Search results for 'Conventional Truth' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Jan Westerhoff, Jay Garfield, Tom Tillemans, Graham Priest, Georges Dreyfus, Sonam Thakchoe, Guy Newland, Mark Siderits, Brownwyn Finnigan & Koji Tanaka (2011). Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jay Garfield (2010). Taking Conventional Truth Seriously: Authority Regarding Deceptive Reality. Philosophy East and West 60 (3):341 - 354.score: 180.0
    Mädhyamika philosophers in India and Tibet distinguish between two truths: the conventional and the ultimate. It is difficult, however, to say in what sense conventional truth is indeed a truth, as opposed to falsehood. Indeed, many passages in prominent texts suggest that it is entirely false. It is explained here in the sense in which, for Candrakïrti and Tsong khapa, conventional truth is truth.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. The Cowherds (2011). Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. OUP USA.score: 180.0
    The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd C CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. T. J. F. Tillemans (2011). How Far Can a Mādhyamika Buddhist Reform Conventional Truth? Dismal Relativism, Fictionalism, Easy-Easy Truth, and the Alternatives. In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 151--165.score: 180.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jeremy E. Henkel (2012). Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy (Review). Philosophy East and West 62 (3):428-429.score: 150.0
  6. Jonathan C. Gold (2013). Review of The Cowherds, Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. [REVIEW] Sophia 52 (2):397-399.score: 150.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sonam Thakchoe (2007). Status of Conventional Truth in Tsong Khapa's Mādhyamika Philosophy. Contemporary Buddhism 8 (1):31-47.score: 150.0
  8. Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.) (2011). Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Stephen Barker (2003). Truth and Conventional Implicature. Mind 112 (445):1-34.score: 144.0
    Are all instances of the T-schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule-based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth-conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. J. Dunning-Davies (2007). Exploding a Myth: "Conventional Wisdom" or Scientific Truth? Horwood.score: 126.0
    In this book Jeremy Dunning-Davies deals with the influence that "conventional wisdom" has on science, scientific research and development. He sets out to explode' the mythical conception that all scientific topics are open for free discussion and argues that no-one can openly raise questions about relativity, dispute the 'Big Bang' theory, or the existence of black holes, which all seem to be accepted facts of science rather than science fiction. In today's modern climate with "Britain's radioactive refuse heap already (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jan Westerhoff (2011). The Merely Conventional Existence of the World. In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
    A platitude questioned by many Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet is the existence of the world. We might be tempted to insert some modifier here, such as “substantial,” “self-existent,” or “intrinsically existent,” for, one might argue, these thinkers did not want to question the existence of the world tout court but only that of a substantial, self-existent, or otherwise suitably qualified world. But perhaps these modifiers are not as important as is generally thought, for the understanding of the world (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP.score: 102.0
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jeanette M. A. Beer (1981). Narrative Conventions of Truth in the Middle Ages. Librairie Droz.score: 68.0
    ETUDES DE PHILOLOGIE 38 ETD'HISTOIRE JEANETTE MA BEER Narrative Conventions of Truth in the Middle Ages GENEVE ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Laurent Cesalli & Nadja Germann (2008). Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in Augustine's Early Philosophical Writings. Vivarium 46 (2):123-154.score: 66.0
    This article is about the conception of truth and signification in Augustine's early philosophical writings. In the first, semantic-linguistic part, the gradual shift of Augustine's position towards the Academics is treated closely. It reveals that Augustine develops a notion of sign which, by integrating elements of Stoic epistemology, is suited to function as a transmitter of true knowledge through linguistic expressions. In the second part, both the ontological structure of signified (sensible) things and Augustine's solution to the apparent tautologies (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Douglas Patterson (2002). Theories of Truth and Convention T. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (5):1-16.score: 60.0
    Partly due to the influence of Tarski's work, it is commonly assumed that any good theory of truth implies biconditionals of the sort mentioned in Convention T: instances of the T-Schema "s is true in L if and only if p" where the sentence substituted for "p" is equivalent in meaning to s. I argue that we must take care to distinguish the claim that implying such instances is sufficient for adequacy in an account of truth from the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Gabriel Abend (2006). Styles of Sociological Thought: Sociologies, Epistemologies, and the Mexican and U.S. Quests for Truth. Sociological Theory 24 (1):1 - 41.score: 54.0
    Both U.S. and Mexican sociologies allege that they are in the business of making true scientific knowledge claims about the social world. Conventional conceptions of science notwithstanding, I demonstrate that their claims to truth and scientificity are based on alternative epistemological grounds. Drawing a random sample of nonquantitative articles from four leading journals, I show that, first, they assign a different role to theories, and indeed they have dissimilar understandings of what a theory should consist of. Second, whereas (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Robert Francescotti (1995). Even: The Conventional Implicature Approach Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (2):153 - 173.score: 54.0
    Like Bennett's account of ‘even’, my analysis incorporates the following plausible and widespread intuitions. (a) The word ‘even’ does not make a truth-functional difference; it makes a difference only in conventional implicature. In particular, ‘even’ functions neither as a universal quantifier, nor amost ormany quantifier. The only quantified statement that ‘EvenA isF’ implies is the existential claim ‘There is anx (namely,A) that isF’, but this implication is nothing more than what the Equivalence Thesis already demands. (b) ‘Even’ is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Radical and Moderate Pragmatics: Does Meaning Determine Truth Conditions? In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    But the sort of context sensitivity exhibited in such sentences does not compromise the claim that meaning determines truth conditions, since recourse to context here is directed and restricted by conventional meaning alone. Anyone who understands sentence (2) knows that its utterances are true just in case whatever object is demonstrated in the context of utterance is nice; and he also knows that any utterance of (2) says of, or expresses about, whichever object is demonstrated that it’s nice. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Dale Cannon (1996). Sanders' Analytic Rebuttal To Polanyi's Critics, With Some Musings On Polanyi's Idea of Truth. Tradition and Discovery 23 (3):17-23.score: 54.0
    This article reviews Michael Polanyi’s Post-Critical Epistemology by Andy F. Sanders but goes on to articulate certain crucial aspects of Polanyi’s post-critical understanding of truth that seem to be overlooked in Sanders’ account and which challenge conventional analyses of truth.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Brian H. Bix (2009). Global Error and Legal Truth. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (3):535-547.score: 54.0
    One standard criterion for there being objectivity in an area of discourse is that there is conceptual space between what someone thinks to be the case and what actually is the case. That is, participants can be mistaken. This article explores one aspect of the objectivity debate as regards law: does it make sense to say that all legal officials or practitioners in a jurisdiction are mistaken (over a significant period of time) about some legal proposition? The possibility of legal (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Luisella Brusa (2013). Between Truth and Relativism: The Choice of Psychoanalysis. Filozofski Vestnik 32 (2).score: 54.0
    My aim in this paper is to draw attention to the position of psychoanalysis regarding the opposition between the quest for truth and relativism. It is a conventional opposition of contemporary thought. On one hand, the quest for truth, and on the other, relativism, as the fundament of our intellectual and political life. I do this by means of Lacanian teachings. My objective is to take on the theoretical tools of psychoanalysis and the consequences of clinical facts, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Sonam Thakchoe (2008). Gorampa on the Objects of Negation: Arguments for Negating Conventional Truths. Contemporary Buddhism 9 (2):265-280.score: 50.0
  23. G. Ebbs (2011). Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention. Mind 120 (478):193-237.score: 48.0
    According to the standard story (a) W. V. Quine’s criticisms of the idea that logic is true by convention are directed against, and completely undermine, Rudolf Carnap’s idea that the logical truths of a language L are the sentences of L that are true-in- L solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for L , and (b) Quine himself had no interest in or use for any notion of truth by convention. This paper argues that (a) and (b) are (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Eric J. Loomis, Eternal Truth by Convention.score: 48.0
    Within the epistemology of the sciences, conventionalism has been the subject of regular criticism for over six decades. Critics such as W. V. Quine and Morton White, and more recently Nathan Salmon (1992), and Paul Boghossian (1996), have attacked even the most basic tenet of conventionalism, namely its claim that the truth of certain statements is fixed not by stipulation-independent facts, but by the conventions governing the meaning of those statements and their constituents.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Miguel Ferrero & J. L. Sánchez-Gómez (forthcoming). Coming From Material Reality. Foundations of Science:1-14.score: 48.0
    In a previous essay we demonstrated that quantum mechanical formalism is incompatible with some necessary principles of the mechanism conception still dominant in the physicist’s community. In this paper we show, based on recent empirical evidence in quantum physics, the inevitability of abandoning the old mechanism conception and to construct a new one in which physical reality is seen as a representation which refers to relations established through operations made by us in a world that we are determining. This change (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Hugh J. Silverman (ed.) (1993). Questioning Foundations: Truth/Subjectivity/Culture. Routledge.score: 48.0
    The continental tradition in philosophy has long focused its energies on the question of foundations. These ssays reopen conventional understandings of the classical themes on which philosophy has been based since its inception.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gustavo Picazo (forthcoming). Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory. Philosophia:1-27.score: 46.0
    The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this process, and I oppose the ‘static’ or ‘analytic’ approach, which is fundamentally based on our own knowledge of the conventional meaning of words and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Giuseppe Ferraro (2013). A Criticism of M. Siderits and J. L. Garfield's 'Semantic Interpretation' of Nāgārjuna's Theory of Two Truths. Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (2):195-219.score: 44.0
    This paper proposes a critical analysis of that interpretation of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the two truths as summarized—by both Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield—in the formula: “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”. This ‘semantic reading’ of Nāgārjuna’s theory, despite its importance as a criticism of the ‘metaphysical interpretations’, would in itself be defective and improbable. Indeed, firstly, semantic interpretation presents a formal defect: it fails to clearly and explicitly express that which it (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Hisayasu Kobayashi (2011). Prajñākaragupta on the Two Truths and Argumentation. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):427-439.score: 44.0
