Search results for 'Credulity' (try it on Scholar)

72 found
Order:
  1.  1
    Jean‐Franĉois Bonnefon (2004). Reinstatement, Floating Conclusions, and the Credulity of Mental Model Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (4):621-631.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  5
    Adam Weiler Gur Arye (2016). Reid's Principle of Credulity as a Principle of Charity. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (1):69-83.
    Reid's principle of credulity may be interpreted as equivalent to a principle of charity, due to the nature of three beliefs it implies concerning the interlocutors, which are held by the person who attempts to acquire their language: They are telling truth in the sense that they are saying what they really think, perceive, feel, believe; they are veracious in the sense that what they say is objectively true; they use language consistently. This interpretation relies on Reid's straightforward remarks (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  62
    William G. Lycan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  20
    Peter Losin (1987). Experience of God and the Principle of Credulity. Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):59-70.
    The Principle of Credulity---i.e. that if I have an experience apparently of X then in the absence of good reasons to think the experience non-veridical I have evidence that X exists---is an essential premise in many formulations of the argument from religious experience. I defend this use of the principle against objections offered by William Rowe. I argue that experiences of God are checkable. and in ways (epistemically) significantly similar to the ways sensory experiences are checkable. and that treating (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  6
    Shelagh Crooks (2005). Strong Credulity and Pro/Con Analysis. Teaching Philosophy 28 (1):45-57.
    This paper inquires into the nature and causes of credulous belief and proposes a way of making negative evidence more salient to believers so that they are less likely to fall into the habit of credulous believing. Contrasting the work of Richard Swinburne with recent work in cognitive psychology, the author argues that for the “strong credulity hypothesis”, namely that our comprehension of testimony is closely linked to an initial acceptance of what speakers claim. That is, we are literally (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  12
    Jerome Gellman (2007). Credulity and Experience of God. Philo 10 (2):114-124.
    In this paper I argue that Richard Swinburne fails to adequately support his Principle of Credulity in favor of the validity of alleged experiences of God. I then formulate an alternative, analogical argument for the validity of alleged experiences of God from the validity of sense-perceptual experiences, and defend it against objections of Gale and Fales. But then I argue against trying to establish the validity of alleged experiences of God by analogy.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Robert Audi (2006). Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press 25--49.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  8. James Van Cleve (2006). I. The Principles of Veracity and Credulity. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  9.  99
    William L. Rowe (1982). Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (2):85-92.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  10.  5
    Susan Haack (2014). Credulity and Circumspection. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 88:27-47.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  17
    E. T. Bell (1925). Mathematics and Credulity. Journal of Philosophy 22 (17):449-458.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  16
    Paul L. Harris, Kathleen H. Corriveau, Elisabeth S. Pasquini, Melissa Koenig, Maria Fusaro & Fabrice Clément (2012). Credulity and the Development of Selective Trust in Early Childhood. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press 193.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  17
    Michael Martin (1986). The Principle of Credulity and Religious Experience. Religious Studies 22 (1):79 - 93.
    In The Existence of God Richard Swinburne argues that certain religious experiences support the hypothesis that God exists. Indeed, the argument from religious experience is of crucial importance in Swinburne's philosophical theology. For, according to Swinburne, without the argument from religious experience the combined weight of the other arguments he considers, e.g. the teleological, the cosmological, or the argument from miracles, does not render the theistic hypothesis very probable. However, the argument from religious experience combined with these other arguments makes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  2
    William Hare (2007). Credibility and Credulity: Monitoring Teachers for Trustworthiness. Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (2):207–219.
  15.  7
    W. E. Ayton Wilkinson (1909). Credulity, Incredulity, and Immortality. The Monist 19 (3):461-468.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  33
    J. William Forgie (1986). The Principle of Credulity and the Evidential Value of Religious Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 19 (3):145 - 159.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  9
    I. Testimony-Based Belief (2006). Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press 25.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  7
    Francis William Newman (2009). The Religious Mischiefs of Credulity. The Works of Francis William Newman on Religion 9:175-186.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  3
    Stephen Paul Foster (1995). Belief and Make-Believe: Critical Reflections on the Sources of Credulity. By G. A. Wells. Modern Schoolman 72 (4):354-356.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  12
    Hendrik Hart (1994). Faith as Trust and Belief as Intellectual Credulity. Philosophy and Theology 8 (3):251-256.
