Search results for 'Constructive Empiricism' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Scientific Realism, Constructive Empiricism & Gary Gutting (1982). Scientific Realism Vs. Constructive Empiricism: A Dialogue. The Monist 65 (3):336 - 349.score: 1740.0
  2. Maarten Van Dyck (2007). Constructive Empiricism and the Argument From Underdetermination. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.score: 246.0
    It is argued that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Bas van Fraassen nowhere uses the argument from underdetermination in his argument for constructive empiricism. It is explained that van Fraassen’s use of the notion of empirical equivalence in The Scientific Image has been widely misunderstood. A reconstruction of the main arguments for constructive empiricism is offered, showing how the passages that have been taken to be part of an appeal to the argument from underdetermination should actually be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jamin Asay (2009). Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth. Philosophy of Science 76 (4):423-443.score: 240.0
    Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive? International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-13.score: 240.0
    In this paper, I argue that Constructive Empiricism (CE) is ambiguous between two interpretations: CE as a normative epistemology of science and CE as a descriptive philosophy of science. When they present CE, constructive empiricists write as if CE is supposed to be more than a normative epistemology of science and that it is meant to be responsible to actual scientific practices. However, when they respond to objections, constructive empiricists fall back on a strictly normative interpretation (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. F. A. Muller (2008). In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Maxwell's Master Argument and Aberrant Theories. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131 - 156.score: 240.0
    Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen’s view of science called Constructive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored. Must we conclude from this silence that no defence is possible and that a fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all? Or is the attack too obviously flawed as not to merit exposure? A careful dissection of Maxwell’s reasoning will make it (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jamin Asay (2007). Truth in Constructive Empiricism. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hillscore: 240.0
    Constructive empiricism, the scientific anti-realism championed by Bas van Fraassen, claims to offer an adequate reconstruction of the aim and practice of scientific inquiry without adopting the inflationary metaphysical excesses of scientific realism. In articulating the positions of the realist and the empiricist, van Fraassen freely makes use of the concept of truth. Theories of truth come in a variety of flavors, some more metaphysically stark than others. Deflationary theories of truth, for instance, boast of the ability to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gideon Rosen (1994). What is Constructive Empiricism? Philosophical Studies 74 (2):143 - 178.score: 180.0
    Van Fraassen defines constructive empiricism as the view that science aims to produce empirically adequate theories. But this account has been misunderstood. Constructive empiricism in not, as it seems, a description of the intentional features of scientific practice, nor is it a normative prescription for their revision. It is rather a fiction about the practice of science that van Fraassen displays in the interests of a broader empiricism. The paper concludes with a series of arguments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2006). Constructive Empiricism and Epistemic Modesty: Response to van Fraassen and Monton. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 64 (3):371-379.score: 180.0
    Bas van Fraassen claims that constructive empiricism strikes a balance between the empiricist’s commitments to epistemic modesty – that one’s opinion should extend no further beyond the deliverances of experience than is necessary – and to the rationality of science. In “Should the Empiricist be a Constructive Empiricist?” I argued that if the constructive empiricist follows through on her commitment to epistemic modesty she will find herself adopting a much more extreme position than van Fraassen suggests. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. James Ladyman (2000). What's Really Wrong with Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):837-856.score: 180.0
    Constructive empiricism is supposed to offer a positive alternative to scientific realism that dispenses with the need for metaphysics. I first review the terms of the debate before arguing that the standard objections to constructive empiricism are not decisive. I then explain van Fraassen's views on modality and counterfactuals, and argue that, because constructive empiricism recommends on epistemological grounds belief in the empirical adequacy rather than the truth of theories, it requires that there be (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda (2011). Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem. Erkenntnis 75 (1):61-65.score: 180.0
    In this paper I articulate a fictionalist solution to the closure problem that affects constructive empiricism. Relying on Stephen Yablo’s recent study of closure puzzles, I show how we can partition the content of a theory in terms of its truthmakers and claim that a constructive empiricist can believe that all the observable conditions that are necessary to make a part of her theory true obtain and remain agnostic about whether or not the other truthmakers for the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. F. A. Muller (2004). Can a Constructive Empiricist Adopt the Concept of Observability? Philosophy of Science 71 (1):80-97.score: 180.0
