This article presents critical psychology in some new light. First, it presents the history of US critical psychology in terms of the overall foundation of its critique (identity-based, ideologically-based, and epistemologically-based). Second, it broadens the population that can be called critical psychologists. The argument is made to include: (1) philosophers of language, science, and mind critical of psychology’s foundational assumptions, conceptions, and methods of inquiry; and (2) non-professional, ordinary people who live their lives (...) critical of psychology by eschewing mainstream approaches and taking alternative routes to getting help with their emotional and physical pain, or the education of their children. Third, the article discusses ontology-based critique through the example of the practical-critical theory/practice of social therapy. (shrink)

Sullivan describes the working of his book as "an elaboration" of its title. He thoroughly develops his meaning of "critical psychology" and demonstrates its relationship to the personal world. His bottom line: psychology is extraordinarily relevant to the current workings of society. Having developed a critical pedagogy for the interpretation of the personal world, Sullivan closes with concrete examples of how critical psychology addresses applied problems and suggests its productive application to any area or (...) discipline. (shrink)

Moral and legal notions engaged in clinical ethics should not only possess analytic clarity but a sound basis in empirical findings. The latter condition brings into question the expansion of the mature minor exception. The mature minor exception in the healthcare law of the United States has served to enable those under the legal age to consent to medical treatment. Although originally developed primarily for minors in emergency or quasi-emergency need for health care, it was expanded especially from the 1970s (...) in order to cover unemancipated minors older than 14 years. This expansion initially appeared plausible, given psychological data that showed the intellectual capacity of minors over 14 to recognize the causal connection between their choices and the consequences of their choices. However, subsequent psychological studies have shown that minors generally fail to have realistic affective and evaluative appreciations of the consequences of their decisions, because they tend to over-emphasize short-term benefits and underestimate long-term risks. Also, unlike most decisionmakers over 21, the decisions of minors are more often marked by the lack of adequate impulse control, all of which is reflected in the far higher involvement of adolescents in acts of violence, intentional injury, and serious automobile accidents. These effects are more evident in circumstances that elicit elevated affective responses. The advent of brain imaging has allowed the actual visualization of qualitative differences between how minors versus persons over the age of 21 generally assess risks and benefits and make decisions. In the case of most under the age of 21, subcortical systems fail adequately to be checked by the prefrontal systems that are involved in adult executive decisions. The neuroanatomical and psychological model developed by Casey, Jones, and Summerville offers an empirical insight into the qualitative differences in the neuroanatomical and neuropsychological bases of adolescent versus adult decision making. These and other data, as well as developing law bearing on the culpability of juvenile criminal offenders, argue for critically re-evaluating the expansion of the mature minor exception with regard to medical decision making, as well as in support of a rebuttable presumption in favor of treating minors as immature decisionmakers. The clinical ethics of adolescent medical decision making will need foundationally to be reconsidered. (shrink)

Introduction: The politics of religious experience -- The ethics of knowledge in the human sciences -- The ethical veil of the knowledge economy -- Binary knowledge and the protected category -- Economic formations of psychology and religion -- Religion, politics, and psychoanalysis -- Maslow's economy of religious experience -- Cognitive capital and the codification of religion -- Conclusion: Critique and the ethics of not-knowing.

The recent turn to discursive psychology has prompted an increasing interest in the work of Michel Foucault, particularly with relation to debates on the possibility and nature of ‘discourse analysis’. This variant of discourse analysis has generally emphasized the utility of Foucauldian insights in critiquing existent psychological practices as a manifestation of the proliferation of disciplinary forms in Western society. This utility may have been dramatically over-stated. Key concepts such as discursive practices and power are inextricably linked to theoretical (...) frameworks that radically resist any ad hoc importation into critical practice. Furthermore, they may be antithetical to the kind of reflexive critique promulgated by critical psychology itself. However, the later Foucault’s partial retreat from the disciplinary containment of subjectivity only promises to trap critical psychology in the agency/structure hiatus that has so bedevilled 20th-century sociological theory. Foucauldian critical psychology may be a dead end. (shrink)

