Search results for 'Cornell realism' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Cornell Realism in Meta-Ethics
  1.  73
    Joseph Long (2014). In Defence of Cornell Realism: A Reply to Elizabeth Tropman. Theoria 80 (2):174-183.
    Cornell realists claim, among other things, that moral knowledge can be acquired in the same basic way that scientific knowledge is acquired. Recently in this journal Elizabeth Tropman has presented two arguments against this claim. In the present article, I attempt to show that the first argument attacks a straw man and the second mischaracterizes the Cornell realists' epistemology and ends up begging the question. I close by suggesting that, given Tropman's own apparent views, her objections are also (...)
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  2.  39
    Luis R. G. Oliveira & Timothy Perrine (forthcoming). Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties. European Journal of Philosophy.
    The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable (ethical conservativism) seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview (ethical naturalism). Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we (...)
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  3.  49
    Elizabeth Tropman (2014). Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge. Theoria 80 (2):184-190.
    According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts in much the same way that we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. In “Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” (2012), I argue that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the moral realist position. Joseph Long has recently defended Cornell moral realism against my concerns. In this article, I respond to Long's arguments and clarify important (...)
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  4. Elizabeth Tropman (2012). Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge? Theoria 78 (1):26-46.
    This article raises a problem for Cornell varieties of moral realism. According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts just as we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. If this is so, it would remove any special mystery that is supposed to attach to our knowledge of objective moral facts. After clarifying the ways in which moral knowledge is to be similar to scientific knowledge, I claim that the analogy fails, but for (...)
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  5.  83
    RF Hendry & DJ Mossley (1999). Review. Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible. Jerrold L Aronson, R Harré, Eileen Cornell Way. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):175-179.
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  6.  21
    Vincent Colapietro, Ian M. Crystal, Gunnar Foss & Eivind Kasa (2003). Alston, William P., Editor. Realism & Antirealism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. Pp. Viii+ 303. Paper, $22.50. Aportone, Anselmo, Francesco Aronadio, and Paolo Spinicci. Il Problema Dell'intuizione: Tre Studi Su Platone, Kant, E Husserl. Naples: Bibliopolis, 2002. Pp. 196. Paper,€ 20.00. Arrington, Robert L., Editor. The World's Great Philosophers. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (3).
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  7.  7
    Obed Balaban, Lawrence A. Blum & Victor Seidler (1990). Arrington, Robert L. Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989; $13.95 (Paper); 321 Pps.(Indexed). Baird, Robert M. And Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Ed). Euthanasia: The Moral Issue. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989; $11.95 (Paper); 182 Pps. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 24:335-336.
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  8.  13
    Matti Eklund (2005). Realism and Antirealism Edited by William P. Alston Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, Viii + 303 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44 (04):786-.
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  9.  5
    R. Hudelson (1990). Book Reviews : Jeffrey C. Isaac, Power and Marxist Theory: A Realist View. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987. Pp. 238, $26.50. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (3):390-393.
  10.  5
    Rod Bertolet (1998). A Realist Conception of Truth William P. Alston Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, Ix + 274 Pp., $35.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 37 (03):648-.
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  11.  2
    Theological Aesthetics After von Balthasar (2008). Allen, Barry. Artifice and Design: Art and Technology in Human Experience. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2008. Pp. 232.£ 17.95 (Hbk). Brooks, Peter. Realist Vision. London: Yale. [REVIEW] British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4).
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  12. Caj Strandberg (2004). Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism. Lund University.
    The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that moral sentences have truth-value, there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true, and moral properties are not reducible to non- moral properties. Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny, and, respectively. In the introductory chapter, it is also argued that there are some prima facie (...)
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  13. Brendan Cline (2015). Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-20.
    Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most persuasive (...)
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  14.  85
    Jorn Sonderholm (2013). Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument. Theoria 79 (1):76-88.
    This article is concerned with Mark Timmons and Terence Horgan's influential twin - earth argument against the semantic views of that school of thought in metaethics that has come to be known as “Cornell realism”. The semantic views of Cornell realism have been developed in greatest detail by Richard Boyd, and it is Boyd's view that is targeted by Timmons and Horgan. In the first part of the article, the twin - earth argument is introduced and (...)
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  15. Michael Rubin (2008). Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307-327.
    A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of papers that make use of their “ Moral Twin Earth ” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic intuitions. If they (...)
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  16. David Slutsky (2001). Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):595-610.
    In this paper, I motivate skepticism about the causal efficacy of moral properties in two ways. First, I highlight a tension that arises between two claims that moral realists may want to accept. The first claim is that physically indistinguishable things do not differ in any causally efficacious respect. The second claim is that physically indistinguishable things that differ in certain historical respects have different moral properties. The tension arises to the extent to which these different moral properties are supposed (...)
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  17. Charles R. Pigden (2012). Identifying Goodness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):93 - 109.
