Search results for 'Criterion of identity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Rafael De Clercq (2005). A Criterion of Diachronic Identity Based on Locke's Principle. Metaphysica 6 (1):23-38.
    The aim of this paper is to derive a perfectly general criterion of identity through time from Locke’s Principle, which says that two things of the same kind cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In this way, the paper pursues a suggestion made by Peter F. Strawson almost thirty years ago in an article called ‘Entity and Identity’. The reason why the potential of this suggestion has so far remained unrealized is twofold: firstly, the (...)
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  2. Rafael De Clercq (2013). Locke's Principle is an Applicable Criterion of Identity. Noûs 47 (4):697-705.
    According to Locke’s Principle, material objects are identical if and only if they are of the same kind and once occupy the same place at the same time. There is disagreement about whether this principle is true, but what is seldom disputed is that, even if true, the principle fails to constitute an applicable criterion of identity. In this paper, I take issue with two arguments that have been offered in support of this claim by arguing (i) that (...)
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  3.  99
    Rafael De Clercq, Wai-Yin Lam & Jiji Zhang (2014). Is There a Problem with the Causal Criterion of Event Identity? American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):109-119.
    In this paper, we take another look at the reasons for which the causal criterion of event identity has been abandoned. We argue that the reasons are not strong. First of all, there is a criterion in the neighborhood of the causal criterion—the counterfactual criterion—that is not vulnerable to any of the putative counterexamples brought up in the literature. Secondly, neither the causal criterion nor the counterfactual criterion suffers from any form of vicious (...)
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  4.  74
    Harold W. Noonan (2009). What is a One-Level Criterion of Identity? Analysis 69 (2):274-277.
    Standardly, a one-level criterion of identity 1 is given in the form: ∀ x∀ y )where ‘ K’ denotes the kind of thing for which the criterion is being given and ‘ R’ denotes the criterial relation.Thus, we have, for example, the criterion of identity for sets: ∀ x∀ y))and for composites: ∀ x∀ y))and for events: ∀ x∀ y)). is equivalent to the conjunction of: ∀ x and ∀ x )),which just give two necessary (...)
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  5. Eric T. Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press 242.
    One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that (...)
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  6.  27
    Sophie C. Gibb (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Subtraction of Powers. Erkenntnis 79 (1):127-146.
    According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property identity is unsatisfactory, because it fails to provide a sufficient condition for the identification of properties. My argument for this claim is based on the observation that the summing of properties does (...)
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  7.  23
    Tristan Guillermo Torriani (2010). Perspectivism and Intersubjective Criteria for Personal Identity: A Defense of Bernard Williams' Criterion of Bodily Continuity. Princípios 15 (23):153-190.
    In this article I revisit earlier stages of the discussion of personal identity, before Neo-Lockean psychological continuity views became prevalent. In particular, I am interested in Bernard Williams’ initial proposal of bodily identity as a necessary, although not sufficient, criterion of personal identity. It was at this point that psychological continuity views came to the fore arguing that bodily identity was not necessary because brain transplants were logically possible, even if physically impossible. Further proposals by (...)
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  8. E. J. Lowe (1989). What is a Criterion of Identity? Philosophical Quarterly 39 (154):1-21.
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  9. Johan E. Gustafsson (2010). Did Locke Defend the Memory Continuity Criterion of Personal Identity? Locke Studies 10:113–129.
    John Locke’s account of personal identity is usually thought to have been proved false by Thomas Reid’s simple ‘Gallant Officer’ argument. Locke is traditionally interpreted as holding that your having memories of a past person’s thoughts or actions is necessary and sufficient for your being identical to that person. This paper argues that the traditional memory interpretation of Locke’s account is mistaken and defends a memory continuity view according to which a sequence of overlapping memories is necessary and sufficient (...)
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  10.  51
    Newton Garver (1964). Criterion of Personal Identity. Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):779-783.
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  11.  8
    C. Anthony Anderson (2001). A Criterion of Identity for Intensional Entities. In C. Anthony Anderson & Michael Zelëny (eds.), Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Kluwer 305--395.
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  12. George I. Mavrodes (1977). The Life Everlasting and the Bodily Criterion of Identity. Noûs 11 (1):27-39.
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  13. Akhtar Imam (1967). Concept of Memory as a Criterion of Self-Identity. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 14 (April):158-176.
  14.  21
    David Sedley (1982). The Stoic Criterion of Identity. Phronesis 27 (3):255-275.
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  15.  32
    David Sedley (1982). The Stoic Criterion of Identity. Phronesis 27 (3):255 - 275.
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  16. J. María Vilajosana (1996). Towards a Material Criterion of Identity of a Legal Order. Rechtstheorie 27 (1):45-64.
     
