports the creation of the self as author of action.
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  9.  33
    Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Freudian Conscious. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):1-28.
    To reduce the likelihood that psychology will develop in a deeply flawed manner, the present article seeks to provide an introduction to Freud?s conception of consciousness because, for among other reasons, his general theory is highly influential in our science and culture and among the best understood by clinicians and experimentalists. The theory is complex and all of its major parts have a bearing on one another; indeed, consciousness has a central place in the total conceptual structure ? as is (...)
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  10.  12
    Yung-Chi Sung & Da-Lun Tang (2007). Unconscious Processing Embedded in Conscious Processing: Evidence From Gaze Time on Chinese Sentence Reading. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):339-348.
    The current study aims to separate conscious and unconscious behaviors by employing both online and offline measures while the participants were consciously performing a task. Using an eye-movement tracking paradigm, we observed participants’ response patterns for distinguishing within-word-boundary and across-word-boundary reverse errors while reading Chinese sentences . The results showed that when the participants consciously detected errors, their gaze time for target words associated with across-word-boundary reverse errors was significantly longer than that for targets words associated with within-word-boundary reverse (...)
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  11.  9
    E. Subitzky (2003). I Am a Conscious Essay. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):64-66.
    Though merely an essay, I challenge you, gentle reader, by attempting to demonstrate that my own words are not fundamentally different from the conscious thoughts in your own mind: I thus claim to have consciousness and qualia.
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  12.  44
    G. Knoblich & T. T. J. Kircher (2004). Deceiving Oneself About Being in Control: Conscious Detection of Changes in Visuomotor Coupling. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 30 (4):657-66.
  13.  37
    Mario Beauregard, Johanne Lévesque & Pierre Bourgouin (2001). Neural Correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of Emotion. Journal of Neuroscience 21 (18):6993-7000.
  14.  14
    Holley S. Hodgins & C. Raymond Knee (2002). The Integrating Self and Conscious Experience. In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press 87-100.
  15.  25
    Steven J. Haase & Gary D. Fisk (2004). Valid Distinctions Between Conscious and Unconscious Perception? Perception and Psychophysics 66 (5):868-871.
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  16.  57
    Alexei V. Samsonovich & Lynn Nadel (2005). Fundamental Principles and Mechanisms of the Conscious Self. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):669-689.
  17. Peter Walla, Bernd Hufnagl, Johann Lehrner, Dagmar Mayer, Gerald Lindinger, Lüder Deecke & Wilfried Lang (2002). Evidence of Conscious and Subconscious Olfactory Information Processing During Word Encoding: A Magnetoencephalographic (MEG) Study. Cognitive Brain Research 14 (3):309-316.
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  18.  20
    Tim Dalgleish & Michael J. Power (2004). The I of the Storm: Relations Between Self and Conscious Emotion Experience: Comment on Lambie and Marcel (2002). Psychological Review 111 (3):812-819.
  19.  18
    Warren Wilner (2005). The Lone Ranger as a Metaphor for the Psychoanalytic Movement From Conscious to Unconscious Experience. Psychoanalytic Review 92 (5):759-776.
  20.  14
    Andrei G. Khromov (2001). Logical Self-Reference as a Model for Conscious Experience. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 45 (5):720-731.
  21.  13
    Masanori Oikawa (2004). Moderation of Automatic Achievement Goals by Conscious Monitoring. Psychological Reports 95 (3):975-980.
  22.  10
    Gladys B. Guarton (2001). Unconscious Learning and Conscious Choice: Commentary on Levenson's Essay. Contemporary Psychoanalysis 37 (2):253-263.
  23. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 301-337.
  24. Emrah Duzel (2000). What Brain Activity Tells Us About Conscious Awareness of Memory Retrieval. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press 173-187.
  25. Harald Höffding & Mary E. Lowndes (2004). The Conscious and the Unconscious: From Outlines of Psychology (1881). American Imago. Special Issue 1750 (3):379-395.
  26. Jack Honvank & Edward H. F. Haaden (2001). Conscious and Unconscious Processing of Emotional Faces. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press 222-237.
  27. Christopher MacKenna (2004). Conscious Change and Changing Consciousness: Some Thoughts on the Psychology of Meditation. British Journal of Psychotherapy 21 (1):103-118.
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  28.  67
    Merlin Donald (2001). A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness. W.W. Norton.
  29. Eddy Nahmias (2005). Agency, Authorship, and Illusion. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785.
    Daniel Wegner argues that conscious will is an illusion. I examine the adequacy of his theory of apparent mental causation and whether, if accurate, it suggests that our experience of agency and authorship should be considered illusory. I examine various interpretations of this claim and raise problems for each interpretation. I also distinguish between the experiences of agency and authorship.
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  30.  44
    Donald D. Hoffman (2006). The Scrambling Theorem: A Simple Proof of the Logical Possibility of Spectrum Inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):31-45.
    The possibility of spectrum inversion has been debated since it was raised by Locke and is still discussed because of its implications for functionalist theories of conscious experience . This paper provides a mathematical formulation of the question of spectrum inversion and proves that such inversions, and indeed bijective scramblings of color in general, are logically possible. Symmetries in the structure of color space are, for purposes of the proof, irrelevant. The proof entails that conscious experiences are not (...)
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  31.  53
    Susan J. Blackmore (2003). Consciousness in Meme Machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.
    Setting aside the problems of recognising consciousness in a machine, this article considers what would be needed for a machine to have human-like conscious- ness. Human-like consciousness is an illusion; that is, it exists but is not what it appears to be. The illusion that we are a conscious self having a stream of experi- ences is constructed when memes compete for replication by human hosts. Some memes survive by being promoted as personal beliefs, desires, opinions and pos- (...)