The essay attempts to contextualize the German-Scandinavian tradition of Critical Psychology (GSCP) that bases on Cultural-Historical Activity Theory in today's critical psychologies. It is argued that adding to a psychology and ideology critique the positive dimension of ”foundational” theory is important to counteract the currently prevailing “negative” ideology of liberalism. It is also claimed that an ”instrumental” version of critical psychology, which takes up elements from psychology for tactical purposes will remain dependent on (...) the given discipline of psychology and unable to reflect on its own subject position. GSCP is then rendered as developing the Marxist ontology of social practice (rather than its utopianism) toward a concept of a subjectivity constituted in social practice but with the criteria of action potency and productive needs on the part of the individual. It is suggested that this approach solves important problems in contemporary critical psychology. Finally, it is described how GSCP, too, might grow from the encounter, by developing a theory of collective subjectivity to include – us. (shrink)

Brazil has one of the highest levels of economic disparity in the world. The educational system plays a large role in this reality, acting as a mechanism of social exclusion. Neoliberalism has resulted in the commodification of education, empowering private schools while undermining the public system. This has created a vicious cycle, whereby educational inequality reflects and reinforces social inequality. Such a system violates the rights of children not lucky enough to be born into wealth – the right to equal (...) education; to equal opportunity; and equal treatment. From within this context, we propose a model, dubbed The Eagle’s Flight, for psychological intervention in public schools. This will form an extension of our research group’s Psychosocial Assessment and Intervention – Prevention, Community and Liberation, which has been an on-going project for the past fourteen years. The intervention model advocates monitoring child development from a critical, social and historical perspective, focusing on how school and community affect everyday life. The analysis will be carried out via the daily immersion of psychologists in the public school setting, who pay attention to key aspects which include various expressions of violence, financial difficulties related to unemployment, informal employment or drug dealing, poor access to health services, and the developmental impact of factors such as poverty. Based on Paulo Freire's Emancipatory Education Proposal and Ignacio Martín-Baró’s Liberation Psychology, intervention in school and community must be an interdisciplinary procedure, employing professionals from a range of disciplines involved in the study of child development. The various subjects’ perspectives seek to provide support for everyday problems and solutions, whilst breaking down the hegemonic model of psychological practice that considers the child and family as responsible for their problems. A concrete example of this critical psychosocial intervention model is presented. (shrink)

Chapter I. Phenomenology and psychology -- chapter II. The phenomenological concept of consciousness-the concept of interntionality and its relevance for psychology -- chapter III. Behaviourism and phenomenology -- chapter IV. Phenomenology and Gestalt psychology -- chapter V. Sartre's constribution to phenomenological psychology -- chapter VI. Max Scheler on the nature of sympathy -- chapter VII. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological psychology -- chapter VIII. A concluding assessment of phenomenological psychology.

Volume 1. The Origins of psychology and the study of consciousness -- Volume 2. Cognitive and neuropsychological approaches to the study of consciousness Part 1 -- Volume 3. Cognitive and neuropsychological approaches to the study of consciousness Part 2 -- Volume 4. New directions: psychogenesis, transformations of consciousness and non-reductive, integrative theories.

Critical thinking always involves logical and metacognitive skills. However, different modes of thinking critically with regard to psychology evince diverse sensibilities, that is, different ways of envisioning what might be wrong with a project or approach and how it could be improved. Fostering critical thinking thus is about developing distinctive modes of responsiveness and discernment, of which there can be more than one type. Literature on critical thinking for psychologists can be parsed into several ideal types. (...) Critical-thinking-in-psychology texts display a sensibility that accords great legitimacy and status to forms of psychological inquiry that emulate a certain vision of the natural sciences, as well as what Max Weber called formal rationality. Texts that advocate “critical thinking about psychology” or identify themselves as “critical psychology” all argue that psychologists need to analyze and challenge fundamental assumptions that usually go unquestioned in the conventional literature, but they also diverge significantly from one another. They generally embody one or more of four distinctive sensibilities: experiential, relational, emancipatory-activist, or emancipatory-ironic. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

