Search results for 'Conscious (Personality Factor)*' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing : Wegner on the Conscious Will. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Mit Press.score: 246.0
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of (...) Will (ICW) Wegner has developed.. (shrink)
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  2. Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.score: 243.0
    Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person (...)
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  3. Evan Thompson (2001). Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic.score: 243.0
    This book puts that right, and goes further by also including decriptions of animal "person-to-person" interactions.
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  4. Stevan Harnad (2003). Can a Machine Be Conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.score: 237.0
    A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can (...)
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  5. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Freudian Conscious. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):1-28.score: 237.0
    To reduce the likelihood that psychology will develop in a deeply flawed manner, the present article seeks to provide an introduction to Freud?s conception of consciousness because, for among other reasons, his general theory is highly influential in our science and culture and among the best understood by clinicians and experimentalists. The theory is complex and all of its major parts have a bearing on one another; indeed, consciousness has a central place in the total conceptual structure ? as is (...)
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  6. Daniel M. Wegner (2003). The Mind's Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.score: 234.0
    We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however – the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct perceptions (...)
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  7. Daniel M. Wegner (2004). Frequently Asked Questions About Conscious Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):679-692.score: 234.0
    The commentators' responses to The Illusion of Conscious Will reveal a healthy range of opinions – pro, con, and occasionally stray. Common concerns and issues are summarized here in terms of 11 “frequently asked questions,” which often center on the theme of how the experience of conscious will supports the creation of the self as author of action.
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  8. Yung-Chi Sung & Da-Lun Tang (2007). Unconscious Processing Embedded in Conscious Processing: Evidence From Gaze Time on Chinese Sentence Reading. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):339-348.score: 228.0
  9. Murray Shanahan (2005). Global Access, Embodiment, and the Conscious Subject. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):46-66.score: 228.0
  10. E. Subitzky (2003). I Am a Conscious Essay. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):64-66.score: 228.0
  11. Emrah Duzel (2000). What Brain Activity Tells Us About Conscious Awareness of Memory Retrieval. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press. 173-187.score: 228.0
  12. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. 301-337.score: 228.0
  13. Patrick Haggard (2005). Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.score: 225.0
  14. Alexei V. Samsonovich & Lynn Nadel (2005). Fundamental Principles and Mechanisms of the Conscious Self. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):669-689.score: 225.0
  15. G. Knoblich & T. T. J. Kircher (2004). Deceiving Oneself About Being in Control: Conscious Detection of Changes in Visuomotor Coupling. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 30 (4):657-66.score: 225.0
  16. Mario Beauregard, Johanne Lévesque & Pierre Bourgouin (2001). Neural Correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of Emotion. Journal of Neuroscience 21 (18):6993-7000.score: 225.0
  17. Wilfried Kunde, Andrea Kiesel & Joachim Hoffman (2003). Conscious Control Over the Content of Unconscious Cognition. Cognition 88 (2):223-242.score: 225.0
  18. Steven J. Haase & Gary D. Fisk (2004). Valid Distinctions Between Conscious and Unconscious Perception? Perception and Psychophysics 66 (5):868-871.score: 225.0
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  19. Tim Dalgleish & Michael J. Power (2004). The I of the Storm: Relations Between Self and Conscious Emotion Experience: Comment on Lambie and Marcel (2002). Psychological Review 111 (3):812-819.score: 225.0
  20. Warren Wilner (2005). The Lone Ranger as a Metaphor for the Psychoanalytic Movement From Conscious to Unconscious Experience. Psychoanalytic Review 92 (5):759-776.score: 225.0
  21. Masanori Oikawa (2004). Moderation of Automatic Achievement Goals by Conscious Monitoring. Psychological Reports 95 (3):975-980.score: 225.0
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  22. Gladys B. Guarton (2001). Unconscious Learning and Conscious Choice: Commentary on Levenson's Essay. Contemporary Psychoanalysis 37 (2):253-263.score: 225.0
  23. Andrei G. Khromov (2001). Logical Self-Reference as a Model for Conscious Experience. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 45 (5):720-731.score: 225.0
  24. Holley S. Hodgins & C. Raymond Knee (2002). The Integrating Self and Conscious Experience. In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press. 87-100.score: 225.0
  25. Harald Höffding & Mary E. Lowndes (2004). The Conscious and the Unconscious: From Outlines of Psychology (1881). American Imago. Special Issue 1750 (3):379-395.score: 225.0
  26. Jack Honvank & Edward H. F. Haaden (2001). Conscious and Unconscious Processing of Emotional Faces. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press. 222-237.score: 225.0
  27. Christopher MacKenna (2004). Conscious Change and Changing Consciousness: Some Thoughts on the Psychology of Meditation. British Journal of Psychotherapy 21 (1):103-118.score: 225.0
     
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  28. Peter Walla, Bernd Hufnagl, Johann Lehrner, Dagmar Mayer, Gerald Lindinger, Lüder Deecke & Wilfried Lang (2002). Evidence of Conscious and Subconscious Olfactory Information Processing During Word Encoding: A Magnetoencephalographic (MEG) Study. Cognitive Brain Research 14 (3):309-316.score: 225.0
     
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  29. Susan J. Blackmore (2003). Consciousness in Meme Machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.score: 216.0
    Setting aside the problems of recognising consciousness in a machine, this article considers what would be needed for a machine to have human-like conscious- ness. Human-like consciousness is an illusion; that is, it exists but is not what it appears to be. The illusion that we are a conscious self having a stream of experi- ences is constructed when memes compete for replication by human hosts. Some memes survive by being promoted as personal beliefs, desires, opinions and pos- (...)
