154 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
B. Jack Copeland [34]Jack Copeland [21]B. J. Copeland [21]Arthur H. Copeland [10]
Rita Copeland [9]Marion W. Copeland [7]Ian Copeland [5]Ian C. Copeland [5]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also:
Profile: James Copeland (University of East Anglia)
Profile: Alexis Copeland
Profile: Katherine Copeland (Liberty University)
Profile: Louisa Copeland (George Washington University)
Profile: Scott Copeland (Liberty University)
Profile: Samantha M Copeland (Norwegian University of Life Sciences)
  1. Shauna Copeland (2003). Double Victims: Fictional Representations of Women in the Holocaust. Inquiry 4.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. B. Jack Copeland (2002). The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2):99-137.
    This article traces the development of possible worlds semantics through the work of: Wittgenstein, 1913-1921; Feys, 1924; McKinsey, 1945; Carnap, 1945-1947; McKinsey, Tarski and Jónsson, 1947-1952; von Wright, 1951; Becker, 1952; Prior, 1953-1954; Montague, 1955; Meredith and Prior, 1956; Geach, 1960; Smiley, 1955-1957; Kanger, 1957; Hintikka, 1957; Guillaume, 1958; Binkley, 1958; Bayart, 1958-1959; Drake, 1959-1961; Kripke, 1958-1965.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  3.  89
    Brant S. Copeland (forthcoming). Book Review: Gathered Before God: Worship-Centered Church Renewal. [REVIEW] Interpretation 59 (4):439-439.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. B. Jack Copeland (1996). What is Computation? Synthese 108 (3):335-59.
    To compute is to execute an algorithm. More precisely, to say that a device or organ computes is to say that there exists a modelling relationship of a certain kind between it and a formal specification of an algorithm and supporting architecture. The key issue is to delimit the phrase of a certain kind. I call this the problem of distinguishing between standard and nonstandard models of computation. The successful drawing of this distinction guards Turing's 1936 analysis of computation against (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  5.  60
    B. Jack Copeland (2002). Hypercomputation. Minds and Machines 12 (4):461-502.
  6. B. Jack Copeland (2000). The Turing Test. Minds and Machines 10 (4):519-539.
    Turing''s test has been much misunderstood. Recently unpublished material by Turing casts fresh light on his thinking and dispels a number of philosophical myths concerning the Turing test. Properly understood, the Turing test withstands objections that are popularly believed to be fatal.
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  7.  94
    B. Jack Copeland (2008). The Church-Turing Thesis. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
    There are various equivalent formulations of the Church-Turing thesis. A common one is that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing machine. The Church-Turing thesis is often misunderstood, particularly in recent writing in the philosophy of mind.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  8.  45
    B. Jack Copeland (2000). Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of Turing's Views on the Mind-Machine Issue. Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):5-33.
  9. B. J. Copeland & D. R. Murdoch (1991). The Arthur Prior Memorial Conference. Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):372-382.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Morris A. Copeland (1927). An Instrumental View of the Part-Whole Relation. Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):96-104.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  7
    S. Chopra, B. J. Copeland, E. Corazza, S. Donaho, F. Ferreira, H. Field, D. M. Gabbay, L. Goldstein, J. Heidema & M. J. Hill (2002). Benton, RA, 527 Blackburn, P., 281 Braüner, T., 359 Brink, C., 543. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (615).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  12. B. Jack Copeland (1993). The Curious Case of the Chinese Gym. Synthese 95 (2):173-86.
    Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13.  79
    B. Jack Copeland & Oron Shagrir (2007). Physical Computation: How General Are Gandy's Principles for Mechanisms? Minds and Machines 17 (2):217-231.
    What are the limits of physical computation? In his ‘Church’s Thesis and Principles for Mechanisms’, Turing’s student Robin Gandy proved that any machine satisfying four idealised physical ‘principles’ is equivalent to some Turing machine. Gandy’s four principles in effect define a class of computing machines (‘Gandy machines’). Our question is: What is the relationship of this class to the class of all (ideal) physical computing machines? Gandy himself suggests that the relationship is identity. We do not share this view. We (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14.  60
    B. Jack Copeland (2002). Accelerating Turing Machines. Minds and Machines 12 (2):281-300.
    Accelerating Turing machines are Turing machines of a sort able to perform tasks that are commonly regarded as impossible for Turing machines. For example, they can determine whether or not the decimal representation of contains n consecutive 7s, for any n; solve the Turing-machine halting problem; and decide the predicate calculus. Are accelerating Turing machines, then, logically impossible devices? I argue that they are not. There are implications concerning the nature of effective procedures and the theoretical limits of computability. Contrary (...)