One of the most important aspects of Grice’s theory of conversation is the drawing of a borderline between what is said and what is implic- ated. Grice’s views concerning this borderline have been strongly and influentially criticised by relevance theorists. In particular, it has become increasingly widely accepted that Grice’s notion of what is said is too lim- ited, and that pragmatics has a far larger role to play in determining what is said than Grice would have allowed. (See for (...) example Bezuidenhuit 1996; Blakemore 1987; Carston 1991; Recanati 1991, 1993, 2001; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Wilson and Sperber 1981.) In this paper, I argue that the rejection of Grice has moved too swiftly, as a key line of objection which has led to this rejection is flawed. The flaw, we will see, is that relevance theorists rely on a misunderstanding of Grice’s project in his theory of conversation. I am not arguing that Grice’s versions of saying and implicating are right in all details, but simply that certain widespread reasons for rejecting his theory are based on misconceptions. (shrink)

In line with the British Psychological Society's recent recommendations for teaching the history of psychology, this comprehensive undergraduate textbook emphasizes the philosophical, cultural and social elements that influenced psychology's development. The authors demonstrate that psychology is both a human (e.g. psychoanalytic or phenomenological) and natural (e.g. cognitive) science, exploring broad social-historical and philosophical themes such as the role of diverse cultures and women in psychology and the complex relationship between objectivity and subjectivity in the development of (...) psychological knowledge. The result is a fresh and balanced perspective on what has traditionally been viewed as the collected achievements of a few 'great men'. With a variety of learning features, including case studies, study questions, thought experiments and a glossary, this new textbook encourages students to critically engage with chapter material and analyze themes and topics within a social, historical and philosophical framework. (shrink)

It is often implied, and sometimes explicitly asserted, that folk psychology is best understood as a kind of predictive device. The key contention of this widely held view is that people apply folk-psychological concepts because the application of these concepts enables them to predict future behavior. If we know what an agent believes, desires, intends, etc., we can make a pretty good guess about what he or she will do next. It seems to me that this picture is not (...) quite right. In a series of recent papers, my colleagues and I have presented data that suggests that moral considerations actually play an important role in folk psychology (Knobe 2003a; 2003b; 2004; Knobe & Burra forthcoming; Knobe & Mendlow forthcoming). These findings do not sit well with the view according to which folk psychology is best understood as a predictive device. It appears that folk psychology might be better understood as a kind of multi-purpose tool. It is used not only in making predictive judgments but also in making moral judgments, and both of these uses appear to have shaped the fundamental competencies that underlie it. One of the most important forms of evidence in this debate comes from studies of the distinction people draw between intentional and unintentional behavior. These studies indicate that people’s intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally can be influenced by their beliefs about the moral status of the behavior.. (shrink)

The discipline of psychology has been under-represented in the critical realist account of the relationship between structure and agency. In this paper a critical realist perspective of educational...

ABSTRACT The discipline of psychology has been under-represented in the critical realist account of the relationship between structure and agency. In this paper a critical realist perspective of educational psychology research focuses on the psychological analysis of the individual and what might be considered as ‘real' and having causal power. Bhaskar's criteria for an entity to be ontologically real are applied to the psychological entity of self-efficacy in the context of a typical piece of classroom teacher-pupil (...) interaction. The role of self-efficacy alongside other psychological, social and cultural entities is presented as a causal mechanism for the generation of Archer’s internal conversation which leads to agency. Self-efficacy is further examined in relation to criteria of ontological depth and emergence. This perspective creates the basis for a consistent ontological framework across educational psychology and that of the social sciences and a sound basis for interdisciplinary research and theory development. (shrink)

v. 1. Representation and mind -- v. 2 The organization of the mind -- v. 3. Special topics: language, thought, and belief -- v. 4. Special topics: consciousness, happiness, and free will.

This book presents a remarkable diversity of contemporary opinions on the prospects of addressing philosophical topics from a psychological perspective. It considers the history and philosophical merits of psychologism, and looks systematically at psychologism in phenomenology, cognitive science, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, philosophical semantics, and artificial intelligence.