    How is it possible to say that truth can be of one kind at the conventional level and totally different in the ultimate plane? As Matilal ( 1971 , p. 154) points out, Kumārila (ca. 600–650), a Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, claims that the Buddhist doctrine of two truths is “a kind of philosophical ‘double-talk’.” It is Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), a Buddhist logician, who tries to give a direct answer to this question posed by Kumārila from the Buddhist side. He (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2008). Structure and Conventions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):399 - 408.score: 40.0
    Wayne Davis’s Meaning, Expression and Thought argues that linguistic meaning is conventional use to express ideas. An obvious problem with this proposal is that complex expressions that have never been used are nonetheless meaningful. In response to this concern, Davis associates conventions of use not only with linguistic expressions but also with the modes in which such expressions can combine into larger expressions. I argue that such constructive conventions are in conflict with the principle of compositionality (as it is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. James Blumenthal (2009). Dynamic and Syncretic Dimensions to Ntarak Ita's Presentation of the Two Truths. Asian Philosophy 19 (1):51 – 62.score: 40.0
    It is common for philosophers from the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhist thought to offer a presentation of the two truths, ultimate truth ( param rthasatya ) and conventional truth ( sa v tisatya ), as a vehicle for presenting their views on the ontological status of entities. Though there is some degree of variance, generally ultimate truths are described as objects known by an awareness of knowing things as they are. Conventional truths are objects as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Hilary Putnam (1987). Truth and Convention. Dialectica 40 (1--2):69--77.score: 40.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley & M. Black (1936). Truth by Convention: A Symposium by A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley, M. Black. Analysis 4 (2/3):17 - 32.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. James Blumenthal (2011). Dynamic and Syncretic Dimensions to Śāntarakṣita's Presentation of the Two Truths. Asian Philosophy 19 (1):51-62.score: 40.0
    It is common for philosophers from the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhist thought to offer a presentation of the two truths, ultimate truth ( param rthasatya ) and conventional truth ( sa v tisatya ), as a vehicle for presenting their views on the ontological status of entities. Though there is some degree of variance, generally ultimate truths are described as objects known by an awareness of knowing things as they are. Conventional truths are objects as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Dharmendra Kumar (1969). Vagueness and Truth by Convention. Analysis 29 (4):129 - 130.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. K. Britton, J. O. Urmson & W. C. Kneale (1947). Symposium: Are Necessary Truths True by Convention? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 21:78 - 133.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Sonam Thakchoe (2003). 'The Relationship Between the Two Truths': A Comparative Analysis of Two Tibetan Accounts. Contemporary Buddhism 4 (2):111-127.score: 40.0
    Introduction Na?ga?rjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself, points out in his famous Mu?lamadhyamakaka?rika? that ?The Buddha's teachings of the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth? (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie at the very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological and soteriological discourses in the Ma?dhyamika tradition revolve around ideas concerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Erik Götlind (1955). Vacuous Variants and Truth by Convention. Theoria 21 (1):1-24.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Donald A. Wells (1951). Some Implications of Empirical Truth by Convention. Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):185-192.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley & M. Black (1936). Truth by Convention : A Symposium. Analysis 4 (2-3):17-32.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Herbert Hochberg (1992). Moore's Anticipation of Tarski's Convention-T and His Refutation of Truth as Coherence. History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (1):97 - 117.score: 40.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Charles A. Baylis (1949). Review: Karl Britton, J. O. Urmson, W. Kneale, Are Necessary Truths True by Convention? [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):201-202.score: 40.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Rene Kollar (2011). James Britten, the Catholic Truth Society, and the Defense of Convent Life in Late Victorian England. Australasian Catholic Record, The 88 (1):30.score: 40.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. W. V. Quine (1936). Truth by Convention. In The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. 77-106.score: 40.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Barkley Rosser (1936). Review: W. V. Quine, Truth by Convention. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):42-42.score: 40.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Jody Azzouni (1990). Truth and Convention. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):81-102.score: 40.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jonathan Bennett (1956). Review: Erik Gotlind, Vacuous Variants and Truth by Convention. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (4):395-395.score: 40.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Reed Way Dasenbrock (2000). Truth and Consequences: Intentions, Conventions, and the New Thematics. Penn State University Press.score: 40.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Marian David (2008). Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press.score: 40.0
  50. Bronwyn Finnigan & Koji Tanaka (2011). Carnap's Pragmatism and the Two Truths. In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 181--188.score: 40.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000