Search results for 'Counterfactuals (Logic' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  55
    Jiji Zhang, Wai-Yin Lam & Rafael De Clercq (2013). A Peculiarity in Pearl's Logic of Interventionist Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):783-794.
    We examine a formal semantics for counterfactual conditionals due to Judea Pearl, which formalizes the interventionist interpretation of counterfactuals central to the interventionist accounts of causation and explanation. We show that a characteristic principle validated by Pearl’s semantics, known as the principle of reversibility, states a kind of irreversibility: counterfactual dependence (in David Lewis’s sense) between two distinct events is irreversible. Moreover, we show that Pearl’s semantics rules out only mutual counterfactual dependence, not cyclic dependence in general. This, we (...)
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  2.  59
    Jiji Zhang (2013). A Lewisian Logic of Causal Counterfactuals. Minds and Machines 23 (1):77-93.
    In the artificial intelligence literature a promising approach to counterfactual reasoning is to interpret counterfactual conditionals based on causal models. Different logics of such causal counterfactuals have been developed with respect to different classes of causal models. In this paper I characterize the class of causal models that are Lewisian in the sense that they validate the principles in Lewis’s well-known logic of counterfactuals. I then develop a system sound and complete with respect to this class. The resulting (...)
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  3.  10
    Jiji Zhang, Wai Yin Lam & Rafael de Clercq, A Peculiarity in Pearl's Logic of Interventionist Counterfactuals.
    We examine a formal semantics for counterfactual conditionals due to Judea Pearl, which formalizes the interventionist interpretation of counterfactuals central to the interventionist accounts of causation and explanation. We show that a characteristic principle validated by Pearl’s semantics, known as the principle of reversibility, states a kind of irreversibility: counterfactual dependence (in David Lewis’s sense) between two distinct events is irreversible. Moreover, we show that Pearl’s semantics rules out only mutual counterfactual dependence, not cyclic dependence in general. This, we (...)
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  4.  2
    Brian Hill (2012). Fiction, Counterfactuals: The Challenge for Logic. In Torres Juan, Pombo Olga, Symons John & Rahman Shahid (eds.), Special Sciences and the Unity of Science. Springer 277--299.
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  5.  62
    Judea Pearl, The Logic of Counterfactuals in Causal Inference.
  6. I. Kvart (1980). Formal semantics for temporal logic and counterfactuals. Logique Et Analyse 23 (89):35.
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  7.  25
    Mark Ryan & Pierre-Yves Schobbens (1997). Counterfactuals and Updates as Inverse Modalities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):123-146.
    We point out a simple but hitherto ignored link between the theoryof updates, the theory of counterfactuals, and classical modal logic: update is a classicalexistential modality, counterfactual is a classical universalmodality, and the accessibility relations corresponding to these modalities are inverses. The Ramsey Rule (often thought esoteric) is simply an axiomatisation of this inverse relationship. We use this fact to translate between rules for updates andrules for counterfactuals. Thus, Katsuno and Mendelzons postulatesU1--U8 are translated into counterfactual rules C1--C8(Table (...)
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  8.  72
    Ernest W. Adams (1975). The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...
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  9.  28
    Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.) (2011). Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press.
    How are causal judgements such as 'The ice on the road caused the traffic accident' connected with counterfactual judgements such as 'If there had not been any ice on the road, the traffic accident would not have happened'? This volume throws new light on this question by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches to causation and counterfactuals. Traditionally, philosophers have primarily been interested in connections between causal and counterfactual claims on the level of meaning or (...)
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  10.  10
    Jack S. Levy (2007). Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals. Routledge.
    This edited volume focuses on the use of ?necessary condition counterfactuals? in explaining two key events in twentieth century history, the origins of the ...
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  11. Daniel Rönnedal (2009). Counterfactuals and Semantic Tableaux. Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (1):71-91.
    The purpose of this paper is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some counterfactual logics. All in all I will discuss 1024 systems. Possible world semantics is used to interpret our formal languages. Soundness results are obtained for every tableau system and completeness results for a large subclass of these.
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  12.  9
    Charles Hermes (2014). Forms of Thought: A Study in Philosophical Logic. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):352-354.
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  13.  6
    Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz (2014). Logic and Probability: Reasoning in Uncertain Environments – Introduction to the Special Issue. Studia Logica 102 (4):663-671.
    The current special issue focuses on logical and probabilistic approaches to reasoning in uncertain environments, both from a formal, conceptual and argumentative perspective as well as an empirical point of view. In the present introduction we give an overview of the types of problems addressed by the individual contributions of the special issue, based on fundamental distinctions employed in this area. We furthermore describe some of the general features of the special issue.
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  14. Wesley H. Holliday (2015). Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do (...)
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  15. David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
    Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.
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  16.  22
    Dale Jacquette (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Logic: An Anthology. Blackwell Publishers.
    The papers presented in this volume examine topics of central interest in contemporary philosophy of logic. They include reflections on the nature of logic and its relevance for philosophy today, and explore in depth developments in informal logic and the relation of informal to symbolic logic, mathematical metatheory and the limiting metatheorems, modal logic, many-valued logic, relevance and paraconsistent logic, free logics, extensional v. intensional logics, the logic of fiction, epistemic logic, formal logical and semantic paradoxes, the concept of truth, (...)
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  17. Lee Walters (2015). Possible Worlds Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1).
    The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that (...)
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  18. Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
    A number of recent authors (Galles and Pearl, Found Sci 3 (1):151–182, 1998; Hiddleston, Noûs 39 (4):232–257, 2005; Halpern, J Artif Intell Res 12:317–337, 2000) advocate a causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals. But the precise logical significance of the causal modeling semantics remains murky. Particularly important, yet particularly under-explored, is its relationship to the similarity-based semantics for counterfactuals developed by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, 1973b). The causal modeling semantics is both an account of the truth conditions (...)
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  19.  76
    Franz Huber (2014). New Foundations for Counterfactuals. Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.
    Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\) , given that the (...)
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  20.  36
    Theodore Sider (2010). Logic for Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Logic for Philosophy is an introduction to logic for students of contemporary philosophy. It is suitable both for advanced undergraduates and for beginning graduate students in philosophy. It covers (i) basic approaches to logic, including proof theory and especially model theory, (ii) extensions of standard logic that are important in philosophy, and (iii) some elementary philosophy of logic. It emphasizes breadth rather than depth. For example, it discusses modal logic and counterfactuals, but does not prove the central metalogical results (...)
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  21.  21
    David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.) (2005). The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
    It is human nature to wonder how things might have turned out differently--either for the better or for the worse. For the past two decades psychologists have been intrigued by this phenomenon, which they call counterfactual thinking. Specifically, researchers have sought to answer the "big" questions: Why do people have such a strong propensity to generate counterfactuals, and what functions does counterfactual thinking serve? What are the determinants of counterfactual thinking, and what are its adaptive and psychological consequences? (...)
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  22.  24
    Tomasz Bigaj (2004). Counterfactuals and Spatiotemporal Events. Synthese 142 (1):1 - 19.
    One of the basic assumptions of David Lewis''s formal semantics of counterfactuals is that the crucial relation of comparative similarity between possible worlds is a linear ordering.Yet there are arguments that when we take into account relativistic features of space-time, this relationshould be only a partial ordering. The first part of the paper deals with the question of how to formulate appropriatetruth conditions for counterfactuals under the supposition of a partial ordering of possible worlds. Such truthconditions will be (...)
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  23.  36
    Dale Jacquette (ed.) (2006). Philosophy of Logic. North Holland.
    The papers presented in this volume examine topics of central interest in contemporary philosophy of logic. They include reflections on the nature of logic and its relevance for philosophy today, and explore in depth developments in informal logic and the relation of informal to symbolic logic, mathematical metatheory and the limiting metatheorems, modal logic, many-valued logic, relevance and paraconsistent logic, free logics, extensional v. intensional logics, the logic of fiction, epistemic logic, formal logical and semantic paradoxes, the concept of truth, (...)
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  24.  21
    Jochen Kluve (2004). On the Role of Counterfactuals in Inferring Causal Effects. Foundations of Science 9 (1):65-101.
    Causal inference in the empiricalsciences is based on counterfactuals. The mostcommon approach utilizes a statistical model ofpotential outcomes to estimate causal effectsof treatments. On the other hand, one leadingapproach to the study of causation inphilosophical logic has been the analysis ofcausation in terms of counterfactualconditionals. This paper discusses and connectsboth approaches to counterfactual causationfrom philosophy and statistics. Specifically, Ipresent the counterfactual account of causationin terms of Lewis's possible-world semantics,and reformulate the statistical potentialoutcome framework using counterfactualconditionals. This procedure highlights variousproperties (...)
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  25.  54
    Ivar Hannikainen (2011). Might-Counterfactuals and the Principle of Conditional Excluded Middle. Disputatio 4 (30):127-149.
    Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the (...)
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  26.  1
    Henri Lauener (1982). Method in Philosophy and Logic. Dialectica 36 (4):353-371.
    SummaryMethodological questions are discussed from a point of view which the author calls open transcendentalism. In the first paragraphs the importance of normative practices is stressed and the application of the method to philosophical problems concerning ontology, analyticity and necessity is illustrated. Against Quine's holism a truely pluralistic view is defended according to which various logical or linguistic systems may be used with regard to the needs in different human activities.In the second part, arguments in favor of a instrumentalistic conception (...)
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  27.  27
    Hannes Leitgeb (2012). A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):85-121.
    This is part B of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual to be true even in the presence of relevant -worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. (...)
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  28.  2
    Krister Segerberg (1995). Belief Revision From the Point of View of Doxastic Logic. Logic Journal of the Igpl 3 (4):535-553.
    In 1985 Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson presented their now classic theory of theory change . In 1988 Adam Grove, generalizing David Lewis's theory of counterfactuals, presented a model theory suitable for the AGM theory. Although AGM and Grove mentioned object languages, neither used them. But recently, Maarten de Rijke has shown how object languages can be brought into the picture. In the present paper we take de Rijke's idea further, addressing the question whether there is a particular doxastic or (...)
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  29.  40
    Tristan Haze (2016). Against the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture. The Reasoner 10 (4):29-30.
    'It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals', write Brogaard and Salerno in (2008: Counterfactuals and context, Analysis 68.1, 39–46). In that article they argue that the putative counterexamples to these principles are actually no threat, on the grounds that they involve a certain kind of illicit contextual shift. -/- Here I argue that this particular kind of contextual shift, if it is properly so called, is not generally illicit, and that (...)
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  30. Jens Christian Bjerring (2013). On Counterpossibles. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
    The traditional Lewis–Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent as trivially or vacuously true. Many have regarded this as a serious defect of the semantics. For intuitively, it seems, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents—counterpossibles—can be non-trivially true and non-trivially false. Whereas the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the mathematical community at the time would have been surprised" seems true, "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the (...)
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  31.  8
    Daniel Kodaj (2016). Counterfactuals and Accessibility. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):n/a-n/a.
    The accessibility relation between possible worlds can be defined in the metalanguage of counterfactual semantics. As a result, counterfactuals can ground the whole of standard modal logic.
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  32.  81
    Luis Alonso-Ovalle (2009). Counterfactuals, Correlatives, and Disjunction. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (2):207-244.
    The natural interpretation of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents involves selecting from each of the disjuncts the worlds that come closest to the world of evaluation. It has been long noticed that capturing this interpretation poses a problem for a minimal change semantics for counterfactuals, because selecting the closest worlds from each disjunct requires accessing the denotation of the disjuncts from the denotation of the disjunctive antecedent, which the standard boolean analysis of or does not allow (Creary and Hill, (...)
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  33. John Collins, Counterfactuals, Causation, and Preemption.
    A counterfactual is a conditional statement in the subjunctive mood. For example: If Suzy hadn’t thrown the rock, then the bottle wouldn’t have shattered. The philosophical importance of counterfactuals stems from the fact that they seem to be closely connected to the concept of causation. Thus it seems that the truth of the above conditional is just what is required for Suzy’s throw to count as a cause of the bottle’s shattering. If philosophers were reluctant to exploit this idea (...)
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  34.  29
    Hannes Leitgeb (2014). A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):605-636.
    We will present a new lottery-style paradox on counterfactuals and chance. The upshot will be: combining natural assumptions on the truth values of ordinary counterfactuals, the conditional chances of possible but non-actual events, the manner in which and relate to each other, and a fragment of the logic of counterfactuals leads to disaster. In contrast with the usual lottery-style paradoxes, logical closure under conjunction—that is, in this case, the rule of Agglomeration of counterfactuals—will not play a (...)
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  35.  22
    Matthias Unterhuber (2013). Possible Worlds Semantics for Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals? A Formal Philosophical Inquiry Into Chellas-Segerberg Semantics. Ontos (Now de Gruyter).
    Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative (...). (shrink)
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  36.  23
    Charles B. Cross (2016). Embedded Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds Semantics. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):665-673.
    Stephen Barker argues that a possible worlds semantics for the counterfactual conditional of the sort proposed by Stalnaker and Lewis cannot accommodate certain examples in which determinism is true and a counterfactual Q > R is false, but where, for some P, the compound counterfactual P > is true. I argue that the completeness theorem for Lewis’s system VC of counterfactual logic shows that Stalnaker–Lewis semantics does accommodate Barker’s example, and I argue that its doing so should be understood as (...)
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  37.  25
    Alan Penczek (1997). Counterfactuals with True Components. Erkenntnis 46 (1):79-85.
    One criticism of David Lewis's account of counterfactuals is that it sometimes assigns the wrong truth-value to a counterfactual when both antecedent and consequent happen to be true. Lewis has suggested a possible remedy to this situation, but commentators have found this to be unsatisfactory. I suggest an alternative solution which involves a modification of Lewis's truth conditions, but which confines itself to the resources already present in his account. This modification involves the device of embedding one counterfactual within (...)
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  38.  35
    E. J. Lowe (2013). Forms of Thought: A Study in Philosophical Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    Introduction -- Individuation, reference, and sortal terms -- Two styles of predication, dispositional and occurrent -- Ontological categories and categorial predication -- What is a criterion of identity? -- Identity conditions and their grounds -- Identity, vagueness, and modality -- Necessity, essence, and possible worlds -- The truth about counterfactuals -- Conditionals and conditional probability.
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  39. Lee Walters & Robert Williams (2013). An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.
    Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, (...)
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  40. Theodore Sider (2002). Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):115 - 138.
    In no possible world does a time traveler succeed in killing herearlier self before she ever enters a time machine. So if many,many time travelers went back in time trying to kill theirunprotected former selves, the time travelers would fail inmany strange, coincidental ways, slipping on bananapeels, killing the wrong victim, and so on. Such cases producedoubts about time travel. How could ``coincidences'' beguaranteed to happen? And wouldn't the certainty of coincidentalfailure imply that time travelers are not free to killtheir (...)
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  41. Angelika Kratzer (1981). Partition and Revision: The Semantics of Counterfactuals. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):201 - 216.
    The last section made it clear that an analysis which at first seems to fail is viable after all. It is viable if we let it depend on a partition function to be provided by the context of conversation. This analysis leaves certain traits of the partition function open. I have tried to show that this should be so. Specifying these traits as Pollock does leads to wrong predictions. And leaving them open endows counterfactuals with just the right amount (...)
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  42.  5
    Kok Yong Lee (2015). Causal Models and the Ambiguity of Counterfactuals. In Wiebe van der Hoek, Wesley H. Holliday & Wen-Fang Wang (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction 5th International Workshop, LORI 2015, Taipei, Taiwan, October 28-30, 2015. Proceedings. Springer 201-229.
    Counterfactuals are inherently ambiguous in the sense that the same counterfactual may be true under one mode of counterfactualization but false under the other. Many have regarded the ambiguity of counterfactuals as consisting in the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals. This is incorrect since the ambiguity persists even in cases not involving backtracking counterfactualization. In this paper, I argue that causal modeling semantics has the resources enough for accounting for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. Specifically, we (...)
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  43.  37
    Alexander R. Pruss (2007). Conjunctions, Disjunctions and Lewisian Semantics for Counterfactuals. Synthese 156 (1):33 - 52.
    Consider the reasonable axioms of subjunctive conditionals if p → q1 and p → q2 at some world, then p → at that world, and if p1 → q and p2 → q at some world, then → q at that world, where p → q is the subjunctive conditional. I show that a Lewis-style semantics for subjunctive conditionals satisfies these axioms if and only if one makes a certain technical assumption about the closeness relation, an assumption that is probably (...)
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  44.  29
    Jean-Paul Vessel (2003). Counterfactuals for Consequentialists. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):103 - 125.
    That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and trueconsequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausibleand popularly endorsed account. But I am wary of endorsing thisimplication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail tocapture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contextsof consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allowfor the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with trueantecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believethat certain types of straightforward consequentialist reasoningare coherent. I (...)
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  45.  68
    Seahwa Kim & Cei Maslen (2006). Counterfactuals as Short Stories. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):81 - 117.
  46.  14
    J. Finkelstein (1999). Space-Time Counterfactuals. Synthese 119 (3):287-298.
    A definition is proposed to give precise meaning to the counterfactual statements that often appear in discussions of the implications of quantum mechanics. Of particular interest are counterfactual statements which involve events occurring at space-like separated points, which do not have an absolute time ordering. Some consequences of this definition are discussed.
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  47.  39
    Kadri Vihvelin (1991). Freedom, Causation, and Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 64 (2):161-84.
  48. Alexander R. Pruss (2007). Conjunctions, Disjunctions and Lewisian Semantics for Counterfactuals. Synthese 156 (1):33-52.
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  49.  23
    Luc Bovens (1998). Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):79-101.
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  50.  45
    Richard Otte (2006). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability. Synthese 152 (1):81 - 93.
    Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga's intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen's and Plantinga's intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.
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