The discipline of psychology has been poorly represented in critical realist texts to date. This is despite Bhaskar’s use of psychoanalytical concepts to underpin his concept of the dialectic. By comparison, other aspects of social science, such as sociology and economics, have a well-established body of critical realist texts. The original approach to psychoanalysis was analogous to the critical realist ontological-axiological chain. It moved from an ontological problem to an axiological solution. Freud’s eagerness to reframe psychoanalysis (...) within a scientistic, objective framework was perhaps due in part to the difficulties that he faced as European Jew in the fin-de-siècle. The application of the critical realist explanatory critique can contribute to our understanding of how and why the fragmentation of Freud’s legacies emerged. Critical realists should avoid the assumption that psychoanalysis is a unitary body of knowledge; as such, they should consider its various legacies separately. (shrink)

Jahoda (2012) criticizes discursive social psychology (DSP) on several different grounds; specifically, he argues that DSP has opaque methodological procedures, is of questionable scientific merit, involves over-interpretation of its data, and implicitly claims its findings to be universal rather than contextually specific. We challenge these criticisms by arguing that observational studies of the kind typical within DSP research have a perfectly valid place within a scientific social psychology, that the interpretations made by DSP researchers should be seen in (...) the context of a temporally extended research process in which they are subject to criticism and potential replication, and that Jahoda is himself guilty of over-interpretation by inferring claims of universality when such an inference is not warranted by the data (i.e. the qualitative content of the sample of research papers considered by Jahoda). (shrink)

Yanchar, Slife, and their colleagues have described how mainstream psychology's notion of critical thinking has largely been conceived of as “scientific analytic reasoning” or “method-centered critical thinking.” We extend here their analysis and critique, arguing that some version of the one-sided instrumentalism and confusion about tacit values that characterize scientistic approaches to inquiry also color phenomenological, critical theoretical, and social constructionist viewpoints. We suggest that hermeneutic/dialogical conceptions of inquiry, including the idea of social theory as itself (...) a form of ethically motivated human practice, give a fuller account of critical thinking in the social disciplines. (shrink)

Good scientific research depends on critical thinking at least as much as factual knowledge; psychology is no exception to this rule. And yet, despite the importance of critical thinking, psychology students are rarely taught how to think critically about the theories, methods, and concepts they must use. This book shows students and researchers how to think critically about key topics such as experimental research, statistical inference, case studies, logical fallacies, and ethical judgments. Using updated research findings (...) and new insights, this volume provides a comprehensive overview of what critical thinking is and how to teach it in psychology. Written by leading experts in critical thinking in psychology, each chapter contains useful pedagogical features, such as critical-thinking questions, brief summaries, and definitions of key terms. It also supplies descriptions of each chapter author's critical-thinking experience, which evidences how critical thinking has made a difference to facilitating career development. (shrink)

This is a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London. As the collection forms part of a Critical Concepts in Psychology series, this selection of major works focuses mainly on works that have a direct psychological relevance. From the mid 19th Century onwards, psychology began to separate itself from philosophy, and the development of psychological thought about consciousness links intimately to the development of psychology itself. In order to trace this development, the (...) four volumes of this collection follow a rough, historical sequence. Volume 1 deals with The Origins of Psychology and the Study of Consciousness. Volumes 2 and 3 deal with contemporary Cognitive and Neuropsychological Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. And Volume 4 focuses mainly on New Directions: Psychogenesis, Transformations of Consciousness and Non-reductive, Integrative Theories, which deal with issues likely to expand current mainstream thought in potentially novel, and, sometimes, challenging directions. The printed, 4-Volume collection presents 89 major readings (or salient extracts from major readings) drawn from the entire field of Consciousness Studies, along with comprehensive introductions to each volume and an extensive index. Further details, along with extensive supporting material are provided in four online Companions to the printed collection (one Companion for each Volume) listed separately in this Archive. (shrink)

Ragnar Rommetveit University of Oslo Let me start this introduction to Professor O'Connell's Critical essays on language use and psychology with some reflections on psychologists and crabs. It so happens that the first professor of psychology in Norway had the middle name Krabbe ("Crab") His full name was Harald Krabbe Schjelderup. Hence, the crab became our symbol for the psychologist. For many years a "crab feast" was held every autumn in Oslo in order to celebrate the material (...) union of crabs and psychologists and ponder (symbolically and metaphorically) their shared fate. A comparison between the predicament of the crab and that of the modern psychologist may indeed be illuminating, once we make certain assumptions about their unique epistemic missions and systematically explore the severe constraints on their heroic search for knowledge. The crab is ordained to unravel the mysteries of the ocean, yet doomed to crawl sidewise on the is most of the time mollusks and bottom. His catch, alas, cadavers of sea creatures, and he cannot help envying the fish swimming freely above him. The psychologist's mission is to unravel the mysteries of His obligation to seek insight into essential the human soul. (shrink)

