Search results for 'Counterfactual' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  37
    Dilip Ninan (2012). Counterfactual Attitudes and Multi-Centered Worlds. Semantics and Pragmatics 5 (5):1-57.
    Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using "multi-centered worlds", possible worlds with multiple distinguished individuals, each of which represents an individual with whom the agent is acquainted. I then present a compositional semantics for de re ascriptions according to which singular terms are "assignment-sensitive" expressions and attitude verbs are "assignment (...)
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  2.  41
    Jan Heylen (2016). Counterfactual Theories of Knowledge and the Notion of Actuality. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673.
    The central question of this article is how to combine counterfactual theories of knowledge with the notion of actuality. It is argued that the straightforward combination of these two elements leads to problems, viz. the problem of easy knowledge and the problem of missing knowledge. In other words, there is overgeneration of knowledge and there is undergeneration of knowledge. The combination of these problems cannot be solved by appealing to methods by which beliefs are formed. An alternative solution is (...)
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  3. Thomas Kroedel & Franz Huber (2013). Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow. Noûs 47 (3):453-466.
    We argue that a semantics for counterfactual conditionals in terms of comparative overall similarity faces a formal limitation due to Arrow’s impossibility theorem from social choice theory. According to Lewis’s account, the truth-conditions for counterfactual conditionals are given in terms of the comparative overall similarity between possible worlds, which is in turn determined by various aspects of similarity between possible worlds. We argue that a function from aspects of similarity to overall similarity should satisfy certain plausible constraints while (...)
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  4. Linton Wang & Wei-Fen Ma (2014). Comparative Syllogism and Counterfactual Knowledge. Synthese 191 (6):1327-1348.
    Comparative syllogism is a type of scientific reasoning widely used, explicitly or implicitly, for inferences from observations to conclusions about effectiveness, but its philosophical significance has not been fully elaborated or appreciated. In its simplest form, the comparative syllogism derives a conclusion about the effectiveness of a factor (e.g. a treatment or an exposure) on a certain property via an experiment design using a test (experimental) group and a comparison (control) group. Our objective is to show that the (...)
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  5. Jessica M. Wilson (2014). Hume's Dictum and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence. In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press 258-279.
    Why believe Hume's Dictum, according to which there are, roughly speaking, no necessary connections between wholly distinct entities? Schaffer suggests that HD, at least as applied to causal or nomological connections, is motivated as required by the best account of of counterfactuals---namely, a similarity-based possible worlds account, where the operative notion of similarity requires 'miracles'---more specifically, worlds where entities of the same type that actually exist enter into different laws. The main cited motivations for such an account of similarity are (...)
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  6. Andrea Sauchelli (2010). Concrete Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Conditionals: Lewis Versus Williamson on Modal Knowledge. Synthese 176 (3):345-359.
    The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
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  7.  50
    Jens Harbecke (2014). Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation. Philosophia 42 (2):363-385.
    Counterfactual conditionals have been appealed to in various ways to show how the mind can be causally efficacious. However, it has often been overestimated what the truth of certain counterfactuals actually indicates about causation. The paper first identifies four approaches that seem to commit precisely this mistake. The arguments discussed involve erroneous assumptions about the connection of counterfactual dependence and genuine causation, as well as a disregard of the requisite evaluation conditions of counterfactuals. In a second (...)
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  8.  34
    Felipe De Brigard (2012). Influence of Outcome Valence in the Subjective Experience of Episodic Past, Future, and Counterfactual Thinking. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1085-1096.
    Recent findings suggest that our capacity to imagine the future depends on our capacity to remember the past. However, the extent to which episodic memory is involved in our capacity to think about what could have happened in our past, yet did not occur , remains largely unexplored. The current experiments investigate the phenomenological characteristics and the influence of outcome valence on the experience of past, future and counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to mentally simulate past, future, and (...) events with positive or negative outcomes. Features of their subjective experiences during each type of simulation were measured using questionnaires and autobiographical interviews. The results suggest that clarity and vividness were higher for past than future and counterfactual simulations. Additionally, emotional intensity was lower for counterfactual simulations than past and future simulations. Finally, outcome valence influenced participants’ judgment of probability for future and counterfactual simulations. (shrink)
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  9.  88
    Gian Carlo Ghirardi & Karl Wienand (2009). Contextuality, Nonlocality and Counterfactual Arguments. Foundations of Physics 39 (7):776-789.
