As the theory of the atom, quantum mechanics is perhaps the most successful theory in the history of science. It enables physicists, chemists, and technicians to calculate and predict the outcome of a vast number of experiments and to create new and advanced technology based on the insight into the behavior of atomic objects. But it is also a theory that challenges our imagination. It seems to violate some fundamental principles of classical physics, principles that eventually have become a part (...) of western common sense since the rise of the modern worldview in the Renaissance. So the aim of any metaphysical interpretation of quantum mechanics is to account for these violations. (shrink)

An attempt is made to give a coherent account of the logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. The central point is that quantum theory is fundamentally pragmatic, but nonetheless complete. The principal difficulty in understanding quantum theory lies in the fact that its completeness is incompatible with external existence of the space—time continuum of classical physics.

Recently, Frauchiger and Renner proposed a Gedankenexperiment, which was claimed to be able to prove that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Here we show that the conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came from their incorrect description of some quantum states. With the correct description there will be no inconsistent results, no matter which quantum interpretation theory is used. Especially, the Copenhagen interpretation can satisfy all the three assumptions,, and of Frauchiger and Renner (...) simultaneously, thus it has no problem consistently describing the use of itself. (shrink)

What is commonly known as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, regarded as representing a unitary Copenhagen point of view, differs significantly from Bohr's complementarity interpretation, which does not employ wave packet collapse in its account of measurement and does not accord the subjective observer any privileged role in measurement. It is argued that the Copenhagen interpretation is an invention of the mid‐1950s, for which Heisenberg is chiefly responsible, various other physicists and philosophers, including (...) Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson, and Popper, having further promoted the invention in the service of their own philosophical agendas. (shrink)

The Copenhagen interpretation is critically considered. A number of ambiguities, inconsistencies and confusions are discussed. It is argued that it is possible to purge the interpretation so as to obtain a consistent and reasonable way to interpret the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, which is in agreement with the way this theory is dealt with in experimental practice. In particular, the essential role attributed by the Copenhagen interpretation to measurement is acknowledged. For this reason it (...) is proposed to refer to it as a neo-Copenhagen interpretation. (shrink)

Popper conceived an experiment whose analysis led to a result that he deemed absurd. Popper wrote that his reasoning was based on the Copenhagen interpretation and therefore invalidated it. Many authors who have examined Popper's analysis have found in it various technical flaws which are briefly summarized here. However, the aim of the present article is not technical. My concern is to redress logical flaws in Popper's argument: the terminology he uses is ambiguous, his analysis involves counterfactual hypotheses, (...) and it violates Bohr's complementarity principle. Therefore, the absurdity of Popper's result only confirms Bohr's approach. (shrink)

Within the past decade there has grown an acute and highly articulate group of critics of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,--the so-called "Copenhagen Interpretation." The writings of people like Bopp, Janossy, and particularly Bohm and Feyerabend, must be taken very seriously indeed. The future of some important discussions in the philosophy and the logic of science rests with these individuals. But they have, in their own writings, occasionally matched the inelegancies of Bohr and Heisenberg with as (...) many inelegancies of their own. The present paper is meant to present a quintet of considerations which may possibly lead to a reassessment of the issues between Bohr, Heisenberg, and their critics, especially Bohm and Feyerabend. (shrink)

