Search results for 'Corey McGrath' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  75
    Corey McGrath (2011). Can Substitution Inferences Explain the Knobe Effect? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):667-679.
    The Knobe effect is the phenomenon demonstrated in the course of repeated studies showing that moral valence affects the way in which we apply concepts. Knobe explains the effect by appealing to the nature of the concepts themselves: whether they actually apply in some situation depends upon the moral valence of some element of that situation. In this paper, a different picture of the effect is presented and given motivation. It is suggested that subjects apply concepts on the basis of (...)
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  2. Patrick Mcgrath (1982). Hominis Est Errare — A Reply to ‘In Defence of Infallibility’: PATRICK McGRATH. Religious Studies 18 (1):87-91.
    The title of A. P. Martinich's article is a misnomer. What he is defending is not the doctrine of infallibility as defined by the First Vatican Council and as understood by Roman Catholic theologians, but his own highly personal and, to my mind, entirely mistaken interpretation of the doctrine. This interpretation derives from the fact that some purportedly infallible utterances contain the expression ‘we declare that…’. This leads Martinich to believe that such utterances are declarations rather than statements and since (...)
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  3. Matthew McGrath (1998). Matthew McGrath. Philosophy 74:587-610.
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  4. Patrick Mcgrath (1980). Statements, Declarations and Infallible Utterances: A Reply to Professor Martinich: PATRICK McGRATH. Religious Studies 16 (4):469-479.
    In his article ‘Infallibility’ A. P. Martinich has argued that the logical character of infallible utterances has been generally misunderstood. Opponents and supporters of the doctrine of papal infallibility have both assumed, he claims, that infallible utterances are statements; but this is incorrect, for such utterances are not statements, but declarations. Consideration of this point, he believes, would enable us to see that the doctrine of papal infallibility is both coherent and correct.
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  5. Elizabeth Campbell Corey (2006). Michael Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics, and Politics. University of Missouri.
    For much of his career, British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott was identified with Margaret Thatcher’s conservative policies. He has been called by some a guru to the Tories, while others have considered him one of the last proponents of British Idealism. Best known for such books as _Experience and Its Modes_ and _Rationalism in Politics_, Oakeshott has been the subject of numerous studies, but always with an emphasis on his political thought. Elizabeth Campbell Corey now makes the case that (...)
     
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  6.  9
    James F. McGrath, Monotheism.
    James McGrath's contribution to the forthcoming edition, Vocabulary for the Study of Religion.
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  7. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error--as seems required if (...)
     
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  8.  52
    Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2013). Truth and Epistemology. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer 127--145.
    In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa's work on the nature of truth. Sosa's chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for truth-centered epistemology -- an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes arguments from Putnam and Davidson against the correspondence theory, he is hesitant to endorse it because he doubts we have a clear (...)
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  9. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2011). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error - as seems (...)
     
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  10.  76
    Sarah McGrath (2011). Reply to King. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:235-241.
    In “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise” (2007), I offer an argument for the conclusion that our controversial moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I defend that argument against the criticisms put forth by Nathan King in his “McGrath on Moral Knowledge.”.
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  11.  19
    John McGrath (2012). Befriending Context and Tradition: Evangelisation and Catholic Schools. The Australasian Catholic Record 89 (3):283.
    McGrath, John The Church 'exists to evangelise'. It is its essential mission. Catholic schooling in Australia professes its enthusiasm for being 'part of the evangelising mission of the Church'. It always has. However, the call to renewed ways of evangelisation in new and diverse circumstances gives rise to a number of questions: How should schools respond to new contexts? What principles should underpin their evangelising efforts? What are some of the renewed ways by which school systems strive to meet (...)
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  12.  1
    James F. McGrath, Conflicting Visions of the Real: Christianity, Buddhism & Baudrillard in The Matrix Films and Popular Culture.
    James McGrath's contribution to the proceedings of the first global conference of the Cyberworlds, Virtual Reality project, which took place from Monday 11 August - Wednesday 13 August 2003, in Prague, as part of the At the Interface conference series.
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  13. Paul Corey (2008). Messiahs and Machiavellians: Depicting Evil in the Modern Theatre. University of Notre Dame Press.
    _Messiahs and Machiavellians_ is an innovative exploration of “modern evil” in works of early- and late-modern theatre, raising issues about ethics, politics, religion, and aesthetics that speak to our present condition. Paul Corey examines how theatre—which expressed a key political dynamic both in the Renaissance and the twentieth century—lays open the impulses that instigated modernity and, ultimately, unparalleled levels of violence and destruction. Starting with Albert Camus’ _Caligula_ and Samuel Beckett’s _Waiting for Godot_, then turning to Machiavelli’s _Mandragola_ and (...)
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  14.  53
    Matthew McGrath (2000). Between Deflationism & Correspondence Theory. Garland Pub..
    McGrath argues for an original theory truth that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
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  15. Matthew McGrath (2013). Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Routledge.
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
     