    The paper reconstructs Moore's Open Question Argument (OQA) and discusses its rise and fall. There are three basic objections to the OQA: Geach's point, that Moore presupposes that ?good? is a predicative adjective (whereas it is in fact attributive); Lewy's point, that it leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis; and Durrant's point that even if 'good' is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate, goodness might be synthetically identical with a naturalistic property. As against Geach, I argue that 'good' has (...)
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  18.  91
    Michael Rubin (2008). Is Goodness a Homeostatic Property Cluster? Ethics 118 (3):496-528.
  19.  51
    Elliott Sober (2015). Two Cornell Realisms: Moral and Scientific. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):905-924.
    Richard Boyd and Nicholas Sturgeon develop distinctive naturalistic arguments for scientific realism and moral realism. Each defends a realist position by an inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I suggest that these arguments for realism should be reformulated, with the law of likelihood replacing inference to the best explanation. The resulting arguments for realism do not work.
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  20.  47
    Simon Blackburn (2015). Blessed Are the Peacemakers. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):843-853.
    In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.
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  21. Jerrold L. Aronson, Rom Harré & Eileen Cornell Way (1994). Realism Rescued How Scientific Progress is Possible.
     
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  22. Jerrold L. Aronson, Rom Harre, Eileen Cornell Way, Robin Findlay Hendry & David J. Mossley (1999). Reviews-Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):175-180.
     
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  23. Stathis Psillos (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Routledge.
    Scientific Realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it to be. In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study, which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, to instrumentalism and modern skeptical empiricism. Scientific (...) explains that the history of science does not undermine the notion of scientific realism, and instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice. Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the state of modern science and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book. (shrink)
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  24. Russ Shafer-Landau (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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  25. David Enoch (2011). Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford University Press.
    David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends Robust Realism--a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity, according to which there are perfectly universal and objective moral truths.
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  26.  16
    Robert Cowan (2014). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  27. Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism (...)
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  28. Robert Cowan (2014). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  29.  31
    Michael Rubin (2015). Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):386-410.
    In order to defend the Cornell variety of naturalistic moral realism from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth objection, several philosophers have proposed what I call Normatively Enriched Moral Meta-Semantics. According to NEMMS, the natural properties that serve as the contents of moral predicates are fixed by non- moral normative facts. In this paper, I elucidate two versions of NEMMS: one proposed by David Brink, and the other proposed by Mark van Roojen. I show what these meta-semantics have (...)
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  30. Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
  31. Anjan Chakravartty (2007). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge University Press.
    Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising recent strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He (...)
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  32. David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated (...)
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  33. John Worrall (1989). Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? Dialectica 43 (1-2):99-124.
    The no-miracles argument for realism and the pessimistic meta-induction for anti-realism pull in opposite directions. Structural Realism---the position that the mathematical structure of mature science reflects reality---relieves this tension.
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  34. Margaret Scotford Archer (ed.) (1998). Critical Realism: Essential Readings. Routledge.
    Since the publication of Roy Bhaskar's A Realist Theory of Science in 1975, critical realism has emerged as one of the most powerful new directions in the philosophy of science and social science, offering a real alternative to both positivism and postmodernism. This reader makes accessible in one volume key readings to stimulate debate about and within critical realism, including: the transcendental realist philosophy of science elaborated in A Realist Theory of Science ; Bhaskar's critical naturalist philosophy of (...)
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  35. Tuomas E. Tahko (2016). Armstrong on Truthmaking and Realism. In Francesco F. Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter 207-218.
    The title of this paper reflects the fact truthmaking is quite frequently considered to be expressive of realism. What this means, exactly, will become clearer in the course of our discussion, but since we are interested in Armstrong’s work on truthmaking in particular, it is natural to start from a brief discussion of how truthmaking and realism appear to be associated in his work. In this paper, special attention is given to the supposed link between truthmaking and (...), but it is argued that this link should not be taken too seriously, as truthmaking turns out to be, to a large extent, ontologically neutral. Some consequences of this are studies. (shrink)
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  36.  67
    Helen De Cruz (2016). Numerical Cognition and Mathematical Realism. Philosophers' Imprint 16 (16).
    Humans and other animals have an evolved ability to detect discrete magnitudes in their environment. Does this observation support evolutionary debunking arguments against mathematical realism, as has been recently argued by Clarke-Doane, or does it bolster mathematical realism, as authors such as Joyce and Sinnott-Armstrong have assumed? To find out, we need to pay closer attention to the features of evolved numerical cognition. I provide a detailed examination of the functional properties of evolved numerical cognition, and propose that (...)
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  37.  33
    Nora Berenstain & James Ladyman (2012). Ontic Structural Realism and Modality. In Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality. Springer
    There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider whether scientific (...)
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  38. Panu Raatikainen (2014). Realism: Metaphysical, Scientific, and Semantic. In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism. Routledge 139-158.