In the quest and search for a physical theory of everything from the macroscopic large body matter to the microscopic elementary particles, with strange and weird concepts springing from quantum physics discovery, irreconcilable positions and inconvenient facts complicated physics – from Newtonian physics to quantum science, the question is- how do we close the gap? Indeed, there is a scientific and mathematical fireworks when the issue of quantum uncertainties and entanglements cannot be explained with classical physics. The Copenhagen (...) class='Hi'>interpretation is an expression of few wise men on quantum physics that was largely formulated from 1925 to 1927 namely by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. From this point on, there is a divergence of quantum science into the realms of indeterminacy, complementarity and entanglement which are principles expounded in Yijing, an ancient Chinese knowledge constructed on symbols, with a vintage of at least 3 millennia, with broken and unbroken lines to form stacked 6-line structure called the hexagram. It is premised on probability development of the hexagram in a space-time continuum. The discovery of the quantization of action meant that quantum physics could not convincingly explain the principles of classical physics. This paper will draw the great departure from classical physics into the realm of probabilistic realities. The probabilistic nature and reality interpretation had a significant influence on Bohr’s line of thought. Apparently, Bohr realized that speaking of disturbance seemed to indicate that atomic objects were classical particles with definite inherent kinematic and dynamic properties (Hanson, 1959). Disturbances, energy excitation and entanglements are processual evolutionary phases in Yijing. This paper will explore the similarities in quantum physics and the methodological ways where Yijing is pivoted to interpret observable realities involving interactions which are uncontrollable and probabilistic and forms an inseparable unity due to the entanglement, superposition Transgressing disciplinary boundaries in the discussion of Yijing, originally from the Western Zhou period (1000-750 BC), over a period of warring states and the early imperial period (500-200 BC) which was compiled, transcribed and transformed into a cosmological texts with philosophical commentaries known as the “Ten Wings” and closely associated with Confucius (551- 479 BC) with the Copenhagen Interpretation (1925-1927) by the few wise men including Niel Bohr and Werner Heisensberg would seem like a subversive undertaking. Subversive as the interpretations from Yijing is based on wisdom derived from thousands of years from ancient China to recently discovered quantum concepts. The subversive undertaking does seem to violate the sanctuaries of accepted ways in looking at Yijing principles, classical physics and quantum science because of the fortified boundaries that have been erected between Yijing and the sciences. Subversive as this paper may be, it is an attempt to re-cast an ancient framework where indeterminism, complementarity, non-linearity entanglement, superposition and probability interpretation is seen in today quantum’s realities. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that although Bohr's version of the Copenhagen interpretation is in line with several key elements of logical positivism, pragmatism is the closest approximation to a classification of the Copenhagen interpretation, whether or not pragmatists directly influenced the key figures of the interpretation. Pragmatism already encompasses important elements of operationalism and logical positivism, especially the liberalized Carnapian reading of logical positivism. We suggest that some elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, (...) which are in line with logical positivism, are also supported by pragmatism. Some of these elements are empirical realism, fallibilism, holism, and instrumentalism. However, pragmatism goes beyond logical positivism in espousing some other key elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, though imperfectly, such as the correspondence principle, complementarity, and indeterminism. (shrink)

Neurological Positivism’s single- and two-neuro-algorithmic referent conceptions of subjective and objective experience respectively are discussed. NP’s account of Bohr and Heisenberg’s Copenhagen interpretation of quantum reality is then described in terms of nonlinear constructions of two-neuro-algorithmic referents that are proposed also to undergird William James’s pragmatic conception of truth. In turn, qualia are depicted as nonlinear single-neuro-algorithmic referents in relation to the two-neuro-algorithmic quantum measurement procedure. Experientially, qualia are described as nonlinear "black twinkling" neuro-flux patterns which in the (...) context of overall brain organization in both phylogeny and ontogeny increase the brain’s probability of survival. It is concluded that ontological questions are really about the relationships between the two-neuro-algorithmic referent systems in the brain, and the quantum theoretical measurement procedure is the best "test" of NP’s two-neuro-algorithmic hypothesis and, as a test, greatly alters the traditional interpretation of Bell’s theorem. (shrink)

The Bohr-Heisenberg scheme, which forms the basis of any current version of the standard or Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, is shown to be internally inconsistent. Although the inconsistencies demonstrated here are directly relatable to Einstein's opinion that it is unsatisfactory to interpret physical theory solely in terms of the knowledge gained from experimental outcomes, it is nevertheless shown that Einstein's view requires important modification. The implications of the Bohr-Heisenberg schem's self-inconsistency are discussed in relation to Bell's theorem (...) and Aspect's experiments. (shrink)

