191 found
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  1. Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
    Recasting important questions about truth and objectivity in new and helpful terms, his book will become a focus in the contemporary debates over realism, and ...
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  2. Crispin Wright (2004). Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
  3. Crispin Wright (2002). (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
  4.  26
    Crispin Wright (2002). (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
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  5.  47
    Crispin Wright (1993). Realism, Meaning, and Truth. Blackwell.
  6. Crispin Wright (1983). Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen University Press.
  7. Crispin Wright (2008). Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
    §1 To many in or on the edges of the Academy, ”Relativism” is a word with overtones of sinister iconoclasm, representing a kind of intellectual and ethical free-for-all in which the traditional investigative virtues of clarity, rigour, objectivity, consistency and the unbiased pursuit of truth are dismissed as illusory and the great scientific constructions of the last two hundred years, together with our deepest moral convictions, rated merely as ‘our way of seeing’ the world, more elaborate and organised but otherwise (...)
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  8. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (1989). Necessity, Caution and Scepticism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):175 - 238.
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  9.  40
    Crispin Wright (ed.) (2001). Rails to Infinity. Harvard University Press.
    This volume, published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death, brings together thirteen of Crispin Wright's most influential essays on Wittgenstein ...
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  10.  2
    Crispin Wright (2008). Internal—External. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):501-517.
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  11.  21
    Crispin Wright (1980). Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. Harvard University Press.
  12. Crispin Wright (2007). The Perils of Dogmatism. In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    "Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...)
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  13.  53
    Crispin Wright (2006). Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb. In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press 38--60.
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  14. Crispin Wright (1986). Facts and Certainty. Proceedings of the British Academy 71:429-472.
  15.  73
    Crispin Wright (1991). Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Mind 100 (1):87-116.
  16. Crispin Wright (2007). Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein's Quietism and the Constitutive Question. Ratio 20 (4):481–502.
    This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about (...)
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  17. Crispin Wright (2008). Comment on John McDowell's "The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument". In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 390.
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  18.  63
    Crispin Wright (2005). Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):236–262.
    The central contentions of this paper are two: first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfil the eirenic promise which, for those who are drawn to it, constitutes, I believe, its main attraction; secondly, that the basic diagnosis of epistemological scepticism as somehow entrapping us, by diverting attention from a surreptitious shift to a special rarefied intellectual context, rests on inattention to the details of the principal sceptical paradoxes. These contentions are consistent with knowledge-contextualism, of some stripe or other, being true. (...)
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  19. Crispin Wright (2013). A Plurality of Pluralisms. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 123.
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  20. Crispin Wright (2008). Relativism About Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts About the Very Idea. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press 157.
  21.  24
    Crispin Wright (2001). On Being in a Quandary. Mind 110 (1):45--98.
    This paper addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalised, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalised conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement-Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived both as (...)
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  22. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2012). Horse Sense. Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
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  23.  33
    Crispin Wright (2012). Replies. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press 201-219.
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  24.  35
    Crispin Wright (2003). Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
    The essays in this companion volume prefigure, elaborate, or defend the proposals put forward in that landmark work.
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  25.  51
    Crispin Wright (2004). Wittgensteinian Certainties. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge 22--55.
  26. Crispin Wright (1991). Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Noûs 25 (2):205.
  27. Crispin Wright (2004). Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws. Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.
    The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic. When certain important distinctions (...)
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  28. Crispin Wright (1995). Truth in Ethics. Ratio 8 (3):209-226.
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    Crispin Wright (1987). Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):227-290.
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  30. Crispin Wright (2007). On Quantifying Into Predicate Position: Steps Towards a New (Tralist) Perspective. In Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael D. Potter (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press 150--74.
  31. Crispin Wright (2008). Internal-External: Doxastic Norms and the Defusing of Skeptical Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):501-517.
  32. Crispin Wright (1975). On the Coherence of Vague Predicates. Synthese 30 (3-4):325--65.
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  33. John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.) (1993). Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press.
    This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. In some cases authors write in response to the essays of other contributors, in other cases they proceed independently. Although not primarily historical this collection includes discussions of philosophers from the middle ages to (...)
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  34.  47
    Crispin Wright (2016). Assessment‐Sensitivity: The Manifestation Challenge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):189-196.
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  35. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2003). Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Bob Hale and Crispin Wright draw together here the key writings in which they have worked out their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. The two main components in Frege's mathematical philosophy were his platonism and his logicism -- the claims, respectively, that mathematics is a body of knowledge about independently existing objects, and that this knowledge may be acquired on the basis of general logical laws and suitable definitions. The central thesis of this collection is that Frege (...)
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  36. Crispin Wright (2001). Is Hume's Principle Analytic? In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Oxford University Press 307-333.
    This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might be problematic. Also the so-called `surplus content' worry is discussed, (...)
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  37. Crispin Wright (1988). Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism. Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Delivered in Oxford on June 2, 1987. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.
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  38.  19
    Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2000). Implicit Definition and the a Priori. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press 286--319.
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  39. Crispin Wright (1984). Kripke's Account of the Argument Against Private Language. Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):759-78.
  40. Crispin Wright (2011). Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):29-41.
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  41. Crispin Wright (2007). New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.
    What I am calling New Age Relativism is usually proposed as a thesis about the truth-conditions of utterances, where an utterance is an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type. Roughly, it is the view that, for certain discourses, whether an utterance is true depends not just on the context of its making—when, where, to whom, by whom, in what language, and so on—and the “circumstances of evaluation”—the state of the world in relevant respects—but also (...)
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  42.  58
    Crispin Wright (2002). On Knowing What is Necessary: Three Limitations of Peacocke's Account. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):655–662.
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  43. Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2002). Benacerraf's Dilemma Revisited. European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):101–129.
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  44. Crispin Wright (2009). The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press
    It is common among philosophers who take an interest in the phenomenon of vagueness in natural language not merely to acknowledge higher-order vagueness but to take its existence as a basic datum— so that views that lack the resources to account for it, or that put obstacles in the way, are regarded as deficient just on that score. My main purpose in what follows is to loosen the hold of this deeply misconceived idea. Higher-order vagueness is no basic datum but (...)
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  45.  54
    Crispin Wright (1998). Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (sup1):31-74.
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  46. Crispin Wright (1992). On Putnam's Proof That We Are Not Brains in a Vat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:67--94.
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  47. Crispin Wright (1997). On the Philosophical Significance of Frege's Theorem. In R. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press 201--44.
     
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  48. Crispin Wright (1992). Is Higher Order Vagueness Coherent? Analysis 52 (3):129-139.
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  49.  88
    Crispin Wright (2011). Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):29-41.
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  50. Crispin Wright & Martin Davies (2004). On Epistemic Entitlement. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167-245.
    [Crispin Wright] Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently (...)
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