Search results for 'Criteria of truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Timothy Rosenkoetter (2009). Truth Criteria and the Very Project of a Transcendental Logic. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 91 (2):193-236.score: 110.0
    This paper argues that Kant's idea for a new kind of logic is bound up with a very specific strategy for obtaining truth criteria, where he takes Christian Wolff to have failed. While the First Critique 's argument against any universal criterion for empirical truth has almost always been treated as extraneous to the main concerns of the Transcendental Analytic, I argue that Kant inserted it at an important juncture in the text to illustrate a signal difference (...)
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  2. S. Eng (1999). Criteria That Are Used in the Setting Up of and Choice Between Descriptive Characterisations. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):475-495.score: 104.0
    This paper investigates the actual use of truth as a criterion in the setting up of and choice between descriptive characterisations. The consideration for truth is often weighed against other considerations. This weighing character is illuminated through examples from everyday life, politics, law, and science. In everyday life the weighing character shows itself inter alia through the categories of `white lies' and `great questions', and in politics, inter alia through the categories of `personal character' versus `the party'. In (...)
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  3. Whitney Schwab (2013). Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth. Apeiron 46 (3):327-344.score: 100.0
    In this paper I examine, and reject, one of the chief philosophical arguments that purports to show that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with possessing any beliefs. That argument, first put forward by Jonathan Barnes and since accepted by many philosophers, focuses on the skeptic's resolute suspension of judgment concerning one philosophical issue, namely whether criteria of truth exist. In short, the argument holds that, because skeptics suspend judgment whether criteria of truth exist, they have no basis (...)
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  4. A. Campbell Garnett (1935). A Theory of the Nature and Criteria of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):66 – 81.score: 93.0
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  5. T. E. Burke (1970). Criteria of Truth. Philosophy 45 (172):154 - 155.score: 90.0
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  6. Jonathan A. Waskan (2000). Kant's Epistemic and Defining Criteria of Truth. International Studies in Philosophy 32 (4):107-121.score: 90.0
  7. Mary Hesse (1975). Criteria of Truth in Science and Theology. Religious Studies 11 (4):385 - 400.score: 90.0
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  8. Henry Sidgwick (1900). Criteria of Truth and Error. Mind 9 (33):8-25.score: 90.0
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  9. Thomas Reinert (1996). Book Review: Literary Power and the Criteria of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Literature 20 (1):275-276.score: 90.0
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  10. Laura Quinney (1996). Book Review: Literary Power and the Criteria of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Literature 20 (1).score: 90.0
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  11. Donald Sievert (1979). Descartes' Criteria of Truth. The Modern Schoolman 56 (2):151-160.score: 90.0
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  12. Brian Ribeiro (2011). A Really Short Refutation of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:31-34.score: 87.0
    The pragmatic theory of truth (PTT) seeks to illuminate the concept of truth by focusing on concepts like usefulness or adaptivity. However, contrary to common opinion, PTT does not merely face a narrow band of (perhaps) rather artificial counterexamples (as in a case of empirically unfounded but life-extending optimism in a cancer patient); instead, PTT is faced with a fast psychological research literature which suggests that inaccurate beliefs are both (1) pervasive in human beings and, nonetheless, (2) fully (...)
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  13. Lorenz B. Puntel (1999). On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth: The Fundamental Problem and a New Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (1):101-130.score: 87.0
    The present article purports to show that the protocol sentence debate, pursued by some leading members of the Vienna Circle in the mid-1930s, was essentially a controversy over the explanation and the real significance of the concept of truth. It is further shown that the fundamental issue underlying the discussions about the concept of truth was the relationship between form and content, as well as between logic/language and the world. R. Carnap was the philosopher who most explicitly and (...)
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  14. Tapani Hyttinen & Gabriel Sandu (2000). Henkin Quantifiers and the Definability of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):507-527.score: 87.0
    Henkin quantifiers have been introduced in Henkin (1961). Walkoe (1970) studied basic model-theoretical properties of an extension $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) of ordinary first-order languages in which every sentence is a first-order sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. In this paper we consider a generalization of Walkoe's languages: we close $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) with respect to Boolean operations, and obtain the language L¹(H). At the next level, we consider an extension $L_{*}^{2}$ (H) of L¹(H) in which every sentence is an L¹(H)-sentence prefixed with (...)
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  15. Kirsten Lomborg & Marit Kirkevold (2003). Truth and Validity in Grounded Theory – a Reconsidered Realist Interpretation of the Criteria: Fit, Work, Relevance and Modifiability. Nursing Philosophy 4 (3):189-200.score: 87.0
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  16. Leon Horsten (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.score: 87.0
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be (...)