    Direct download (17 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  15.  45
    B. Jack Copeland (1998). Turing's O-Machines, Searle, Penrose and the Brain. Analysis 58 (2):128 - 138.
  16. Jack Copeland (1998). Turing's o-Machines, Searle, Penrose, and the Brain. Analysis 58 (2):128-138.
    In his PhD thesis (1938) Turing introduced what he described as 'a new kind of machine'. He called these 'O-machines'. The present paper employs Turing's concept against a number of currently fashionable positions in the philosophy of mind.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  17.  86
    Jack Copeland (1997). The Broad Conception of Computation. American Behavioral Scientist 40 (6):690-716.
    A myth has arisen concerning Turing's paper of 1936, namely that Turing set forth a fundamental principle concerning the limits of what can be computed by machine - a myth that has passed into cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, to wide and pernicious effect. This supposed principle, sometimes incorrectly termed the 'Church-Turing thesis', is the claim that the class of functions that can be computed by machines is identical to the class of functions that can be computed by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  18.  13
    B. Jack Copeland & Oron Shagrir (2011). Do Accelerating Turing Machines Compute the Uncomputable? Minds and Machines 21 (2):221-239.
  19.  87
    Jack Copeland (1999). Beyond the Universal Turing Machine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):46-67.
    We describe an emerging field, that of nonclassical computability and nonclassical computing machinery. According to the nonclassicist, the set of well-defined computations is not exhausted by the computations that can be carried out by a Turing machine. We provide an overview of the field and a philosophical defence of its foundations.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  20. Jack Copeland (1993). Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Presupposing no familiarity with the technical concepts of either philosophy or computing, this clear introduction reviews the progress made in AI since the inception of the field in 1956. Copeland goes on to analyze what those working in AI must achieve before they can claim to have built a thinking machine and appraises their prospects of succeeding. There are clear introductions to connectionism and to the language of thought hypothesis which weave together material from philosophy, artificial intelligence and neuroscience. John (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  21.  79
    B. J. Copeland (1985). Substitutional Quantification and Existence. Analysis 45 (1):1 - 4.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22.  7
    B. Jack Copeland (forthcoming). Prior, Translational Semantics, and the Barcan Formula. Synthese:1-13.
    The revolution in semantics in the late 1960s and 1970s overturned an earlier competing paradigm, ‘translational’ semantics. I revive and defend Prior’s translational semantics for modals and tense-modals. I also show how to extend Prior’s propositional modal semantics to quantificational modal logic, and use the resulting semantics to formalize Prior’s own counterexample to the Barcan Formula.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke & Diane Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289–293.
    Ignoring the temporal dimension, an object such as a railway tunnel or a human body is a three-dimensional whole composed of three-dimensional parts. The four-dimensionalist holds that a physical object exhibiting identity across time—Descartes, for example—is a four-dimensional whole composed of 'briefer' four-dimensional objects, its temporal parts. Peter van Inwagen (1990) has argued that four-dimensionalism cannot be sustained, or at best can be sustained only by a counterpart theorist. We argue that different schemes of individuation of temporal parts are available, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  21
    B. Jack Copeland & Richard Sylvan (1999). Beyond the Universal Turing Machine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):46-66.
  25.  31
    B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2010). Deviant Encodings and Turing's Analysis of Computability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):247-252.
    Turing’s analysis of computability has recently been challenged; it is claimed that it is circular to analyse the intuitive concept of numerical computability in terms of the Turing machine. This claim threatens the view, canonical in mathematics and cognitive science, that the concept of a systematic procedure or algorithm is to be explicated by reference to the capacities of Turing machines. We defend Turing’s analysis against the challenge of ‘deviant encodings’.Keywords: Systematic procedure; Turing machine; Church–Turing thesis; Deviant encoding; Acceptable encoding; (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26.  18
    B. Jack Copeland (1998). Super Turing-Machines. Complexity 4 (1):30-32.
  27.  42
    B. J. Copeland (1979). On When a Semantics is Not a Semantics: Some Reasons for Disliking the Routley-Meyer Semantics for Relevance Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):399 - 413.
  28.  36
    Wulf Rehder, Igal Kvart, Bj Copeland, Michel V. Wedin & Howard G. Callaway (forthcoming). MJ CRESSWELL, A Canonical Model for S2 3 ROSS T. BRADY, Completeness Proofs for the Systems RM3 and BN4 9. Logique Et Analyse.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  39
    Jack Copeland (1996). On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism. Synthese 108 (3):361-377.
