Search results for 'Consciousness States*' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: O'Shaughnessy and the Mythology of the Attention. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):35-64.score: 81.0
    What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O?Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic space (...)
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  2. Thomas Natsoulas (2000). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Further Considerations in the Light of James's Conception. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):139-166.score: 81.0
    How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as ?feelings? in William James?s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James?s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James?s are intended to pick out the variable ?width? belonging (...)
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  3. H. Sidky (2009). A Shaman's Cure: The Relationship Between Altered States of Consciousness and Shamanic Healing. Anthropology of Consciousness 20 (2):171-197.score: 75.0
    This study, which is based upon ethnographic data collected between 1999 and 2008 in Nepal, examines the connection between the shaman's altered states of consciousness (ASC; i.e., what goes on inside the healer's mind/brain) and therapeutic changes that take place in the patient's mind/body. Unlike other studies that primarily emphasize the shaman's internal psychological state, this article attempts to explain the role of the healer's ASC and elucidate how desired therapeutic changes depend upon patient–healer interactions. This question is explored (...)
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  4. Nathan Porath (2013). “Not to Be Aware Anymore”: Indigenous Sumatran Ideas and Shamanic Experiences of Changed States of Awareness/Consciousness. Anthropology of Consciousness 24 (1):7-31.score: 75.0
    Anthropologists working on altered states of consciousness (ASC) have suggested that we should do away with psychologizing concepts and use people's own terms for these experiences. With material drawn from the Orang Sakai of Sumatra this paper shows that practitioners who utilize ASC do recognize the alteration of states of awareness as preconditions for numinous interactions. Also critically discussed is the term ASC.
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  5. Ronald J. Pekala & V. K. Kumar (2007). An Empirical-Phenomenological Approach to Quantifying Consciousness and States of Consciousness: With Particular Reference to Understanding the Nature of Hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. 167-194.score: 73.0
     
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  6. Levente Móró (2010). Hallucinatory Altered States of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):241-252.score: 72.0
    Altered states of consciousness (ASC), especially hallucinatory ones, are philosophically and scientifically interesting modes of operation of the mind–brain complex. However, classical definitions of ASC seem to capture only a few common characteristics of traditionally regarded phenomena, thus lacking exact classification criteria for assessing altered and baseline states. The current situation leads to a priority problem between phenomena-based definitions and definition-based phenomena selection. In order to solve the problem, this paper introduces a self-mapping procedure that is based on a (...)
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  7. Gerhard Grössing (2001). Comparing the Long-Term Evolution of ``Cognitive Invariances'' in Physics with a Dynamics in States of Consciousness. Foundations of Science 6 (4):255-272.score: 72.0
    It is shown that the evolution of physics canin several regards be described by elements of``regression'', i.e., that within a certaintradition of ideas one begins with theconstruction of most ``plausible'' statements(axioms) at hand, and then ``works onselfbackwards'' with respect to developmental terms.As a consequence of this strategy, the furtherwork proceeds along such a ``regressive'' path,the more one arrives at concepts andrelationships which are unexpected or evencounter-intuitive in terms of our everydayexperiences. However, a comparable phenomenology is wellknown from studies on states (...)
