Search results for 'Consciousness States' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: O'Shaughnessy and the Mythology of the Attention. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):35-64.score: 212.0
    What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O?Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic (...)
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  2. Thomas Natsoulas (2000). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Further Considerations in the Light of James's Conception. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):139-166.score: 210.0
    How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as ?feelings? in William James?s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James?s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James?s are intended to pick out the variable (...)
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  3. Lizette Heine, Andrea Soddu, Francisco Gómez, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Luaba Tshibanda, Marie Thonnard, Vanessa Charland-Verville, Murielle Kirsch, Steven Laureys & Athena Demertzi (2012). Resting State Networks and Consciousness: Alterations of Multiple Resting State Network Connectivity in Physiological, Pharmacological, and Pathological Consciousness States. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 200.0
    In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to conscious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in fMRI functional connectivity under physiological (sleep), pharmacological (anesthesia) and pathological altered states of consciousness, such as brain death, coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and minimally conscious state. The reviewed RSNs were the DMN, left and right executive control, salience, sensorimotor, auditory and visual networks. We highlight some methodological issues concerning resting state analyses in severely injured (...)
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  4. H. Sidky (2009). A Shaman's Cure: The Relationship Between Altered States of Consciousness and Shamanic Healing. Anthropology of Consciousness 20 (2):171-197.score: 198.0
    This study, which is based upon ethnographic data collected between 1999 and 2008 in Nepal, examines the connection between the shaman's altered states of consciousness (ASC; i.e., what goes on inside the healer's mind/brain) and therapeutic changes that take place in the patient's mind/body. Unlike other studies that primarily emphasize the shaman's internal psychological state, this article attempts to explain the role of the healer's ASC and elucidate how desired therapeutic changes depend upon patient–healer interactions. This question is (...)
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  5. Nathan Porath (2013). “Not to Be Aware Anymore”: Indigenous Sumatran Ideas and Shamanic Experiences of Changed States of Awareness/Consciousness. Anthropology of Consciousness 24 (1):7-31.score: 198.0
    Anthropologists working on altered states of consciousness (ASC) have suggested that we should do away with psychologizing concepts and use people's own terms for these experiences. With material drawn from the Orang Sakai of Sumatra this paper shows that practitioners who utilize ASC do recognize the alteration of states of awareness as preconditions for numinous interactions. Also critically discussed is the term ASC.
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  6. Ronald J. Pekala & V. K. Kumar (2007). An Empirical-Phenomenological Approach to Quantifying Consciousness and States of Consciousness: With Particular Reference to Understanding the Nature of Hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. 167-194.score: 194.0
     
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  7. Levente Móró (2010). Hallucinatory Altered States of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):241-252.score: 192.0
    Altered states of consciousness (ASC), especially hallucinatory ones, are philosophically and scientifically interesting modes of operation of the mind–brain complex. However, classical definitions of ASC seem to capture only a few common characteristics of traditionally regarded phenomena, thus lacking exact classification criteria for assessing altered and baseline states. The current situation leads to a priority problem between phenomena-based definitions and definition-based phenomena selection. In order to solve the problem, this paper introduces a self-mapping procedure that is based (...)
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  8. Gerhard Grössing (2001). Comparing the Long-Term Evolution of ``Cognitive Invariances'' in Physics with a Dynamics in States of Consciousness. Foundations of Science 6 (4):255-272.score: 192.0
    It is shown that the evolution of physics canin several regards be described by elements of``regression'', i.e., that within a certaintradition of ideas one begins with theconstruction of most ``plausible'' statements(axioms) at hand, and then ``works onselfbackwards'' with respect to developmental terms.As a consequence of this strategy, the furtherwork proceeds along such a ``regressive'' path,the more one arrives at concepts andrelationships which are unexpected or evencounter-intuitive in terms of our everydayexperiences. However, a comparable phenomenology is wellknown from studies on (...) of consciousness.In particular, the evolutionary logic of theconstructions of major ``cognitive invariances''in physics, which is in part due to everincreasing rates of data processing, ismirrored in a logic of states of consciousnesswhich deviate from a ``normal'' state of dailyroutine along increasing levels of centralnervous arousal. Examples are given from the evolution ofphysics, and future perspectives are brieflyoutlined on the basis thereof. (shrink)
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  9. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.score: 188.0
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG (...)