Abstract. Don Browning's career involved a deep exploration into the frequently hidden philosophical assumptions buried in various forms of psychotherapeutic healing. These healing methodologies were based on metaphors and metaphysical assumptions about both the meaning of human fulfillment and the ultimate context of our lives. All too easily, psychological theories put forward philosophical anthropologies while claiming to be operating within a modest, empirical approach. Browning does not fault or criticize these psychotherapeutic enterprises for making such claims because he thinks these (...) claims are implicit in all discussions of psychological health. But he does fault these methodologies for not being more forthcoming about their shift from a narrow empirical investigation to a broad-ranging philosophical and even quasireligious orientation. Browning can be described as a “horizon analyst” who constantly pulled back the curtains and helped us see the deeper symbols, images, and metaphysical assumptions behind our psychological investigations. (shrink)

This research aims to read psychological states through Islamic knowledge that includes the method of hadith criticism. Because, in the hadith studies, we understand that the critic makes evaluations in the field of cognitive psychology. The implementations of these scientific rules related to the science of cognitive psychology, which isThis research deals with reading the psychological states through Islamic knowledge that includes the method of hadith criticism. Because, in the hadith studies, we understand that the critic makes evaluations (...) in the field of cognitive psychology even though he or she doesn’t use psychological terms. The implementations of these scientific rules related to the science of cognitive psychology, which is used to accept or reject hadiths, reveals that there is a similarity between these two sciences because their subject is human knowledge. Scholars of both sciences were compared in terms of cognitive processes such as attention, memorization, memory and measurement tests, and some subjects related to human psychology, which are the focus of these processes, such as their abilities, motivations and the imbalances that affect them. After that, examples from the studies of the hadith scholars and researchers in the science of psychology were presented in the method of criticism in order to determine the points where they converged and diverged. As a result, although they differ in terms of starting point and result, it was concluded that there is a partial similarity between the two sciences in terms of subjects related to mental actions. The condition for the Zabt of the Thiqa definition of hadith critics includes the meaning of attention that psychologists talk about. However, the hadith scholars were more selective in this regard due to the Shari’a reasons such as good deeds and sins. In cognitive psychology, researchers have proven that people’s mental abilities play a role in attention and focus. The attention of hadith critics, who made comparisons among the narrators, concentrated on this point in order to distinguish the acceptable one from the others. used to accept or reject hadiths, reveals that there is a close relationship between these two sciences because their subject is human knowledge. Scholars of both sciences were compared in terms of cognitive processes such as attention, memorization, memory and measurement tests, and some subjects related to human psychology, which are the focus of these processes, such as their abilities, motivations and the imbalances that affect them. After that, examples from the studies of the hadith scholars and researchers in the science of psychology were presented in the method of criticism in order to determine the points where they converged and diverged. As a result, although they differ in terms of starting point and result, it was concluded that there is a partial similarity between the two sciences in terms of subjects related to mental actions. The condition for the Zabt of the Thiqa definition of hadith critics includes the meaning of attention that psychologists talk about. However, the hadith scholars were more selective in this regard due to the Shari’a reasons such as good deeds and sins. In cognitive psychology, researchers have proven that people’s mental abilities play a role in attention and focus. The attention of hadith critics, who made comparisons among the narrators, concentrated on this point in order to distinguish the acceptable one from the others. (shrink)

(2009). Practicing Critical Thinking in an Educational Psychology Classroom: Reflections from a Cultural-Historical Perspective. Educational Studies: Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 377-391.