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  32.  36
    Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
    The Latin conscius does not translate anything like mind or consciousness. Only in the mid-nineteenth century do we find the first attempts to study consciousness as its own discipline. Wundt, James, and Freud disagreed about how to approach the science of consciousness, although agreeing that psychology was a 'science of consciousness' that takes lived biological experience as its object. The behaviorists vetoed this idea. By the 1950s, for cognitive science, mind (conscious and unconscious) was considered analogous to computer software. (...)
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  33.  35
    Stevan Harnad (2002). Turing Indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins 3-18.
    Many special problems crop up when evolutionary theory turns, quite naturally, to the question of the adaptive value and causal role of consciousness in human and nonhuman organisms. One problem is that -- unless we are to be dualists, treating it as an independent nonphysical force -- consciousness could not have had an independent adaptive function of its own, over and above whatever behavioral and physiological functions it "supervenes" on, because evolution is completely blind to the difference between a (...) organism and a functionally equivalent (Turing Indistinguishable) nonconscious "Zombie" organism: In other words, the Blind Watchmaker, a functionalist if ever there was one, is no more a mind reader than we are. Hence Turing-Indistinguishability = Darwin-Indistinguishability. It by no means follows from this, however, that human behavior is therefore to be explained only by the push-pull dynamics of Zombie determinism, as dictated by calculations of "inclusive fitness" and "evolutionarily stable strategies." We are conscious, and, more important, that consciousness is piggy-backing somehow on the vast complex of unobservable internal activity -- call it "cognition" -- that is really responsible for generating all of our behavioral capacities. Hence, except in the palpable presence of the irrational (e.g., our sexual urges) where distal Darwinian factors still have some proximal sway, it is as sensible to seek a Darwinian rather than a cognitive explanation for most of our current behavior as it is to seek a cosmological rather than an engineering explanation of an automobile's behavior. Let evolutionary theory explain what shaped our cognitive capacity (Steklis & Harnad 1976; Harnad 1996, but let cognitive theory explain our resulting behavior. (shrink)
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  34.  28
    Bernard J. Baars (2001). How Could Brain Imaging Not Tell Us About Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):24-29.
    Revonsuo argues that current brain imaging methods do not allow us to ‘discover’ consciousness. While all observational methods in science have limitations, consciousness is such a massive and pervasive phenomenon that we cannot fail to observe its effects at every level of brain organization: molecular, cellular, electrical, anatomical, metabolic, and even the ‘higher levels of electrophysiological organization that are crucial for the empirical discovery and theoretical explanation of consciousness’ . Indeed, the first major discovery in that respect was Hans Berger's (...)
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  35. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). On the Temporal Continuity of Human Consciousness: Is James's Firsthand Description, After All, "Inept"? Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (2):121-148.
    Contrary to James's emphasis on the sensible continuity of each personal consciousness, our purported "stream," as it presents itself to us, is not accurately described as having a flowing temporal structure; thus Strawson has argued based on how he finds his own consciousness to be. Accordingly, qua object of inner awareness, our consciousness is best characterized as constituted successively by pulses of consciousness separated in time, one from the next, by a momentary state of complete unconsciousness. It seems at times (...)
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  36.  50
    Antti Revonsuo (2000). Inner Presence: Consciousness As a Biological Phenomenon. MIT Press.
  37.  31
    Michael Snodgrass, Edward Bernat & Howard Shevrin (2004). Unconscious Perception: A Model-Based Approach to Method and Evidence. Perception and Psychophysics 66 (5):846-867.
  38.  47
    Daniel Holender & Katia Duscherer (2004). Unconscious Perception: The Need for a Paradigm Shift. Perception and Psychophysics 66 (5):872-881.
  39. Kent C. Berridge & Piotr Winkielman (2003). What is an Unconscious Emotion? (The Case for Unconscious "Liking"). Cognition and Emotion 17 (2):181-211.
  40.  11
    Wilfried Kunde, Andrea Kiesel & Joachim Hoffmann (2005). On the Masking and Disclosure of Unconscious Elaborate Processing. A Reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, and Verguts (2005). Cognition 97 (1):99-105.
  41.  44
    Naotsugu Tsuchiya & Ralph Adolphs (2007). Emotion and Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):158-167.
  42.  44
    Evan Thompson (2001). Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
    This book puts that right, and goes further by also including decriptions of animal "person-to-person" interactions.
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  43.  25
    Julian Paul Keenan, Jennifer Rubio, Connie Racioppi, Amanda Johnson & Allyson Barnacz (2005). The Right Hemisphere and the Dark Side of Consciousness. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):695-704.
  44. Eyal M. Reingold (2004). Unconscious Perception and the Classic Dissociation Paradigm: A New Angle? Perception and Psychophysics 66 (5):882-887.
  45.  13
    Filip Van Opstal, Bert Reynvoet & Tom Verguts (2005). Unconscious Semantic Categorization and Mask Interactions: An Elaborate Response to Kunde Et Al. (2005). Cognition 97 (1):107-113.
  46. Victor Manoel Andrade (2003). Affect, Thought, and Consciousness: The Freudian Theory of Psychic Structuring From an Evolutionary Perspective. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 5 (1):71-80.
  47.  25
    Dorothée Legrand (2003). How Not to Find the Neural Signature of Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):544-546.
  48. Irene E. Harvey (2002). Evolving Robot Consciousness: The Easy Problems and the Rest. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins
  49.  60
    Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Hoffman's "Proof" of the Possibility of Spectrum Inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.
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  50.  37
    Edgar Levenson (2001). The Enigma of the Unconscious. Contemporary Psychoanalysis 37 (2):239-252.
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