    Alan Musgrave, Michael Friedman, Jeffrey Foss, and Richard Creath raised different objections against the Distinction between observables and unobservables when drawn within the confines of Bas C. van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism (CE), to the effect that the Distinction cannot be drawn there coherently. Van Fraassen has only responded to Musgrave but Musgrave claimed not to understand van Fraassen's succinct response. I argue that van Fraassen's response is not enough. What remains in the end is an unsolved problem which (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Bas C. van Fraassen (2001). Constructive Empiricism Now. Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):151 - 170.score: 180.0
    Constructive empiricism, the view introduced in The Scientific Image, is a view of science, an answer to the question "what is science?" Arthur Fine's and Paul Teller's contributions to this symposium challenge especially two key ideas required to formulate that view, namely the observable/unobservable and acceptance/belief distinctions. I wish to thank them not only for their insightful critique but also for the support they include. For they illuminate and counter some misunderstandings of Constructive Empiricism along the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Bradley Monton & Bas C. van Fraassen (2003). Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405-422.score: 180.0
    James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term ‘observable’ has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and (...) empiricism require clarification in the face of Ladyman's argument. But we also argue that, even if Ladyman were right that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, this would not be a problem for constructive empiricism. 1 Introduction 2 Concerning (A) ‘The entire view is stated in modal discourse’ 3 Concerning (B) ‘The central term "observable" is a modal term’ 3.1 A devastating argument? 3.2 Critique of the argument 4 The objectivity of ‘observable’ 4.1 A specific empirical question 4.2 Viewing ourselves as our own measuring instruments 5 Concerning (C) ‘Scientific theories involve irreducible modality’ 6 Serious tension at the motivational level? (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Gabriele Contessa (2006). Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37 (4):454–468.score: 180.0
    In this paper, I argue that, contrary to the constructive empiricist’s position, observability is not an adequate criterion as a guide to ontological commitment in science. My argument has two parts. First, I argue that the constructive empiricist’s choice of observability as a criterion for ontological commitment is based on the assumption that belief in the existence of unobservable entities is unreasonable because belief in the existence of an entity can only be vindicated by its observation. Second, I (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. James Ladyman (2004). Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and Van Fraassen. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):755-765.score: 180.0
    , I argued that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism was undermined in various ways by his antirealism about modality. Here I offer some comments and responses to the reply to my arguments by Bradley Monton and van Fraassen [2003]. In particular, after making some minor points, I argue that Monton and van Fraassen have not done enough to show that the context dependence of counterfactuals renders their truth conditions non-objective, and I also argue that adopting modal realism does (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Valeriano Iranzo (2002). Constructive Empiricism and Scientific Practice. A Case Study. Theoria 17 (2):335-357.score: 180.0
    According to van Fraassen, constructive empiricism (CE) makes better sense of scientific activity than scientific realism (SR). I discuss a recent episode in biomedical research - investigations about Helicobacter Pylori and its relation to peptic ulcer. CE's expedient to cope with it is a sort of belief substitution. I argue that replacing realist beliefs by empiricist surrogates (as-if beliefs) could accommodate scientists' expectations and behavior. Nonetheless, theoretical agnosticism could hardly motivate scientists to focus just on the observational consequences (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Hasok Chang (2005). A Case for Old-Fashioned Observability, and a Reconstructed Constructive Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):876-887.score: 180.0
    I develop a concept of observability that pertains to qualities rather than objects: a quality is observable if it can be registered by human sensation (possibly with the aid of instruments) without involving optional interpretations. This concept supports a better description of observations in science and everyday life than the object-based observability concepts presupposing causal information-transfer from the object to the observer. It also allows a rehabilitation of the traditional empiricist distinction between observations and their interpretations, but without a presumption (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. F. A. I. Buekens & F. A. Muller (2012). Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism. Erkenntnis 76 (1):91-100.score: 180.0
    By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Paul Teller (2001). Whither Constructive Empiricism? Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):123 - 150.score: 180.0
    In this paper I will set out my understanding of Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, some of the difficulties which I believe beset the current version, and, very briefly, some valuable lessons I believe are nonetheless to be learned by considering this view.We’ll need to begin with a review of how van Fraassen conceives of this kind of discussion.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Joseph F. Hanna (2004). Contra Ladyman: What Really is Right with Constructive Empiricism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):767-777.score: 180.0
