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Profile: Craig French (Cambridge University)
  1.  83
    Anil Gomes & Craig French, Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta.
    We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply.
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  2. Craig French (2013). Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P. Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
    I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus we can’t sustain (...)
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  3.  86
    Craig French (2012). Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge? Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
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  4. Anil Gomes & Craig French (2016). On the Particularity of Experience. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.
    Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full (...)
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  5.  26
    Craig French (2014). Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. Ratio 27 (4):393-413.
    Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...)
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  6.  43
    Craig French, Pathology Based Philosophy of Mind. iCog.
    In this post the author defends a pathology based approach to the philosophy of mind.
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  7.  65
    Craig French (2016). The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):86-104.
    I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—the basis problem. And second, it is less committed (...)
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  8.  49
    Craig French (forthcoming). Idiosyncratic Perception. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv068.
    Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyncratic perception. I defend the relational view in response to this problem.
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  9. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, Space, Time, and Sensory Integration (Network for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness, Question 4).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal?
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  10.  26
    Craig French (2014). Knowledge and Ways of Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):353-364.
    Quassim Cassam offers a conception of ways of knowing which he argues is preferable to rival accounts such as the account we find in Williamson. The correct way to think about ways of knowing matters for philosophers, such as Cassam and Williamson, who want to understand knowledge itself in terms of ways of knowing. So is Cassam right that his conception of ways of knowing is preferable to Williamson's? The discussion to follow is irenic in spirit: I will argue that (...)
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  11. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration: Conference Report.
    This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011: 1. What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration? 2. Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal? 3. How should we model the unity of consciousness? 4. Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal? 5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?
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  12. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration (Network for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness, Question 1).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration?
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  13.  48
    Craig French (2015). Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology By Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias. [REVIEW] Analysis 75 (3):528-530.
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  14. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, Multimodal Building Blocks? (Network for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness, Question 2).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal?
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  15. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Report on the Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop.
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
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  16. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Cognitive Penetration (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Two).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: Can perceptual experience be modified by reason?
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  17. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, Modeling the Unity of Consciousness (Network for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness, Question 3).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: How should we model the unity of consciousness?
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  18. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, Studying Experience as Unified (Network for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness, Question 5).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: How should we study experience, given unity relations?
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  19. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question One).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: What is perceptual learning?
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  20.  44
    Craig French (2012). Visual Perception as a Means of Knowing. Dissertation, UCL
    This thesis falls into two parts, a characterizing part, and an explanatory part. In the first part, I outline some of the core aspects of our ordinary understanding of visual perception, and how we regard it as a means of knowing. What explains the fact that I know that the lemon before me is yellow is my visual perception: I know that the lemon is yellow because I can see it. Some explanations of how one knows specify that in virtue (...)
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  21.  91
    Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Phenomenology (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Three).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology?
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  22.  90
    Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Content (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Four).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception?
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  23. Craig French (forthcoming). Object Seeing and Spatial Perception. In Fiona MacPherson, Martine Nida-Rümelin & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence.
    I consider the way in which spatial perception is necessary for object seeing. In section 1 I outline the operative conception of object seeing. I consider Cassam’s view that in order to see o, you must see it as spatially located (section 2). I argue that Cassam’s argument is unsound. Cassam’s argument relies on the claim that seeing o requires visual differentiation. But it is not the case that seeing o requires visual differentiation. This is because the following principle is (...)
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  24.  83
    Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Action (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Five).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
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  25.  17
    Craig French (2015). Objectivity and the Parochial, by Charles Travis. [REVIEW] Mind 124 (494):693-696.
    Book Review of Charles Travis's Objectivity and the Parochial.
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  26.  20
    Craig French (2009). Review: Forster, Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 50 (2):334-335.
  27.  15
    Craig French (2009). Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World. By Fiona Hughes. Heythrop Journal 50 (2):336-336.
  28. Craig French & Lee Walters (forthcoming). The Invalidity of the Argument From Illusion. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that (...)
     
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