SummaryThe problem of quantum measurement is considered in the framework of a naturalized and evolutionary epistemology. Consider two simple textbook observations: a) quantum measurement is an information processing method invented for the purpose of exploring domains of the external world which are not accessible otherwise b) quantum measurement interprets signals from the external world with the help of a computing algorithm invented specifically for this purpose. Replace the words “quantum measurement” and “invented” in a) and b) by “vision” and “evolved (...) respectively”. Both sentences remain simple textbook observations; this time about vision and its biological evolution. Since both a) and b) are substantial statements whether they refer to vision or to quantum measurement the analogy between these processes suggests that quantum measurement may be viewed as a culturally evolved perceptual mode. This idea is explored further by comparing the developments of vision and of quantum measurement. The comparison reveals some interesting similarities between the two processes. One result of the comparison and of viewing quantum measurement as a perceptual mode is a realistic formulation of the Copenhagen interpretation which in turn permits a rational explanation of why, in quantum measurement, some observables exist in nature only when observed. (shrink)

According to the standard view, the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum mechanics originated in discussions between Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927, and was defended by Bohr in his classic debate with Einstein. Yet recent scholarship has shown Bohr’s views were never widely accepted, let alone properly understood, by his contemporaries, many of whom held divergent views of the ‘Copenhagen orthodoxy’. This paper examines how the ‘myth of the Copenhagen interpretation’ was constructed by situating it in (...) the context of Soviet Marxist critique of quantum mechanics in the 1950s and the response by physicists such as Heisenberg and Rosenfeld. (shrink)

The Copenhagen interpretation, which informs the textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, depends fundamentally on the notion of ontological wave-particle duality and a viewpoint called “complementarity.” In this paper, Bohr's own interpretation is traced in detail and is shown to be fundamentally different from and even opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation in virtually all its particulars. In particular, Bohr's interpretation avoids the ad hoc postulate of wave function ‘collapse' that is central to the Copenhagen (...) interpretation. The strengths and weakness of both interpretations are summarized. ‡I thank Edward Mackinnon, Henry Folse, and Greg Anderson for valuable comments on the penultimate draft. The final responsibility for the paper rests with the author. †To contact the author, please write to: Bhaktivedanta Institute, 2334 Stuart Street, Berkeley, CA; e-mail: [email protected]. I have been unable to achieve a sharp formulation of Bohr's principle of complementarity despite much effort I have expended on it. (Einstein 1949, 674) While imagining that I understand the position of Einstein, as regards the EPR correlations, I have very little understanding of his principal opponent, Bohr. (Bell 1987, 155) Niels Bohr brain-washed a generation of physicists into believing that the problem had been solved fifty years ago. (Gell-Mann 1979, 29) Every sentence I say must be understood not as an affirmation, but as a question. (Niels Bohr, quoted in Jammer 1966, 175) Bohr's interpretation has never been fully clarified. It needs an interpretation itself, and only that will be its defense. (Weizsäcker 1971, 25). (shrink)

The Copenhagen interpretation, which informs the textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, depends fundamentally on the notion of ontological wave-particle duality and a viewpoint called “complementarity”. In this paper, Bohr’s own interpretation is traced in detail and is shown to be fundamentally different from and even opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation in virtually all its particulars. In particular, Bohr’s interpretation avoids the ad hoc postulate of wave function ‘collapse’ that is central to the Copenhagen (...) interpretation. The strengths and weakness of both interpretations are summarized. (shrink)