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  17. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1977). Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):349 - 354.score: 87.0
    Robert cummins has recently attacked this line of argument: if p is a semantically primitive predicate of a first order language l, then p requires its own clause in the definition of satisfaction integral to a definition of truth of l. thus if l has infinitely many such p, the satisfaction clause cannot be completed and truth for l will remain undefined. against this cummins argues that a single clause in a general base theory for l can specify (...)
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  18. Günther Eder (2014). Remarks on Compositionality and Weak Axiomatic Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):541-547.score: 87.0
    The paper draws attention to an important, but apparently neglected distinction relating to axiomatic theories of truth, viz. the distinction between weakly and strongly truth-compositional theories of truth. The paper argues that the distinction might be helpful in classifying weak axiomatic theories of truth and examines some of them with respect to it.
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  19. Nader N. Chokr (1993). Nelson Goodman on Truth, Relativism, and Criteria of Rightness Or Why We Should Dispense with Truth and Adopt Rightness? Dialectica 47 (1):55-73.score: 87.0
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  20. Colin Leslie Dean (2005). Juxtaposing 2 Contradictory Views of Freud: The Apotheosis of Logic ; the Undermining of the Epistemological Validity of Logic: Freud Rejects Aristotelian Logic as the Criteria to Assess the 'Truths' of Psychoanalysis and Thus Becomes a Precursor to Quantum Mechanics and Mathematics Like Wise Abandonment of Aristotelian Logis as an Epistemic Condition of 'Truth' in Certain Situations. Gamahucher Press.score: 87.0
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  21. Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). Hegel's Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion. In Jon Stewart (ed.), The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: A Collection of Critical and Interpretive Essays. SUNY. 173 - 188.score: 86.0
    [Revised version.] Contemporary epistemologists, including Chisholm, Moser, Alston and Fogelin, have over-simplified Pyrrhonian scepticism and in particular Sextus Empiricus’ Dilemma of the Criterion. I argue that the central methodological problem Hegel addresses in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit is the ‘Dilemma of the Criterion’, which purports to show that no criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood can be established. I show that the Dilemma is especially pressing for any epistemology which, like Hegel’s, rejects ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, aims (...)
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  22. P. Schlenker (2007). The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):251 - 307.score: 85.0
    Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken together, are paradoxical. Yablo's paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k > i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k > i is s(k) true). We generalize Yablo's (...)
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  23. Jennifer Bleazby (2011). Overcoming Relativism and Absolutism: Dewey's Ideals of Truth and Meaning in Philosophy for Children. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (5):453-466.score: 84.0
    Different notions of truth imply and encourage different ideals of thinking, knowledge, meaning, and learning. Thus, these concepts have fundamental importance for educational theory and practice. In this paper, I intend to draw out and clarify the notions of truth, knowledge and meaning that are implied by P4C's pedagogical ideals. There is some disagreement amongst P4C theorists and practitioners about whether the community of inquiry implies either relativism or absolutism. I will argue that both relativism and absolutism are (...)
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  24. Boris Rähme, The Paradox of Knowability and Epistemic Theories of Truth.score: 84.0
    The article suggests a reading of the term ‘epistemic account of truth’ which runs contrary to a widespread consensus with regard to what epistemic accounts are meant to provide, namely a definition of truth in epistemic terms. Section 1. introduces a variety of possible epistemic accounts that differ with regard to the strength of the epistemic constraints they impose on truth. Section 2. introduces the paradox of knowability and presents a slightly reconstructed version of a related argument (...)
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  25. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.score: 84.0
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for (...)
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  26. Jay Newhard (2009). The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345 - 352.score: 84.0
    Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. (...)
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  27. Jeremy Wyatt (2014). Pluralism and the Absence of Truth. Dissertation, University of Connecticutscore: 84.0
    In this dissertation, I argue that we should be pluralists about truth and in turn, eliminativists about the property Truth. Traditional deflationists were right to suspect that there is no such property as Truth. Yet there is a plurality of pluralities of properties which enjoy defining features that Truth would have, were it to exist. So although, in this sense, truth is plural, Truth is non-existent. The resulting account of truth is indebted to (...)
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  28. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.score: 84.0
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  29. Josep Maria Font (2009). Taking Degrees of Truth Seriously. Studia Logica 91 (3):383 - 406.score: 84.0
    This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works (...)
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  30. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). Two Concepts of Truth. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):35 - 58.score: 84.0
    In this paper the authors recapitulate, justify, and defend against criticism the extension of the redundancy theory of truth to cover a wide range of uses of ‘true’ and ‘false’. In this they are guided by the work of A. N. Prior. They argue Prior was right about the scope and limits of the redundancy theory and that the line he drew between those uses of ‘true’ which are and are not susceptible to treatment via redundancy serves to distinguish (...)