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  17. Pawel Garbacz (2002). What Is A Level Of A Criterion Of Identity? Metaphysica 3 (2).
     
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  18. Marwan Rashed (2010). Alexander of Aphrodisias on Particulars and the Stoic Criterion of Identity. In R. W. Sharples (ed.), Particulars in Greek Philosophy: The Seventh S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. Brill
  19.  13
    Julie Maybee (2001). Who Am I?: The Limits of Shared Culture as a Criterion of Group Solidarity and Individual Identity. Radical Philosophy Review 4 (1/2):39-53.
    Maybee asserts that racial group formation and identity politics may be more complex than simply shared cultural practices or skin color. They may be based on political interests and commitment to liberation and antiracist struggles.
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  20. Eric T. Olson (2006). The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity. In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Clarendon Press
     
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  21.  10
    Bernard D. Katz (1978). Is the Causal Criterion of Event-Identity Circular? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):225 – 229.
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  22.  83
    E. J. Lowe (1989). Impredicative Identity Criteria and Davidson's Criterion of Event Identity. Analysis 49 (4):178-81.
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  23.  13
    J. E. Tiles (1976). David'S Criterion Of Event Identity. Analysis 36 (June):185-187.
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  24.  6
    Lynn Pasqurella (1991). Chisholm's Intentional Criterion of Property-Identity and de Se Belief. Philosophical Issues 1:261-273.
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  25. A. Chakraborty (1996). A Critical Analysis of John Locke's Criterion of Personal Identity. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 23 (3-4):349-362.
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  26. G. Nayak (1978). The Criterion of Personal Identity Must It Be Physical? Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (4):587-600.
     
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  27.  6
    Dmitry A. Golovushkin (2010). On the Issue of Religious Tolerance in Modern Russia: National Identity and Religion. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 3 (7):101-110.
    The sources of religious tolerance but also of religious nationalism in post-soviet Russia can be found basically in the group identification of nationality and religion. In crisis situations, the historical religion of the Russian society - Orthodoxy - becomes the criterion for identifying the national identity. However, despite the fact that the majority of Russians in our times consider themselves Orthodox, many of them are not believers. The observable effect of the “external belief” results in the fact that (...)
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  28.  25
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (forthcoming). Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities. Synthese:1-13.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used (...)
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  29.  2
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2016). Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities. Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used (...)
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  30.  41
    P. Garbacz (2004). Subsumption and Relative Identity. Axiomathes 14 (4):341-360.
    This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute (...)
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  31. Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):61-68.
    We show that finitely axiomatized first-order theories that involve some criterion of identity for entities of a category C can be reformulated as conjunctions of a non-triviality statement and a criterion of identity for entities of category C again. From this, we draw two conclusions: First, criteria of identity can be very strong deductively. Second, although the criteria of identity that are constructed in the proof of the theorem are not good ones intuitively, it (...)
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  32.  71
    Max Kistler (2002). The Causal Criterion of Reality and the Necessity of Laws of Nature. Metaphysica 3 (1):57-86.
    I propose an argument for the thesis that laws of nature are necessary in the sense of holding in all worlds sharing the properties of the actual world, on the basis of a principle I propose to call the Causal Criterion of Reality . The CCR says: for an entity to be real it is necessary and sufficient that it is capable to make a difference to causal interactions. The crucial idea here is that the capacity to interact causally (...)
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  33.  48
    Aleksandar Kellenberg (2009). Identifying Criteria of Identity. Metaphysica 10 (1):109-122.
    I discuss E. J. Lowe's conception of criteria of identity and sketch a different and, I think, more adequate conception. On my view, criteria of identity are some of the things we can do. They are what we do when distinguishing between single entities of the kind in question and pairs of entities of the relevant domain. And they enable us to make such distinctions because they are applicable to all single and to all pairs of entities of (...)
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  34.  22
    Radu Neculau (2012). Being Oneself in Another: Recognition and the Culturalist Deformation of Identity. Inquiry 55 (2):148-170.
    Abstract Nancy Fraser raises serious doubts about the critical potential of identity theories of recognition on the ground that they encourage the reduction of personal identity to cultural identity. Based on a comparative analysis of Charles Taylor's and Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, this paper argues that Fraser's critique is justified with respect to some aspects of Taylor's theory of identity, but not with respect to his conception of recognition, or to Honneth's conception of both (...) and recognition. Taylor's theory of identity recognition is vulnerable to Fraser's critique because under certain conditions of pathological socialization it cannot prevent the normative subordination of strong evaluation to whatever dominant goods are acquired through acculturation. Honneth's theory of identity recognition overcomes this normative weakness in three ways. First, Honneth differentiates between three types of self-relation that cannot be reduced to cultural identity. Second, he operates with a mixed, attributive?responsive model of recognition that normatively underwrites all these types of self-relation. Third, he makes the condition of reciprocity in recognition the criterion for successful self-realization that enables one to distinguish between misrecognition and non-normative experiences of human suffering. (shrink)
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  35. Theodore Sider (2001). Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):189-209.
    When is there no fact of the matter about a metaphysical question? When multiple candidate meanings are equally eligible, in David Lewis's sense, and fit equally well with ordinary usage. Thus given certain ontological schemes, there is no fact of the matter whether the criterion of personal identity over time is physical or psychological. But given other ontological schemes there is a fact of the matter; and there is a fact of the matter about which ontological scheme is (...)
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  36.  2
    François-Igor Pris (2014). Illusions of Possibilities and Real Possibilities. NB: Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 5.
    I suggest a Wittgensteinian explanation of the illusion of possibility of the violation of a necessary a posteriori identity, which satisfies the psychoanalytical criterion of Stephen Yablo.
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  37. Logi Gunnarsson (2010). Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. Routledge.
    Introduction -- Am I alone in my body? -- Multiple personality -- Personal identity -- Diachronic identity -- What am I fundamentally? -- Empirical discernability and fission -- My body -- The various senses of personal identity -- Multiple personality and individuation -- Morton Prince's seminal case study the dissociation of a personality -- Philosophical theories of multiple personality -- The coexistence thesis -- Sharing my body -- A criterion of individuation -- Multiple personality in therapeutic (...)
     
