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  1. Cordelia Fine (2013). Is There Neurosexism in Functional Neuroimaging Investigations of Sex Differences? Neuroethics 6 (2):369-409.
    The neuroscientific investigation of sex differences has an unsavoury past, in which scientific claims reinforced and legitimated gender roles in ways that were not scientifically justified. Feminist critics have recently argued that the current use of functional neuroimaging technology in sex differences research largely follows that tradition. These charges of ‘neurosexism’ have been countered with arguments that the research being done is informative and valuable and that an over-emphasis on the perils, rather than the promise, of such research threatens to (...)
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  2. Cordelia Fine, Rebecca Jordan-Young, Anelis Kaiser & Gina Rippon (2013). Plasticity, Plasticity, Plasticity… and the Rigid Problem of Sex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (11):550-551.
  3. Cordelia Fine (2012). Explaining, or Sustaining, the Status Quo? The Potentially Self-Fulfilling Effects of 'Hardwired' Accounts of Sex Differences. Neuroethics 5 (3):285-294.
    In this article I flesh out support for observations that scientific accounts of social groups can influence the very groups and mental phenomena under investigation. The controversial hypothesis that there are hardwired differences between the brains of males and females that contribute to sex differences in gender-typed behaviour is common in both the scientific and popular media. Here I present evidence that such claims, quite independently of their scientific validity, have scope to sustain the very sex differences they seek to (...)
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  4. Giordana Grossi & Cordelia Fine (2012). The Role of Fetal Testosterone in the Development of "the Essential Difference" Between the Sexes : Some Essential Issues. In Robyn Bluhm, Anne Jaap Jacobson & Heidi Lene Maibom (eds.), Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
  5. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature (...)
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  6. Cordelia Fine (2008). Will Working Mothers' Brains Explode? The Popular New Genre of Neurosexism. Neuroethics 1 (1):69-72.
    A number of recent popular books about gender differences have drawn on the neuroscientific literature to support the claim that certain psychological differences between the sexes are ‘hard-wired’. This article highlights some of the ethical implications that arise from both factual and conceptual errors propagated by such books.
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  7. Cordelia Fine (2006). Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
    According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by (...)
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  8. Cordelia Fine, Jillian Craigie & Ian Gold (2005). Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don't: The Impasse in Cognitive Accounts of the Capgras Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):143-151.
  9. Cordelia Fine, Jillian Craigie & Ian Gold (2005). The Explanation Approach to Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):159-163.