A familiar interpretation of quantum mechanics (one of a number of views sometimes labeled the "Copenhagen interpretation'"), takes its empirical apparatus at face value, holding that the quantum wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation except on certain occasions of measurement, when it collapses into a new state according to the Born rule. This interpretation is widely rejected, primarily because it faces the measurement problem: "measurement" is too imprecise for use in a fundamental physical theory. We (...) argue that this is a weak objection, as there may be many ways of making "measurement" precise. However, measurement-collapse interpretations face a more serious objection: a dilemma tied to the quantum Zeno effect. Is measurement itself an observable that can enter superpositions? If yes, then the standard measurement-collapse dynamics is ill-defined. If no, then (at least if measurement is an observable), measurements can never start or finish. The best way out is to deny that measurement is an observable, but this leads to strong and revisionary consequences. This reinforces the view that there is no nonrevisionary interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In what follows, I examine three main points which may help us to understand the deep nature of Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics. After having played a fundamental pioneer role in the birth of quantum physics, Einstein was, as is well known, far less enthusiastic about its constitution as a quantum mechanics and, since 1927, he constantly argued against the pretention of its founders and proponents to have settled a definitive and complete theory. I emphasize first the importance of the (...) philosophical climate, which was dominated by the Copenhagen orthodoxy and Bohr's idea of complementarity: What Einstein was primarily reluctant to was to accept the fundamental character of quantum mechanics as such, and to modify for it the basic principles of knowledge. I thus stress the main lines of Einstein's own programme in respect to quantum physics, which is to be considered in relation to his other contemporary attempts and achievements. Finally, I show how Einstein's arguments, when dealing with his objections, have been fruitful and some of them still worthy, with regard to recent developments concerning local nonseparability as well as concerning the problems of completeness and accomplishment of quantum theory. (shrink)

The statistical aspects of quantum explanation are intrinsic to quantum physics; individual quantum events are created in the interactions associated with observation and are not describable by predictive theory. The superposition principle shows the essential difference between quantum and non-quantum physics, and the principle is exemplified in the classic single-photon two-slit interference experiment. Recently Mandel and Pfleegor have done an experiment somewhat similar to the optical single-photon experiment but with two independently operated lasers; interference is obtained even with beam intensity (...) so small that only one photon is in the apparatus at a time. The result can be understood in terms of the superposition of states; or, in terms of the Uncertainty Principle, which is found to forbid the determination of which of the two lasers is the source of a given photon (if conditions for interference are to obtain). The Mandel-Pfleegor experiment gives a physical argument against the continuous localization of a photon that is assumed in the hidden variable theories and therefore gives further support for the generally accepted view that an observed entity (observed state) is created in the observation event. This aspect of quantum physics implies a subjectivism on the level of individual quantum-level occurrences, since there is in quantum theory no basis for asserting the existence of the event independently of observation of it. Extension of this subjectivism to large scale, non-quantum phenomena falls within the principles of quantum theory; counter considerations that argue against such an extension are noted. (shrink)

A review: Kristian Camilleri: Heisenberg and the interpretation of quantum mechanics: The physicist as philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, 212 pp.

Most interpretations of Quantum Mechanics alternative to Copenhagen interpretation try to avoid the dualistic flavor of the latter. One of the basic goals of the former is to avoid the ad hoc introduction of observers and observations as an inevitable presupposition of physics. Non-Copenhagen interpretations usually trust in decoherence as a necessary mechanism to obtain a well-defined, observer-free transition from a unitary quantum description of the universe to classicality. Even though decoherence does not solve the problem of (...) the definite outcomes, it helps to explain why we do not observe superpositions and, according to Zurek’s existential interpretation, why a specific preferred basis emerges through system–environment interactions. The aim of this paper is to show why such interpretation ends up begging the question and provides little progress in understanding the quantum-to-classical transition; the ultimate reason being that preferred bases always correlate to human observation. Benefitting from the technical discussion, some remarks will be offered in the last section regarding the role of classical observations as a necessary condition to make workable the formalism of Quantum Mechanics and scientific activity itself. (shrink)