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  16. Matthew McGrath (2015). Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Routledge.
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
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  17. Matthew McGrath (2014). Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Routledge.
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
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  18. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2002). Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification. Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting evidentialism by defending a (...)
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  19.  58
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Looks and Perceptual Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  20. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558–589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving (...)
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  21. Sarah McGrath (2011). Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.
    In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution.
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  22.  95
    Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath (2016). Perceptual Reasons. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.
    The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...)
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  23.  13
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Looks and Perceptual Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1).
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  24. A. McGrath (2002). Scientific Theology, Volume 1: Nature. Ars Disputandi 2.
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  25.  85
    Matthew McGrath (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification.
  26.  16
    Matthew McGrath, Knowing What Things Look Like.
    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it’s a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one’s knowledge of what the (...)
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  27.  15
    J. Fantl & M. McGrath (2002). ``Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justifcation". Philosophical Review 111 (1):67--94.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting evidentialism by defending a (...)
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  28. Sarah McGrath (2005). Causation by Omission: A Dilemma. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):125--48.
    Some omissions seem to be causes. For example, suppose Barry promises to water Alice’s plant, doesn’t water it, and that the plant then dries up and dies. Barry’s not watering the plant – his omitting to water the plant – caused its death. But there is reason to believe that if omissions are ever causes, then there is far more causation by omission than we ordinarily think. In other words, there is reason to think the following thesis true.
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  29.  56
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Schellenberg on the Epistemic Force of Experience. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):897-905.
    According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we (...)
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  30.  21
    Matthew McGrath (forthcoming). Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing in Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
  31.  50
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Hill on Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):841-849.
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  32. Matthew McGrath (2013). Siegel and the Impact for Epistemological Internalism. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):723-732.
  33. Matthew McGrath (2013). Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.
  34. Sarah McGrath (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
    On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it would have (...)
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  35. Sarah McGrath (2009). The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference1. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
    Case B. You tell me that eating meat is immoral. Although I believe that, left to my own devices, I would not think this, no matter how long I reflected, I adopt your attitude as my own. It is not that I believe that you are better informed about potentially relevant non-moral facts (e.g., about the conditions under which livestock is kept, or about the typical effects of eliminating meat from one’s diet). On the contrary, I know that I have (...)
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  36.  7
    Matthew McGrath (forthcoming). Cohen on ‘Epistemic’. Inquiry:1-17.
    Stewart Cohen offers a critique of much contemporary epistemology. Epistemologies use the term ‘epistemic’ in order to specify the issues they investigate and about which they disagree. Cohen sees widespread confusion about these issues. The problem, he argues, is that ‘epistemic’ is functioning as an inadequately defined technical term. I will argue, rather, that the troubles come more from non-technical vocabulary, in particular with ‘justification’ and ‘ought’, and generally from the difficulty of explaining normativity. Overall, the message of this paper (...)
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  37. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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  38. Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath (2010). Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough? Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.
    Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...)
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  39. J. Fantl & M. McGrath (2012). Arguing for Shifty Epistemology. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press 55--74.
    Shifty epistemologists allow that the truth value of “knowledge”-ascriptions can vary not merely because of such differences, but because of factors not traditionally deemed to matter to whether someone knows, like salience of error possibilities and practical stakes. Thus, contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists are both examples. This paper examines two strategies for arguing for shifty epistemology: the argument-from-instances strategy, which attempts to show that the truth-value of knowledge-ascriptions can vary by proposing cases in which they vary (e.g., the bank cases, (...)
     
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  40. Sarah McGrath (2008). Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 3. Oxford University Press 87-108.
    The phenomenon of persistent ethical disagreement is often cited in connection with the question of whether there is any ‘‘absolute’’ morality, or whether, instead, morality is in some sense merely ‘‘a matter of personal opinion’’. Citing disagreement, many people who hold strong views about controversial issues such as the permissibility of abortion, eating meat, or the death penalty deny that these views are anything more than ‘‘personal beliefs’’. But while there might be inconsistencies lurking in this position, it is not (...)
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  41. M. McGrath (1997). Discussion. Reply to Kovach. Mind 106 (423):581-586.
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  42. Matthew McGrath (1997). Weak Deflationism. Mind 106 (421):69-98.
    Is truth a substantial feature of truth-bearers? Correspondence theorists answer in the affirmative, deflationists in the negative. Correspondence theorists cite in their defense the dependence of truth on meaning or representational content. Deflationists in turn cite the conceptual centrality of simple equivalences such as ''Snow is white' is true iff snow is white'' and 'It is true that snow is white iff snow is white'. The apparent facts to which these theorists appeal correspond to some of our firmest and most (...)
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  43. Matthew McGrath (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (1):1 - 24.
    Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in (...)
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  44.  24
    Matthew Mcgrath (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (1):1-24.
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  45.  25
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.
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  46.  29
    M. McGrath (1998). Van Inwagen's Critique of Universalism. Analysis 58 (2):116-121.
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  47.  80
    Matthew McGrath (2010). Contextualism and Intellectualism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):383-405.
  48.  27
    M. McGrath (2001). Rea on Universalism. Analysis 61 (1):69-76.
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  49. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55 - 66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  50. Matthew McGrath (2007). Temporal Parts. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.
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