Search results for 'Counterexample' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jorn Sonderholm (2008). Having Fun with the Periodic Table: A Counterexample to Rea's Definition of Pornography. Philosophia 36 (2):233-236.score: 24.0
    In a paper from 2001, Michael C. Rea considers the question of what pornography is. First, he examines a number of existing definitions of ‘pornography’ and after having rejected them all, he goes on to present his own preferred definition. In this short paper, I suggest a counterexample to Rea’s definition. In particular, I suggest that there is something that, on the one hand, is pornography according to Rea’s definition, but, on the other hand, is not something that we (...)
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  2. Simon H. Aronson (1972). The Happy Philosopher--A Counterexample to Plato's Proof. Journal of the History of Philosophy 10 (4):383-398.score: 21.0
    The author argues that Plato’s “proof” that happiness follows justice has a fatal flaw – because the philosopher king in Plato’s Republic is itself a counter example.
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  3. Seth Shabo (2011). Agency Without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt's Counterexample Strategy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so far (...)
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  4. Ezio Di Nucci (2011). Frankfurt Counterexample Defended. Analysis 71 (1):102-104.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that even if we accept that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario, Frankfurt’s counterexample is still safe because showing that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario does not show that Jones avoids killing Smith, because whether Black intervenes is not up to Jones. I argue that Frankfurt’s counterexample does not depend on the agent acting (let alone doing the same thing) in the counterfactual scenario.
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  5. Seth Shabo (2010). Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):239-252.score: 18.0
    Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In defending this (...)
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  6. Seth Yalcin (2012). A Counterexample to Modus Tollens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.score: 18.0
    This paper defends a counterexample to Modus Tollens, and uses it to draw some conclusions about the logic and semantics of indicative conditionals and probability operators in natural language. Along the way we investigate some of the interactions of these expressions with 'knows', and we call into question the thesis that all knowledge ascriptions have truth-conditions.
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  7. D. Bonevac, J. Dever & D. Sosa (2012). The Counterexample Fallacy. Mind 120 (480):1143-1158.score: 18.0
    Manley and Wasserman (2008) join the chorus of opposition to the possibility of conditional analysis of dispositions. But that score cannot be settled without more careful attention to the implicit philosophical methodology. Some of the opposition to such an analysis badly overestimates the effect of counterexamples, as if the Gettier example were sufficient to refute the possibility of conjunctive analysis of knowledge. A general objection to a form of analysis must satisfy a number of constraints, and Manley and Wasserman join (...)
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  8. Jason Rourke (2013). A Counterexample to the Contrastive Account of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643.score: 18.0
    Many epistemologists treat knowledge as a binary relation that holds between a subject and a proposition. The contrastive account of knowledge developed by Jonathan Schaffer maintains that knowledge is a ternary, contrastive relation that holds between a subject, a proposition, and a set of contextually salient alternative propositions the subject’s evidence must eliminate. For the contrastivist, it is never simply the case that S knows that p; in every case of knowledge S knows that p rather than q. This paper (...)
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  9. Eric Dietrich (2000). A Counterexample T o All Future Dynamic Systems Theories of Cognition. J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 12 (2):377-382.score: 18.0
    Years ago, when I was an undergraduate math major at the University of Wyoming, I came across an interesting book in our library. It was a book of counterexamples t o propositions in real analysis (the mathematics of the real numbers). Mathematicians work more or less like the rest of us. They consider propositions. If one seems to them to be plausibly true, then they set about to prove it, to establish the proposition as a theorem. Instead o f setting (...)
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  10. Eduardo Rivera-López (2012). The Moral Murderer. A (More) Effective Counterexample to Consequentialism. Ratio 25 (3):307-325.score: 18.0
    My aim in this paper is to provide an effective counterexample to consequentialism. I assume that traditional counterexamples, such as Transplant (A doctor should kill one person and transplant her organs to five terminal patients, thereby saving their lives) and Judge (A judge should sentence to death an innocent person if he knows that an outraged mob will otherwise kill many innocent persons), are not effective, for two reasons: first, they make unrealistic assumptions and, second, they do not pass (...)
