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Cory Juhl [15]Cory F. Juhl [6]
  1. Cory Juhl (2010). Gary Ebbs's Truth and Words. Philosophical Books 51 (3):175-186.
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  2. Cory Juhl (2009). Analyticity. Routledge.
    Conceptions of analytic truth -- Hume's fork -- Kant and the analytic/synthetic distinction -- Synthetic a priori propositions -- Bolzano and analyticity -- Analyticity in frege -- Russell's paradox and the theory of descriptions -- The Vienna circle -- Carnap and logical empiricism -- Carnap and Quine -- Demise of the aufbau -- Philosophy as logical syntax -- Logical and descriptive languages -- Physical languages -- Analyticity in syntax -- Carnap's move to semantics -- Explications -- Analyticity in a semantic (...)
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  3. Cory Juhl (2009). Pure and Impure Stipulata. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):637-652.
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  4. Cory Juhl (2007). Fine-Tuning and Old Evidence. Noûs 41 (3):550–558.
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  5. Cory Juhl (2006). Fine-Tuning is Not Surprising. Analysis 66 (292):269–275.
    This paper is a response to Stephen Leeds’s "Juhl on Many Worlds". Contrary to what Leeds claims, we can legitimately argue for nontrivial conclusions by appeal to our existence. The ’problem of old evidence’, applied to the ’old evidence’ that we exist, seems to be a red herring in the context of determining whether there is a rationally convincing argument for the existence of many universes. A genuinely salient worry is whether multiversers can avoid illicit reuse of empirical evidence in (...)
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  6. Mark Sainsbury, Cory Juhl, Nicholas Asher, Hans Halvorson, Lawrence Sklar & Jim Hankinson (2006). Tracy Lupher. In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. 164-202.
     
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  7. Cory Juhl (2005). Finetuning, Many Worlds, and the 'Inverse Gambler's Fallacy'. Noûs 39 (2):337–347.
    A number of authors have claimed that the fact that our universe seems ’fine-tuned’ is evidence that there are many universes. Ian Hacking (1987) raised doubts about inferences to many sequential universes. More recently, Roger White has argued that it is a fallacy to infer that there are many universes, whether existing all at once or sequentially, from the fact that ours is fine-tuned. The upshot of our discussion will be that Hacking is right about the existence of certain fallacious (...)
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  8. Cory Juhl (2003). Review of Hans-Johann Glock,, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11).
    Glock’s most recent book is a critical examination of the views of Quine and Davidson. One of the novel features of the book that will prove helpful to most readers is Glock’s comparative treatment of the two. Glock not only thoroughly articulates their views, he also points out significant differences between their basic assumptions and between the goals driving their various projects. For example, Glock compares Quine’s ’radical translation’ project with Davidson’s ’radical interpretation’ project, pointing out interesting differences in assumptions (...)
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  9. Cory F. Juhl (2000). The Comprehensibility of the Universe. International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):517-518.
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  10. Cory F. Juhl (2000). Teleosemantics, Kripkenstein and Paradox. In N. Shanks & R. Gardner (eds.), Logic, Probability and Science. Atlanta: Rodopi. 168-181.
  11. Cory F. Juhl (1998). Conscious Experience and the Nontrivality Principle. Philosophical Studies 91 (1):91-101.
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  12. Cory F. Juhl (1997). A Context-Sensitive Liar. Analysis 57 (3):202–204.
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  13. Kevin T. Kelly, Oliver Schulte & Cory Juhl (1997). Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 64 (2):245-267.
    This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on inductive uncertainty and uncomputability.
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  14. Cory Juhl (1996). Topology as Epistemology. The Monist 79 (1):141-147.
  15. Cory F. Juhl (1996). Objectively Reliable Subjective Probabilities. Synthese 109 (3):293 - 309.
    Subjective Bayesians typically find the following objection difficult to answer: some joint probability measures lead to intuitively irrational inductive behavior, even in the long run. Yet well-motivated ways to restrict the set of reasonable prior joint measures have not been forthcoming. In this paper I propose a way to restrict the set of prior joint probability measures in particular inductive settings. My proposal is the following: where there exists some successful inductive method for getting to the truth in some situation, (...)
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  16. Cory Juhl (1995). Is Gold-Putnam Diagonalization Complete? Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (2):117 - 138.
    Diagonalization is a proof technique that formal learning theorists use to show that inductive problems are unsolvable. The technique intuitively requires the construction of the mathematical equivalent of a "Cartesian demon" that fools the scientist no matter how he proceeds. A natural question that arises is whether diagonalization is complete. That is, given an arbitrary unsolvable inductive problem, does an invincible demon exist? The answer to that question turns out to depend upon what axioms of set theory we adopt. The (...)
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  17. Cory Juhl (1994). Blind Realism. Review of Metaphysics 47 (4):797-798.
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  18. Cory F. Juhl (1994). The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):857-863.
    , Hans Reichenbach made a bold and original attempt to ‘vindicate’ induction. He proposed a rule, the ‘straight rule’ of induction, which would guarantee inductive success if any rule of induction would. A central problem facing his attempt to vindicate the straight rule is that too many other rules are just as good as the straight rule if our only constraint on what counts as ‘success’ for an inductive rule is that it is ‘asymptotic’, i.e. that it converges in the (...)
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  19. Cory Juhl & Kevin T. Kelly (1994). Realism, Convergence, and Additivity. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:181 - 189.
    In this paper, we argue for the centrality of countable additivity to realist claims about the convergence of science to the truth. In particular, we show how classical sceptical arguments can be revived when countable additivity is dropped.
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  20. Cory Juhl (1993). Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.
    The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianism is "inductively incomplete" for such agents. Finally a consistency proof shows (...)
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  21. Kevin T. Kelly, Cory Juhl & Clark Glymour, Reliability, Realism, and Relativism.
    Kevin T. Kelly, Cory Juhl and Clark Glymour. Reliability, Realism, and Relativism.
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