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  8. A. Dietrich (2003). Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness: The Transient Hypofrontality Hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):231-256.score: 69.0
  9. Charles T. Tart (2000). Investigating Altered States of Consciousness on Their Own Terms: State-Specific Sciences. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.score: 69.0
     
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  10. L. I. Aftanas & S. A. Golosheikin (2003). Changes in Cortical Activity in Altered States of Consciousness: The Study of Meditation by High-Resolution EEG. Human Physiology 29 (2):143-151.score: 66.0
  11. Dieter Vaitl, Niels Birbaumer, John Gruzelier, Graham A. Jamieson, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Dietrich Lehmann, Wolfgang H. R. Miltner, Ulrich Ott, Peter Pütz, Gebhard Sammer, Inge Strauch, Ute Strehl, Jiri Wackermann & Thomas Weiss (2005). Psychobiology of Altered States of Consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 131 (1):98-127.score: 66.0
  12. Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2003). Hypnotic Phenomena and Altered States of Consciousness: A Multilevel Framework of Description and Explanation. Contemporary Hypnosis 20 (3):111-164.score: 66.0
  13. John Gruzelier (2005). Altered States of Consciousness and Hypnosis in the Twenty-First Century: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):1-7.score: 66.0
  14. Andrzej Kokoszka (2000). Altered States of Consciousness. Psychiatr Pol 27 (1):75-83.score: 66.0
  15. Patricia Tassi & Alain Muzet (2001). Defining the States of Consciousness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 25 (2):175-191.score: 66.0
  16. D. L. Spivak (2004). Linguistics of Altered States of Consciousness: Problems and Prospects. Journal of Quantitative Linguistics 11 (1):27-32.score: 66.0
  17. Peter Naish (2005). Detecting Hypnotically Altered States of Consciousness: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):24-30.score: 66.0
  18. Sanford I. Nidich, Randi J. Nidich & Charles N. Alexander (2000). Moral Development and Higher States of Consciousness. Journal of Adult Development. Special Issue 1949 (4):217-225.score: 66.0
  19. Dagmar Koethe, Christoph W. Gerth, Miriam A. Neatby, Anita Haensel, Martin Thies, Udo Schneider, Hinderk M. Emrich, Joachim Klosterkötter, Frauke Schultze-Lutter & F. Markus Leweke (2006). Disturbances of Visual Information Processing in Early States of Psychosis and Experimental Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol Altered States of Consciousness. Schizophrenia Research 88 (1-3):142-150.score: 66.0
  20. Errol R. Korn (2002). Visualization Techniques and Altered States of Consciousness. In Anees A. Sheikh (ed.), Handbook of Therapeutic Imagery Techniques. Baywood Publishing Co.. 41-49.score: 66.0
  21. Ralph Metzner (2005). Psychedelic, Psychoactive, and Addictive Drugs and States of Consciousness. In Mitch Earleywine (ed.), Mind-Altering Drugs: The Science of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press. 25-48.score: 66.0
     
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  22. Ronald J. Pekala & E. Cardena (2000). Methodological Issues in the Study of Altered States of Consciousness and Anomalous Experiences. In E. Cardena & S. Lynn (eds.), Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientific Evidence. American Psychological Association.score: 66.0
  23. M. A. Richards, S. A. Koren & M. A. Persinger (2002). Circumcerebral Application of Weak Complex Magnetic Fields with Derivatives and Changes in Electroencephalographic Power Spectra Within the Theta Range: Implications for States of Consciousness. Perceptual and Motor Skills 95 (2):671-686.score: 66.0
  24. Jirí Wackerman, Peter Pütz, Simone Büchi, Inge Strauch & Dietrich Lehmann (2002). Brain Electrical Activity and Subjective Experience During Altered States of Consciousness: Ganzfeld and Hypnagogic States. International Journal of Psychophysiology 46 (2):123-146.score: 66.0
  25. Robert P. Zelman, Experiential Philosophy: Metaphysics and Altered States of Consciousness.score: 66.0
     
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  26. J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2003). Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States. In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press. 793-842.score: 64.0
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
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  27. J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2000). Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.score: 64.0
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
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  28. Lizette Heine, Andrea Soddu, Francisco Gómez, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Luaba Tshibanda, Marie Thonnard, Vanessa Charland-Verville, Murielle Kirsch, Steven Laureys & Athena Demertzi (2012). Resting State Networks and Consciousness: Alterations of Multiple Resting State Network Connectivity in Physiological, Pharmacological, and Pathological Consciousness States. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 63.0
    In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to conscious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in fMRI functional connectivity under physiological (sleep), pharmacological (anesthesia) and pathological altered states of consciousness, such as brain death, coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and minimally conscious state. The reviewed RSNs were the DMN, left and right executive control, salience, sensorimotor, auditory and visual networks. We highlight some methodological issues concerning resting state analyses in severely injured brains (...)
