Reviewed: The Philosophy of Husserl, by Burt C. Hopkins. Mc-Gill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. 290 pp., pb. $22.95, ISBN-13: 9780773538238; hb. $95, ISBN-13: 978-0773538221. Burt Hopkins’s The Philosophy of Husserl presents a challenging and thoughtful elucidation of Husserl’s phenomenology that pays special attention to important methodological aspects of Husserl’s philosophy, and, thereby, to Husserl’s characterization of phenomenology as a pure and transcendental philosophy. Unlike other texts that attempt to elucidate Husserl’s philosophy, Hopkins carries out his project in an unusual fashion, by (...) beginning with a consideration of the conflict between Plato and Aristotle regarding the meaning and status of the eide, and ending with a systematic critique of two of Husserl’s most fierce opponents, Heidegger and Derrida. This review essay gives an overview of Hopkins’s book and offers some critical remarks. (shrink)
In the last three decades, the consideration of whether non-human animals should be ascribed any moral status, and if so in what way it ought to be ascribed to them, has become of central philosophical, political and economic importance. Thus, given thecontemporary significance of what may be called (jar simplicity’s sake) the “animal issue,” it is worthwhile to examine in what way Ancient Greek philosophy might contribute to our understanding of the issue and to our philosophical response to it. With (...) this in mind,in this essay I examine the issue of the moral status of animals from a “critical” Aristotelian perspective, on the basis of which I shall attempt: (§I) to show how, unlike the Cartesian view of animal nature, Aristotle’s conception of the non-moral status of animals stillinforms the prevailing contemporary view of the animal, and (§II) to establish that Aristotle’s failure to ascribe moral status to animals should be rejected (a) given his admission that animals are, by nature, capable of suffering while they are unable to engage in rational deliberation, and (b) given his understanding of the connection between moral blameworthiness, natural disposition, and various kinds of acts, particularly un-chosen and chosen willing acts. In this way, we shall show that although the prevailing contemporary view of the animal’s moral status represents a slightly more “elevated” view than Aristotle’s, insofar as (typically) we do not explicitly claim, as Aristotle did, that animals are due no moral consideration, by critically appropriating the relevant Aristotelian texts, we nonetheless findrich philosophical evidence that permits us to further elevate our conception of the moral status of animals such that we are prepared to grant them genuine moral significance, not just in theory but also in practice. (shrink)
In this essay I argue that the Stranger’s interest in keeping the philosopher and the sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the charges ofsophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to defend Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that the Stranger’s task in the Sophist, namely to keep philosophy distinct from sophistry, is intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is therefore not merely of theoretical importance but is also—and essentially—of (...) political and ethical significance. (shrink)
In this paper I provide a compelling argument against the thesis that Aristotle’s understanding of the relation between the soul and the body can be construed asfunctionalist, despite some passages that would seem to support such an interpretation. Toward this end, in section I of the essay I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the soul-body relation that emphasizes the non-contingent nature of the connection between the soul and a specific kind of body, arguing that Aristotle’s account of the (...) soul as the “form” and “actuality” of the living thing, and of the organic body as its “matter” and “potentiality,” shows their necessary relation with one another. In section II, I present the functionalist account of mind, placing especial emphasis on its post-Cartesian genesis, which takes seriously the “problematic” status of the relation between mind and body. I then attempt to show, in section III, how because functionalism holds that psychic capacities can be realized within a number of different material bases, including physical and artificial systems, it is incompatible with Aristotle’s conception of the necessary soul-body relation, and thus that Aristotle’s account of psuche is not best construed as functionalist. (shrink)
In this article we present (1) a close paraphrase--virtually a translation--of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, §74, "Die Grundverfassung der Geschichtlichkeit," pp. 382-387, together with an analytical outline found in the Appendix; and (2) a brief commentary on the text. What Heidegger says about his own translation of Aristotle's Physics B 1 applies here as well: "The ‘translation' is already the interpretation proper. Thereafter only an explanation of the ‘translation' is called for.".