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  38.  2
    Burt C. Hopkins (2016). Numerical Identity and the Constitution of Transcendence in Transcendental Phenomenology. Research in Phenomenology 46 (2):205-220.
    _ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 205 - 220 I investigate the phenomenological significance of Husserl’s appeal to the “numerical identity” of _irreality_ as it appears in recollected manifolds of lived-experience in his mature account of the transcendental constitution of transcendence and find it wanting. I show that what is at stake for Husserl in this appeal is the descriptive mark that exhibits the distinction between a unit of meaning as it is constituted in psychologically determined lived-experience and (...)
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  39.  41
    Bernardo J. Cantens (2001). A Solution to the Problem of Personal Identity in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:121-134.
    This paper presents a solution to the problem of personal identity over time in Thomas’s metaphysics. I argue that Professor Gracia’s solution to the problem of personal identity, existence, and Professor Stump’s solution, form or the human soul, are not only compatible but also necessarily interdependent on one another. This argument rests on (1) the special nature of the human soul, and (2) the metaphysical claim that for Thomas the human soul and existence are inseparable. First, I refine (...)
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  40.  5
    M. K. Chakraborty & A. Chatterjee (1996). On Representation of Indeterminate Identity Via Vague Concepts. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 6 (2):191-201.
    ABSTRACT Vague concepts are represented by L-fuzzy sets. It is argued that any vague concept carries with it an approximate identity which is a fuzzy equivalence relation. The relation also fulfills the criterion of ? indiscernibility of Identicals ?, which is called ? saturatedness ? in this context. An application in knowledge representation is indicated.
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  41.  22
    Karl Ameriks (1977). Criteria of Personal Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47 - 69.
    I defend the claim that bodily continuity is the primary criterion of personal identity by arguing there is an important sense in which it (unlike rival criteria) is a necessary condition of such identity. This claim is shown to be misunderstood in recent discussions because of a confusion of it with the claim that bodily continuity is a sufficient condition of personal identity. In the course of my argument, I criticize williams, Shoemaker, Puccetti, Quinton, Miri, And (...)
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  42.  5
    Dennis Dieks (2014). Weak Discernibility and the Identity of Spacetime Points. In Giovanni Macchia, Francesco Orilia & Vincenzo Fano (eds.), Space and Time: A Priori and a Posteriori Studies. De Gruyter 43-62.
    In this article we investigate putative counterexamples to Leibniz’s principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In particular, we look at the status of spacetime points: although these all possess exactly the same properties in symmetrical spacetimes and thus seem indiscernible, there are certainly more than one of them. However, we shall defend Leibniz’s principle, even for such highly symmetrical cases. Part of our strategy will be to invoke the notion of “weak discernibility”, as proposed in the recent literature. Weakly (...)
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  43. Peter Lazor (2010). The Identity of Particulars Over Time. Filozofia 65 (6):589-594.
    The aim of the paper is to shed light on the problem of identity of particulars over time within the framework of Quinean analysis. First, it focuses on the relationship between essential and accidental property changes as a criterion for distinguishing cases when objects retain their identity from cases when they loose it. In this part it is shown, that a coherent distinction between essential and accidental properties is problematic. Quinean approach indicates that we do not need (...)
     