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  30. Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.score: 216.0
    The Latin conscius does not translate anything like mind or consciousness. Only in the mid-nineteenth century do we find the first attempts to study consciousness as its own discipline. Wundt, James, and Freud disagreed about how to approach the science of consciousness, although agreeing that psychology was a 'science of consciousness' that takes lived biological experience as its object. The behaviorists vetoed this idea. By the 1950s, for cognitive science, mind (conscious and unconscious) was considered analogous to computer software. (...)
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  31. Stevan Harnad (2002). Turing Indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins. 3-18.score: 201.0
    Many special problems crop up when evolutionary theory turns, quite naturally, to the question of the adaptive value and causal role of consciousness in human and nonhuman organisms. One problem is that -- unless we are to be dualists, treating it as an independent nonphysical force -- consciousness could not have had an independent adaptive function of its own, over and above whatever behavioral and physiological functions it "supervenes" on, because evolution is completely blind to the difference between a (...) organism and a functionally equivalent (Turing Indistinguishable) nonconscious "Zombie" organism: In other words, the Blind Watchmaker, a functionalist if ever there was one, is no more a mind reader than we are. Hence Turing-Indistinguishability = Darwin-Indistinguishability. It by no means follows from this, however, that human behavior is therefore to be explained only by the push-pull dynamics of Zombie determinism, as dictated by calculations of "inclusive fitness" and "evolutionarily stable strategies." We are conscious, and, more important, that consciousness is piggy-backing somehow on the vast complex of unobservable internal activity -- call it "cognition" -- that is really responsible for generating all of our behavioral capacities. Hence, except in the palpable presence of the irrational (e.g., our sexual urges) where distal Darwinian factors still have some proximal sway, it is as sensible to seek a Darwinian rather than a cognitive explanation for most of our current behavior as it is to seek a cosmological rather than an engineering explanation of an automobile's behavior. Let evolutionary theory explain what shaped our cognitive capacity (Steklis & Harnad 1976; Harnad 1996, but let cognitive theory explain our resulting behavior. (shrink)
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  32. Irene E. Harvey (2002). Evolving Robot Consciousness: The Easy Problems and the Rest. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.score: 198.0
  33. Endel Tulving (2000). Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Pr.score: 198.0
  34. Bernard J. Baars (2001). How Could Brain Imaging Not Tell Us About Consciousness? Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):24-29.score: 198.0
  35. Dorothée Legrand (2003). How Not to Find the Neural Signature of Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):544-546.score: 198.0
  36. Antti Revonsuo (2001). Discovering the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Reply to Commentaries. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):44-50.score: 198.0
  37. John G. Taylor (2001). Functional Brain Imaging to Search for Consciousness Needs Attention. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):39-43.score: 198.0
  38. Geraint Rees (2001). Can Philosophy Discover Consciousness in the Brain? Commentary on Revonsuo's Can Functional Brain Imaging Discover Consciousness in the Brain?. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):34-38.score: 198.0
  39. Gianfranco Dalla Barba (2001). Beyond the Memory-Trace Paradox and the Fallacy of Homunculus: A Hypothesis Concerning the Relationship Between Memory, Consciousness and Temporality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):51-78.score: 198.0
  40. Bill Faw (2003). Models and Mechanisms of Consciousness: Report on ASSC-7 in Memphis: May 30-June 2, 2003. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (8):79-89.score: 198.0
  41. N. Andreasen (2000). Is Schizophrenia a Disorder of Memory or Consciousness? In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.score: 198.0
  42. Gianfranco Dalla Barba (2000). Memory, Consciousness, and Temporality: What is Retrieved and Who Exactly is Controlling the Retrieval? In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. 138-155.score: 198.0
  43. Christopher D. Frith (2001). Commentary on Revonsuo's Can Functional Brain Imaging Discover Consciousness in the Brain?. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):30.score: 198.0
  44. John M. Gardiner (2000). On the Objectivity of Subjective Experiences and Autonoetic and Noetic Consciousness. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.score: 198.0
  45. Brian Levine (2000). Self-Regulation and Autonoetic Consciousness. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.score: 198.0
  46. Kathleen Wider (2006). Emotion and Self-Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 63-87.score: 198.0
  47. Victor Manoel Andrade (2003). Affect, Thought, and Consciousness: The Freudian Theory of Psychic Structuring From an Evolutionary Perspective. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 5 (1):71-80.score: 195.0
  48. Merlin Donald (2001). A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness. W.W. Norton.score: 195.0
  49. Robert W. Lurz (2003). Neither Hot nor Cold: An Alternative Account of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (1).score: 195.0
  50. Antti Revonsuo (2000). Inner Presence: Consciousness As a Biological Phenomenon. MIT Press.score: 195.0
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