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  29. Lothar Schafer (2006). Quantum Reality, the Emergence of Complex Order From Virtual States, and the Importance of Consciousness in the Universe. Zygon 41 (3):505-532.score: 60.0
  30. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.score: 60.0
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG (...)
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  31. Lothar Schäfer (2006). Quantum Reality, the Emergence of Complex Order From Virtual States, and the Importance of Consciousness in the Universe. Zygon 41 (3):505-532.score: 60.0
  32. Joseph Glicksohn (1998). States of Consciousness and Symbolic Cognition. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):105-118.score: 60.0
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  33. Brandon Randolph-Seng & Michael Nielsen (2009). Opening the Doors of Perception: Priming Altered States of Consciousness Outside of Conscious Awareness. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 31 (2):237-260.score: 60.0
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  34. Brandon Randolph-Seng & Michael E. Nielsen (2009). Opening the Doors of Perception: Priming Altered States of Consciousness Outside of Conscious Awareness. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 31 (2):237-260.score: 60.0
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  35. William A. Richards (2008). The Phenomenology and Potential Religious Import of States of Consciousness Facilitated by Psilocybin. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 30 (1):189-199.score: 60.0
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  36. Charles T. Tart (ed.) (1990). Altered States of Consciousness. (Third Edition).score: 60.0
  37. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Open Neuroimaging Journal 6:55-68.score: 58.0
    The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, (...)
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  38. Graham A. Jamieson (2007). Previews and Prospects for the Cognitive Neuroscience of Hypnosis and Conscious States. In , Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. 1-11.score: 58.0
  39. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Timing of Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.score: 57.0
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  40. Jacob Berger (forthcoming). Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.score: 55.0
    According to Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness (...)
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  41. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.score: 54.0
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is (...)
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  42. T. Bresnick & R. Levin (2006). Phenomenal Qualities of Ayahuasca Ingestion and its Relation to Fringe Consciousness and Personality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):5-24.score: 54.0
    Ayahuasca, a hallucinogen with profound consciousness- altering properties, has been increasingly utilized in recent studies (e.g., Strassman, 2001; Shanon, 2002a,b). However, other than Shanon's recent work, there has been little attempt to examine the effects of ayahuasca on perceptual, affective and cognitive experience, its relation to fringe consciousness or to pertinent personality variables. Twenty-one volunteers attending a seminar on ayahuasca were administered personality measures and a semi-structured interview about phenomenal qualities of their experience. Ayahuasca ingestion was associated with (...)
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  43. Jaak Panksepp (2000). The Neuro-Evolutionary Cusp Between Emotions and Cognitions: Implications for Understanding Consciousness and the Emergence of a Unified Mind Science. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):15-54.score: 54.0
    The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values (...)
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  44. Anil K. Seth & Bernard J. Baars (2005). Neural Darwinism and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):140-168.score: 54.0
    Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 (...)
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  45. Joseph L. Verheijde, Mohamed Y. Rady & Joan L. McGregor (2009). Brain Death, States of Impaired Consciousness, and Physician-Assisted Death for End-of-Life Organ Donation and Transplantation. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (4):409-421.score: 54.0
    In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea (i.e., brain death) with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. (...)
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  46. Brie Gertler (2012). Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.score: 52.0
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  47. Ezequiel Morsella & John A. Bargh (2007). Supracortical Consciousness: Insights From Temporal Dynamics, Processing-Content, and Olfaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):100.score: 52.0
    To further illuminate the nature of conscious states, it may be progressive to integrate Merker's important contribution with what is known regarding (a) the temporal relation between conscious states and activation of the mesodiencephalic system; (b) the nature of the information (e.g., perceptual vs. premotor) involved in conscious integration; and (c) the neural correlates of olfactory consciousness. (Published Online May 1 2007).
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  48. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.score: 51.0
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is (...)
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  49. Joseph T. Giacino & J. T. Whyte (2005). The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Current Knowledge and Remaining Questions. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 20 (1):30-50.score: 51.0
  50. Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice (2001). Introspective Physicalism as an Approach to the Science of Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):161-196.score: 51.0
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. (...)
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