    In response to the critique of his work by William Sweet, Hendrik Hart first offers some terminological clarifications. The important difference between ‘faith’ (trust in God) and ‘belief’ (our network of accepted understandings of things, expressed in concepts and propositions) is emphasized and his use of terms such as ‘religion,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘truth’ are explained. Hart then clarifies his approach to the Western philosophical tradition . He argues that Christian accommodation to philosophy and its idea of ‘reason’ as ultimate arbiter (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  13
    Carl Page (1989). Demonic Credulity and the Universalization of Cartesian Doubt. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):399-426.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  9
    Max J. Skidmore (2011). On the Meeting of East and West: An Essay on Credulity. The European Legacy 16 (4):519 - 526.
    The European Legacy, Volume 16, Issue 4, Page 519-526, 01Jul2011.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. William Dembski, Evolution's Logic of Credulity: An Unfettered Response to Allen Orr.
    Allen Orr wrote an extended critical review (over 6000 words) of my book No Free Lunch for the Boston Review this summer (http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR27.3/orr.html). The Boston Review subsequently contacted me and asked for a 1000 word response. I wrote a response of that length focusing on what I took to be the fundamental flaw in Orr's review (and indeed in Darwinian thinking generally, namely, conflating the realistically possible with the merely conceivable). What I didn't know (though I should have expected it) (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  4
    Nicholas S. Thompson (2000). Evolutionary Psychology Can Ill Afford Adaptionist and Mentalist Credulity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1013-1014.
    The idea that dreams function as fright-simulations rests on the adaptionist notion that anything that has form has function, and psychological argument relies on the mentalist assumption that dream reports are accurate reports of experienced events. Neither assumption seems adequately supported by the evidence presented. [Revonsuo].
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  1
    David McCallam (2010). Credit and Credulity in Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes. Lumen: Selected Proceedings From the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies 29:107.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Jon Palfreman (1979). Between Scepticism and Credulity: A Study of Victorian Scientific Attitudes to Modern Spiritualism. In Roy Wallis (ed.), On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge. University of Keele 201--236.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  15
    Aaran Burns (forthcoming). A Phenomenal Conservative Perspective on Religious Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-15.
    Can religious experience justify belief in God? We best approach this question by splitting it in two: Do religious experiences give their subjects any justification for believing that there is a God of the kind they experience? And Does testimony about such experiences provides any justification for believing that there is a God for those who are not the subject of the experience? The most popular affirmative answers trace back to the work of Richard Swinburne, who appeals to the Principle (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory. In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  29. Wendy Kaminer (1999). Sleeping with Extra-Terrestrials: The Rise of Irrationalism and Perils of Piety. Pantheon Books.
    In Sleeping with Extra-Terrestrials , Wendy Kaminer argues that we are a society intoxicated by the irrational: religion, spirituality, and popular therapies threaten to replace rational thought with supernaturalism and impassioned but unexamined personal testimony. Ranging from our fascination with angels, aliens, and near- death experiences to the rise of junk science, the recovery movement, and the digital culture, Kaminer points out the amusing and ominous effects of our deference to spiritual authorities and resistance to critical thinking. She questions conventional (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  9
    Maurice Caveing (2007). Savoirs et sciences selon Gérard Simon. Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 1 (1):203-216.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  55
    Martin Smith (forthcoming). Full Blooded Entitlement. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press
    Entitlement is defined as a sort of epistemic justification that one can possess by default – a sort of epistemic justification that does not need to be earned or acquired. Epistemologists who accept the existence of entitlement generally have a certain anti-sceptical role in mind for it – entitlement is intended to help us resist what would otherwise be compelling radical sceptical arguments. But this role leaves various details unspecified and, thus, leaves scope for a number of different potential conceptions (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  88
    P. Faulkner (2002). On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony. Synthese 131 (3):353 - 370.
    The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  33.  9
    Jack M. C. Kwong (forthcoming). Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth? Synthese:1-14.
    Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  34
    Robert Audi (2011). The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Action: Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement. Philosophy 86 (1):5-29.
    The contemporary explosion of information makes intellectual responsibility more needed than ever. The uncritical tend to believe too much that is unsubstantiated; the overcritical tend to believe too little that is true. A central problem for this paper is to formulate standards to guide an intellectually rigorous search for a mean between excessive credulity and indiscriminate skepticism. A related problem is to distinguish intellectual responsibility for what we believe from moral responsibility for what we do. A third problem is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35. Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff (2007). Animal Minds, Cognitive Ethology, and Ethics. Journal of Ethics 11 (3):299-317.
    Our goal in this paper is to provide enough of an account of the origins of cognitive ethology and the controversy surrounding it to help ethicists to gauge for themselves how to balance skepticism and credulity about animal minds when communicating with scientists. We believe that ethicists’ arguments would benefit from better understanding of the historical roots of ongoing controversies. It is not appropriate to treat some widely reported results in animal cognition as if their interpretations are a matter (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  36. Nicholas Shackel (2013). Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief. In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press 417.
    I take pseudoscience to be a pretence at science. Pretences are innumerable, limited only by our imagination and credulity. As Stove points out, ‘numerology is actually quite as different from astrology as astrology is from astronomy’ (Stove 1991, 187). We are sure that ‘something has gone appallingly wrong’ (Stove 1991, 180) and yet ‘thoughts…can go wrong in a multiplicity of ways, none of which anyone yet understands’ (Stove 1991, 190). Often all we can do is give a careful description (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  45
    Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence. Faith and Philosophy 24 (2):203-228.
    I defend the first premise of William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil against influential criticisms due to William Alston. I next suggest that the central inference in Rowe’s arguments is best understood to move from the claim that we have an absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to the claim that we have evidence of absence of such a theodicy. I endorse the view which holds that this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that (roughly) if (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  38. Lloyd Gerson (2004). The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima. Phronesis 49 (4):348-373.
    Desperately difficult texts inevitably elicit desperate hermeneutical measures. Aristotle's De Anima, book three, chapter five, is evidently one such text. At least since the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias, scholars have felt compelled to draw some remarkable conclusions regarding Aristotle's brief remarks in this passage regarding intellect. One such claim is that in chapter five, Aristotle introduces a second intellect, the so-called 'agent intellect', an intellect distinct from the 'passive intellect', the supposed focus of discussion up until this passage.1 This (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  6
    Paul L. Harris (2002). Checking Our Sources: The Origins of Trust in Testimony. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):315-333.
    Developmental psychologists have often portrayed young children as stubborn autodidacts who ignore the testimony of others. Yet the basic design of the human cognitive system indicates an early ability to co-ordinate information derived from first-hand observation with information derived from testimony. There is no obvious tendency to favour the former over the latter. Indeed, young children are relatively poor at monitoring whether they learned something from observation or from testimony. Moreover, the processes by which children and adults understand and remember (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  40.  19
    Juho Ritola (2012). Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible. Metaphilosophy 43 (5):659-678.
    Michael Huemer () argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41.  44
    William Hare (2003). Is It Good to Be Open-Minded? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):73-87.
    Although open-mindedness is still widely regarded as an intellectual virtue and an aim of education, it is also commonly held that this attitude carries with it certain implications that ultimately threaten serious inquiry. In particular, open-mindedness is often thought (i) to encourage credulity, (ii) to discourage the formation of definite views, and (iii) to detract from the tenacious pursuit of an idea. These confusions turn up in the work of reputable philosophers and it is important to address them if (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Dominic Murphy (2005). Can Evolution Explain Insanity? Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):745-766.
