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  1. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright, Focus Restored Comment on John MacFarlane's “Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Programme”.
    Anything worth regarding as logicism about number theory holds that its fundamental laws – in effect, the Dedekind-Peano axioms – may be known on the basis of logic and definitions alone. For Frege, the logic in question was that of the Begriffschrift – effectively, full impredicative second order logic - together with the resources for dealing with the putatively “logical objects” provided by Basic Law V of Grundgesetze. With this machinery in place, and with the course-of-values operator governed by Basic (...)
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  2. Crispin Wright, Lewy on Necessity and Convention.
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  3. Crispin Wright, The Disjunctive Conception of Experience.
    §1 The Disjunctive Conception of Experience Descartes was surely right that while normal waking experience, dreams and hallucinations are characteristically distinguished at a purely phenomenological level, — by contrasts of spatial perspective, coherence, clarity of image, etc., — it is not essential that they be so.1 What is it like for someone who dreams that he is sitting, clothed in his dressing gown, in front of his fire can in principle be subjectively indistinguishable from what it is like to perceive (...)
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  4. Crispin Wright, Whence the Paradox? Axiom V and Indefinite Extensibility.
    In a well-known passage in the last chapter of Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics Michael Dummett suggests that Frege’s major “mistake”—the key to the collapse of the project of Grundgesetze—consisted in “his supposing there to be a totality containing the extension of every concept defined over it; more generally [the mistake] lay in his not having the glimmering of a suspicion of the existence of indefinitely extensible concepts” (Dummett [1991, 317]). Now, claims of the form, Frege fell into paradox because……. are (...)
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  5. Crispin Wright & Bob Hale, Metaphor.
    Metaphor enters contemporary philosophical discussion from a variety of directions. Aside from its obvious importance in poetics, rhetoric, and aesthetics, it also figures in such fields as philosophy of mind (e.g., the question of the metaphorical status of ordinary mental concepts), philosophy of science (e.g, the comparison of metaphors and explanatory models), in epistemology (e.g., analogical reasoning), and in cognitive studies (in, e.g., the theory of concept-formation). This article will concentrate on issues metaphor raises for the philosophy of language, with (...)
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  6. Crispin Wright, On the Characterisation of Borderline Cases.
    It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to contribute to this volume dedicated to the critical celebration of Stephen Schiffer’s very considerable philosophical achievements. My focus will be on his recent work on vagueness.1 The broad direction of Schiffer’s researches in this area has been to give priority to what we may call the characterisation problem: the problem of saying what the vagueness of expressions of natural language consists in or, more specifically – since Schiffer takes it as (...)
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  7. Crispin Wright, “Wang's Paradox”.
    There is now a widespread accord among philosophers that the vagueness of natural language gives rise to some particularly deep and perplexing problems and paradoxes. It was not always so. For most of the first century of analytical philosophy, vagueness was generally regarded as a marginal, slightly irritating phenomenon, —receiving some attention, to be sure, in parts of the Philosophical Investigations and in the amateur linguistics enjoyed by philosophers in Oxford in the 1950s, but best idealised away in any serious (...)
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  8. Crispin Wright (2013). A Plurality of Pluralisms. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 123.
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  9. Crispin Wright (2013). Foreword. In Gottlob Frege (ed.), Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Derived Using Concept-Script: Volumes I & Ii. Oxford University Press.
     
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  10. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2012). Horse Sense. Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
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  11. Crispin Wright (2012). Replies. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press. 201-219.
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  12. Crispin Wright (2012). Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What is Inference”. Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.
    This is a response to Paul Boghossian’s paper: What is inference? (doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9903-x). The paper and the abstract originate from a symposium at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA in San Diego in April 2011. John Broome was a co-commentator.
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  13. Crispin Wright (2012). Meaning and Assertibility: Some Reflections on Paolo Casalegno's 'The Problem of Non-Conclusiveness'. Dialectica 66 (2):249-266.
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  14. Crispin Wright (2012). Reflections on François Recanati's,'Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: What It is and Where It Comes From'. In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 247--280.
     
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  15. Crispin Wright (2012). The Pain of Rejection, the Sweetness of Revenge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 160 (3):465-476.
    The pain of rejection, the sweetness of revenge Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9794-2 Authors Crispin Wright, Department of Philosophy, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  16. Crispin Wright (2012). Verdad: Un Debate Tradicional Revisado. Areté. Revista de Filosofía 19 (2):265-301.
    “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed”. This paper proposes a critical review of the presuppositions at the background of the traditional discussion on truth. Despite acknowledging that the said discussion rationalizes many of the movements and tentatives of its main characters to clarify the facts, it isascertained that, since it is centered in a reductive analyses of truth, it is not apt to generate the most adequate interpretation of the same. The theories in dispute will be expounded and criticized: deflationism, intrinsicalism, (...)
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  17. Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.) (2012). Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as (...)
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  18. Crispin Wright (2011). Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):29-41.
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  19. Crispin Wright (2010). Theories of Meaning and Speakers' Knowledge. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
  20. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2009). Focus Restored: Comments on John MacFarlane. Synthese 170 (3):457 - 482.
    In “Double Vision Two Questions about the Neo-Fregean Programme”, John MacFarlane’s raises two main questions: (1) Why is it so important to neo-Fregeans to treat expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’ as a species of singular term? What would be lost, if anything, if they were analysed instead as a type of quantifier-phrase, as on Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions? and (2) Granting—at least for the sake of argument—that Hume’s Principle may be used as a means of implicitly (...)
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  21. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2009). The Metaontology of Abstraction. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
  22. Sebastiano Moruzzi & Crispin Wright (2009). Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future. Synthese 166 (2):309 - 331.