    It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks unorganised machines. By the application of what he described as appropriate interference, mimicking education an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of neurons is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  30.  7
    L. Bovens, T. Brauner, B. J. Copeland, C. S. Delancey, J. Dubucs, K. Fine, A. Galton, N. Georgalis, J. Gert & K. Green (2006). Kastner, RE. Synthese 150:511.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  31. B. Jack Copeland (1995). Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  32.  58
    B. Jack Copeland (1997). Vague Identity and Fuzzy Logic. Journal of Philosophy 94 (10):514-534.
  33.  60
    John W. Copeland (1971). B. F. Skinner's Skepticism About Choices and Future Consequences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (4):540-545.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  45
    Jack Copeland (1998). Super Turing-Machines. Complexity 4 (1):30-32.
    The tape is divided into squares, each square bearing a single symbol—'0' or '1', for example. This tape is the machine's general-purpose storage medium: the machine is set in motion with its input inscribed on the tape, output is written onto the tape by the head, and the tape serves as a short-term working memory for the results of intermediate steps of the computation. The program governing the particular computation that the machine is to perform is also stored on the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  35.  10
    W. J. Copeland (2012). Newman's Parochial and Plain Sermons “Found a Response in the Hearts and Minds and Consciences of Those to Whom They Were Addressed.”. Newman Studies Journal 9 (2):3-5.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  83
    B. Jack Copeland (2006). Meredith, Prior, and the History of Possible Worlds Semantics. Synthese 150 (3):373 - 397.
    This paper charts some early history of the possible worlds semantics for modal logic, starting with the pioneering work of Prior and Meredith. The contributions of Geach, Hintikka, Kanger, Kripke, Montague, and Smiley are also discussed.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  6
    Ryan A. Brown, David H. Rehkopf, William E. Copeland, E. Jane Costello & Carol M. Worthman (2009). Lifecourse Priorities Among Appalachian Emerging Adults: Revisiting Wallace's Organization of Diversity. Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 37 (2):225-242.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38.  17
    B. J. Copeland (1986). What is a Semantics for Classical Negation? Mind 95 (380):478-490.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  39.  25
    B. Jack Copeland (2000). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity, and Property Identity, Aristotelian-Style. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):11-25.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. B. Jack Copeland (2003). The Chinese Room From a Logical Point of View. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41.  38
    Diane Proudfoot & B. Jack Copeland (1994). Turing, Wittgenstein and the Science of the Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):497 – 519.
  42.  4
    B. J. Copeland (1998). Turing's O-Machines, Searle, Penrose and the Brain. Analysis 58 (2):128-138.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  4
    J. Copeland, H. Dyke & D. Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289-293.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. B. Jack Copeland (ed.) (1996). Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. Oxford University Press.
    Logic and Reality is a collection of essays by philosophers, logicians, mathematicians, and computer scientists, celebrating the work of the late distinguished philosopher Arthur Prior on the eightieth anniversary of his birth. Topics range from philosophical discussions of the nature of time and of the nature of logic itself, to descriptions of computer systems that can reason and take account of the fact that they exist in a temporal world.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  45.  25
    B. J. Copeland (1980). The Trouble Anderson and Belnap Have with Relevance. Philosophical Studies 37 (4):325 - 334.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  46.  31
    Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2012). Our Posthuman Future. The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):73-78.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  11
    Marion Copeland (2003). Crossover Animal Fantasy Series: Crossing Cultural and Species as Well as Age Boundaries. Society and Animals 11 (3):287-298.
    Crossover fantasy series such as Harry Potter , designed to appeal to readers of all ages, have received much popular and critical attention. Series like His Dark Materials , more sophisticated and complex than Rowling's, have benefited from Harry Potter's press. In Rowling, nonhuman animals play roles but are not foregrounded. They are not central to action or theme or, in any sense, developed characters. Pullman's books foreground nonhumans and develop their characters. His three novels, however, belong to their human (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  34
    B. J. Copeland (1983). Pure Semantics and Applied Semantics. Topoi 2 (2):197-204.
  49.  8
    B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (1996). On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism. Synthese 108 (3):361 - 377.
    It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks 'unorganised machines'. By the application of what he described as 'appropriate interference, mimicking education' an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of 'neurons' is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50. Ryan A. Brown, David H. Rehkopf, William E. Copeland, E. Jane Costello & Carol M. Worthman (2009). Lifecourse Priorities Among Appalachian Emerging Adults: Revisiting Wallace's Organization of Diversity. Ethos 37 (2):225-242.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 154