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  10. A. Dietrich (2003). Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness: The Transient Hypofrontality Hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):231-256.score: 186.0
  11. Charles T. Tart (2000). Investigating Altered States of Consciousness on Their Own Terms: State-Specific Sciences. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.score: 186.0
     
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  12. L. I. Aftanas & S. A. Golosheikin (2003). Changes in Cortical Activity in Altered States of Consciousness: The Study of Meditation by High-Resolution EEG. Human Physiology 29 (2):143-151.score: 180.0
  13. Dieter Vaitl, Niels Birbaumer, John Gruzelier, Graham A. Jamieson, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Dietrich Lehmann, Wolfgang H. R. Miltner, Ulrich Ott, Peter Pütz, Gebhard Sammer, Inge Strauch, Ute Strehl, Jiri Wackermann & Thomas Weiss (2005). Psychobiology of Altered States of Consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 131 (1):98-127.score: 180.0
  14. Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2003). Hypnotic Phenomena and Altered States of Consciousness: A Multilevel Framework of Description and Explanation. Contemporary Hypnosis 20 (3):111-164.score: 180.0
  15. John Gruzelier (2005). Altered States of Consciousness and Hypnosis in the Twenty-First Century: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):1-7.score: 180.0
  16. Andrzej Kokoszka (2000). Altered States of Consciousness. Psychiatr Pol 27 (1):75-83.score: 180.0
  17. Patricia Tassi & Alain Muzet (2001). Defining the States of Consciousness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 25 (2):175-191.score: 180.0
  18. D. L. Spivak (2004). Linguistics of Altered States of Consciousness: Problems and Prospects. Journal of Quantitative Linguistics 11 (1):27-32.score: 180.0
  19. Peter Naish (2005). Detecting Hypnotically Altered States of Consciousness: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):24-30.score: 180.0
  20. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Open Neuroimaging Journal 6:55-68.score: 180.0
    The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, (...)
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  21. Sanford I. Nidich, Randi J. Nidich & Charles N. Alexander (2000). Moral Development and Higher States of Consciousness. Journal of Adult Development. Special Issue 1949 (4):217-225.score: 180.0
  22. Dagmar Koethe, Christoph W. Gerth, Miriam A. Neatby, Anita Haensel, Martin Thies, Udo Schneider, Hinderk M. Emrich, Joachim Klosterkötter, Frauke Schultze-Lutter & F. Markus Leweke (2006). Disturbances of Visual Information Processing in Early States of Psychosis and Experimental Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol Altered States of Consciousness. Schizophrenia Research 88 (1-3):142-150.score: 180.0
  23. Errol R. Korn (2002). Visualization Techniques and Altered States of Consciousness. In Anees A. Sheikh (ed.), Handbook of Therapeutic Imagery Techniques. Baywood Publishing Co.. 41-49.score: 180.0
  24. Ralph Metzner (2005). Psychedelic, Psychoactive, and Addictive Drugs and States of Consciousness. In Mitch Earleywine (ed.), Mind-Altering Drugs: The Science of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press. 25-48.score: 180.0
     
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  25. Ronald J. Pekala & E. Cardena (2000). Methodological Issues in the Study of Altered States of Consciousness and Anomalous Experiences. In E. Cardena & S. Lynn (eds.), Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientific Evidence. American Psychological Association.score: 180.0
  26. M. A. Richards, S. A. Koren & M. A. Persinger (2002). Circumcerebral Application of Weak Complex Magnetic Fields with Derivatives and Changes in Electroencephalographic Power Spectra Within the Theta Range: Implications for States of Consciousness. Perceptual and Motor Skills 95 (2):671-686.score: 180.0
  27. Jirí Wackerman, Peter Pütz, Simone Büchi, Inge Strauch & Dietrich Lehmann (2002). Brain Electrical Activity and Subjective Experience During Altered States of Consciousness: Ganzfeld and Hypnagogic States. International Journal of Psychophysiology 46 (2):123-146.score: 180.0
  28. Robert P. Zelman, Experiential Philosophy: Metaphysics and Altered States of Consciousness.score: 180.0
     
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  29. Joseph L. Verheijde, Mohamed Y. Rady & Joan L. McGregor (2009). Brain Death, States of Impaired Consciousness, and Physician-Assisted Death for End-of-Life Organ Donation and Transplantation. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (4):409-421.score: 170.0
    In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea (i.e., brain death) with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human (...)
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  30. Lothar Schafer (2006). Quantum Reality, the Emergence of Complex Order From Virtual States, and the Importance of Consciousness in the Universe. Zygon 41 (3):505-532.score: 168.0
  31. Lothar Schäfer (2006). Quantum Reality, the Emergence of Complex Order From Virtual States, and the Importance of Consciousness in the Universe. Zygon 41 (3):505-532.score: 168.0
  32. Joseph Glicksohn (1998). States of Consciousness and Symbolic Cognition. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):105-118.score: 168.0
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  33. Brandon Randolph-Seng & Michael Nielsen (2009). Opening the Doors of Perception: Priming Altered States of Consciousness Outside of Conscious Awareness. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 31 (2):237-260.score: 168.0
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  34. Brandon Randolph-Seng & Michael E. Nielsen (2009). Opening the Doors of Perception: Priming Altered States of Consciousness Outside of Conscious Awareness. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 31 (2):237-260.score: 168.0
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  35. William A. Richards (2008). The Phenomenology and Potential Religious Import of States of Consciousness Facilitated by Psilocybin. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 30 (1):189-199.score: 168.0
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  36. Charles T. Tart (ed.) (1990). Altered States of Consciousness. (Third Edition).score: 168.0
  37. Jacob Berger (forthcoming). Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.score: 158.0
    According to Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness (...)
