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  1. Cristina Bicchieri, Knowing and Supposing In.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a su cient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, (...)
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  2. Cristina Bicchieri & Alex K. Chavez (2013). Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion: Experimental Evidence. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):175-198.
    Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed that recipients found it fair, (...)
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  3. Cristina Bicchieri & Hugo Mercier (2013). Self-Serving Biases and Public Justifications in Trust Games. Synthese 190 (5):909-922.
    Often, when several norms are present and may be in conflict, individuals will display a self-serving bias, privileging the norm that best serves their interests. Xiao and Bicchieri (J Econ Psychol 31(3):456–470, 2010) tested the effects of inequality on reciprocating behavior in trust games and showed that—when inequality increases—reciprocity loses its appeal. They hypothesized that self-serving biases in choosing to privilege a particular social norm occur when the choice of that norm is publicly justifiable as reasonable, even if not optimal (...)
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  4. James Konow, Eric Schwitzgebel, Cristina Bicchieri, Jason Dana & María Jiménez-Buedo (2013). Experiments In Economics And Philosophy. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):151-153.
    Not so long ago, many economists and philosophers felt that their disciplines had no use for experimental methods. An experimental study was, by its nature, ‘not economics’ or ‘not philosophy’ – psychology maybe. Opinion has changed dramatically. This issue of Economics and Philosophy represents a collection of recent contributions to experimental research that explicitly deal with empirical findings or methodological questions in the intersection of the two disciplines. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first such collection dedicated (...)
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  5. Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger (2013). On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):1470594-12447791.
    A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
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  6. Cristina Bicchieri & Jiji Zhang, An Embarrassment of Riches : Modeling Social Preferences in Ultimatum Games.
    Experimental results in Ultimatum, Trust and Social Dilemma games have been interpreted as showing that individuals are, by and large, not driven by selfish motives. But we do not need experiments to know that. In our view, what the experiments show is that the typical economic auxiliary hypothesis of non-tuism should not be generalized to other contexts. Indeed, we know that when the experimental situation is framed as a market interaction, participants will be more inclined to keep more money, share (...)
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  7. Erte Xiao & Cristina Bicchieri (2012). Words or Deeds? Choosing What to Know About Others. Synthese 187 (1):49-63.
    Social cooperation often relies on individuals’ spontaneous norm obedience when there is no punishment for violation or reward for compliance. However, people do not consistently follow pro-social norms. Previous studies have suggested that an individual’s tendency toward norm conformity is affected by empirical information (i.e., what others did or would do in a similar situation) as well as by normative information (i.e., what others think one ought to do). Yet little is known about whether people have an intrinsic desire to (...)
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  8. Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On (2011). Studying the Ethical Implications of E-Trust in the Lab. Ethics and Information Technology 13 (1):5-15.
    The paper presents results of recent laboratory experiments that study if and how computer-mediated communication affects cooperation and trust. It is argued that communication medium does not matter much for trust-building and maintenance, whereas relevant pre-play communication and group size can have a major influence. The implications of the findings for the design of sites that depend on trusting communities are discussed.
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  9. Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon, Social Norms.
  10. Cristina Bicchieri, Azi Lev-On & Alex Chavez (2010). The Medium or the Message? Communication Relevance and Richness in Trust Games. Synthese 176 (1):125 - 147.
    Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. Most importantly, we find that first-movers' expectations of second-movers' reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment.
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  11. Cristina Bicchieri (2009). Rationality and Indeterminacy. In Harold Kincaid & Don Ross (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford University Press. 159.
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  12. Cristina Bicchieri (2008). The Fragility of Fairness: An Experimental Investigation on the Conditional Status of Pro-Social Norms. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):229-248.
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  13. Cristina Bicchieri & Jason McKenzie Alexander (2008). Preface. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):487-488.
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  14. Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri (2007). Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information. Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...)
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  15. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri, Knowing and Supposing in Games with Perfect Information.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...)
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  16. Cristina Bicchieri & Jason McKenzie Alexander (2007). Preface. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):559-560.
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  17. Cristina Bicchieri, Jason McKenzie Alexander, Kevin T. Kelly, Kevin Js Zollman, Malcolm R. Forster, Predrag Šustar, Patrick Forber, Kenneth Reisman, Jay Odenbaugh & Yoichi Ishida (2007). 10. Philosophy of Chemistry. Philosophy of Science 74 (5).
     
