Introduction: Women in love -- Cupid doffs his blindfold : love as wisdom -- The power of power differentials : love as inequality -- The blade between us : love as transgression -- We must be two before we can be one : love as absence -- On my blood I'll carry you away : love as heroism -- Anonymous except for injury : love as failure -- Carving in the flesh : love as art -- Epilogue: Waging love : (...) toward a new definition of eros. (shrink)
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) argue that the extant literature on ambiguity aversion is not successful in accounting for Ellsberg choices as rational responses to ambiguity. We concur, and propose that rational choice under ambiguity aims at robustness rather than avoidance of ambiguity. A central argument explains why robust choice is intrinsically context-dependent and legitimately violates standard choice consistency conditions. If choice consistency is forced, however, ambiguity-aversion emerges as a semi-rational response to ambiguity.
This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called `Simultaneous (...) Expected Utility Maximization'. It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment. An essential but non-standard feature of Simultaneous Expected Utility choices is their dependence on the entire choice set. This is justified by the conception of optimality as compromise rather than as superiority in pairwise comparisons. (shrink)
The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) plays an important role in game theory and the economics of information. It is the basic assumption behind decision-theoretic justifications of equilibrium reasoning in games (Aumann, 1987, Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) and no-trade results with asymmetric information (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Recently several authors (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned whether the CPA is meaningful in situations of incomplete information, where there is no ex ante stage and where the primitives of (...) the model are the individuals' beliefs about the external world (their first-order beliefs), their beliefs about the other individuals' beliefs (second-order beliefs), etc., i.e. their hierarchies of beliefs. In this context, the CPA is a mathematical property whose conceptual content is not clear. The main results of this paper (Theorems 1 and 2) provide a characterization of Harsanyi consistency in terms of properties of the belief hierarchies that are entirely unrelated to the idea of an ex ante stage. (shrink)
Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are: (1) if at the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief in the rationality of every player and common belief that no player has false beliefs (he calls this joint condition âstrong rationalizabilityâ), then the true (or actual) strategy profile is path equivalent to a (...) Nash equilibrium; (2) in a normal-form game a strategy profile is strongly rationalizable if and only if it belongs to C8 , the set of profiles that survive the iterative deletion of inferior profiles. (shrink)
In her book Rationality and coordination (Cambridge University Press, 1994) Cristina Bicchieri brings together (and adds to) her own contributions to game theory and the philosophy of economics published in various journals in the period 1987-1992. The book, however, is not a collection of separate articles but rather a homogeneous unit organized around some central themes in the foundations of non-cooperative game theory. Bicchieri’s exposition is admirably clear and well organized. Somebody with a good knowledge of game theory would (...) probably benefit mainly from reading the second part of Chapter 3 (from Section 3.6 onward) and Chapter 4. On the other hand, those who have had little exposure to game theory, would certainly benefit from reading the entire book. I shall begin with an overview of the content of the book and then offer some critical comments on what I consider to be the most important part of it. (shrink)
This article offers a critical assessment of Cristina Bicchieri and Jon Elster’s recent attempt to distinguish between social, moral, and quasi-moral norms. Although their typologies present interesting differences, they both distinguish types of norms on the basis of the way in which context, and especially other agents’ expectations and behavior, shapes one’s preference to comply with norms. We argue that both typologies should be abandoned because they fail to capture causally relevant features of norms. We nevertheless emphasize that both (...) Bicchieri and Elster correctly draw attention to important and often neglected characteristics of the psychology of norm compliance. (shrink)
This article is meant as a response to Cristina Lafont’s critiques of Habermas’ view of religion’s role in the public sphere. For Lafont, the burdens that Habermas places on secular citizens, by requiring them to avoid secularism, may entail dangerous consequences for a correct understanding of the concept of deliberative democracy. For this reason, she presents a proposal of her own in which no citizen, whether religious or secular, has the obligation to engage in a way of thinking alien (...) to his or her own cognitive stance. Although subtle and revealing, Lafont’s critiques face two great problems. On the one hand, she does not discuss Habermas’ thoughts on the nature and value of religion, and, on the other, she overestimates sincerity as an element of an ethics of citizenship. I have divided my text in three sections. First, I will present Lafont’s criticism on Habermas’ proposal. For presenting Lafont’s objections I will use and expand an example mentioned by Lafont herself, namely, a political public debate about same-sex marriage. Second, I will answer Lafont’s objections, and finally, I will offer some conclusions regarding the philosophical bases on which Habermas’ account rests. (shrink)
O ensaio tem como objeto o estudo das estratégias ficcionais presentes na correspondência da poetisa, missivista e tradutora Ana Cristina César, com o intuito de dar visibilidade aos espaços públicos e privados na literatura da contemporaneidade. Como fonte de pesquisa dos novos limiares existentes entre esses espaços foi escolhida a obra Correspondência incompleta, de 1999. De uma perspectiva historicizada, o ensaio traça o percurso teórico-crítico de definição desses espaços. Analisa alguns exemplos, tomados das cartas, para apresentar o entrecruzamento desses (...) espaços, oferecendo o ponto de vista da literatura. (shrink)
El presente artículo muestra los esfuerzos realizados por Cristina de Pizán a la hora de combatir el discurso misógino. En este contexto de lucha por el reconocimiento de las mujeres, Pizán se sirve de dos armas: el dominio del propio cuerpo femenino para contrarrestar los ataques masculinos y el discurso como herramienta para configurar performativamente una identidad flexible, abierta y en constante proceso de construcción.
The paper aims at analysing the fundamental theoretical aspects of the latest book by Maria Cristina Bartolomei, La dimensione simbolica and at showing some possible paths of research it suggests in the direction of a hermeneutical perspective opened to the metaphysics. After reflecting about what the author of the book affirms regarding the vision of the symbol from ‘high’ and from ‘low’ and the relation which it has with interpretation and concept, the suggested symbolic character of thought is analyzed (...) in connection with the themes of analogy and paradox. On one hand, it is pointed out that analogy is related both to symbol (Ricoeur) and to concept (Gadamer) and it is inquired how it is possible to describe the relationship between proportion and proportionality implied with analogy. On the other hand, it is underlined how the original principle can be thought in our fallen situation not only by means of symbol and analogy (Bartolomei), but also in the light of symbol and paradox, understood as form of thought which recomposes the break between finite and infinite without removing the signs of it (Ciancio). Finally, it is inquired if analogy and paradox, conceived as critical and conceptual forms of symbol, can light up the relationship among mystical, symbolic and common experience which seems to characterize our existence. (shrink)
O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como a carta de Galileu a Cristina de Lorena procura compatibilizar o sistema copernicano com o texto bíblico. Para isso, ela obedece aos cânones da arte de escrever cartas ( ars dictaminis ) codificados desde a Idade Média, cujas partes tradicionais são: saudação, captatio benevolentiae, exposição, petição e conclusão.