Psychology does not get rid of its problems by taking experience at its face value, for it is the province of psychology to study problems arising when experience is taken at its face value. Only in actual lived experience is concrete reality to be found in its fullest sense. All reality which is experience includes attributes both spatial and temporal. Objects cannot b7 considered in the first place apart from such attributes. Physical objects are perceived as parts of (...) a total situation and there is merit in the suggestion of the Gestalt psychologists. Always much will be found in the perceptum which will not correspond with the physical object, since the physical object is only an abstract. The effort to control our environment has led to a sophisticated attitude toward perceptual experience, which is said in psychological circles to lead to the stimulus error. Those who have seen children gradually grow into a realization of the unreliability of perception—for purposes of muscular manipulation—will understand what is meant. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The historical background of the contrasting traditions of experimental and discursive social psychologies is outlined, and two illustrative experimental and discursive studies are described in detail and critically scrutinised. Among the major weaknesses of the experimental approach is an increasing tendency towards an a-social computer-mediated procedure and a decontextualised setting. While experimental methods and results are clearly set out, the discursive research presents only small and highly selected fragments of masses of data. Hence the actual ways in which findings are (...) arrived at remain largely obscure. Experimental, and to a lesser extent discursive social psychology, make implicit and unjustified claims for universality. The scientific pretensions of mainstream social psychology texts are also questioned in a brief discussion of the implications of these critiques for social psychology at large. (shrink)

The topic of this thesis is how different phenomena, commonly regarded as "psychological" or "mental", are or can be apprehended in the first person. The aim is to show that a number of influential texts of contemporary philosophy display a particular type of oversight on this topic. The texts in question display, I argue, an insufficient appreciation of the case for holding that "non-qualitative" psychological phenomena are apprehended in an exclusive way in the first person. To make this case, I (...) begin by isolating a limited class of phenomena. The class, which is called the class of 'occurrent psychological doings', includes performances such as searching for a flower and adding two numbers. In chapter 2, I submit a case for holding that it is logically necessary that if an agent is performing an occurrent psychological doing, then he has a certain apprehension of what he is doing. This claim is called The First-Person Thesis'. In chapter 3, I submit a case for holding that the type of apprehension mentioned in The First-Person Thesis is logically exclusive: it is an apprehension which an agent who is doing so-and-so can have of the fact that he is doing so-and-so but which it is logically impossible for someone else to have of this fact. This claim is called 'The Exclusiveness Thesis'. In chapters 4 and 5, the two theses are used in critical discussions of some influential texts of contemporary philosophy. In chapter 4,1 examine two arguments of Wittgenstein's to the effect that one may perform some selected actions without having a particular type of "experience", or "sensation". I try to show that these arguments, while valid, have rather limited implications. I use The First-Person Thesis to illustrate the limited scope of these implications. I then try to show that the limited significance of the arguments has often been obscured by commentators of Wittgenstein. In chapter 5, I examine a position commonly held in contemporary philosophy of mind, and often associated with Nagel. The position is that "qualitative" phenomena such as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations are, because of the appearances they present in the first person, particularly difficult to explain in physical terms. An implication of this view is the claim that other phenomena do not present appearances to subjects in the allegedly problematic way that "qualitative" phenomena do. The First-Person Thesis and The Exclusiveness Thesis are used to argue that this position, as exemplified in the writings of McGinn and Chalmers, involve controversial assumptions for which insufficient justification is provided. (shrink)

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian (...) moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view. (shrink)

I will present what I think is the best argument for the version of psychological egoism under consideration here, and explain why I think even that argument fails to go much distance toward establishing it. It turns out, though, I will caution, that defeating that argument means only that we are right to reject psychological egoism as extremely implausible; it does not entitle us to claim to have shown the thesis itself to be either confused and senseless or false. However, (...) my main goal in this paper is neither to refute nor to defend psychological egoism, but rather to show how it, even in a very strong form, manages to survive a number of common objections both to itself and to arguments meant to support it. (shrink)

Introducing the concept of tradition and its importance for critical-intellectual development, traditions of radical philosophy and psychology are presented. Emphasizing the role of Marxist and post-Marxist thought in various critical approaches, critical programs are presented as theoretical endeavors that share the critique of ideology. These approaches examine knowledge production and knowledge biases in the sciences and psychology from the perspective of social categories or in terms of power. It is suggested that critical thinking in (...) psychology could benefit from incorporating categories from this tradition. Consequences for critical thinking in psychology are discussed. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It (...) relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce. (shrink)