Online research in philosophy

Abstract Does Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi ? This identification has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will's dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical case; Scotus (...) suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi . Accordingly, it can be concluded that: ( i ) when considering the will in its real condition, both affections belong to the will's free appetite; ( ii ) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; ( iii ) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain Scotus’s transformation of the Aristotelian view on the difference between rational and irrational potencies. In Metaphysics 9, 2 Aristotle establishes the distinction between rational and nonrational powers and explains their difference in terms of their being ad opposita and ad unum, respectively. In his interpretation Scotus concludes that the most basic division between active principles is the difference between nature and will, rather than the difference between univocal and equivocal agents. Thus, the (...) Aristotelian distinction between rational and non-rational powers has now become a distinction between nature and will. And the criterion for such a difference no longer lies in the contrast between ad unum and ad opposita, but rather is based on the twofold way the potencies can elicit their acts. Therefore, according to Scotus, the key difference between nature and will is the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. (shrink)