    there be an objective modal distinction between the observable and the unobservable.’ My intent is to counter Ladyman's claim that the irreducibly modal character of empirical adequacy is something that is ‘really wrong with constructive empiricism’. I argue that disposition concepts refer to non-modal properties of types rather than to modal properties of tokens of those types. Solubility, for example, is an ‘occurrent’, though unobservable, property of a type of substance (involving the structure of associated atoms); and observability (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Bas C. Fraassen (1994). Gideon Rosen on Constructive Empiricism. Philosophical Studies 74 (2):179 - 192.score: 180.0
    In response to parts I-III of G Rosen's "What is Constructive Empiricism?", "Philosophical Studies", 74, 1994, 143-178, this paper examines several construals of the position of constructive empiricism. At issue, in part, is the equation of intentional aspects of science with the intentions and opinions of scientists. In addition it is necessary to distinguish the constructive empiricist -- a philosopher holding that acceptance of theories in science need not involve belief that they are true -- (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001). Should the Empiricist Be a Constructive Empiricist? Philosophy of Science 68 (4):413-431.score: 180.0
    Van Fraassen does not argue that everyone should be a constructive empiricist. He claims only that constructive empiricism (CE) is a coherent post-positivist alternative to realism, notwithstanding the realist's charge that CE is arbitrary and irrational. He does argue, however, that the empiricist is obliged to limit belief as CE prescribes. Criticism of CE has been largely directed at van Fraassen's claim that CE is a coherent option. Far less attention has been directed at his claim that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Stephen Leeds (1994). Constructive Empiricism. Synthese 101 (2):187 - 221.score: 180.0
    Constructive Empiricism, the view introduced in The Scientific Image, is a view of science, an answer to the question “what is science?” Arthur Fine’s and Paul Teller’s contributions to this symposium challenge especially two key ideas required to formu- late that view, namely the observable/unobservable and accept- ance/belief distinctions. I wish to thank them not only for their insightful critique but also for the support they include. For they illuminate and counter some misunderstandings of Constructive Empiricism (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Paul Dicken (2007). Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):605 - 612.score: 180.0
    James Ladyman ([2000]) argues that constructive empiricism is untenable because it cannot adequately account for modal statements about observability. In this paper, I attempt to resist Ladyman's conclusion, arguing that the constructive empiricist can grant his modal discourse objective, theory-independent truth-conditions, yet without compromising his empiricism.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Bradley Monton (1998). Bayesian Agnosticism and Constructive Empiricism. Analysis 58 (3):207–212.score: 180.0
    This paper addresses the question: how should the traditional doxastic attitude of agnosticism be represented in a Bayesian framework? Bas van Fraassen has one proposal: a Bayesian is agnostic about a proposition if her opinion about the proposition is represented by a probability interval with zero as the lower limit. I argue that van Fraassen's proposal is not adequate. Mark Kaplan claims that this leads to a problem with constructive empiricism; I show that Kaplan's claim is incorrect.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Bradley Monton & Bas C. Van Fraassen (2003). Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405 - 422.score: 180.0
    James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term 'observable' has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and (...) empiricism require clarification in the face of Ladyman's argument. But we also argue that, even if Ladyman were right that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, this would not be a problem for constructive empiricism. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Elliott Sober (1985). Constructive Empiricism and the Problem of Aboutness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):11-18.score: 180.0
    constructive empiricism asserts that it is not for science to reach a verdict on whether a theory is true or false, if the theory is about unobservable entities; science's only interest here, says Van Fraassen, is to discover whether the theory is ‘empirically adequate’. However, if a theory is soley about observables, empirical adequacy and truth are said to ‘coincide’, here discovering the theory's truth value is an appropriate scientific goal. Constructive empiricism thus rests an epistemological (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Paul Dicken (2009). Constructive Empiricism and the Vices of Voluntarism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):189 – 201.score: 180.0
    Constructive empiricism - as formulated by Bas van Fraassen - makes no epistemological claims about the nature of science. Rather, it is a view about the aim of science, to be situated within van Fraassen's broader voluntarist epistemology. Yet while this epistemically minimalist framework may have various advantages in defending the epistemic relevance of constructive empiricism, I show how it also has various disadvantages in maintaining its internal coherence.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Stathis Psillos (1997). How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism: A Rejoinder. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):369-372.score: 180.0
    No doubt my earlier paper has struck a sensitive nerve among existing and prospective constructive empiricists – hence their united reply.1 I shall, for brevity, introduce an imaginary single author of their critique and call him CE. In this rejoinder, I try to show, first, that CE’s counter-arguments do not refute my original arguments; and second, that a claim of CE’s paper is very close to the conclusion of my original paper. A central point of my original piece was (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. F. A. Muller, In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Metaphpysics Versus Science.score: 180.0
