Search results for 'Counterexample' (try it on Scholar)

509 found
Order:
  1.  34
    John Corcoran (2007). Logically Equivalent False Universal Propositions with Different Counterexample Sets. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11:554-5.
    This paper corrects a mistake I saw students make but I have yet to see in print. The mistake is thinking that logically equivalent propositions have the same counterexamples—always. Of course, it is often the case that logically equivalent propositions have the same counterexamples: “every number that is prime is odd” has the same counterexamples as “every number that is not odd is not prime”. The set of numbers satisfying “prime but not odd” is the same as the set of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  85
    Jorn Sonderholm (2008). Having Fun with the Periodic Table: A Counterexample to Rea's Definition of Pornography. Philosophia 36 (2):233-236.
    In a paper from 2001, Michael C. Rea considers the question of what pornography is. First, he examines a number of existing definitions of ‘pornography’, and after having rejected them all, he goes on to present his own preferred definition. In this short paper, I suggest a counterexample to Rea’s definition. In particular, I suggest that there is something that, on the one hand, is pornography according to Rea’s definition, but, on the other hand, is not something that we (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Simon H. Aronson (1972). The Happy Philosopher--A Counterexample to Plato's Proof. Journal of the History of Philosophy 10 (4):383-398.
    The author argues that Plato’s “proof” that happiness follows justice has a fatal flaw – because the philosopher king in Plato’s Republic is itself a counter example.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. A. Ahmed (2013). Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample. Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.
    The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  77
    Tristan Haze (forthcoming). A Counterexample to the Breckenridge-Magidor Account of Instantial Reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Research 41.
    In a recent paper, Breckenridge and Magidor argue for an interesting and counterintuitive account of instantial reasoning. According to this account, in arguments such as one beginning with 'There is some x such that x is mortal. Let O be such an x. ...', the 'O' refers to a particular object, although we cannot know which. I give and defend a simple counterexample involving the notion of an unreferred-to object.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Seth Yalcin (2012). A Counterexample to Modus Tollens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.
    This paper defends a counterexample to Modus Tollens, and uses it to draw some conclusions about the logic and semantics of indicative conditionals and probability operators in natural language. Along the way we investigate some of the interactions of these expressions with 'knows', and we call into question the thesis that all knowledge ascriptions have truth-conditions.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  7.  48
    Matthew Kopec (2015). A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis. Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.
    In this essay, I present a straightforward counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis, which holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. Ezio Di Nucci (2011). Frankfurt Counterexample Defended. Analysis 71 (1):102-104.
    In this paper I argue that even if we accept that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario, Frankfurt’s counterexample is still safe because showing that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario does not show that Jones avoids killing Smith, because whether Black intervenes is not up to Jones. I argue that Frankfurt’s counterexample does not depend on the agent acting (let alone doing the same thing) in the counterfactual scenario.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9. D. Bonevac, J. Dever & D. Sosa (2012). The Counterexample Fallacy. Mind 120 (480):1143-1158.
    Manley and Wasserman (2008) join the chorus of opposition to the possibility of conditional analysis of dispositions. But that score cannot be settled without more careful attention to the implicit philosophical methodology. Some of the opposition to such an analysis badly overestimates the effect of counterexamples, as if the Gettier example were sufficient to refute the possibility of conjunctive analysis of knowledge. A general objection to a form of analysis must satisfy a number of constraints, and Manley and Wasserman join (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  10. Jacob Nebel (2012). A Counterexample to Parfit's Rule Consequentialism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:00-00.
    Derek Parfit argues that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. I present a counterexample: a world in which no one's moral beliefs have any motivating force. I explain how Parfit's metaethical commitments imply that such a world is possible, and why this possibility is a problem for Parfit's project of reconciling Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism. I consider two of Parfit's responses to my counterexample.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Seth Shabo (2011). Agency Without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt's Counterexample Strategy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so far (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  45
    Hans Rott (2004). A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation. Synthese 139 (2):225 - 240.
    In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  13. Seth Shabo (2010). Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):239-252.
    Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In defending this (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14.  12
    Michael Robinson (forthcoming). Truthmakers, Moral Responsibility, and an Alleged Counterexample to Rule A. Erkenntnis:1-7.
    Charles Hermes argues that the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility fails because one of the inference rules on which it relies, Rule A, is invalid. Rule A states that if a proposition p is broadly logically necessary, then p is true and no one is, or ever has been, even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Hermes purports to offer a counterexample to Rule A which focuses on agents’ moral responsibility for disjunctions. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  38
    Toby Ord (2015). A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism. Utilitas 27 (3):298-302.
    Prioritarianism is the moral view that a fixed improvement in someone's well-being matters more the worse off they are. Its supporters argue that it best captures our intuitions about unequal distributions of well-being. I show that prioritarianism sometimes recommends acts that will make things more unequal while simultaneously lowering the total well-being and making things worse for everyone ex ante. Intuitively, there is little to recommend such acts and I take this to be a serious counterexample for prioritarianism.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  30
    John Corcoran (1987). Three Rules of Distribution: One Counterexample. Journal of Symbolic Logic 52:886-887.