Theological engagement with quantum physics has, to this day, been dominated by the Copenhagen interpretation. However, philosophers and physicists working in the “quantum foundations” field have largely abandoned the Copenhagen view on account of what is widely seen as its troublesome antirealism. Other metaphysical approaches have come to the fore instead, which often take a strongly realist flavor, such as de Broglie-Bohm, or Everett's “Many-Worlds” interpretation. In the spirit of recent quantum foundations work, this article introduces (...) a collection of studies aimed at taking quantum theology “beyond Copenhagen.” The present article advocates a commitment to “quantum fundamentalism,” which could resolve some of the enduring ontological problems faced by existing theological work with quantum mechanics, especially in discussions of quantum special divine action. Taking quantum fundamentalism literally would mean a departure from the Copenhagen interpretation, and the article suggests the need for a new research program to lay the groundwork in the natural theology of quantum foundations. (shrink)

I describe a pedagogical scheme devised to teach efficiently to computer scientists just enough quantum mechanics to permit them to understand the theoretical developments of the last decade going under the name of “quantum computation.” I then note that my offbeat approach to quantum mechanics, designed to be maximally efficacious for this specific educational purpose, is nothing other than the Copenhagen interpretation.

I describe a pedagogical scheme devised to teach efficiently to computer scientists just enough quantum mechanics to permit them to understand the theoretical developments of the last decade going under the name of ''quantum computation.'' I then note that my offbeat approach to quantum mechanics, designed to be maximally efficacious for this specific educational purpose, is nothing other than the Copenhagen interpretation.

While it is widely agreed that decoherence will not solve the measurement problem, decoherence has been used to explain the “emergence of classicality” and to eliminate the need for a Copenhagen edict that some systems simply have to be treated as classical via a quantum-classical “cut”. I argue that decoherence still relies on such a cut. Decoherence accounts derive classicality only in virtue of their incompleteness, by omission of part of the entangled system of which the classical-appearing subsystem is (...) a part. I argue that this omission is only justified by implicit classical assumptions that objectify a subsystem and are employed via either a traditional Copenhagen cut or a functionally equivalent imposition of separability on a system in a non-separable state. I argue that decoherence cannot derive classicality without assuming it in some other form, and I provide an analysis of when it is appropriate to make these otherwise implicit classical assumptions by adopting a minimalistic Copenhagen-style approach to measurement. Finally, I argue that, ironically, the conditions for making these assumptions may be better satisfied in standard measurement situations than in cases of environmental monitoring. (shrink)

Why does one theory "succeed" while another, possibly clearer interpretation, fails? By exploring two observationally equivalent yet conceptually incompatible views of quantum mechanics, James T. Cushing shows how historical contingency can be crucial to determining a theory's construction and its position among competing views. Since the late 1920s, the theory formulated by Niels Bohr and his colleagues at Copenhagen has been the dominant interpretation of quantum mechanics. Yet an alternative interpretation, rooted in the work of Louis (...) de Broglie in the early 1920s and reformulated and extended by David Bohm in the 1950s, equally well explains the observational data. Through a detailed historical and sociological study of the physicists who developed different theories of quantum mechanics, the debates within and between opposing camps, and the receptions given to each theory, Cushing shows that despite the preeminence of the Copenhagen view, the Bohm interpretation cannot be ignored. Cushing contends that the Copenhagen interpretation became widely accepted not because it is a better explanation of subatomic phenomena than is Bohm's, but because it happened to appear first. Focusing on the philosophical, social, and cultural forces that shaped one of the most important developments in modern physics, this provocative book examines the role that timing can play in the establishment of theory and explanation. (shrink)