    A defence of constructive empiricism against an attack of N. Maxwell by means of his pet-thesis that science implicitly and permanently accepts a metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe. We argue that Maxwell's attack can be beaten off; that his arguments do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish; and that we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertatian nature of constructive empiricism.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Sam Mitchell (1988). Constructive Empiricism and Anti-Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:174 - 180.score: 180.0
    Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is presently the most influential and well-developed alternative to scientific realism. In this paper I argue that a reasonable condition on the distinction between belief and agnosticism prevents van Fraassen from claiming that we can be agnostic about what a theory says about unobservable entities while simultaneously accepting that theory. The upshot is that we must find some other way to do justice both to the argument for constructive empiricism and to van (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Richard Dawid, High Energy Physics and Constructive Empiricism.score: 180.0
    Progress in elementary particle physics in recent decades has changed the status of the visible phenomena in the context of scientific research. Empiricist positions in philosophy of science, which put particular emphasis on the pre-eminence of the visible regime, are affected by this development. In spite of its less radical claims, constructive empiricism turns out to run into more serious problems than straightforward instrumentalism. The constructive empiricist’s emphasis on the scientist’s aims makes it essential for her to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Thomas A. Boylan & Pascal F. O'Gorman (1991). The Critique of Equilibrium Theory in Economic Methodology: A Constructive Empiricist Perspective. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2):131 – 142.score: 180.0
    Abstract Kaldor, one of the leading figures of the post?war ?Cambridge School?, has produced a large volume of methodological writings since the mid?1960s, which we will argue represents one of the major critiques of orthodox equilibrium economic theory produced this century. While Kaldor's position represents a fundamental and radical rejection of the methodological basis of equilibrium economics, he did not provide a systematically formulated alternative methodology for economics. Recent attempts at providing such a reconstruction has argued that scientific realism provides (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. D. Hausman (1982). Constructive Empiricism Contested. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63:21-28.score: 180.0
    Constructive empiricism, Bas van fraassen's new variety of anti-Realism, Maintains that science aims at empirically adequate, Rather than true theories and that, In fully accepting a theory, One should believe only that it is empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate just in case it has a model in which all observable phenomena may be embedded. I challenge van fraassen's main arguments and argue that the observable/unobservable distinction will not bear the weight that van fraassen places on it.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Maurice Lagueux (1994). Friedman's ?Instrumentalism? And Constructive Empiricism in Economics. Theory and Decision 37 (2):147-174.score: 162.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Paul Dicken (2010). Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 162.0
  37. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (1997). On an Inconsistency in Constructive Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):511-514.score: 156.0
    I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. James Ladyman (2007). The Epistemology of Constructive Empiricism. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.score: 156.0
  39. Philip Percival (2007). An Empiricist Critique of Constructive Empiricism : The Aim of Science. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.score: 156.0
  40. Howard Sankey (1997). Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism. Cogito 11 (3):175-181.score: 150.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Steven Savitt (1993). Selective Scientific Realism, Constructive Empiricism, and the Unification of Theories. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):154-165.score: 150.0
  42. Christopher Norris (1997). Ontology According to van Fraassen: Some Problems with Constructive Empiricism. Metaphilosophy 28 (3):196-218.score: 150.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Anthony Graybosch (1990). Observation, Instrumentalism, and Constructive Empiricism. Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (2):1-17.score: 150.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Alan Musgrave (1982). Review: Constructive Empiricism Versus Scientific Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 32 (128):262 - 271.score: 150.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2003). The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322.score: 150.0
  46. Charles Chihara & Carol Chihara (1993). A Biological Objection to Constructive Empiricism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):653-658.score: 150.0
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2012). Constructive Empiricism Revisited. Metascience 21 (1):187-191.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Norman Melchert (1985). Why Constructive Empiricism Collapses Into Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):213 – 215.score: 150.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Thomas R. Grimes (1984). An Appraisal of Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):261 - 268.score: 150.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. F. A. Muller (2011). Review of Paul Dicken, Constructive Empiricism. Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).score: 150.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000