    In the paper we argue that truth-relativism is potentially hostage to a problem of exhibiting witnesses of its own truth. The problem for the relativist stems from acceptance of a trumping principle according to which there is a dependency between ascriptions of truth of an utterance and ascriptions of truth to other ascriptions of truth of that utterance. We argue that such a dependency indeed holds in the case of future contingents and the case of epistemic modals and that, consequently, (...)
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  23. Crispin Wright (2009). Foreword: On Becoming a Philosopher. Synthese 171 (3):359 - 364.
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  24. Crispin Wright (2009). Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future. Synthese 166 (2):309 - 331.
    In the paper we argue that truth-relativism is potentially hostage to a problem of exhibiting witnesses of its own truth. The problem for the relativist stems from acceptance of a trumping principle according to which there is a dependency between ascriptions of truth of an utterance and ascriptions of truth to other ascriptions of truth of that utterance. We argue that such a dependency indeed holds in the case of future contingents and the case of epistemic modals and that, consequently, (...)
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  25. Crispin Wright (2009). The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    It is common among philosophers who take an interest in the phenomenon of vagueness in natural language not merely to acknowledge higher-order vagueness but to take its existence as a basic datum— so that views that lack the resources to account for it, or that put obstacles in the way, are regarded as deficient just on that score. My main purpose in what follows is to loosen the hold of this deeply misconceived idea. Higher-order vagueness is no basic datum but (...)
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  26. Crispin Wright (2009). The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Abstraction. In Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag. 11--195.
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  27. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2008). Abstraction and Additional Nature. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (2):182-208.
    What is wrong with abstraction’, Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan explain a further objection to the abstractionist programme in the foundations of mathematics which they first presented in their ‘Hale on Caesar’ and which they believe our discussion in The Reason's Proper Study misunderstood. The aims of the present note are: To get the character of this objection into sharper focus; To explore further certain of the assumptions—primarily, about reference-fixing in mathematics, about certain putative limitations of abstractionist set theory, and (...)
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  28. Crispin Wright (2008). Comment on John McDowell's "The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument". In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 390.
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  29. Crispin Wright (2008). Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
    §1 To many in or on the edges of the Academy, ”Relativism” is a word with overtones of sinister iconoclasm, representing a kind of intellectual and ethical free-for-all in which the traditional investigative virtues of clarity, rigour, objectivity, consistency and the unbiased pursuit of truth are dismissed as illusory and the great scientific constructions of the last two hundred years, together with our deepest moral convictions, rated merely as ‘our way of seeing’ the world, more elaborate and organised but otherwise (...)
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  30. Crispin Wright (2008). Internal-External: Doxastic Norms and the Defusing of Skeptical Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):501-517.
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  31. Crispin Wright (2008). McKinsey One More Time. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    §1 It is not always true that recognizably valid reasoning from known, or otherwise epistemically warranted premises, can be enlisted to produce knowledge, or other epistemic warrant, for a conclusion. The counterexamples are cases that exhibit what I have elsewhere called warrant transmission-failure. It is nowadays widely accepted that there are indeed such counterexamples, though individual cases remain controversial. One such controversial case is the so-called McKinsey paradox. The paradox presents as a simple collision between three claims that many would (...)
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  32. Crispin Wright (2008). Relativism About Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts About the Very Idea. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 157.
  33. Crispin Wright (2008). Review: Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
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  34. Crispin Wright (2007). New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.
    What I am calling New Age Relativism is usually proposed as a thesis about the truth-conditions of utterances, where an utterance is an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type. Roughly, it is the view that, for certain discourses, whether an utterance is true depends not just on the context of its making—when, where, to whom, by whom, in what language, and so on—and the “circumstances of evaluation”—the state of the world in relevant respects—but also (...)
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  35. Crispin Wright (2007). On Quantifying Into Predicate Position: Steps Towards a New (Tralist) Perspective. In Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael D. Potter (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 150--74.
  36. Crispin Wright (2007). Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein's Quietism and the Constitutive Question. Ratio 20 (4):481–502.
    This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) (...)
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  37. Crispin Wright (2007). The Perils of Dogmatism. In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    "Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...)
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  38. Stewart Shapiro & Crispin Wright (2006). All Things Indefinitely Extensible. In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), ¸ Iterayo&Uzquiano:Ag. Clarendon Press. 255--304.
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  39. Stewart Shapiro & Crispin Wright (2006). ¸ Iterayo&Uzquiano:Ag.
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  40. Crispin Wright (2006). Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb. In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press. 38--60.
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  41. Crispin Wright (2006). True Relativism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press.
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  42. Crispin Wright (2006). Vagueness-Related Partial Belief and the Constitution of Borderline Cases. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):225–232.
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  43. Crispin Wright (2005). Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):236–262.
    The central contentions of this paper are two: first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfil the eirenic promise which, for those who are drawn to it, constitutes, I believe, its main attraction; secondly, that the basic diagnosis of epistemological scepticism as somehow entrapping us, by diverting attention from a surreptitious shift to a special rarefied intellectual context, rests on inattention to the details of the principal sceptical paradoxes. These contentions are consistent with knowledge-contextualism, of some stripe or other, being true. (...)
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  44. Crispin Wright (2005). Fakty a pewność. Roczniki Filozoficzne 53 (1):321-368.
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  45. Crispin Wright (2004). Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws. Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.
  46. Crispin Wright (2004). Scepticism, Certainty, Moore and Wittgenstein. In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance. Routledge.
  47. Crispin Wright (2004). Wittgensteinian Certainties. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. 22--55.
  48. Crispin Wright (2004). Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
  49. Crispin Wright & Martin Davies (2004). On Epistemic Entitlement. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167 - 245.
    [Crispin Wright] Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently (...)
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