    I distinguish three evolutionary explanations of mental illness: first, breakdowns in evolved computational systems; second, evolved systems performing their evolutionary function in a novel environment; third, evolved personality structures. I concentrate on the second and third explanations, as these are distinctive of an evolutionary psychopathology, with progressively less credulity in the light of the empirical evidence. General morals are drawn for evolutionary psychiatry.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. M. D. Faber (2004). The Psychological Roots of Religious Belief: Searching for Angels and the Parent-God. Prometheus Books.
    The basic biological situation -- Credulity, and the skeptical tradition -- The early period -- Construction of the inner realm -- Brain, mind, religion -- Infantile amnesia -- Prayer and faith -- Angelic encounters -- Are we 'wired for God'?.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44.  91
    JIm Stone (2011). CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):59-70.


    The Principle of Credulity: 'It is basic to human knowledge of the world that we believe things are as they seem to be in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary' [Swinburne 1996: 133]. This underlies the Evidential Problem of Evil, which goes roughly like this: ‘There appears to be a lot of suffering, both animal and human, that does not result in an equal or greater utility. So there's probably some pointless suffering. As God's existence precludes pointless (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Anthony Kenny (1992). What is Faith?: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, renowned philosopher Anthony Kenny focuses on one of the central questions in the philosophy of religion: is the belief in God and faith in the divine word rational? Surveying what has been said on the topic by such major recent thinkers as Wittgenstein and Platinga, Kenny contructs his own account of what he calls "the intellectual virtue of reasonable belief which stands between skepticism and credulity," which he then applies to the Christian doctrine of faith. Kenny (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  46.  91
    H. G. Callaway (2003). The Esoteric Quine? Belief Attribution and the Significance of the Indeterminacy Thesis in Quine’s Kant Lectures. In W.V. Quine, Wissenschaft und Empfindung. Frommann-Holzboog
    This is the Introduction to my translation of Quine's Kant Lectures. Part of my interpretation is that an "esoteric doctrine" in involved in Quine's distinctive semantic claims: his skepticism of the credulity of non-expert evaluation of discourse and theory.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  99
    Richard Wollheim (1991). The Cabinet of Dr. Lacan. Topoi 10 (2):163--174.
    Obscurity is not the worst failing, and it is philistinism to pretend that it is. In a series of brilliant essays written over the last fifteen years Stanley Cavell has consistently argued that more important than the question whether obscurity could have been avoided is whether it affects our confidence in the author. Confidence raises the issue of intention, and I would have thought that the primary commitment of a psychoanalytic writer was to pass on, and (if he can) to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  21
    Robert J. Yanal (2000). Rebecca 's Deceivers. Philosophy and Literature 24 (1):67-82.
    In his Meditations Descartes tells us that he initially thought error might be avoided if he withheld assent “no less carefully from what is not plainly certain and indubitable than from what is obviously false.” For example, he thinks it plainly certain and indubitable that he is “sitting by the fire, wearing a winter cloak, holding this paper in my hands, and so on.” And yet even what is “plainly certain and indubitable” can be doubted. “I will suppose, then, not (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49.  3
    Paul Sakmann (1971). The Problems of Historical Method and of Philosophy of History in Voltaire. History and Theory 11:24-59.
    Voltaire's reform program for history-writing emerges when his scattered utterances on method are collected under three headings: I. Details. Voltaire objects to tedious details, but characterizing detail can be used. There must be selection, and its criterion is significance to large-scale trends. II. Falsehoods. Most historians are to be distrusted. Falsehoods arise from relating very ancient or mythical elements, a matter Voltaire comprehends only superficially; also from partisanship, exaggerations, and traditions. Criteria of probability and for the evaluation of testimony are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  33
    Andrew Davis (2010). Defending Religious Pluralism for Religious Education. Ethics and Education 5 (3):189 - 202.
    Religious exclusivism, or the idea that only one religion can be true, fuels hatred and conflict in the modern world. Certain objections to religious pluralism, together with associated defences of exclusivism are flawed. I defend a moderate religious pluralism, according to which the truth of one religion does not automatically imply the falsity of others. The thought that we can respect persons even when holding them mistaken strains credulity when we are dealing with religious convictions. Moreover, exclusivism is informed (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 72