    In this paper, following an elementary line of thought which somewhat differs from the usual one, we prove once more that any deterministic theory predictively equivalent to quantum mechanics unavoidably exhibits a contextual character. The purpose of adopting this perspective is that of paving the way for a critical analysis of the use of counterfactual arguments when dealing with nonlocal physical processes.
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  10.  4
    Francesca Poggiolesi (forthcoming). Natural Deduction Calculi and Sequent Calculi for Counterfactual Logics. Studia Logica:1-34.
    In this paper we present labelled sequent calculi and labelled natural deduction calculi for the counterfactual logics CK + {ID, MP}. As for the sequent calculi we prove, in a semantic manner, that the cut-rule is admissible. As for the natural deduction calculi we prove, in a purely syntactic way, the normalization theorem. Finally, we demonstrate that both calculi are sound and complete with respect to Nute semantics [12] and that the natural deduction calculi can be effectively transformed into (...)
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  11.  27
    Teresa McCormack, Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Christoph Hoerl & Patrick Burns (2009). Cue Competition Effects and Young Children's Causal and Counterfactual Inferences. Developmental Psychology 45 (6):1563-1575.
    The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children's counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined by (...)
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  12. Gabriele Contessa (2006). On the Supposed Temporal Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence; Or: It Wouldn't Have Taken a Miracle! Dialectica 60 (4):461–473.
    The thesis that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world plays a central role in Lewis’s philosophy, as. among other things, it underpins one of Lewis most renowned theses—that causation can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence. To maintain that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world, Lewis committed himself to two other theses. The first is that the closest possible worlds at which the antecedent of a counterfactual (...)
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  13.  55
    Katsuhiko Sano (2009). Hybrid Counterfactual Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (4):515-539.
    The purpose of this paper is to argue that the hybrid formalism fits naturally in the context of David Lewis’s counterfactual logic and that its introduction into this framework is desirable. This hybridization enables us to regard the inference “The pig is Mary; Mary is pregnant; therefore the pig is pregnant” as a process of updating local information (which depends on the given situation) by using global information (independent of the situation). Our hybridization also has the following technical advantages: (...)
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  14.  27
    Brian Leahy, Eva Rafetseder & Josef Perner (2014). Basic Conditional Reasoning: How Children Mimic Counterfactual Reasoning. Studia Logica 102 (4):793-810.
    Children approach counterfactual questions about stories with a reasoning strategy that falls short of adults’ Counterfactual Reasoning (CFR). It was dubbed “Basic Conditional Reasoning” (BCR) in Rafetseder et al. (Child Dev 81(1):376–389, 2010). In this paper we provide a characterisation of the differences between BCR and CFR using a distinction between permanent and nonpermanent features of stories and Lewis/Stalnaker counterfactual logic. The critical difference pertains to how consistency between a story and a (...) antecedent incompatible with a nonpermanent feature of the story is achieved. Basic conditional reasoners simply drop all nonpermanent features of the story. Counterfactual reasoners preserve as much of the story as possible while accommodating the antecedent. (shrink)
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  15.  9
    Yunfeng Zhang, Jaehyon Paik & Peter Pirolli (2015). Reinforcement Learning and Counterfactual Reasoning Explain Adaptive Behavior in a Changing Environment. Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):368-381.
    Animals routinely adapt to changes in the environment in order to survive. Though reinforcement learning may play a role in such adaptation, it is not clear that it is the only mechanism involved, as it is not well suited to producing rapid, relatively immediate changes in strategies in response to environmental changes. This research proposes that counterfactual reasoning might be an additional mechanism that facilitates change detection. An experiment is conducted in which a task state changes over time and (...)
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  16.  38
    Noel Hendrickson (2012). Counterfactual Reasoning and the Problem of Selecting Antecedent Scenarios. Synthese 185 (3):365-386.
    A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term (...)
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  17.  11
    Rodney C. Roberts (2006). The Counterfactual Conception of Compensation. Metaphilosophy 37 (3-4):414–428.
    : My aim in this essay is to remove some of the rubbish that lies in the way of an appropriate understanding of rectificatory compensation, by arguing for the rejection of the counterfactual conception of compensation. Although there is a significant extent to which contemporary theorists have relied upon this idea, the counterfactual conception of compensation is merely a popular assumption, having no positive argument in support of it. Moreover, it can make rendering compensation impossible, and absurd notions (...)