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  31. Colin Johnston (2013). Judgment and the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):381-397.score: 84.0
    The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.
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  32. Ernesto Perini-Santos (2011). John Buridans Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar. Vivarium 49 (1-3):184-213.score: 84.0
    The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera quia qualitercumque significat in rebus (...)
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  33. Angel J. Gil (2013). On Gentzen Relations Associated with Finite-Valued Logics Preserving Degrees of Truth. Studia Logica 101 (4):749-781.score: 84.0
    When considering m-sequents, it is always possible to obtain an m-sequent calculus VL for every m-valued logic (defined from an arbitrary finite algebra L of cardinality m) following for instance the works of the Vienna Group for Multiple-valued Logics. The Gentzen relations associated with the calculi VL are always finitely equivalential but might not be algebraizable. In this paper we associate an algebraizable 2-Gentzen relation with every sequent calculus VL in a uniform way, provided the original algebra L has a (...)
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  34. Catherine Legg (2014). Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth. Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.score: 84.0
    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.
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  35. Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra (2010). A Pragmatic View of Truth. Principia 8 (2):259-277.score: 84.0
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they (...)
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  36. Barry Smith (1982). Some Formal Moments of Truth. In Werner Leinfellner (ed.), Language and Ontology. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky / Reidel. 186--90.score: 84.0
    A preliminary statement of the formal theory of the truthmaker relation advanced in the paper “Truth-makers” (Mulligan, Simons and Smith) in 1984. Correspondence theories of truth have. I give a brief account of some more or less obvious formal characteristics of this almost forgotten basic truthmaker relation. I then attempt to show how this account may be extended to provide elements of a theory of truth which is in keeping with the spirit of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.
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  37. Celso Reni Braida (2010). Realist Conception of Truth, W. P. Alston. Principia 1 (2):305-311.score: 84.0
    Review on Realist conception of Truth, of the W. P. Alston.
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  38. Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith (2003). Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth. In Jaako Hintikka (ed.), Philosophy and Logic: In Search of the Polish Tradition. Kluwer.score: 83.0
    The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of (...)
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  39. Anton Carpinschi (2010). The Culture of Acknowledgement and the Horizons of Truth. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 5 (15):54-65.score: 83.0
    Focused on the dynamic of the relations between truth and acknowledgement, this study brings forward the following series of hypotheses: 1) between “the essence of truth”, as revelation and referential experience, cognitive and moral supreme resort and the various embodiments of partial, temporary and relative truths, there is an operational space of thinking and acting, favorable to the comprehensive truths, as we call them; 2) within the unceasing aspiration of overcoming the partial truths and asymptotical closeness to “the (...)
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  40. Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.score: 82.0
    This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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  41. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). The Price of Truth. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), Pragmatism, Minimalism and Metaphysics.score: 82.0
    Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean (...)
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  42. Kyung-Man Kim (2011). Habermas on Understanding: Virtual Participation, Dialogue and the Universality of Truth. [REVIEW] Human Studies 34 (4):393-406.score: 82.0
    Although the success of Habermas’s theory of communicative action depends on his dialogical model of understanding in which a theorist is supposed to participate in the debate with the actors as a ‘virtual participant’ and seek context-transcendent truth through the exchange of speech acts, current literature on the theory of communicative action rarely touches on the difficulties it entails. In the first part of this paper, I will examine Habermas’s argument that understanding other cultural practices requires the interpreter to (...)
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  43. Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch (2001). Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth. Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.score: 82.0
    We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.
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  44. Lynch Michael (2009). The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.score: 82.0
    There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
     
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  45. Xinli Wang (2002). Taxonomy, Truth-Value Gaps and Incommensurability: A Reconstruction of Kuhn's Taxonomic Interpretation of Incommensurability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):465-485.score: 81.0
    Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, I reconstruct Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation on the basis of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication. According to the reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth values when considered within its own context, lack truth (...)
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  46. Josiah B. Gould (1967). Chrysippus: On the Criteria for the Truth of a Conditional Proposition. Phronesis 12 (1):152-161.score: 81.0
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  47. M. S. N. BA & Marit Kirkevold RN EdD (2003). Truth and Validity in Grounded Theory – a Reconsidered Realist Interpretation of the Criteria: Fit, Work, Relevance and Modifiability. Nursing Philosophy 4 (3):189–200.score: 81.0
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  48. S. Grean (1993). Truth and Faith in Tillich, Paul Thought-the Criteria and Values of Ultimacy. Ultimate Reality and Meaning 16 (1-2):149-166.score: 81.0
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  49. William P. Alston (1996). A Realist Conception of Truth. Cornell University Press.score: 80.0
    William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia", Greek for "truth").
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