“The problem of color realism” as defined in the first section of the target article, is crucial to the argument laid out by Byrne & Hilbert. They claim that the problem of color realism “does not concern, at least in the first instance, color language or color concepts” (sect. 1.1). I argue that this claim is misconceived and that a different characterisation of the problem, and some of their preliminary assumptions makes their positive proposal less appealing.
Colors are of philosophical interest for two kinds of reason. One is that colors comprise such a large and important portion of our social, personal and epistemological lives and so a philosophical account of our concepts of color is highly desirable. The second reason is that trying to fit colors into accounts of metaphysics, epistemology and science leads to philosophical problems that are intriguing and hard to resolve. Not surprisingly, these two kinds of reasons are related. The fact that colors (...) are so significant in their own right, makes more pressing the philosophical problems of fitting them into more general metaphysical and epistemological frameworks. (shrink)
Michael Tye argues for two crucial theses: (1) that experiences of pain have representational content (essentially); (2) that the representational content can be specified in terms of something like damage in parts of the body. (Different types of pain are connected with different types of damage.) I reject both of these theses. In my view experiences of pain carry nonconceptual content, but do not represent essentially. Rather they are apt to represent when the subject attends to them. The experiences carry (...) nonconceptual content not only about tissue damage, but about many other qualities as well, including dispositional qualities. (shrink)
Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that there is good reason to think (...) that Colour Relationalism needs to be supplemented by some version ofan Error theory. In so doing, I examine, in detail, the issues raised in a paper by Janet Levin in which she engages in an instructive debate with Colin McGinn. Levin’s paper is important since Cohen places heavy reliance on her arguments, both in defending his relationalist theory against crucial objections, and in his dismissal of error theories. (shrink)
Although the existence of tachyons is not ruled out by special relativity, it appears that causal paradoxes will arise if there are tachyons. The usual solutions to these paradoxes employ some form of the reinterpretation principle. In this paper it is argued first that the principle is incoherent, second that even if it is not, some causal paradoxes remain, and third, the most plausible “solution,” which appeals to boundary conditions of the universe, will conflict with special relativity.
The critical studies in the Sociology of Agriculture can be generally divided into four questions: Agrarian, Environmental, Food, and Emancipatory. While the four questions overlap and all address social justice concerns, there is a chronological sequence to the studies. In this presidential address presented at the joint meetings of the Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society and the Association for the Study of Food in Society held in June 2008 in New Orleans, LA, I provide an overview of the four (...) questions and call for researchers and activists in agrifood studies to engage as public social scientists to bring about a more just and equitable agrifood system. (shrink)
Employing the case of the global tuna-fish industry, it is argued that the process of globalization is contested terrain as it opens “free spaces” to some classes or groups and closes “free spaces” to others; that the nation-States' regulatory abilities are weakened; and finally, that while some social movements may gain, others are marginalized. Three basic conclusions are reached. (1) The industry's actions were successfully “contested” by environmental groups supported by the legislative and judicial branches of the US State. (2) (...) Simultaneously, pro-environmental legislation is currently threatened, along with several national and international environmental accords. (3) Workers in the US and, particularly, in Latin America are paying the consequences of the introduction of pro-environmental legislation and the actions of transnational corporations (TNCs). (shrink)
This analysis uses an analytical frameworkgrounded in political economy perspectives of theglobalization of the agro-food sector combined with acase study approach focusing on the Marine StewardshipCouncil (MSC) to inform discussions regarding thecharacteristics of societal regulation in thepost-Fordist era. More specifically, this analysisuses the case of the emergence of the MSC toinvestigate propositions regarding the existence of,and location of, nascent forms of a transnationalState. The MSC proposes to regulate the certificationof sustainable fisheries at the global level throughan eco-labeling program. The MSC (...) was created in 1996by the transnational environmental organization theWorld Wildlife Fund and the transnational corporationUnilever. The emergence of the MSC has generatedheated discussion in fisheries management circles thatis in general divided along North/South lines. Thisanalysis indicates that the case of the MSC providesvaluable insights into the possible characteristics ofsupranational regulatory mechanisms that might emulatethe role of the nation-State in the post-Fordist era. (shrink)
I provide an historical overview of the development of the Sociology of Agriculture as a critical response to perceived inadequacies of conservative theories of social change regarding rural society in general, and agriculture in particular. I do this by focusing on the three questions that have dominated the discourse on agrifood studies: “The Agrarian Question,” “The Environment Question,” and “The Food Question.” I analyze the success and constraints of selected alternative agrifood initiatives in relation to the three questions and introduce (...) a fourth, the Emancipatory Question. I conclude that agrifood social scientists need to embrace a praxis orientation to agrifood studies and participate in social movements designed to create a more socially just alternative agrifood system. (shrink)
As concerns over the negative social and environmental impacts of industrial agriculture become more widespread, efforts to define and regulate sustainable agriculture have proliferated in the US. Whereas the USDA spearheaded previous efforts, today such efforts have largely shifted to Tripartite Standards Regimes (TSRs). Using a case study of the Leonardo Academy’s initiative to develop a US sustainable agriculture standard, this paper examines the standards-development process and efforts by agribusiness to influence the process. Specifically, we analyze how politics operate in (...) seemingly “depoliticized” TSRs, and how agribusiness and the USDA use “framing practices” and procedural complaints to influence the standard-development process. We contend that although governance mechanisms are a potentially powerful tool for advocates of alternative agrifood, their efficacy may be constrained by science-based requirements, an agribusiness countermovement, and a captured state. (shrink)
The US poultry industry based on flexible accumulation has been advanced as the model of agro-industrial development for agrifood globalization. Similarly, Mexico has been presented as a noteworthy example of the negative effects of neoliberal restructuring associated with the globalization project. In this paper we use both of these assertions as points of departure to guide an investigation of the case of the restructuring of the Mexican poultry industry. Informed by a commodity systems analysis, archival data and key informant interviews (...) are used to generate an overview of the history of the poultry industry in Mexico. A sociology of agrifood theoretical framework informed by regimes theory is employed to analyze the events of the case. We conclude that neoregulation related to the IMF and NAFTA restructuring in Mexico facilitated the diffusion of the US model of poultry production. (shrink)
In this issue, Constance Kassor describes Gorampa's attitude to contradictions as they occur in various contexts of Buddhist pursuit. We agree with much of what she says; with some things we do not.First, some preliminary comments, and a fundamental disagreement. Kassor says:Based on . . . [the assumption that Nāgārjuna has a coherent system of thought] one must resolve apparent contradictions in Nāgārjuna's texts in order to maintain the coherency of his logic. The problem with contradictions is that if (...) they are introduced into a classical logical system, that entire system can break down. This is because of the law of explosion—the principle that everything can follow [DGP: does follow] from a contradiction.One .. (shrink)
Cohen begins by defining ‘Color Physicalism’ so that the position is incompatible with Color Relationalism (unlike Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 7, and note 18). Physicalism, in any event, is something of a distraction, since Cohen’s argument from perceptual variation is directed against any view on which minor color misperception is common (Byrne and Hilbert 2004). A typical color primitivist, for example, is equally vulnerable to the argument. Suppose that normal human observers S1 and S2 are viewing a chip C, as (...) in Cohen’s example. C looks unique green to S1, and bluish green to S2. The problem, as Cohen has it, is to explain “what could (metaphysically) make it the case” that S1, say, and not S2, is perceiving C correctly. He purports to find the explanation “extremely hard to imagine”, and so concludes that both S1 and S2 are perceiving C correctly. (That is not the only option, of course: Hardin concludes that neither is perceiving the chip correctly.). (shrink)