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  18.  3
    Craig Purshouse (2016). A Defence of the Counterfactual Account of Harm. Bioethics 30 (4):251-259.
    In order to determine whether a particular course of conduct is ethically permissible it is important to have a concept of what it means to be harmed. The dominant theory of harm is the counterfactual account, most famously proposed by Joel Feinberg. This determines whether harm is caused by comparing what actually happened in a given situation with the ‘counterfacts’ i.e. what would have occurred had the putatively harmful conduct not taken place. If a person's interests are worse off (...)
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  19.  22
    Lance J. Rips & Brian J. Edwards (2013). Inference and Explanation in Counterfactual Reasoning. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1107-1135.
    This article reports results from two studies of how people answer counterfactual questions about simple machines. Participants learned about devices that have a specific configuration of components, and they answered questions of the form “If component X had not operated [failed], would component Y have operated?” The data from these studies indicate that participants were sensitive to the way in which the antecedent state is described—whether component X “had not operated” or “had failed.” Answers also depended on whether the (...)
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  20.  19
    İskender Taşdelen (2014). A Counterfactual Analysis of Infinite Regress Arguments. Acta Analytica 29 (2):195-213.
    I propose a counterfactual theory of infinite regress arguments. Most theories of infinite regress arguments present infinite regresses in terms of indicative conditionals. These theories direct us to seek conditions under which an infinite regress generates an infinite inadmissible set. Since in ordinary language infinite regresses are usually expressed by means of infinite sequences of counterfactuals, it is natural to expect that an analysis of infinite regress arguments should be based on a theory of counterfactuals. The Stalnaker–Lewis theory of (...)
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  21.  6
    Samuel Fillenbaum (1974). Information Amplified: Memory for Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (1):44-49.
    Conducted 2 experiments with undergraduates which demonstrated that, in a recognition memory task, Ss recognized the negated antecedent and consequent propositions of previously encountered counterfactual conditionals significantly more often than control items, the latter effect being distinctly stronger (Exp I, n = 110). A similar result was obtained for causals related to previously encountered counterfactual conditionals and counterfactual conditionals related to previously encountered causals, the latter being the stronger effect (Exp II, n = 92). Results are discussed (...)
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  22.  10
    Louis A. Mancha Jr (2005). A Counterfactual Analysis in Defense of Aquinas's Inference of Omnipotence From Creation Ex Nihilo. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:145-155.
    There is a traditional view, maintained by Aquinas and others, which holds that there is a mutual entailment between the power to Create Ex Nihilo and the property of omnipotence. In his Metaphysical Disputations, however, Suarez attacks the traditional view by pointing out a seriousflaw in Aquinas’s argument. Suarez claims that there is no reason in principle why God cannot miraculously bestow CEN-power to creatures––albeit in a limitedform––even on the assumption that God cannot make creatures omnipotent. In this paper the (...)
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  23. Jim Woodward (2002). What is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S366-S377.
    This paper presents a counterfactual account of what a mechanism is. Mechanisms consist of parts, the behavior of which conforms to generalizations that are invariant under interventions, and which are modular in the sense that it is possible in principle to change the behavior of one part independently of the others. Each of these features can be captured by the truth of certain counterfactuals.
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  24. Sungho Choi (2008). Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 117 (468):795-841.
    For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be brought to light that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, which (...)
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  25. Timothy Williamson (2005). I *-Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1-23.
    A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general cognitive capacity (...)
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  26.  43
    Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation. The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.
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  27. Richard Bradley & H. Orri Stefánsson (forthcoming). Counterfactual Desirability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv023.
    The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. In this paper we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey's decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations (...)
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  28. P. Dowe (2001). A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.
    There is, no doubt, a temptation to treat preventions, such as ‘the father’s grabbing the child prevented the accident’, and cases of ‘causation’ by omission, such as ‘the father’s inattention was the cause of the child’s accident’, as cases of genuine causation. I think they are not, and in this paper I defend a theory of what they are. More specifically, the counterfactual theory defended here is that a claim about prevention or ‘causation’ by omission should be (...)
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  29.  71
    Justin Klocksiem (2012). A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.