    Three influential forms of realism are distinguished and interrelated: realism about the external world, construed as a metaphysical doctrine; scientific realism about non-observable entities postulated in science; and semantic realism as defined by Dummett. Metaphysical realism about everyday physical objects is contrasted with idealism and phenomenalism, and several potent arguments against these latter views are reviewed. -/- Three forms of scientific realism are then distinguished: (i) scientific theories and their existence postulates should be taken (...)
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  39.  37
    Dave Elder-Vass (2005). Emergence and the Realist Account of Cause. Journal of Critical Realism 4 (2):315-338.
    This paper aims to improve critical realism's understanding of emergence by discussing, first, what emergence is and how it works; second, the need for a compositional account of emergence; and third, the implications of emergence for causation. It goes on to argue that the theory of emergence leads to the recognition of certain hitherto neglected similarities between real causal powers and actual causation. (edited).
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  40. Michael Huemer (forthcoming). A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
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  41. Jonathan Michael Kaplan & Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2014). Realism, Antirealism, and Conventionalism About Race. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):1039-1052.
    This paper distinguishes three concepts of "race": bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1962, A.W.F. Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by (...)
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  42. Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    This is the third volume of Hilary Putnam's philosophical papers, published in paperback for the first time. The volume contains his major essays from 1975 to 1982, which reveal a large shift in emphasis in the 'realist'_position developed in his earlier work. While not renouncing those views, Professor Putnam has continued to explore their epistemological consequences and conceptual history. He now, crucially, sees theories of truth and of meaning that derive from a firm notion of reference as inadequate.
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  43. David Enoch (2010). The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How Best to Understand It, and How to Cope with It. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):413-438.
    Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative— realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt (...)
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  44. Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
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  45.  49
    Achille C. Varzi (2014). Realism in the Desert. In Massimo Dell’Utri, Fabio Bacchini & Stefano Caputo (eds.), Realism and Ontology without Myths. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 16–31.
    Quine’s desert is generally contrasted with Meinong’s jungle, as a sober ontological alternative to the exuberant luxuriance that comes with the latter. Here I focus instead on the desert as a sober metaphysical alternative to the Aristotelian garden, with its tidily organized varieties of flora and fauna neatly governed by fundamental laws that reflect the essence of things and the way they can be, or the way they must be. In the desert there are no “natural joints”; all the boundaries (...)
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  46.  44
    D. L. Anderson (2002). Why God is Not a Semantic Realist. In William P. Alston (ed.), Realism and Antirealism. Cornell Up 131--48.
    Traditional theists are, with few exceptions, global semantic realists about the interpretation of external world statement. Realism of this kind is treated by many as a shibboleth of traditional Christianity, a sine qua non of theological orthodoxy. Yet, this love affair between theists and semantic realism is a poor match. I suggest that everyone (theist or no) has compelling evidence drawn from everyday linguistic practice to reject a realist interpretation of most external world statements. But theists have further (...)
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  47.  77
    Ian F. Verstegen (2006). A Critical Realist Perspective on Aesthetic Value. Journal of Critical Realism 5 (2):323-343.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 323 - 343 The following article attempts to bring critical realism to bear on the changing nature of aesthetic value. Beginning with the transitive-intransitive distinction, it is advised that we withhold judgment on the possibility of aesthetic judgment, lest we commit the epistemic fallacy. Without hoping to attain a form of aesthetic value absolutism, a strategy of ‘eliminative realism’ is introduced, which seeks to remove false causes of apparent judgmental relativism. Then (...)
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  48. Gary Hatfield (2010). Mandelbaum's Critical Realism. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge
    Mandelbaum adopted a middle course between physicalistic scientific realism and phenomenalistic "ordinary language" direct realism. He affirmed the relevance of scientific knowledge for epistemology, but did not attempt to reduce the content of perception to physical properties. Rather, he developed a critical direct realism, according to which we see bodies by means of having phenomenal experience. This phenomenal experience was not, however, to be equated with the sense-data of the usual representative realism. Rather, it was a (...)
     
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  49.  4
    Ian Verstegen (2006). A Critical Realist Perspective on Aesthetic Value. Journal of Critical Realism 5 (2):323-343.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 323 - 343 The following article attempts to bring critical realism to bear on the changing nature of aesthetic value. Beginning with the transitive-intransitive distinction, it is advised that we withhold judgment on the possibility of aesthetic judgment, lest we commit the epistemic fallacy. Without hoping to attain a form of aesthetic value absolutism, a strategy of ‘eliminative realism’ is introduced, which seeks to remove false causes of apparent judgmental relativism. Then (...)
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  50.  5
    David Wilson & William Dixon (2006). Das Adam Smith Problem_ - _A Critical Realist Perspective. Journal of Critical Realism 5 (2):251-272.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 251 - 272 The old _Das Adam Smith Problem_ is no longer tenable. Few today believe that Smith postulates two contradictory principles of human action: one in the _Wealth of Nations_ and another in the _Theory of Moral Sentiments_. Nevertheless, an Adam Smith problem of sorts endures: there is still no widely agreed version of what it is that links these two texts, aside from their common author; no widely agreed version of how, (...)
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