This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: Can perceptual experience be modified by reason?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: What is perceptual learning?
This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: How should we model the unity of consciousness?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal?
This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: How should we study experience, given unity relations?
This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011: 1. What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration? 2. Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal? 3. How should we model the unity of consciousness? 4. Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal? 5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?
I consider the way in which spatial perception is necessary for object seeing. In section 1 I outline the operative conception of object seeing. I consider Cassam’s view that in order to see o, you must see it as spatially located (section 2). I argue that Cassam’s argument is unsound. Cassam’s argument relies on the claim that seeing o requires visual differentiation. But it is not the case that seeing o requires visual differentiation. This is because the following principle is (...) true: if S sees a visible proper part of o, then S sees o, and since there are cases in which S sees a visible proper part of o yet o is not visually differentiated for S , seeing o doesn’t require visual differentiation (section 3). In section 4 I suggest an alternative way of understanding the idea that spatial perception is necessary for object seeing. (shrink)
In this paper I discuss (material) object seeing. Such seeing is, as Dretske has argued, non-epistemic: S's seeing o doesn't entail that S has any knowledge or belief about o. Though such seeing, I suggest, is epistemically significant in that it is knowledge-explaining. That is, `S sees o' can (in the right circumstances) be a perfectly good answer to the question `How does S know that o is F?', thus indicating that S's seeing o can be a source of S's (...) knowledge (see Cassam). I defend this perspective against a challenge which claims that it is rather S's seeing that o is F which is knowledge-explaining; propositional seeing, not object seeing. I argue, against this, that S's seeing that o is F is a way of knowing---that is, it is a matter of S's knowing that o is F by visual means. And so, I suggest, seeing that o is F is not suited to be a source of S's knowledge that o is F. Having defended the conception of object seeing's epistemic significance set out I then address the task of explaining what accounts for its epistemic significance. I suggest that the place to look for giving such an account is to the constitutive conditions on seeing and knowing (see Peacocke). I adopt the perspective of a naive realist and suggest the following: if S sees o and so the constitutive conditions on seeing o are met, then some of the constitutive conditions on knowing things about o will be met. This is because, I argue, for a naive realist part of what is involved in S's seeing o is that o itself is a literal constituent of S's o seeing experience. But, if they understand o as a relatively thick particular (as they should for reasons I set out), then this means that just in virtue of seeing o, S has a reason to believe something about o. This is because thick particulars are states of affairs, and states of affairs are reasons for beliefs (in virtue of them bearing the truthmaking relation to truths, a relation which I argue is an epistemic favouring relation). If a thick particular is a literal constituent of your perceptual experience, then that particular---that reason for beliefs about o---is accessible or available for exploitation in cognition. And this just means that a particular constitutive condition on knowing about o is satisfied. (shrink)
I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that p —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that p . And thus we can’t sustain (...) fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that p , a non-propositional view of seeing that p is, I argue, perfectly intelligible. (shrink)
In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...) “see” does not have the sort of meaning (a purely perceptual meaning) which would sustain Turri's claims about the cases he offers (specifically, the (A) verdicts). (shrink)