    Although the counterfactual comparative account of harm, according to which someone is harmed when things go worse for her than they otherwise would have, is intuitively plausible, it has recently come under attack. There are five serious objections in the literature: some philosophers argue that the counterfactual account makes it hard to see how we could harm someone in the course of benefitting that person; others argue that Parfit’s non-identity problem is particularly problematic; another objection claims (...)
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  30. Adam Elga (2001). Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence. Philosophy of Science 68 (S1):S313-.
    In “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” David Lewis defends an analysis of counterfactuals intended to yield the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence: that later affairs depend counterfactually on earlier ones, and not the other way around. I argue that careful attention to the dynamical properties of thermodynamically irreversible processes shows that in many ordinary cases, Lewis’s analysis fails to yield this asymmetry. Furthermore, the analysis fails in an instructive way: one that teaches us something about the connection between the (...)
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  31. Robert Stalnaker (1996). Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games. Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):133.
    Deliberation about what to do in any context requires reasoning about what will or would happen in various alternative situations, including situations that the agent knows will never in fact be realized. In contexts that involve two or more agents who have to take account of each others' deliberation, the counterfactual reasoning may become quite complex. When I deliberate, I have to consider not only what the causal effects would be of alternative choices that I might make, but also (...)
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  32. Frank Veltman (2005). Making Counterfactual Assumptions. Journal of Semantics 22 (2):159-180.
    This paper provides an update semantics for counterfactual conditionals. It does so by giving a dynamic twist to the ‘Premise Semantics’ for counterfactuals developed in Veltman (1976) and Kratzer (1981). It also offers an alternative solution to the problems with naive Premise Semantics discussed by Angelika Kratzer in ‘Lumps of Thought’ (Kratzer, 1989). Such an alternative is called for given the triviality results presented in Kanazawa et al. (2005, this issue).
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  33.  15
    John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner (2014). Accommodating Counterfactual Attitudes: A Further Reply to Johansson. Journal of Ethics 18 (1):19-21.
    Here we respond to Johansson’s main worry, as laid out in his, “Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner.” We show how our principle BF*(dd*) can be adjusted to address this concern compatibly with our fundamental approach to responding to Lucretius.
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  34.  22
    Matthias Unterhuber (2013). Possible Worlds Semantics for Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals? A Formal Philosophical Inquiry Into Chellas-Segerberg Semantics. Ontos (Now de Gruyter).
    Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative conditionals.
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  35.  54
    Philippe Huneman (2012). Natural Selection: A Case for the Counterfactual Approach. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 76 (2):171-194.
    This paper investigates the conception of causation required in order to make sense of natural selection as a causal explanation of changes in traits or allele frequencies. It claims that under a counterfactual account of causation, natural selection is constituted by the causal relevance of traits and alleles to the variation in traits and alleles frequencies. The “statisticalist” view of selection (Walsh, Matthen, Ariew, Lewens) has shown that natural selection is not a cause superadded to the causal interactions (...)
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  36.  26
    Nina Emery (2015). The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to ensure that the (...)
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  37.  28
    Thomas Müller (2002). Branching Space-Time, Modal Logic and the Counterfactual Conditional. In T. Placek & J. Butterfield (eds.), Non-Locality and Modality. Kluwer 273--291.
    The paper gives a physicist's view on the framework of branching space-time, 385--434). Branching models are constructed from physical state assignments. The models are then employed to give a formal semantics for the modal operators ``possibly'' and ``necessarily'' and for the counterfactual conditional. The resulting formal language can be used to analyze quantum correlation experiments. As an application sketch, Stapp's premises LOC1 and LOC2 from his purported proof of non-locality, 300--304) are analyzed.
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  38.  33
    Jim Bogen (2004). Analysing Causality: The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):3 – 26.
    Using Jim Woodward's Counterfactual Dependency account as an example, I argue that causal claims about indeterministic systems cannot be satisfactorily analysed as including counterfactual conditionals among their truth conditions because the counterfactuals such accounts must appeal to need not have truth values. Where this happens, counterfactual analyses transform true causal claims into expressions which are not true.
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  39. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge. Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):537-552.
    The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot (...)
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  40. Michael Strevens (2008). Physically Contingent Laws and Counterfactual Support. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (8):1-20.