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  18. Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On (2007). Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):139-168.
    University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...)
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  19. Cristina Bicchieri (2006). Philosophy: What is to Be Done? [REVIEW] Topoi 25 (1-2):21-23.
    The isolation and professionalization of philosophy is detrimental to it. The most interesting philosophical activity is conducted at the interface of philosophy and other disciplines. Thus philosophy must continue to cross boundaries and avoid fretting about what is and is not philosophy proper.
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  20. Cristina Bicchieri, Ram Mudambi & Pietro Navarra (2005). A Matter of Trust: The Search for Accountability in Italian Politics, 1990–2000. Mind and Society 4 (1):129-148.
    During the Nineties Italian politics underwent major changes. Following the uncovering of systemic corruption, the current political establishment was wiped out. The system of representation at both the national and local level underwent a significant transformation that improved voters’ control over their elected representatives. We argue that both events were the consequence of citizens’ demand for greater accountability of public officers. We model the relationship between voters and politicians as a repeated Trust game. In such game, cooperation can be attained (...)
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  21. Cristina Bicchieri (2004). Rationality and Game Theory. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 182--205.
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  22. Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy & and Gil Tolle (2004). Trust Among Strangers. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):286-319.
    The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a "trust and reciprocate" norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.
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  23. Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy & Gil Tolle (2004). Trust Among Strangers. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):286-319.
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  24. Charles R. Twardy, Kevin B. Korb, Ole Rogeberg, Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy, Gil Tolle, P. D. Magnus, Craig Callender, Joseph F. Hanna & Paul Skokowski (2004). 1. A Criterion of Probabilistic Causation A Criterion of Probabilistic Causation (Pp. 241-262). Philosophy of Science 71 (3).
     
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  25. Cristina Bicchieri (1999). Local Fairness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
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  26. Cristina Bicchieri (1999). Review: Local Fairness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229 - 236.
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  27. Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green (1999). Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. 175.
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  28. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) (1999). The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press.
    Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form (...)
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  29. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (1999). Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games. In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press.
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  30. Cristina Bicchieri & Oliver Schulte (1996). Common Reasoning About Admissibility. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):299 - 325.
    We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form, and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common (...)
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  31. Cristina Bicchieri & Brian Skyrms (1996). Rationality and Coordination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
     
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  32. Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
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  33. Cristina Bicchieri & Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like rationality at a node and knowledge at a node. We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own theory of the game. The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
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  34. Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri, Backwards Forwards Induction.
    Gian Aldo Antonelli and Cristina Bicchieri. Backwards Forwards Induction.
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  35. Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri, Forward Induction.
    Gian Aldo Antonelli and Cristina Bicchieri. Forward Induction.
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  36. Cristina Bicchieri (1993). Counterfactuals, Belief Changes, and Equilibrium Refinements. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):21-52.
    It is usually assumed in game theory that agents who interact strategically with each other are rational, know the strategies open to other agents as well as their payoffs and, moreover, have common knowledge of all the above. In some games, that much information is sufficient for the players to identify a "solution" and play it. The most commonly adopted solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is defined a combination of strategies, one for each player, such (...)
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  37. Cristina Bicchieri (1992). Knowledge-Dependent Games: Backward Induction. In Cristina Bicchieri, Dalla Chiara & Maria Luisa (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press. 327--343.
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  38. Cristina Bicchieri, Dalla Chiara & Maria Luisa (eds.) (1992). Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press.
    In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in (...)
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  39. Cristina Bicchieri (1990). Norms of Cooperation. Ethics 100 (4):838-861.
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  40. Cristina Bicchieri (1990). Paradoxes of Rationality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):65-79.
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  41. Cristina Bicchieri (1989). Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 30 (1-2):69 - 85.
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  42. Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
    A large class of games is that of non-cooperative, extensive form games of perfect information. When the length of these games is finite, the method used to reach a solution is that of a backward induction. Working from the terminal nodes, dominated strategies are successively deleted and what remains is a unique equilibrium. Game theorists have generally assumed that the informational requirement needed to solve these games is that the players have common knowledge of rationality. This assumption, however, has given (...)
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  43. Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Methodological Rules as Conventions. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (4):477-495.
  44. Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals. Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
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  45. Cristina Bicchieri (1987). Rationality and Predictability in Economics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):501-513.
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  46. Cristina Bicchieri (1987). Book Review:Le Liberalisme Moderne: Analyse d'une Raison Economique. Serge-Christophe Kolm; Le Contrat Social Liberal: Philosophie et Pratique du Liberalisme. Serge-Christophe Kolm. [REVIEW] Ethics 98 (1):185-.
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