    This self-contained one page paper produces one valid two-premise premise-conclusion argument that is a counterexample to the entire three traditional rules of distribution. These three rules were previously thought to be generally applicable criteria for invalidity of premise-conclusion arguments. No longer can a three-term argument be dismissed as invalid simply on the ground that its middle is undistributed, for example. The following question seems never to have been raised: how does having an undistributed middle show that an argument's conclusion (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  55
    W. W. Tait (2005). Gödel's Reformulation of Gentzen's First Consistency Proof for Arithmetic: The No-Counterexample Interpretation. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):225-238.
    The last section of “Lecture at Zilsel’s” [9, §4] contains an interesting but quite condensed discussion of Gentzen’s first version of his consistency proof for P A [8], reformulating it as what has come to be called the no-counterexample interpretation. I will describe Gentzen’s result (in game-theoretic terms), fill in the details (with some corrections) of Godel's reformulation, and discuss the relation between the two proofs.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18. Duncan McFarland (1999). Mark Johnston's Substitution Principle: A New Counterexample? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):683-689.
    According to a subjectivist view of some concept, C, there is an a priori implication of subjective responses in C's application or possession conditions. Subjectivists who intend their view to be descriptive of our practice with C will hold that it is possible for there to be true empirical claims which explain such responses in terms of certain things being C. Mark Johnston's "missing-explanation argument" employs a substitution principle with a view to establishing that these strands of subjectivism are inconsistent. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Eric Dietrich (2000). A Counterexample T o All Future Dynamic Systems Theories of Cognition. J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 12 (2):377-382.
    Years ago, when I was an undergraduate math major at the University of Wyoming, I came across an interesting book in our library. It was a book of counterexamples t o propositions in real analysis (the mathematics of the real numbers). Mathematicians work more or less like the rest of us. They consider propositions. If one seems to them to be plausibly true, then they set about to prove it, to establish the proposition as a theorem. Instead o f setting (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  14
    Ulrich Kohlenbach (1999). On the No-Counterexample Interpretation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1491-1511.
    In [15], [16] G. Kreisel introduced the no-counterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated ε-substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of first-order Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive functionals Φ A of order type 0 which realize the Herbrand normal form A H of A. Subsequently more perspicuous proofs of this fact via functional interpretation (combined with normalization) and cut-elimination were found. These proofs however (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  21.  70
    Eduardo Rivera-López (2012). The Moral Murderer. A (More) Effective Counterexample to Consequentialism. Ratio 25 (3):307-325.
    My aim in this paper is to provide an effective counterexample to consequentialism. I assume that traditional counterexamples, such as Transplant (A doctor should kill one person and transplant her organs to five terminal patients, thereby saving their lives) and Judge (A judge should sentence to death an innocent person if he knows that an outraged mob will otherwise kill many innocent persons), are not effective, for two reasons: first, they make unrealistic assumptions and, second, they do not pass (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  72
    Jason Rourke (2013). A Counterexample to the Contrastive Account of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643.
    Many epistemologists treat knowledge as a binary relation that holds between a subject and a proposition. The contrastive account of knowledge developed by Jonathan Schaffer maintains that knowledge is a ternary, contrastive relation that holds between a subject, a proposition, and a set of contextually salient alternative propositions the subject’s evidence must eliminate. For the contrastivist, it is never simply the case that S knows that p; in every case of knowledge S knows that p rather than q. This paper (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  61
    J. Brian Pitts, The Relevance of Irrelevance: Absolute Objects and the Jones-Geroch Dust Velocity Counterexample, with a Note on Spinors.
    James L. Anderson analyzed the conceptual novelty of Einstein's theory of gravity as its lack of ``absolute objects.'' Michael Friedman's related concept of absolute objects has been criticized by Roger Jones and Robert Geroch for implausibly admitting as absolute the timelike 4-velocity field of dust in cosmological models in Einstein's theory. Using Nathan Rosen's action principle, I complete Anna Maidens's argument that the Jones-Geroch problem is not solved by requiring that absolute objects not be varied. Recalling Anderson's proscription of (globally) (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  7
    Duncan Purves (2014). A Counterexample to Two Accounts of Harm. Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):243-250.
    Two alternative accounts have emerged as viable competitors to the forerunning counterfactual comparative account in the recent debate concerning the nature of harm. These are the “non-comparative statebased account of harm ” defended by Elizabeth Harman, the “event-based account of harm ” defended by Matthew Hanser. I raise one simple but serious counterexample involving “non-regrettable disabilities” that applies to both of these alternative accounts but that is avoided by the counterfactual comparative account. I point out that my counterexample (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  21
    Joseph S. Fulda (2010). Vann McGee’s Counterexample to Modus Ponens: An Enthymeme. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):271-273.
