Search results for 'Cotenability' (try it on Scholar)

9 found
Sort by:
  1. Vladan Djordjevic (2013). Similarity and Cotenability. Synthese 190 (4):681-691.score: 15.0
    In this paper I present some difficulties for Lewis’s and similar theories of counterfactuals, and suggest that the problem lies in the notion of absolute similarity. In order to explain the problem, I discuss the relation between Lewis’s and Goodman’s theory, and show that the two theories are not related in the way Lewis thought they were.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Barry M. Loewer (1979). Cotenability and Counterfactual Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):99 - 115.score: 9.0
  3. Luc Bovens (1998). Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):79-101.score: 9.0
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Vladan Djordjevic (2012). Goodman's Only World. In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miscevic & Berislav Zarnic (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Springer. 269.score: 7.0
    An incorrect interpretation of Goodman’s theory of counterfactuals is persistently being offered in the literature. I find that strange. Even more so since the incorrectness is rather obvious. In this paper I try to figure out why is that happening. First I try to explain what Goodman did say, which of his claims are ignored, and what he did not say but is sometimes ascribed to him. I emphasize one of the bad features of the interpretation: it gives counterfactuals some (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Tomasz Bigaj (2005). Causes, Conditions and Counterfactuals. Axiomathes 15 (4):599-619.score: 3.0
    The article deals with one particular problem created by the counterfactual analysis of causality à la Lewis, namely the context-sensitivity problem or, as I prefer to call it, the background condition problem. It appears that Lewis’ counterfactual definition of causality cannot distinguish between proper causes and mere causal conditions – i.e. factors necessary for the effect to occur, but commonly not seen as causally efficacious. The proposal is put forward to amend the Lewis definition with a condition, based on the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Barry Ward (2005). Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261.score: 3.0
    Faced with the paradox of undermining futures, Humeans have resigned themselves to accounts of chance that severely conflict with our intuitions. However, such resignation is premature: The problem is Humean supervenience (HS), not Humeanism. This paper develops a projectivist Humeanism on which chance claims are understood as normative, rather than fact stating. Rationality constraints on the cotenability of norms and factual claims ground a factual-normative worlds semantics that, in addition to solving the Frege-Geach problem, delivers the intuitive set of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John F. Halpin (1989). Counterfactual Analysis: Can the Metalinguistic Theory Be Revitalized? Synthese 81 (1):47 - 62.score: 3.0
    This paper evaluates the recent trend to renounce the similarity approach to counterfactuals in favor of the older metalinguistic theory. I try to show, first, that the metalinguistic theory cannot work in anything like its present form (the form described by many in the last decade who claim to be able to solve Goodman''s old problem of cotenability). This is so, I argue, because the metalinguistic theory requires laws of nature of a sort that we (apparently) do not have: (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jonathan Ichikawa, Inference in Imagination and Counterfactual Conditionals.score: 3.0
    I propose an explanation for reasoning about counterfactual conditionals. We reason properly to a counterfactual if A, C, when we imagine A along with cotenable background conditions, then properly infer C. Proper inference in my sense is just the same sort of inference that is proper in cases of theoretical reasoning with beliefs. (Roughly: a proper inference is warrant-transferring from belief in A and the background conditions to C.) Cotenability for counterfactuals is explained by reference to our abilities to (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.score: 1.0
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation