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  1. Craig DeLancey (2014). Commitment and Attunement. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):579-594.
    Heidegger’s view of attunement, and evolutionary theories of emotion, would appear to be wholly independent accounts of affects. This paper argues that we can understand the phenomenology of attunement and the evolutionary functionalist theory of emotions as distinct perspectives on those same emotions. The reason that the two perspectives are distinct is that some affects can act as commitment mechanisms, and this requires them to be experienced in a way that obscures their ultimate functional role. These perspectives are potentially mutually (...)
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  2. Craig DeLancey (2013). The Modal Arguments and the Complexity of Consciousness. Ratio 26 (1):35-50.
    This paper explores consequences of the claim that phenomenal experiences are physical events of great descriptive complexity. This claim is attractive both because it can explain our most perplexing intuitions about the quality of consciousness and also because it is suggestive of very productive research opportunities. I illustrate the former by showing that two of the most compelling anti-physicalist arguments about phenomenal experience – the modal argument of Kripke and the conceivability argument of Chalmers – are not sound if this (...)
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  3. Craig DeLancey (2012). An Ecological Concept of Wilderness. Ethics and the Environment 17 (1):25-44.
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  4. Craig Delancey (2012). After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. By Quentin Meillassoux. The European Legacy 17 (3):403 - 404.
    The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 403-404, June 2012.
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  5. Craig DeLancey (2012). Consciousness and the Superfunctionality Claim. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):433-451.
    The superfunctionality claim is that phenomenal experiences are more than functional (objective, causal) relations. This is one of the most widely used but least attacked claims in the anti-physicalist literature on consciousness. Coupled with one form of structuralism, the view that science only explains functional relations, the superfunctionality claim entails that science will not explain phenomenal experience. The claim is therefore essential to many anti-physicalist arguments. I identify an open question argument for the superfunctionality claim that expresses an intuition deserving (...)
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  6. Craig DeLancey (2011). Does a Parsimony Principle Entail a Simple World? Metaphysica 12 (2):87-100.
    Many scholars claim that a parsimony principle has ontological implications. The most common such claim is that a parsimony principle entails that the “world” is simple. This ontological claim appears to often be coupled with the assumption that a parsimony principle would be corroborated if the “world” were simple. I clarify these claims, describe some minimal features of simplicity, and then show that both these claims are either false or they depend upon an implausible notion of simplicity. In their stead, (...)
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  7. Craig DeLancey (2010). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Review). Symploke 18 (1):415-417.
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  8. Craig DeLancey (2009). Review of Georg Brun, Ulvi Doguoglu, Dominique Kuenzle (Eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
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  9. Craig DeLancey (2007). Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information. Erkenntnis 66 (3):329 - 352.
    This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson.
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  10. Craig DeLancey (2007). Review of Ronald de Sousa, Why Think? Evolution and the Rational Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12).
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  11. Craig Stephen Delancey (2007). Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language. Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
    I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...)
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  12. Craig S. Delancey (2006). Ontology and Teleofunctions: A Defense and Revision of the Systematic Account of Teleological Explanation. Synthese 150 (1):69 - 98.
    I defend and revise the systematic account of normative functions (teleofunctions), as recently developed by Gerhard Schlosser and by W. D. Christensen and M. H. Bickhard. This account proposes that teleofunctions are had by structures that play certain kinds of roles in complex systems. This theory is an alternative to the historical etiological account of teleofunctions, developed by Ruth Millikan and others. The historical etiological account is susceptible to a general ontological problem that has been under-appreciated, and that offers important (...)
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  13. Craig Stephen Delancey (2006). Basic Moods. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
    The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing (...)
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  14. Craig DeLancey (2005). Lewis's DS Approach is a Tool, Not a Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):201-201.
    Lewis argues convincingly that a DS approach to emotion theory will be fruitful. He also appears to hold that there are DS principles that constitute a theory or are substantial empirical claims. I argue that this latter move is a mistake.
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  15. Craig DeLancey (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  16. Craig Delancey (2004). Architecture Can Save the World: Building and Environmental Ethics. Philosophical Forum 35 (2):147–159.
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  17. Craig Delancey (2004). Teleofunctions and Oncomice: The Case for Revising Varner's Value Theory. Environmental Ethics 26 (2):171-188.
    The view that organisms deserve moral respect because they have their own purposes is often grounded in a specification of the biological functions that the organism has. One way to identify such functions, adopted by Gary Varner, is to determine the etiology of some behavior based on the evolution of the structures enabling it. This view suffers from some unacceptable problems, including that some organisms with profound defects will by definition have a welfare interest in their defects. For example, this (...)
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  18. Craig DeLancey (2001). Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About the Mind and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
    The emotions have been one of the most fertile areas of study in psychology, neuroscience, and other cognitive disciplines. Yet as influential as the work in those fields is, it has not yet made its way to the desks of philosophers who study the nature of mind. Passionate Engines unites the two for the first time, providing both a survey of what emotions can tell us about the mind, and an argument for how work in the cognitive disciplines can help (...)
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  19. Craig DeLancey (2000). Affect Programs, Intentionality, and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):197-198.
    I express two concerns with the theory of emotion that Rolls provides: (1) rewards and punishers alone fail to explain the basic emotions; (2) Rolls needs to clarify his notion of the intentionality of emotions. I also criticize his theory of consciousness, arguing that it fails to explain qualia, and that ironically it is emotions which make this most evident.
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  20. Craig DeLancey (1998). Real Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):467-487.
    I argue that natural realism is the best approach to explaining some emotional actions, and thus is the best candidate to explain the relevant emotions. I take natural realism to be the view that these emotions are motivational states which must be identified by using (not necessarily exclusively) naturalistic discourse which, if not wholly lacking intentional terms, at least does not require reference to belief and desire. The kinds of emotional actions I consider are ones which continue beyond the satisfaction (...)
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  21. Craig DeLancey (1997). Emotion and the Computational Theory of Mind. In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.
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  22. Craig DeLancey (1996). Emotion and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.