    Solves Vann McGee's counterexample to Modus Ponens within classical logic by disclosing the suppressed premises and bringing them /within/ the argument.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  9
    Mark McEvoy (2005). The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):179-187.
    An unadorned form of process reliabilism (UPR) contends that knowledge is true belief, produced by a reliable process, undefeated by a more reliable process. There is no requirement that one know that one’s belief meets this requirement; that it actually does so is sufficient. An integral aspect of UPR, then, is the rejection of the KK thesis. One popular method of showing the implausibility of UPR is to specify a case where a subject satisfies all of UPR’s conditions on knowledge (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  6
    Ezio Di Nucci (2011). Frankfurt Counterexample Defended. Analysis 71 (1):102 - 104.
    Frankfurt sets out to refute the principle according to which ‘a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise’ . Frankfurt devises a counterexample in which an agent is intuitively responsible even though she could not have done otherwise: Suppose someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  11
    Wim de Neys, Walter Schaeken & G. (2005). Working Memory and Counterexample Retrieval for Causal Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (2):123 – 150.
    The present study is part of recent attempts to specify the characteristics of the counterexample retrieval process during causal conditional reasoning. The study tried to pinpoint whether the retrieval of stored counterexamples (alternative causes and disabling conditions) for a causal conditional is completely automatic in nature or whether the search process also demands executive working memory (WM) resources. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a counterexample generation task and a measure of WM capacity. We found a positive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2016). A Counterexample to Variabilism. Analysis 76 (1):26-29.
    Recent literature contains influential arguments for variabilism, the view that we should understand proper names as analogues not of constants but of variables. In particular, proper names are said to sometimes take semantic values that are not referential but purely general. I present a counter-example to this view.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Vann McGee (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  31.  30
    Charles Hermes (2014). A Counterexample to A. Philosophia 42 (2):387-389.
    The Direct Argument is an important argument for demonstrating that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism because it makes no presuppositions about the nature of free will. One of the inference rules employed in the Direct Argument is rule A: If a proposition is broadly logically necessary, then it is true and no one is, nor ever has been, even partially morally responsible for the fact that the proposition is true. While inference rule A is assumed by all parties to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32.  31
    Michael S. McKenna (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  33.  46
    Alexander R. Pruss (2012). A Counterexample to Plantinga's Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):400-415.
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdoings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these worlds is a world that God can actualize.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34. Bernard D. Katz (1999). On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404-415.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35.  99
    E. J. Lowe (1987). Not a Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Analysis 47 (1):44 - 47.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  36. D. Saracino (1975). A Counterexample in the Theory of Model Companions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (1):31-34.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  54
    Pavel Tichý (1976). A Counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis Analysis of Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):271 - 273.
  38. Vann McGee (1985). ``A Counterexample to Modus Ponens&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 83:462-471.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  39. Wim De Neys (2010). Counterexample Retrieval and Inhibition During Conditional Reasoning: Direct Evidence From Memory Probing. In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40.  94
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (1997). Ramsification and Glymour’s Counterexample. Analysis 57 (3):167–169.
  41.  55
    Christian Piller (1996). Vann McGee's Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42.  16
    Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & John Hummel (2015). A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision. Cognitive Science 39 (8):1950-1964.
    What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  49
    Jaakko Hintikka (1975). A Counterexample to Tarski-Type Truth-Definitions as Applied to Natural Languages. Philosophia 5 (3):207-212.
  44.  20
    Wim De Neys, Walter Schaeken & Géry D'Ydewalle (2005). Working Memory and Counterexample Retrieval for Causal Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (2):123-150.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Karel Lambert (1972). Derivation and Counterexample. Encino, Calif.,Dickenson Pub. Co..
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  46.  67
    Jonardon Ganeri (1995). Contextually Incomplete Descriptions: A New Counterexample to Russell? Analysis 55 (4):287 - 290.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  16
    Alex Rosenberg (2006). Is Epigenetic Inheritance a Counterexample to the Central Dogma? History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 28 (4):549 - 565.
    This paper argues that nothing that has been discovered in the increasingly complex delails of gene regulation has provided any grounds to retract or qualify Crick's version of the central dogma. In particular it defends the role of the genes as the sole bearers of information, and argues that the mechanism of epigenetic modification of the DNA is but another vindication of Crick's version of the central dogma. The paper shows that arguments of C.K. Waters for the distinctive causual role (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  4
    D. Braddon-Mitchell & R. Nola (1997). Ramsification and Glymour's Counterexample. Analysis 57 (3):167-169.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  28
    Bernard D. Katz (1999). On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):404 - 415.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  7
    Frank Wolter (1996). A Counterexample in Tense Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (2):167-173.
    We construct a normal extension of K4 with the finite model property whose minimal tense extension is not complete with respect to Kripke semantics.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 509