    The generalizations found in biology, psychology, sociology, and other high-level sciences are typically physically contingent. You might conclude that they play only a limited role in scientific investigation, on the grounds that physically contingent generalizations offer no or only feeble counterfactual support. But the link between contingency and counterfactual support is more complex than is commonly supposed. A certain class of physically contingent generalizations, comprising many, perhaps the vast majority, of those in the high-level sciences, provides strong (...) support of just the sort that appears to be scientifically important. This paper explains why. (shrink)
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  41. Jonathan Waskan (2008). Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions Through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):259 – 275.
    Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward's interventionist-counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend (...)
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  42. R. E. Kastner (1999). The Three-Box “Paradox” and Other Reasons to Reject the Counterfactual Usage of the ABL Rule. Foundations of Physics 29 (6):851-863.
    An apparent paradox proposed by Aharonov and Vaidman in which a single particle can be found with certainty in two (or more) boxes is analyzed by way of a simple thought experiment. It is found that the apparent paradox arises from an invalid counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule and effectively attributes conflicting properties not to the same particle but no different particles. A connection is made between the present analysis and the consistent histories formulation of Griffiths. Finally, (...)
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  43.  29
    Charles B. Cross (2016). Every Proposition is a Counterfactual. Acta Analytica 31 (2):117-137.
    I present and discuss two logical results. The first shows that a non-trivial counterfactual analysis exists for any contingent proposition that is false in at least two possible worlds. The second result identifies a set of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the success of a counterfactual analysis. I use these results to shed light on the question whether disposition ascribing propositions can be analyzed as Stalnaker-Lewis conditional propositions. The answer is that they can, but, (...)
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  44.  81
    Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred”. While counterfactual analyses have been given of type-causal concepts, most counterfactual analyses have focused on singular causal or token-causal claims of the form “event c caused event e”. Analyses of token-causation have become popular in the last thirty years, especially since (...)
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  45. Andrew Moon (2015). The New Evil Demon, a Frankfurt-Style Counterfactual Intervener, and a Subject’s Perspective Objection: Reply to McCain. Acta Analytica 30 (1):107-116.
    In my paper ‘Three Forms of Internalism and the New Evil Demon Problem,’ I argued that the new evil demon problem, long considered to be one of the biggest obstacles for externalism, is also a problem for virtually all internalists. In and in his recent book, Kevin McCain provides a challenging and thought provoking reasons for thinking that many internalists do not have any such problem. In this paper, I’ll provide some replies to McCain. Of note, I’ll show that a (...)
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    Henry P. Stapp, Meaning of Counterfactual Statements in Quantum Physics.
    David Mermin suggests that my recent proof pertaining to quan tum nonlocality is undermined by an essential ambiguity pertaining to the meaning of counterfactual statements in quantum physics The ambiguity he cites arise from his imposition of a certain criterion for the meaningfulness of such counterfactual statements That criterion con ates the meaning of a counterfactual statement with the details of a proof of its validity in such a way as to make the meaning (...)
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  47.  10
    Joseph Y. Halpern (2013). From Causal Models to Counterfactual Structures. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):305-322.
    Galles & Pearl (l998) claimed that s [possible-worlds] framework.s framework. Recursive models are shown to correspond precisely to a subclass of (possible-world) counterfactual structures. On the other hand, a slight generalization of recursive models, models where all equations have unique solutions, is shown to be incomparable in expressive power to counterfactual structures, despite the fact that the Galles and Pearl arguments should apply to them as well. The problem with the Galles and Pearl argument is identified: an axiom (...)
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  48. Sungho Choi (2007). Causation and Counterfactual Dependence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):1 - 16.
    Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis (...)
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  49. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (forthcoming). A Counterfactual Account of Essence. The Reasoner.
    Kit Fine (1994. “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16) argues that the standard modal account of essence as de re modality is ‘fundamentally misguided’ (p. 3). We agree with his critique and suggest an alternative counterfactual analysis of essence. As a corollary, our counterfactual account lends support to non-vacuism the thesis that counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are not always vacuously true.
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    Lance J. Rips (2010). Two Causal Theories of Counterfactual Conditionals. Cognitive Science 34 (2):175-221.
    Bayes nets are formal representations of causal systems that many psychologists have claimed as plausible mental representations. One purported advantage of Bayes nets is that they may provide a theory of counterfactual conditionals, such as If Calvin had been at the party, Miriam would have left early. This article compares two proposed Bayes net theories as models of people's understanding of counterfactuals. Experiments 1-3 show that neither theory makes correct predictions about backtracking counterfactuals (in which the event of the (...)
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