We construct a world model consisting of a matter field living in 4 dimensional spacetime and a gravitational field living in 11 dimensional spacetime. The seven hidden dimensions are compactified within a radius estimated by reproducing the particle–wave characteristics of diffraction experiments. In the presence of matter fields the gravitational field develops localized modes with elementary excitations called gravonons which are induced by the sources. The final world model treated here contains only gravonons and a scalar matter field. The gravonons (...) are localized in the environment of the massive particles which generate them. The solution of the Schrödinger equation for the world model yields matter fields which are localized in the 4 dimensional subspace. The localization has the following properties: There is a chooser mechanism for the selection of the localization site. The chooser selects one site on the basis of minor energy differences and differences in the gravonon structure between the sites, which at present cannot be controlled experimentally and therefore let the choice appear statistical. The changes from one localization site to a neighbouring one take place in a telegraph-signal like manner. The times at which telegraph like jumps occur depend on subtleties of the gravonon structure which at present cannot be controlled experimentally and therefore let the telegraph-like jumps appear statistical. The fact that the dynamical law acts in the configuration space of fields living in 11 dimensional spacetime lets the events observed in 4 dimensional spacetime appear non-local. In this way the phenomenology of CQM is obtained without the need of introducing the process of collapse and a probabilistic interpretation of the wave function. Operators defining observables need not be introduced. All experimental findings are explained in a deterministic way as a consequence of the time development of the wave function in configuration space according to Schrödinger’s equation without the need of introducing a probabilistic interpretation. (shrink)

The book considers foundational thinking in quantum theory, focusing on the role the fundamental principles and principle thinking there, including thinking that leads to the invention of new principles, which is, the book contends, one of the ultimate achievements of theoretical thinking in physics and beyond. The focus on principles, prominent during the rise and in the immediate aftermath of quantum theory, has been uncommon in more recent discussions and debates concerning it. The book argues, however, that exploring the fundamental (...) principles and principle thinking is exceptionally helpful in addressing the key issues at stake in quantum foundations and the seemingly interminable debates concerning them. Principle thinking led to major breakthroughs throughout the history of quantum theory, beginning with the old quantum theory and quantum mechanics, the first definitive quantum theory, which it remains within its proper (nonrelativistic) scope. It has, the book also argues, been equally important in quantum field theory, which has been the frontier of quantum theory for quite a while now, and more recently, in quantum information theory, where principle thinking was given new prominence. The approach allows the book to develop a new understanding of both the history and philosophy of quantum theory, from Planck's quantum to the Higgs boson, and beyond, and of the thinking the key founding figures, such as Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and Dirac, as well as some among more recent theorists. The book also extensively considers the nature of quantum probability, and contains a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, "the statistical Copenhagen interpretation." Overall, the book's argument is guided by what Heisenberg called "the spirit of Copenhagen," which is defined by three great divorces from the preceding foundational thinking in physics-reality from realism, probability from causality, and locality from relativity-and defined the fundamental principles of quantum theory accordingly. (shrink)

We rebut the objections to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics presented by Park [9,10], Margenau [10], and Popper [11]. It seems to us that these authors, having adopted different interpretations of quantum mechanics, have been unable to grasp the perspective of the Copenhagenist. They therefore miss the points which the Copenhagenist is making when he: accords a special status to observations in quantum theory; attributes a state vector to an individual system; places restrictions on the simultaneous measurability (...) of non-commuting observables; hesitates to use his measurements for retrodictions. In our opinion, the arguments of the above authors reflect their incomprehension of Copenhagenism. Elsewhere [5,6] we have discussed two alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics which we have called Copenhagenism and Popperism. We have there shown how the dispute between the schools stems from disparate uses of the word ‘state’. We continue the discussion here within the context of the above points and show how these disparate notions of state are related to diverse notions of ‘behaviour’. (shrink)

This column is about experimental tests of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics. The question at issue is whether we can perform experiments that can show whether there is an "observer-created reality" as suggested by the Copenhagen Interpretation, or a peacock’s tail of rapidly branching alternate universes, as suggested by the Many-Worlds Interpretation, or forward-backward in time handshakes, as suggested by the Transactional Interpretation? Until recently, I would have said that this was an impossible task, but (...) a new experiment has changed my view, and I now believe that the Copenhagen and Many-Worlds Interpretations (at least as they are usually presented) have been falsified by experiment. (shrink)

Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics deals with these problems is reviewed. A new interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics, the transactional interpretation, is presented. The basic element of this interpretation is the transaction describing a quantum event as an exchange of advanced and retarded waves, as implied by the work of Wheeler and Feynman, Dirac, and others. The transactional interpretation is explicitly nonlocal and thereby consistent with recent tests of the Bell inequality, yet (...) is relativistically invariant and fully causal. A detailed comparison of the transactional and Copenhagen interpretations is made in the context of well-known quantum-mechanical Gedankenexperimenre and "paradoxes." The transactional interpretation permits quantum-mechanical wave functions to be interpreted as real waves physically present in space rather than as "mathematical representations of knowledge" as in the Copenhagen interpretation. The transactional interpretation is shown to provide insight into the complex character of the quantum-mechanical state vector and the mechanism associated with its "collapse." It also leads in a natural way to justification of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Born probability law (P = ii iij*), basic elements of the Copenhagen interpretation. (shrink)

This paper argues against the possibility of presenting a consistent version of the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics, characterizing its founders' philosophical pronouncements including those on the realism-antirealism issue, as a contingent collection of local, often contradictory, moves in changing theoretical and sociopolitical circumstances. The paper analyzes the fundamental differences of opinion between Bohr and the mathematical physicists, Heisenberg and Born, concerning the foundational doctrine of the "indispensability of classical concepts", and their related disagreements on "quantum reality." The (...) paper concludes with an explanation of how the appearance of consensus was achieved despite fundamental disagreements among the proponents. The paper undermines the adequacy of the notion of a general conceptual framework to describe the philosophical endeavors of working scientists. (shrink)

Foundational attitudes towards quantum theory have recently thrown off much of the old philosophical baggage largely associated with Niels Bohr to which Einstein famously objected, including the central ‘collapse of the wavefunction’ concept. A ‘neo-Copenhagen’ interpretation, it is suggested, has arisen. This development is placed in its historical context and contrasted to philosophical allegations of anti-realism. The neo-Copenhagen interpretation remains wedded to Heisenberg's uncertainty and observer-dependent values of particles. However a discussion of Nick Herbert's ‘rainbow analogy’ (...) suggests that subatomic particles are emergent from a ‘nonlocal’ level of reality outside the domain of space and time. Critical realism recognizes that emergent systems have an irreducibly ontologically character, and in its combination of epistemological relativism and ontological realism, provides a basis for the proposition that realists who support Einstein's objections must now recognize that their realism must be redefined. (shrink)

This paper presents a new Symmetrical Interpretation (SI) of relativistic quantum mechanics which postulates: quantum mechanics is a theory about complete experiments, not particles; a complete experiment is maximally described by a complex transition amplitude density; and this transition amplitude density never collapses. This SI is compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) for the analysis of Einstein’s bubble experiment. This SI makes several experimentally testable predictions that differ from the CI, solves one part of the measurement problem, (...) resolves some inconsistencies of the CI, and gives intuitive explanations of some previously mysterious quantum effects. (shrink)

This article seeks to demonstrate the influence of J. G. Fichte's philosophy on Søren Kierkegaard's theory of the self as he develops it in The Sickness unto Death and to interpret his theory of the self as a religious critique of autonomy. Following Michelle Kosch, it argues that Kierkegaard's theory of the self was developed in part as a critique of idealist conceptions of agency. Moreover, Kierkegaard's view of agency provides a powerful way of understanding human freedom and finitude that (...) has implications for contemporary debates about autonomy, normativity, and agency. (shrink)

We present an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new inter- pretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. Elementary particles are considered as extended objects and nonlocal effects are included. The role of the new concepts in the problems of measurement and of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations is described. Experiments to distinguish the proposed interpretation from (...) the Copenhagen one are pointed out. (shrink)