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  11. J. Brian Pitts, The Relevance of Irrelevance: Absolute Objects and the Jones-Geroch Dust Velocity Counterexample, with a Note on Spinors.score: 18.0
    James L. Anderson analyzed the conceptual novelty of Einstein's theory of gravity as its lack of ``absolute objects.'' Michael Friedman's related concept of absolute objects has been criticized by Roger Jones and Robert Geroch for implausibly admitting as absolute the timelike 4-velocity field of dust in cosmological models in Einstein's theory. Using Nathan Rosen's action principle, I complete Anna Maidens's argument that the Jones-Geroch problem is not solved by requiring that absolute objects not be varied. Recalling Anderson's proscription of (globally) (...)
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  12. Hans Rott (2004). A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation. Synthese 139 (2):225 - 240.score: 18.0
    In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not (...)
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  13. W. W. Tait (2005). Gödel's Reformulation of Gentzen's First Consistency Proof for Arithmetic: The No-Counterexample Interpretation. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):225-238.score: 18.0
    The last section of “Lecture at Zilsel’s” [9, §4] contains an interesting but quite condensed discussion of Gentzen’s first version of his consistency proof for P A [8], reformulating it as what has come to be called the no-counterexample interpretation. I will describe Gentzen’s result (in game-theoretic terms), fill in the details (with some corrections) of Godel's reformulation, and discuss the relation between the two proofs.
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  14. A. Ahmed (2013). Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample. Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.score: 18.0
    The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it.
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  15. Duncan McFarland (1999). Mark Johnston's Substitution Principle: A New Counterexample? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):683-689.score: 18.0
    According to a subjectivist view of some concept, C, there is an a priori implication of subjective responses in C's application or possession conditions. Subjectivists who intend their view to be descriptive of our practice with C will hold that it is possible for there to be true empirical claims which explain such responses in terms of certain things being C. Mark Johnston's "missing-explanation argument" employs a substitution principle with a view to establishing that these strands of subjectivism are inconsistent. (...)
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  16. Wim de Neys, Walter Schaeken & G. (2005). Working Memory and Counterexample Retrieval for Causal Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (2):123 – 150.score: 18.0
    The present study is part of recent attempts to specify the characteristics of the counterexample retrieval process during causal conditional reasoning. The study tried to pinpoint whether the retrieval of stored counterexamples (alternative causes and disabling conditions) for a causal conditional is completely automatic in nature or whether the search process also demands executive working memory (WM) resources. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a counterexample generation task and a measure of WM capacity. We found a positive (...)
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  17. Ulrich Kohlenbach (1999). On the No-Counterexample Interpretation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1491-1511.score: 18.0
    In [15], [16] G. Kreisel introduced the no-counterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated ε-substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of first-order Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive functionals Φ A of order type 0 which realize the Herbrand normal form A H of A. Subsequently more perspicuous proofs of this fact via functional interpretation (combined with normalization) and cut-elimination were found. These proofs however (...)
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  18. Joseph S. Fulda (2010). Vann McGee’s Counterexample to Modus Ponens: An Enthymeme. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):271-273.score: 18.0
    Solves Vann McGee's counterexample to Modus Ponens within classical logic by disclosing the suppressed premises and bringing them /within/ the argument.
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  19. Stuart Gluck & Steven Gimbel (1997). An Intervening Cause Counterexample to Railton's DNP Model of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):692-697.score: 16.0
    Peter Railton (1978) has introduced the influential deductive-nomological-probabilistic (DNP) model of explanation which is the culmination of a tradition of formal, non-pragmatic accounts of scientific explanation. The other models in this tradition have been shown to be susceptible to a class of counterexamples involving intervening causes which speak against their sufficiency. This treatment has never been extended to the DNP model; we contend that the usual form of these counterexamples is ineffective in this case. However, we develop below a new (...)
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  20. Vann McGee (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.score: 15.0
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  21. Bernard D. Katz (1999). On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404-415.score: 15.0
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  22. Christian Piller (1996). Vann McGee's Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.score: 15.0
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  23. Pavel Tichý (1976). A Counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis Analysis of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):271 - 273.score: 15.0
  24. Jaakko Hintikka (1975). A Counterexample to Tarski-Type Truth-Definitions as Applied to Natural Languages. Philosophia 5 (3):207-212.score: 15.0
  25. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (1997). Ramsification and Glymour’s Counterexample. Analysis 57 (3):167–169.score: 15.0
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  26. E. J. Lowe (1987). Not a Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Analysis 47 (1):44 - 47.score: 15.0
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  27. Gregory Landini & Thomas R. Foster (1991). The Persistence of Counterexample: Re-Examining the Debate Over Leibniz Law. Noûs 25 (1):43-61.score: 15.0
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  28. Michael S. McKenna (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.score: 15.0
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  29. Alexander R. Pruss (2012). A Counterexample to Plantinga's Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):400-415.score: 15.0
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdoings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these worlds is a world that God can actualize.