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  44. David W. Shoemaker (2002). The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductionism About Personal Identity. Philo 5 (2):143-160.
    Before being able to answer key practical questions dependent on a criterion of personal identity (e.g., am I justified in anticipating surviving the death of my body?), we must first determine which general approach to the issue of personal identity is more plausible, reductionism or non-reductionism. While reductionism has become the more dominant approach amongst philosophical theorists over the past thirty years, non-reductionism remains an approach that, for all these theorists have shown, could very well still be (...)
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  45. Geoffrey Madell (2014). The Essence of the Self: In Defense of the Simple View of Personal Identity. Routledge.
    In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the "simple" or "anti-criterial" view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes that there is always a gap between ‘A is f and (...)
     
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  46. Geoffrey Madell (2014). The Essence of the Self: In Defense of the Simple View of Personal Identity. Routledge.
    In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the "simple" or "anti-criterial" view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes that there is always a gap between ‘A is _f_ and (...)
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  47.  48
    Giovanni Boniolo & Giuseppe Testa (2012). The Identity of Living Beings, Epigenetics, and the Modesty of Philosophy. Erkenntnis 76 (2):279-298.
    Two problems related to the biological identity of living beings are faced: the who-problem (which are the biological properties making that living being unique and different from the others?); the persistence-problem (what does it take for a living being to persist from a time to another?). They are discussed inside a molecular biology framework, which shows how epigenetics can be a good ground to provide plausible answers. That is, we propose an empirical solution to the who-problem and to the (...)
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  48.  38
    Helena Preester (2013). Merleau-Ponty's Sexual Schema and the Sexual Component of Body Integrity Identity Disorder. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):171-184.
    Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), formerly also known as apotemnophilia, is characterized by a desire for amputation of a healthy limb and is claimed to straddle or to even blur the boundary between psychiatry and neurology. The neurological line of approach, however, is a recent one, and is accompanied or preceded by psychodynamical, behavioural, philosophical, and psychiatric approaches and hypotheses. Next to its confusing history in which the disorder itself has no fixed identity and could not be classified (...)
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  49.  62
    Jeremy Butterfield (2005). On the Persistence of Particles. Foundations of Physics 35 (2):233-269.
    This paper is about the metaphysical debate whether objects persist over time by the selfsame object existing at different times (nowadays called “endurance” by metaphysicians), or by different temporal parts, or stages, existing at different times (called “perdurance”). I aim to illuminate the debate by using some elementary kinematics and real analysis: resources which metaphysicians have, surprisingly, not availed themselves of. There are two main results, which are of interest to both endurantists and perdurantists. (1) I describe a precise formal (...)
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  50.  8
    Anne Barraquier (2013). A Group Identity Analysis of Organizations and Their Stakeholders: Porosity of Identity and Mobility of Attributes. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 115 (1):45-62.
    I propose an ethnographic study on the incremental transformation of identity. Through an analysis of managerial perceptions of stakeholder influence, I suggest that identity is adaptive rather than enduring and that, to explain adaptive identity, group identity is more appropriate than an organizational identity perspective. The case study uses qualitative data collected in organizations manufacturing flavors and fragrances for the large consumer goods industries. The analysis reveals that attributes shared with clannish stakeholders gradually replace attributes (...)
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