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  38. J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2000). Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.score: 156.0
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
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  39. J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2003). Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States. In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press. 793-842.score: 156.0
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
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  40. Brie Gertler (2012). Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.score: 156.0
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  41. Ken Wilber (2000). Waves, Streams, States and Self: Further Considerations for an Integral Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):145-176.score: 150.0
  42. Geoffrey W. Dennis (2008). The Use of Water as a Medium for Altered States of Consciousness in Early Jewish Mysticism: A Cross-Disciplinary Analysis. Anthropology of Consciousness 19 (1):84-106.score: 150.0
    This article combines the disciplines of textual/linguistic analysis, anthropology, and perceptual psychology to examine selected ancient Jewish mystical texts that claim to describe the praxis for ascents into heaven and encounters with angelic spirits in order to reconstruct the psychosocial context of these literary works. Specifically, the article examines Hekhalot or "Divine Palaces" texts that deal with hydromancy, giving attention to their mythic–symbolic assumptions, their described preparatory and triggering rituals, and their accounts of the ASC (altered states of (...)) visions resulting from these rituals that are experienced by the practitioners. The article suggests that these accounts correlate with ASC practices identified in the literature and additionally suggests that although the mystical texts are written to resemble biblical accounts of revelatory experiences, the texts under consideration are more than works of fabulous imagination; they are literary artifacts of an actual ecstatic ASC praxis among the Jews of Late Antiquity. (shrink)
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  43. Gregg Caruso (2005). Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption. In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.score: 144.0
    One of the central assumptions made in much of contemporary philosophy of mind is that there is no appearance-reality distinction when it comes to sensory states. On this assumption, sensory states simply are as they seem: consciousness is an intrinsic property of sensory states—that is, all sensory states are conscious—and the consciousness of one’s own sensory states is never inaccurate. For a sensation to be felt as pain, for example, is for it to (...)
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  44. J. Allan Hobson (2003). The Dream Drugstore: Chemically Altered States of Consciousness. MIT Press.score: 144.0
    In this book J. Allan Hobson offers a new understanding of altered states of consciousness based on knowledge of how our brain chemistry is balanced when we are...
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  45. Ernst Pöppel (1997). Consciousness Versus States of Being Conscious. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):155-156.score: 144.0
    States of being conscious (S) can be defined on the basis of temporal information processing. A high-frequency mechanism provides atemporal system states with periods of approximately 30 msec to implement the functional connection of distributed activities allowing the construction of primordial events; a low frequency mechanism characterized by automatic temporal integration sets up temporal windows with approximately 3 seconds duration. This integration mechanism can be used to define S. P-consciousness and A-consciousness as conceived of by Block (...)
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  46. Arthur Saniotis & Maciej Henneberg (2011). An Evolutionary Approach Toward Exploring Altered States of Consciousness, Mind–Body Techniques, and Non-Local Mind. World Futures 67 (3):182 - 200.score: 144.0
    Humans are a part of the complex system including both natural and cultural-technological environment. Evolution of this system included self-amplifying feedbacks that lead to the appearance of human conscious mind. We describe the current state of the understanding of human brain evolution that stresses neurohormonal and biochemical changes rather than simple increase of anatomical substrate for the mind. It follows that human brain is strongly influenced by the state of the body and may operate at various levels of consciousness (...)
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  47. John Palmer (1998). Parapsychology, Anomaly, and Altered States of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):302-303.score: 144.0
    Pseudoscience is not an appropriate label for parapsychology. Although the noise reduction model of extrasensory perception (ESP) is explanatory only in a limited sense, research does exist addressing the correlation between ESP and altered states of consciousness (ASCs). The term anomaly is not appropriately applied to experiences such as out of body experiences (OBEs) per se, but only to the question of their source. Research on both topics should be encouraged.
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  48. Grant Gillett (1999). Consciousness and Lesser States: The Evolutionary Foothills of the Mind. Philosophy 74 (3):331-360.score: 144.0
    Consciousness and its relation to the unconscious mind have long been debated in philosophy. I develop the thesis that consciousness and its contents reflect the highest elaboration of a set of abilities to respond to the environment realized in more primitive organisms and brain circuits. The contents of the states lesser than consciousness are, however, intrinsically dubious and indeterminate as it is the role of the discursive skills we use to construct conscious contents that lends articulation (...)
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  49. Quentin Noirhomme & Caroline Schnakers, A Twitch of Consciousness: Defining the Boundaries of Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.score: 144.0
    Some patients awaken from their coma but only show reflex motor activity. This condition of wakeful (eyes open) unawareness is called the vegetative state. In 2002, a new clinical entity coined ‘‘minimally conscious state’’ defined patients who show more than reflex responsiveness but remain unable to communicate their thoughts and feelings. Emergence from the minimally conscious state is defined by functional recovery of verbal or nonverbal communication.1 Our empirical medical definitions aim to propose clearcut borders separating disorders of consciousness (...)
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  50. Roumen Kirov (2007). The Sleeping Brain, the States of Consciousness, and the Human Intelligence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):159-159.score: 144.0
    A large number of experimental results clearly indicate that sleep has an important role for human intelligence. Sleep-wake stages and their specific patterns of brain activation and neuromodulation subserve human memory, states of consciousness, and modes of information processing that strongly relate to intelligence. Therefore, human intelligence should be explained in a broader framework than is implicated by neuroimaging data alone.
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