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  30. Nancy Kendrick (2009). Why Hume's Counterexample is Insignificant and Why It is Not. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):955 – 979.score: 15.0
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  31. Kai Hauser (1999). A Minimal Counterexample to Universal Baireness. Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1601-1627.score: 15.0
    For a canonical model of set theory whose projective theory of the real numbers is stable under set forcing extensions, a set of reals of minimal complexity is constructed which fails to be universally Baire. The construction uses a general method for generating non-universally Baire sets via the Levy collapse of a cardinal, as well as core model techniques. Along the way it is shown (extending previous results of Steel) how sufficiently iterable fine structure models recognize themselves as global core (...)
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  32. W. W. Tait (1959). A Counterexample to a Conjecture of Scott and Suppes. Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1):15-16.score: 15.0
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  33. Charles Hermes (2014). A Counterexample to A. Philosophia 42 (2):387-389.score: 15.0
    The Direct Argument is an important argument for demonstrating that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism because it makes no presuppositions about the nature of free will. One of the inference rules employed in the Direct Argument is rule A: If a proposition is broadly logically necessary, then it is true and no one is, nor ever has been, even partially morally responsible for the fact that the proposition is true. While inference rule A is assumed by all parties to (...)
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  34. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (1986). Four Types of Counterexample to the Latest Test for Perlocutionary Act Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 9 (2):219 - 223.score: 15.0
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  35. William Ferraiolo (1997). Black's 'Twin Globe' Counterexample. Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (1):59-66.score: 15.0
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  36. David P. Hunt (2002). On a Theoretical Counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 19 (2):245-255.score: 15.0
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  37. Neil Feit (1996). On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:381 - 386.score: 15.0
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  38. Igal Kvart (1987). On Putnam's Counterexample Toa Theory of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Papers 16 (3):235-239.score: 15.0
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  39. Jonardon Ganeri (1995). Contextually Incomplete Descriptions: A New Counterexample to Russell? Analysis 55 (4):287 - 290.score: 15.0
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  40. Alex Rosenberg (2006). Is Epigenetic Inheritance a Counterexample to the Central Dogma? History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 28 (4):549 - 565.score: 15.0
    This paper argues that nothing that has been discovered in the increasingly complex delails of gene regulation has provided any grounds to retract or qualify Crick's version of the central dogma. In particular it defends the role of the genes as the sole bearers of information, and argues that the mechanism of epigenetic modification of the DNA is but another vindication of Crick's version of the central dogma. The paper shows that arguments of C.K. Waters for the distinctive causual role (...)
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  41. Matthias Steup (1995). Review: Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga's Proper Functioning Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):409 - 413.score: 15.0
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  42. L. Burkholder (1975). Derivation and Counterexample: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Teaching Philosophy 1 (1):64-68.score: 15.0
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  43. Frank Wolter (1996). A Counterexample in Tense Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (2):167-173.score: 15.0
    We construct a normal extension of K4 with the finite model property whose minimal tense extension is not complete with respect to Kripke semantics.
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  44. Mark McEvoy (2005). The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):179-187.score: 15.0
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  45. Robert L. Causey (1968). Review: W. W. Tait, A Counterexample to a Conjecture of Scott and Suppes. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (2):288-288.score: 15.0
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  46. D. Saracino (1975). A Counterexample in the Theory of Model Companions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (1):31-34.score: 15.0
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  47. R. Lance Factor (1978). A Counterexample to Lehrer's Definition of Knowledge. Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (2):37-41.score: 15.0
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  48. C. F. K. (1973). Derivation and Counterexample, an Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):136-137.score: 15.0
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  49. Joan Rand Moschovakis (1981). Review: M. D. Krol, The Topological Models of Intuitionistic Analysis. One Counterexample; M. D. Krol, A Topological Model for Intuitionistic Analysis with Kripke's Scheme; M. D. Krol', B. F. Wells, Distinct Variants of Kripke's Schema in Intuitionistic Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (3):660-661.score: 15.0
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